The Ship Model Forum

Those early U-Boats attacked on the surface when they could. Being slow underwater, they could not chase a contact down while submerged. The torpedos were effective enough as early sinkings of British Cruisers proved.
I've read any number of books about the WWI U-Boats. They found it easy to chase down Merchantmen on the surface and take them in the manner of a surface raider. Torpedoes were used as a last resort or if Escort vessels were around.
But the main question about attacking the BEF ships. Well, they were pretty easy to protect as the Channel conflict proved throughout the long war. It was the lone Merchant vessel that a U-boat could snap up with ease. So I would have sent my U-Boats to the Channel to do what damage they could. But no way would it be decisive in any form.
Operational conditions for U-Boats in Channel waters seemed to pose no real problems. They came and went through the Dover Starights almost at will for the greater part of the war. It resulted in losses, but only near the end of the war did the straights become really deadly. Lots of obstacles to overcome in the mine and net barrages and asw ships, but mostly the U-Boats of the smaller UC/UB got through. Throughout the war they didn't mention the Channel from Dover to Lands End as being a difficult operational area due to currents or depth. Often the currents were used to carry the boats out of trouble and help with the Dover Straights passage as well. The shallow dept saved numerous U-Boats who when damaged could settle on the bottom and get things back in order with damage control. In deep water they would have been lost.
The Germans were just so badly placed, they had no easy or obvious course of action against a superior fleet in it's well placed blockading positions. As I said before, bombarding the East Coast and hoping for units of the Grand Fleet to be hit by U-Boats and caught by a larger German force was about all their options. A raid against the 10 Cruiser Squadron enforcing the blockade was worth a try with a BC or two after Jutland proved the hopelessness of a general fleet action.

Bob B.

Laurence, Andy,

Thanks for your replies. It certainly was difficult to achieve surprise with a coal-fired fleet. Even the process of coaling raises a visible cloud.

Night attacks with U-boats in the channel would have been most effective. If what I have read is correct, most U-boat torpedo attacks took place while on the surface, augmented by deck gunfire.

Dropping the bridge would bottle any ships at Rosyth up in the harbor. Perhaps the bridge supports in the water would be vulnerable to torpedo attack.

Andy, I am a fan of bridges and have long considered this one perhaps the most graceful of any of its type. It would be a shame to destroy such a structure.

[quote="Lesforan"]Pummel that big, beautiful railway bridge that spans the harbor entrance with heavy shellfire and drop it into the channel. That would slow it down for awhile![/quote]

[img]http://www.worldtour-of-scotland.com/tour/images-tour/2008-forth-rail-bridge.jpg[/img]

That bridge, only a few miles away from me here**, was considered a potential threat by the vessels based at Rosyth during the war. Rosyth is situated about a mile upstream of the bridge on the north bank of the Forth.

In reality, it'd be like shooting at one of those cage masts recently mentioned in another thread. You'd achieve next-to-nothing before half a dozen angry battlecruisers and supporting smaller vessels popped out to see what was up.
[i]And[/i] you'd have to get both in-stream supports in order to block the Firth. Taking one out would probably leave the other cantilever still standing.

Andy

** I'm not a big bridge fan, but it's gorgeous in photos and even better in real life. A stunning piece of 19th century metalwork!

To be able to sortie the HSF without the Admiralty knowing would be very difficult to achieve.

One must always remember the ships were coal fired then and to get a whole fleet ready to sail is a very large logistical undertaking even in WW2. To ammunition and coal every ship in the fleet, to organise standing fleet orders and navigation plans etc meant that to get a whole fleet to sea in a kind of rush/surprise effort, as some suggest, is very difficult to accomplish.

Therefore I think you can discard this course of action. Furthermore the Admiralty broke the German HSF codes early in WWI (can't remember preciely when) but generally they usually had fair warning before 'anything was afoot' at sea.

The HSF's best chnace is to use the small number of U-boats it has at its disposal and send them into the channel at dusk or sunlight and prey on the cross-channel shipping. Probably also pull them out into more open waters at night and to then go in again if conditions are favourable. Keep repeating this until all torpedoes & shells are used up and then return to Wilhelmshaven etc.

The weakness in this is Germany doesn't really have any forms of intelliengence of what convoys are where, whats the escort composition etc so they kind of enter the English Channel blind and hope for the best. Perhaps they can use Zeppelins?, but I doubt they have more than a few that could fly out there and report back with wireless in 1914.

