The Ship Model Forum

by **Werner** » Sun Jun 24, 2007 5:56 pm

Don't forget, those mobilized men cannot work their farms. The fields on which they are based, etc. were agriculturally unproductive.

When WW.I occurs, you lose an entire generation of people who knew how to farm, dig coal, work the factory or whatever.

If the USA could have stayed out of WW.I altogether, they would have made the most money possible supporting the unproductive forces on the one hand and the recovery afterwards on the part of both sides.

by **Laurence Batchelor** » Sun Jun 24, 2007 4:28 pm

Maybe I'm still not clear,
I thinking of USA trade with central european powers at the time of the Washington Treaty i.e. 1920.

Thus way before the USA became isolationist and kept a distant watch on the rise of facist governments in central European states (Italy, Spain, Germany) in the 1930s.

Another point I'd like to make clear.
Whilst Britain, France, Italy, Germany were all busy towards full industrial mobilisation to war production from 1915-1918 and then busy with reconstruction 1919-1920 the USA had spent her 1915-1917 period penentrating many foreign trade markets due to little competition.
Thus again increasing her foreign exports, and global commitments by the time of the Washington Treaty negotiations.

I guess in a nutshell I think your downplaying the USA's clear and increasing need to protect her foreign trade by 1920 at the conference.
I am not saying she needs as many cruisers as the British, what I am saying is she knows she is going to start to need more than she had a decade earlier.

by **Werner** » Sun Jun 24, 2007 4:06 pm

I did say it was the Republican position to "let the Europeans fight it out", and "sell food and materials to both sides".

I am sure in the simplistic minds of the Congress of the time, no power in Europe would interrupt US trade with the "enemy", and risk an administrative shutdown of trade by the command of Washington. It would be in their interests to leave US ships alone.

Principals like Lindburgh and Ford were very supportive of Hitler and expressed this by pressing for isolation.

by **Laurence Batchelor** » Sun Jun 24, 2007 3:30 pm

I was speaking of her large trade with other European powers from 1900-1925 say, not trade in the pacific, not trade in the Atlantic or Caribbean.

The USA's European trade in this time period was what would also be effecting their Washington thinking.
It seems to me you talking of a later time frame when your thinking isolationist.

I agree though their respective naval strengths could be mutually benefial by the 1930s, but then again there was a lot of Anglo-American antagonism earlier in the 1920s.

by **Guest** » Sun Jun 24, 2007 2:44 pm

Laurence Batchelor wrote:I disagree,

Read one of earlier posts, British blockade agasinst the central European powers during WWI stung American exports in a large way.
This demonstrates that already by WWI, some 14 or so years after over taking the British as the dominant economic power in the world she was already a nation enjoying a large part of her wealth derived from foreign export trade.
The Ford Motor Co., being a good example.

The bulk of American overseas trade was in the Atlantic and in the Caribbean. Her trade across the pacific at the time was small and nothing like what it is now. The US understood that the better part of her trade was as vital to the British as it was to the Americans, that Britain had already become significantly dependent upon the US in any serious war, and it is very unlikely for the US and UK to be found on the opposite sides of any conflict. It is also unlikely for the US to find herself in independent conflict with another European power with Britain being on the same side. Thus America would be the automatic beneficiary of Britain's cruiser fleet for trade protection.

by **Werner** » Sun Jun 24, 2007 2:04 pm

Chuck wrote: Britain with her wide spread interests and the possibility of more remote regions of conflict, would have much more need for cruiser flag showing then the US.

US interests are much more concentrated, and with the Japanese right next door to the focus of American overseas interests....

Not only is this true, it is consistent with the record. The Monroe Doctrine and defense obligations in the Philippines until independence in 1945 (agreed by treaty in 1935 but foreseen years earlier) were the only reason prior to 1921 for US cruisers. The "Peace Cruiser" role needed by the Monroe Doctrine was well served by the 1880-1900 era cruisers and CNO Pratt planned to replace them with gunboats of the Erie type (the "Treasury Class" Coast Guard Cutters are slightly modified Eries with a different stern counter).

The US planned to concentrate the fleet at San Pedro near Los Angeles, and keep it there except in annual fleet problems, or to wave the flag during problems in the Pacific. They never expected to keep more than a token force at Subic Bay and Manila, as "speed bumps" which would provide whatever political justification or cover suited Congress. As such, submarines and destroyers were the weapons of choice.

Irrespective of the economic benefits of Globalization, the US Congress of the period was very isolationist. The voting public was even moreso. Only Hollywood had any interest in what was going on abroad, and largely only to support the Communists in Spain during the Civil War there.

Republican pundits did not see a European war as desirable because it was very unlikely to be won. Better to sell food, trucks and machinery to both sides. The Pacific was another matter: plenty of emerging markets which could use US low and medium technology goods and pay premiums, as long as the colonial powers and Japan didn't get involved. I think Australia and The USA pretty much saw eye-to-eye, which was really a realistic assessment by Australia of British abilities to keep promises regarding defense and so on. After the rattle PM Billy Hughes made at Paris, they expected frigid relations with Japan.

The Washington and London treaties revalued ship types and made the cruiser "Battleship-lite". It became necessary to build cruisers because it was likely they in the future would be performing capital ship duties in peacetime as well as at war. There were too few battleships, and they were too expensive to expose them the way they had in the past. They became the great strategic reserve, the "H-bomb" of the era.

by **Laurence Batchelor** » Sun Jun 24, 2007 1:54 pm

I disagree,

Read one of earlier posts, British blockade agasinst the central European powers during WWI stung American exports in a large way.
This demonstrates that already by WWI, some 14 or so years after over taking the British as the dominant economic power in the world she was already a nation enjoying a large part of her wealth derived from foreign export trade.
The Ford Motor Co., being a good example.

