by bengtsson » Mon Nov 20, 2006 1:50 pm
Well, here are some figures I looked up, you be the judge if this force could or could not inflict harm to any degree.
US intelligence estimates of Japanese air strength were hoplessly and dangerously astray as plans for Operation Olympic went forward.
when the war ended on Aug 15 Japan had some 12,725 planes of all types. 5,651 Army, 7,074 Navy along with 100 underground plants in various stages of completion, but most machinery was not yet in production, sub-contacting was spread across the country.
July production figures were 1,131 aircraft completed
pilots were more of a problem 7,000 being available with another 1,422 in training on Kyushu itself. 800 were in hospital. All of the above were to be pressed into service for the suicide missions during the invasion.
These figures can be broken down by individual air fleets. but I will not bother with that.
Reserve stocks of fuel were set aside and buried deep to prevent their distruction by B29 raids. 30,000 tons of high grade aviation fuel were hoped to be produced each month, but that high a figure is doubtful.
20 suicide airstrips with buried fuel storage and underground hangers were in preparation in Southern Kyushu. Another 35 airfields and 9 seaplane bases were also available in Kyushu for suicide aircraft.
once the invasion was certain, 330 specially trained navy combat planes would take off to attack the USN Task Forces, a second force of 2,000 Army and Navy planes was to fight to the death in the conventional air combat over the invasion force. While these two forces engaged the Americans 825 suicide planes were to hit the Transports on the open sea. As the invasion convoy approached the anchorages, another 2,000 suicide planes were to attack in waves of 300-400 at the rate of one wave a hour.
The main difference between the Okinawa campaign and the battle over the Olympic invasion forces would be the short flight times for Japanese aircraft. At Okinawa the Japanese flew 425 miles from southern Kyushu to the invasion force. That gave plenty of air time to cut the attacker to pieces in the air. That luxury would not exist in operation Olympic. With plane's flight times measured in only a few minutes the advantage would shift from the American fighters to the Japanese suicide planes. The Japanese had use of 58 other air fields within easy flight range to the invasion force all of these were to be used for the launch of suicide planes.
Now these are just figures, alot could be expected to go wrong with Japanese plans, but this force was in place or would be by Sept.
The war was all but over for Japan's naval and airforces and Japan could not fight conventional air warfare. But the above force with the advantage of short flight times is not to be considered a minor threat, in the SUICIDE ROLE.
Bob B.
Well, here are some figures I looked up, you be the judge if this force could or could not inflict harm to any degree.
US intelligence estimates of Japanese air strength were hoplessly and dangerously astray as plans for Operation Olympic went forward.
when the war ended on Aug 15 Japan had some 12,725 planes of all types. 5,651 Army, 7,074 Navy along with 100 underground plants in various stages of completion, but most machinery was not yet in production, sub-contacting was spread across the country.
July production figures were 1,131 aircraft completed
pilots were more of a problem 7,000 being available with another 1,422 in training on Kyushu itself. 800 were in hospital. All of the above were to be pressed into service for the suicide missions during the invasion.
These figures can be broken down by individual air fleets. but I will not bother with that.
Reserve stocks of fuel were set aside and buried deep to prevent their distruction by B29 raids. 30,000 tons of high grade aviation fuel were hoped to be produced each month, but that high a figure is doubtful.
20 suicide airstrips with buried fuel storage and underground hangers were in preparation in Southern Kyushu. Another 35 airfields and 9 seaplane bases were also available in Kyushu for suicide aircraft.
once the invasion was certain, 330 specially trained navy combat planes would take off to attack the USN Task Forces, a second force of 2,000 Army and Navy planes was to fight to the death in the conventional air combat over the invasion force. While these two forces engaged the Americans 825 suicide planes were to hit the Transports on the open sea. As the invasion convoy approached the anchorages, another 2,000 suicide planes were to attack in waves of 300-400 at the rate of one wave a hour.
The main difference between the Okinawa campaign and the battle over the Olympic invasion forces would be the short flight times for Japanese aircraft. At Okinawa the Japanese flew 425 miles from southern Kyushu to the invasion force. That gave plenty of air time to cut the attacker to pieces in the air. That luxury would not exist in operation Olympic. With plane's flight times measured in only a few minutes the advantage would shift from the American fighters to the Japanese suicide planes. The Japanese had use of 58 other air fields within easy flight range to the invasion force all of these were to be used for the launch of suicide planes.
Now these are just figures, alot could be expected to go wrong with Japanese plans, but this force was in place or would be by Sept.
The war was all but over for Japan's naval and airforces and Japan could not fight conventional air warfare. But the above force with the advantage of short flight times is not to be considered a minor threat, in the SUICIDE ROLE.
Bob B.