A strength though is if this is in 1914, anti-submarine netting is not really in place; there is a lack of destroyers and co-ordination on the Allied side. To my knowledge the RN convoyed just about everything across the channel from the beginning of the War so if a U-boat preys on shipping and is on the surface it does run the risk of getting detected and possibly nailed.

Question if I may, as WWI U-boats are not my thing, how effective were 1914 U-boats at attacking shipping with their torpedoes only?

To Les, the bridge I think you mean is the Firth of Forth Railway bridge which crosses the Firth of Forth and is in Scotland. If you were to shell it and bring it down it would land in those waters and not in the English Channel which is a few hundred miles to the South.

Also if you study what the HSF was trying to achieve before Jutland they were trying to engage Beatty's battlecruiser force on its own out of Rosyth, before Jellicoe from Scapa could come South and intervene. The idea was to then whittle down the Royal Navy's superiority in numbers of its Grand Fleet and therefore gain parity in numbers. This in turn would make the Royal Navy seriously less confident to then engage in a large fleet battle as they could potentially lose the war at sea in an afternoon etc etc.

Destroying Dover as a dockyard, really wouldn't cause much of a strategic advantage. Remember what the real point for the U-boats is, is to sink those fat juicy merchants crammed with the BEF and its equipment. This would make the initial push onto Paris in 1914 perhaps easier for the Germans as they would be facing a weaker British land force and only the French Army which would be further stretched to defend the points which the British may have been allocated.

Also remember to protect the Channel there is also elements of the French Fleet to contend with.

Pardon me for diving into this one late, but I've been off working for the past three months.

An excellent question to consider. I have to agree with Werner and Chuck on their initial assessments. If the RN was dispersed among several ports, the opportunity was there to destroy it in detail.

The main problem, as I see it, would be in being able to sortie the HSF without its being detected by the British.

Going off the top of my head (correct me if I'm wrong), the RN fleet was distributed on the east coast of Britian in three locations: Scapa Flow (main fleet anchorage); Roseyth (battlecruisers); Dover (covering force for cross-channel operations).

A first strike should have been directed at Roseyth. This would have neutralized the RN's fastest response force. You wouldn't have to breach the sub nets or even attack the BC's directly. Pummel that big, beautiful railway bridge that spans the harbor entrance with heavy shellfire and drop it into the channel. That would slow it down for awhile!

Move on down to Dover and put the hurt on the covering fleet and docks.

Then be prepared to fight the remainder of the Grand Fleet, which would be storming out of Scapa flow like a nestful of angry hornets. Put the BB's in the van: heaviest units vs. heaviest units.

Use Heligoland (home of some of my ancestors) as a base for raids against the North sea fishing fleet. This while the U-boats are squeezing off British food supplies from the New World and Empire.

[quote="bengtsson"][quote="Dustermaker"]i would have attacked the British Expeditionary force on its way to France......thats just me though.[/quote]

I would have sent every operational U-boat in the German Navy to try and disrupt the Channel crossings of the BEF. If you mean a surface raid or general fleet attack against the Channel Traffic, then I doubt they would accomplish much. Wireless signals would have the entire shipping lanes empty by the time a surface force arrived and getting back home through the Dover Straights after chasing around an empty channel would have resulted in a general fleet action on very unfavorable terms.

Bob B.[/quote]


At the beginning of the war there were few Uboats. English channel is in any case not a good place for U boat operation due to strong currents, possibility of saturation levels of surface patrol.

[quote="Dustermaker"]i would have attacked the British Expeditionary force on its way to France......thats just me though.[/quote]

I would have sent every operational U-boat in the German Navy to try and disrupt the Channel crossings of the BEF. If you mean a surface raid or general fleet attack against the Channel Traffic, then I doubt they would accomplish much. Wireless signals would have the entire shipping lanes empty by the time a surface force arrived and getting back home through the Dover Straights after chasing around an empty channel would have resulted in a general fleet action on very unfavorable terms.

Bob B.

Between August 1914 and Dogger Bank there was a crisis of confidence in the British Military institutions. That was the one time a major naval thrust could have had an impact out of all proportions to the military investment.

i would have attacked the British Expeditionary force on its way to France......thats just me though.

[quote="Laurence Batchelor"]Bob I wonder if that book is the inspiration of a warfilm I have of the same name.

