by Goodwood » Tue Nov 12, 2013 3:45 pm
Not to be a snob when it comes to pilots/aircrew versus your basic squid, but let's be honest with ourselves. It takes more effort to train someone to drop bombs accurately from the air than it does to train that same person to flick a switch, press a button, or even to work as a team to coordinate a gunshot or missile launch from a surface ship. That may change in future, but for now and in the last eighty years of history, this has been the case.
Regarding my comment about space warfare following the Japanese model, I'm referring to how they planned their war fleet as well as how they intended to surround the Home Islands with buffer zones of other island chains to one side and conquered nations on the other. For the first point, they had a good mix of aircraft carriers delivering effective striking power, but backed up with and supplemented by effective close-in (cruisers, destroyers) and stand-off (battleships and heavy cruisers) surface units. This translates into having the means to project power as well as to hold what they had at the same time. The fact that they lost the war due to boatloads of reasons does not necessarily negate the basic principle of their fleet planning.
For the second point, just imagine if you will that every island and city that the Japanese held was a planet, with island chains and nations constituting star systems. Now imagine that Japan itself is a star system at the center of this territory that the ships of their space navy allow them to deliver armies to conquer these other planets and systems. To go back to the Star Wars paradigm, picture the Japanese main fleet units as Star Destroyers projecting power to those other systems, with their smaller warships as analogous to the corvettes and frigates that the Rebels had. This offers a well-balanced navy that, in theory, should be able to hold a sphere of influence while at the same time rushing a reserve force to any trouble spots.
There are two main reasons why the Japanese model failed when it was put up against the United States Navy that I can think of, which aren't simply based on luck, happenstance, or the fallibility of leadership on both sides, etc. (basically, this is pure theory with the human element expunged for sake of argument). First: the vast disparity of industrial capacity between Japan and the US; even if we'd lost at Midway and hadn't destroyed any of their carriers or, worse, had lost all of ours, we still would have won the war of attrition. Even as the battle was over, we had Essex-class flattops on the ways, and better aircraft in development as well as some of the best training of any navy. A year after Midway, we already had more carriers either completed or in production than any other nation on the globe; the retention of four of their ships would not have made that huge of a difference in the grand scheme of things.
Second: the Japanese model also failed to embrace shifting doctrine and the emergence of new technologies. You are quite right to suggest that the 25mm AAA was crap, but it's more than that. The IJN was late to adopt radar, and even when they did they still used their tried-and-true night-fighting tactics as often as they thought they could get away with it. Advances in gunnery and fire-control were also either ignored or missed out on, and as a result their ability to hit back became increasingly ineffectual. In addition, while they started the war with the world's best crop of naval aviators, they had no system set up to handle attrition. I contend often that the US had the best pilot training in the world during the war because we insisted on sending veteran pilots back to the States to teach new recruits, as well as the fact that the program itself was quite long compared to other nations. The Japanese, by contrast, graduated only about 100 pilots a year, and their standards were exceedingly high, to the point that they began grooming potential pilots as they entered what we consider high school. This system, naturally, went to hell in a handcart once the shooting started. As if that wasn't enough, their reluctance to develop and use new and better aircraft types was also quite a handicap; the Luftwaffe also suffered from this almost institutional setback.
To sum it all up, the Japanese model of zone defense using strategic points of contention and mobile striking forces remains sound, it's just the execution�and their lack of depth�that left them with the short end of the stick. But this is all just the opinion of a sci-fi nut and amateur historian.

Not to be a snob when it comes to pilots/aircrew versus your basic squid, but let's be honest with ourselves. It takes more effort to train someone to drop bombs accurately from the air than it does to train that same person to flick a switch, press a button, or even to work as a team to coordinate a gunshot or missile launch from a surface ship. That may change in future, but for now and in the last eighty years of history, this has been the case.
Regarding my comment about space warfare following the Japanese model, I'm referring to how they planned their war fleet as well as how they intended to surround the Home Islands with buffer zones of other island chains to one side and conquered nations on the other. For the first point, they had a good mix of aircraft carriers delivering effective striking power, but backed up with and supplemented by effective close-in (cruisers, destroyers) and stand-off (battleships and heavy cruisers) surface units. This translates into having the means to project power as well as to hold what they had at the same time. The fact that they lost the war due to boatloads of reasons does not necessarily negate the basic principle of their fleet planning.
For the second point, just imagine if you will that every island and city that the Japanese held was a planet, with island chains and nations constituting star systems. Now imagine that Japan itself is a star system at the center of this territory that the ships of their space navy allow them to deliver armies to conquer these other planets and systems. To go back to the Star Wars paradigm, picture the Japanese main fleet units as Star Destroyers projecting power to those other systems, with their smaller warships as analogous to the corvettes and frigates that the Rebels had. This offers a well-balanced navy that, in theory, should be able to hold a sphere of influence while at the same time rushing a reserve force to any trouble spots.
There are two main reasons why the Japanese model failed when it was put up against the United States Navy that I can think of, which aren't simply based on luck, happenstance, or the fallibility of leadership on both sides, etc. (basically, this is pure theory with the human element expunged for sake of argument). First: the vast disparity of industrial capacity between Japan and the US; even if we'd lost at Midway and hadn't destroyed any of their carriers or, worse, had lost all of ours, we still would have won the war of attrition. Even as the battle was over, we had Essex-class flattops on the ways, and better aircraft in development as well as some of the best training of any navy. A year after Midway, we already had more carriers either completed or in production than any other nation on the globe; the retention of four of their ships would not have made that huge of a difference in the grand scheme of things.
Second: the Japanese model also failed to embrace shifting doctrine and the emergence of new technologies. You are quite right to suggest that the 25mm AAA was crap, but it's more than that. The IJN was late to adopt radar, and even when they did they still used their tried-and-true night-fighting tactics as often as they thought they could get away with it. Advances in gunnery and fire-control were also either ignored or missed out on, and as a result their ability to hit back became increasingly ineffectual. In addition, while they started the war with the world's best crop of naval aviators, they had no system set up to handle attrition. I contend often that the US had the best pilot training in the world during the war because we insisted on sending veteran pilots back to the States to teach new recruits, as well as the fact that the program itself was quite long compared to other nations. The Japanese, by contrast, graduated only about 100 pilots a year, and their standards were exceedingly high, to the point that they began grooming potential pilots as they entered what we consider high school. This system, naturally, went to hell in a handcart once the shooting started. As if that wasn't enough, their reluctance to develop and use new and better aircraft types was also quite a handicap; the Luftwaffe also suffered from this almost institutional setback.
To sum it all up, the Japanese model of zone defense using strategic points of contention and mobile striking forces remains sound, it's just the execution�and their lack of depth�that left them with the short end of the stick. But this is all just the opinion of a sci-fi nut and amateur historian. :)