'The Big Blockade' but its mainly about the early years of WW2.

To answer your question:

[i]"would it have been worth it, in 1915-16, to try and force the war economy of Germany into collapse"? [/i]

It may have been, but not until 1917-18 when the German economy was really finding it difficult to cope with an acculumation over the years of the global blockade.
The earlier date I think would have difficult to implement so soon in the war.
If you take this major strategical change then Gallipoli will have to be postponed or cancelled also.

Though in hindsight, stopping the ore traffic from Sweden may have better a better course of action.

What ships would be used for such a blockade in 1915-16? submarines? armed merchant trawlers?
Surely after a few sinkings the Germans would start to implement coastal convoys for this vital war cargo, that would esculate things and then what? send cruisers in or the big boys?

Question back at you chaps, Whats stopping a new railroad system being implemented in WWI to take the ore to a southern Scandinavian port?
Thus bypassing any British blockade off the coast of Norway.
Apart from the Geography it has to be built through of course!
I'm thinking in wartime, if the needs are there, these things are normally done no matter the cost in men of material.[/quote]

Good questions Laurence. The "Big Blockade" is the history of the 10th cruiser squadron in WWI. This was the collection of Armed Merchant Cruisers the RN fitted out for the blockade lines held throughout the war.
Since the bigger liners could keep the sea much better than old cruisers, they ended up with the job. I haven't seen the movie you mention.
The Swedes had two railheads, one at Narvik and one in the north Baltic. But the Baltic was frozen up for half the year. So Narvik was of prime importance in both World Wars for the German war economy. I think the expense of long haul trains the length of Sweden [it's a long country] made it very expensive to do the journey all by rail, plus at that time I think there were huge gaps in rail system. Even in 1940 it was too difficult a journey as the Germans invaded Northern Norway to get control of Narvik.
The RN made one try at the ore ships in the summer of 1915. The armed trawler "Tenby Castle" was able to take a German ore ship Pallas. Next she took a Swedish ore ship and handed her off to HMS India. After that she chased and sank by gunfire another German Fredrich App. As support the trawler could call upon three RN AMCs on patrol line "G" off the Norwegian coast.
This became such a threat to the German communications that something had to be done about it. U-22 ,amoung other U-boats ,operated against the British Patrols of Norway and was able to sink HMS India. This helped reduce the pressure on Germany's ore traffic.
Norway was a bit pro German. The radio station at Narvik was known to "Jam" RN radio traffic between the Armed Trawlers and AMCs operating against the Ore Trade. It would have meant going inside Norway's territorial waters to close off the trade.
Lots of neutral cargo reached Norway, Sweden and Denmark and thus on to Germany. Britian had to keep track of shipments and ration each nation to s set amount of certain goods and take the rest over and above that.
Had the attacks continued on the Ore Trade, Germany might have had no choice but to try and roll up the patrol line "G". Battlecruiser raid most likely.

Bob B.

Bob I wonder if that book is the inspiration of a warfilm I have of the same name.

'The Big Blockade' but its mainly about the early years of WW2.

To answer your question:

[i]"would it have been worth it, in 1915-16, to try and force the war economy of Germany into collapse"? [/i]

It may have been, but not until 1917-18 when the German economy was really finding it difficult to cope with an acculumation over the years of the global blockade.
The earlier date I think would have difficult to implement so soon in the war.
If you take this major strategical change then Gallipoli will have to be postponed or cancelled also.

Though in hindsight, stopping the ore traffic from Sweden may have better a better course of action.

What ships would be used for such a blockade in 1915-16? submarines? armed merchant trawlers?
Surely after a few sinkings the Germans would start to implement coastal convoys for this vital war cargo, that would esculate things and then what? send cruisers in or the big boys?

Question back at you chaps, Whats stopping a new railroad system being implemented in WWI to take the ore to a southern Scandinavian port?
Thus bypassing any British blockade off the coast of Norway.
Apart from the Geography it has to be built through of course!
I'm thinking in wartime, if the needs are there, these things are normally done no matter the cost in men of material.

Would a close blockade of Narvik have brought Norway into the war on the side of the Central Powers? Basing a detachment of the High Seas Fleet in Bergen or Narvik could have been a negative consequence for Britain.

A book I am reading from 1932 by E. Keble Chatterton called "The Big Blockade" has made me bring this discussion back from the grave.
Although more to the point of Royal Navy strategy, it does point to a big problem for the German High Seas Fleet.
Mr. Chatterton points to the few feeble efforts by the Royal Navy Blockading force to get at the German and neutral ore ships coming down the Norwegian coast from the Narvik railhead for the Swedish iron ore mines.
In short the RN used a patrol line G of three ships plus a couple armed trawlers close in to try and snap up a few ore ships. One was taken by a trawler, but that was about it for the effort. German supplies came on a steady basis. Mr. Chatterton also points out that had the British decided that it was worth the trouble to push Norway into the German camp, but nevertheless keep them isolated by naval blockade, the RN would have forced the High Seas Fleet out to break the blockade of the Narvik ore shipping lanes inside Norwegian waters. It would have been either lose your war economy or fight in the North Sea.
My question, "would it have been worth it, in 1915-16, to try and force the war economy of Germany into collapse"?
Since the German fleet was so inactive, Mr. Chatterton also points out that a determined raid or two by a single German BC willing to sell itself in order to roll up the blockade lines may have been worth the effort, as neutral shipping [the USA] was making efforts to ship to neutrals for overland or Baltic transhipment or direct to Germany large cargos during the 1914-16 period.

Bob B.

Sorry to join the debate late in the day, been busy and not had time to read everything!

Right this could be a biggie!

@ Werner the quote your looking for off the top of my head is something like "Jellicoe was the only man who could loose the war in an afternoon" I think it was Churchill who first said it.

@ Chuck

[i]"Jellicoe very much had that in mind during Jutland. Destroy the Highsea fleet, and Britain would gain much in reputation but little in distance to victory, for Germany would only be slightly weakened. Trafalgar did not defeat Napoleon"[/i]

Jellicoe was always preoccupied with preserving his fleet and not taking undue risk. That is why he turned away at Jutland through fear of a torpedo attack crippling his numerically superior fleet. We must always bear in the mind the sheer weight on this mans shoulders. Under his command he the largest battlefleet ever constructed, the cost in money, in crews, and to maintain it was simply mind boggling.

Being academic Trafalgar did defeat Napolean. It defeated his ambitions of conquests outside of mainland Europe. The defeat of the only other 2 naval superpowers (Spain & France) who could threaten the Royal Navy at sea Britain made sure that for the rest of the Napoleanic war she was safe from invasion and could thus land an army in Portugual and start to push Boney back leading to the freeing of Portugual and then Spain and then ultimately to his defeat. Trafalgar was the first key step in his mainland European defeat.


@ Guest (assume Chuck?)

[i]"I don't think a Britain bereft of her battlefleet would continue the war if at the same time the French are lossing the land war."[/i]

I disagree she has the largest shipbuilding industry in the world at this time and the 2nd strongest economy. Any material losses can be made up quite quickly. Admitively her land army is small and poorly equipped, but she does have all her colonies to depend on which gives her further resources to exploit and also a sense of well being. She could also mobilise a million fighting men in a matter of months as she often did throughout the war. She is also an island nation and faced in vasion and far more dangerous situations in the past, did she ever back away from war? Furthermore I don't think she would ever pull out of the First World War regardless of the losses as well its to unBritish like in character! :big_grin:

[i]"German navy of 1914 showed every indication of being able to do far better against the English than Napoleon's fleet were able to in 1805. Yet even if the High Sea Fleet were to suffer as the French fleet did, it would not be a huge deal. So why did they not try?"[/i]

The Royal Navy still had a whiff of invincibilty about it and respect steeped in 100 years of undisputed dominance of the world's oceans. Remember Nelson defeated a combined Spanish & French Fleet, with a numerically smaller force I might add. At Traflagar it was not just about defeating Bony, it was also about knocking out the only other 2 superpowers at sea. Germany knew to take on Britain in any naval war was a major risk, no matter how well armoured her ships were, no matter how well her gunnery was Britain normally in any naval battle often with numerically inferior forces for 100s of years tended to win. Germany would in order to win would have to buck this trend. Also remember the Kaiser was Queen Victoria's Grandson and he had originally wanted to build great a Navy as mighty and good as the Royal Navy for colonial expansion and worldwide trade it was not to build one to defeat the RN.
He looked to emulate it by following what Mahan had written, Germany wanted worldside trade markets and felt unjust as she was in many ways the more powerful economic power in Europe, why should Britain have access to all the best markets and trade? etc

Only when Germany invaded Belgium and Britain's 1839 Treaty meant she would defend Belgium's neutrality and thus war was declared on 4th August 1914 did that become Germany's naval objective. Of course there was the arms race beforehand but a naval war between both countries was not a given and planning for it was forced on the German high command late in the day. Germany in the end went for an adapted Mahan principle of a fleet in being and tried in vein to pick off small portions of the Grand Fleet in a hope to whittle down the numbers, a very poor naval plan in my book when all things considered.

In terms of what Britain would gain if she defeated the High Seas Fleet early in the war, the most important things she would gain would be International prestige and a greater freedom to disperse some of her maritime forces around the globe for trade protection or to invade other German colonies perhaps? say naval operations in East Africa. She would not have to worry such much about manning a huge fleet for North Sea operations. She would also be able to strangle Germany from naval blockade more quickly as she could operate closer to German waters (it would still take years to accumulate though but the effects could be speeded up perhaps). This could help stir up a greater public outcry in Germany from her populace about food shortages and make it much more a problem for Germany's war leaders.

Remember Germany employed many questionable policy's in WW1, not just naval. Unlike Britain she did NOT mobilize women into the workforce, making munitions of war or to work on the land and make agriculture more productive. Thus freeing up more men for the armed forces to replace losses etc. She was very much in comparison a poorer 'managed economy' in the war probaly due to her ideas for only a short war to capture Paris with her massive army which numerically was greater than any other single power she was up against and better equipped.

Going back to the naval, what Britain & Germany both lacked between 1914-1917 was an agressive enough Admiral willing to take calculated risks. An Admiral who was able to embrace new ideas faster and new tactical doctrines to gain the upper hand in the new industrialised naval war which was becoming more complex.
The war in that early period was too much about 'fleets in being' and 'engage only inferior forces with a good chance of success' etc.
Technology in warships had moved on at such a pace before the war it took many wars years until the man or the service could catch up. Note the late war operations off Zeebrugge or the planned carrier raids on the Zeppelin sheds at Cruxhaven which the armistice scuppered. Things like that were not even contemplated in 1914. By the end of the war one Navy at least had found a way to break the monotiny of the proceeding 3 years, Dogger Bank, Jutland et al aside.

Germany could not really hope to win the naval war against Britian unless she could develope her geographical and thus tactical position better. Her bases on German shores were quite 'hemmed in' and did not offer much freedom of operation from, though Zeppelins did help! I agree an invasion into Norway or some way to gain access to the Mediterranean would have forced the British Admiralty to maintain ships over greater distances in order to cover their dispositions, much like in WW2.

Right written enough now! :heh:

[quote="Werner"]I would have thought the Japanese would have regarded the US role in the Pacific favorably in comparison to the UK's more-or-less permanence in her colonies.[/quote]

On the contrary. Don't forget who "opened" the doors of Japan; who "liberated" the Philippines; who moderated the Russian-Japanese Peace Treaty; who took Guam at the end of WWI; etc etc etc. Although Japan wasn't yet completely hostile to USA they weren't very keen to forget what USA played with them in the past. For Britain, well, they had an Alliance with them and Britain was helping Japan to develop herself a lot. Just being brief...
A few good books on the subject are Paul Kennedy's "Rise and Fall of Great Powers" and Charles Kupchan "Vulnerability of the Empire".

It ought to have been obvious by 1907 that the US was a different kind of colonial power and the Philippines was moving toward self-governance at a fairly brisk (but irregular) pace. I would have thought the Japanese would have regarded the US role in the Pacific favorably in comparison to the UK's more-or-less permanence in her colonies.

[quote="Gernot"]As I understand it, Japan was pretty shocked at the non-renewal of the treaty.[/quote]


Quite true. Here's a quote from a paper I wrote a few years ago:

[quote]An already much delicate situation to the Americans and to the British was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. This alliance was renewed from 10 to 10 years and it was programmed a new meeting somewhere on 1921 by request of the Empire of Japan. The Japanese had clearly turned expansionists, especially due to their intentions over China. The question that it was raised to the Americans was not the fact of having to confront Japan alone in a eventually of a conflict but the possibility of hostilities with the British that, under the alliance ambit, would have to defend Japan's interests. The British were also reticent in relation to the continuity of the alliance. They would have to opt to maintain a strong and polemic alliance with an expansionist country or try an approximation with the United States. The biggest fear was the eventuality of hostilities with Japan and the danger that the British possessions in the Far East like Singapore and Honk Kong could face. For these logistical questions and due to the fact of possessing a huge empire defending such territories were clearly difficult to protect. The solution was the consolidation of a common strategy with the United States, that also possessed interests in the region. In the other side and once again emerged the question of the war debts. Together with the tolerance in naval demobilization such approach to the United States in the Pacific area could eventually led the Americans to forgive the heavy dollars amounts that the British own to them. At last, the solution had to be this exact one. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 was turned obsolete with the acclamation of the Four-Power Washington Treaty, signed by delegations of Japan, United States, Great Britain and France, on the 13th of December 1921. Such treaty substituted the former alliance and established a new common policy in the strategy of these countries to adopt in their possessions and interests in the Pacific. The Japanese, that in fact thought that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as an "obstacle" to their military and territorial expansion, were surprised by the creation of this new treaty and with the British practically staying side by side with the Americans. On long terms, Japan had chosen its enemies. The words of General Itami, military attaché in London, to Malcolm Kennedy, representative of the British War Cabinet, clearly demonstrates the Japanese dissatisfaction related to the laying off of the British:

[i]"I understand your feelings and appreciate them… But you British will find how mistaken you have been. You thing that the Americans will be so pleased that they will cancel your war debts; but they don't, I am sure they won't, and you will lose far more than you gain by giving up one friend to win the favor of another."[/i][/quote]

Well, they were at the learning curve until around 1915-16, I know it well, but I also know about a lot of conflicts when at the same time japs and australians landing on the same island same time, or one party coming late for occupation. And also, the learning curve was quite over by 1914, shipbuilding industry was setup and running, 3 out of 4 Kongos, Ises, Fusos, destroyers, cruisers being built locally. When the war was going well for the allies, the japanese stuck to the treaty as it was profitable for them. Barely losses, no real cost (how many destroyers joined mediterranean fleet? Two? Three? Plus one or two cruisers hunting for raiders....) and large gains..And I suppose if british fleet would be reduced largely (say, a decisive fleet action costed around 10 - 15 dreadnoughts to each germans and british, leaving about 8-10 ships to royal navy... to face remainants of german, plus the fresh italian and austrian fleets in mediterranean) japanese would consider to at least occupy the "unprotected colonies" of singapore, british samoa, etc... They were quite confident in their army after the russo-japanese war...

[quote="PetrOs"]I actually guess, the germans did not need to destroy the royal navy. They should have weakened it to the extent that britain would not be able to protect their colonies and shipping from the 3rd party. As that third party I really see Japan. From what I know, even if japanese were in allied camp (mainly to get a chance to occupy the german colonies like Tsingtao or Marianas...) and to fulfil (quite formally) the british-japanese treaty, they would switch the side quite fast if a chance would open to occupy a lot of british colonies unharmed/../[/quote]

PetrOs, I disagree with you about Japan. Japan relied on the 1904 Treaty to gain influence among the Western powers, and to learn from the undisputed leader of naval powers of the time. Until 1915 or so IIRC they were ordering all large guns from the UK, even though ships were being built in Japan already. Japan was on a serious learning curve, and they were not about to jump off it - they knew very well how far behind their own industry was, and how important the the UK was as an ally. As I understand it, Japan was pretty shocked at the non-renewal of the treaty.

It's my understanding that the British civil population suffered a crisis of confidence in the Government in late 1914 and early 1915 as the ground war stabilized; the Scarborough raid and zeppelin attacks were blown out of all proportion by the press, and the loss of [i]Hogue, Cressy[/i] and [i]Aboukir[/i] was a devastating political blow. If Germany's fleet could have made a credible performance against the Grand Fleet, I think there might have been some political accommodation. Churchill, Kitchener and Fisher may have been out of the Cabinet with interesting consequences.

If the Germans were throwing their weight around in the North Sea, it may have been politically impossible to go on the offensive in Turkey. The ANZAC may have come to Britain as a home guard if invasion looked possible.

Destruction of the Channel Fleet as an early engagement would have crushed Jellicoe's confidence in the power of the Grand Fleet. Look to his demand for the US battleships as compensation for sending a squadron to Dover. If he had to send a much stronger force there to replace a lost Channel Fleet, I think he would stay behind the blockships in Scapa.