From around 1915 and into the 1920s from my reading of economics the USA's exports went up dramatically.

This in turn pushed them to have to secure that extra, highly valuable trade routes and markets.
This meant she started to need cruisers just as much as the RN, though not as many until a few more years in the future.

by **Guest** » Sun Jun 24, 2007 1:36 pm

Laurence Batchelor wrote:
The fact still remains the USN & RN still needed lots of cruisers as the ideal global policeman, gun-barrel politics etc.
These navies would perhaps stick with smaller lighter 6-inch cruisers and perhaps try and make them 36knts so they can evade the newly completed battlecruisers?

Britain with her wide spread interests and the possibility of more remote regions of conflict, would have much more need for cruiser flag showing then the US.

US interests are much more concentrated, and with the Japanese right next door to the focus of American overseas interests, the US would look silly showing off with mere cruisers.

by **Pieter** » Sun Jun 24, 2007 12:11 pm

I think the 10.000 ton limit should be seen in conjuction with the ban on the coonstruction battlecruisers. The appearance of Hawkins and Furutaka (a very similar design which is often overlooked) meant that something had to be done to counter them. In a non-treaty world these designs presented something of a dilemma. As the designers of Dunkerque, Kronstadt and Alaska would discover countering these vessels on a similar displacement was almost impossible and Hawkins/Furutaka killer designs would grow very quickly to 20.000 tons or more. In a no-treaty world this would mean that ships would be built with a very difficult design rationale now that 33 knot Hood, G3, Lexington and Akagi were around. These could never be built in the numbers required to hunt down a series if Hawkins and Furutaka's but which could hunt down the relatively few 20.000-ish tons Hawkins/Furutaka killers. No navy wanted to be left in a corner like that so a solution was found in simply freezing this small arms race at the point which it had reached at the time. Hence the combination of a 10.000 ton limit and a battlecruiser ban.

by **Laurence Batchelor** » Sun Jun 24, 2007 5:06 am

Thats my thinking.

The very large, fast and powerful battlecruisers which would emerge by 1925 from many of the leading navies which would make the idea of large cruisers redundant.

The fact still remains the USN & RN still needed lots of cruisers as the ideal global policeman, gun-barrel politics etc.
These navies would perhaps stick with smaller lighter 6-inch cruisers and perhaps try and make them 36knts so they can evade the newly completed battlecruisers?

by **chuck** » Sun Jun 24, 2007 1:12 am

Laurence Batchelor wrote:Taking the discussion on a slightly different tack, if NO Washington then would cruisers main armaments by the 1920s & 1930s have got closer to Capital Ships?

I don't think so. A very large number (18 by my count) of very fast, full fledged 16" battlecruisers would have emerged in the absence of Washington treaty. These battle cruisers would sweep the tonnage range between themselves and that of 8000-10000 ton fleet work cruisers clean. If anyone were to build a large, quasi-capitalship style cruiser that falls into that intermediate tonnage region, these large cruiser would appear to be death traps that would both draw and attention of the big battle cruisers and not be able to withstand that attention.

by **Werner** » Sun Jun 24, 2007 12:03 am

Laurence Batchelor wrote:Taking the discussion on a slightly different tack, if NO Washington then would cruisers main armaments by the 1920s & 1930s have got closer to Capital Ships?

Can't speak for Britain except to say they did not have a high opinion of Courageous & Glorious.

USN Scout cruiser designs 1915-1921:

16 April 1915: Design 118: Scout Cruiser with 4 x 12 inch 14,350 tons;
16 April 1915: Design 120: Scout Cruiser with 4 x 12 inch 22,850 tons;
Design 112: 10 x 6 inch @ 10,500 tons;
Sometime in 1915: 2 or 4 x 14 inch; 4 x 16 inch; all about 25,000 tons;
Design 130: 8 x 16 inch,30 knots, 10-inch armor; 52,000 tons;
Design 135: 8 x 16 inch, 30 knots, no armor, 16,000 tons;
Design 141: 8 x 16-inch, 30 knots, 4-inch armor; 30 Kts. 27,000 tons.
1917 Scout became Omaha;

The General board felt that any cruisers would be at a disadvantage if it had less than 33 knots speed.

They also give quantities for the US cruisers needed. 53 light cruisers for screening operations and 20 to protect sea lines of communications.

So, the US need of 73 cruisers is not that far off British requirements, but where British ships would be between 6,000 and 8,000 tons, US ships would be of two categories: 7,500 ton types and 20,000+ ton types.

In general, I feel the US types do represent a gradual merger of cruiser and capital designs as Laurence speculated, and they also show a gross immaturity of the US long-range design process. I do not think this process "got it's feet" until the early 1930s and it's first fruit was North Carolina.

by ar » Sat Jun 23, 2007 5:57 pm

Very well then.
Eight thousand tons at light load gives about ten thousand fivehundred tons full.
Ten thousand tons light gives about fourteen thousand tons full.

This will give you the necessary range.
Number and type of guns are a different matter.

Werner wrote:The US hated "Standard Tons", because although it neglected the weight of feed water and fuel, it included stores. Since the USN expected to have to steam at least 10,000 miles before any replenishment was possible, the quantity of stores was significant. Of course, you could supply SPACE for whatever you wanted....

The other issue for the USN was the "feed water". US habitation requirements meant USN sailors required at least 5X the water requirements of British sailors. The treaty called the supply for fresh water showerbaths "feed water". More water and more tankage and more equipment.

I think more creative minds were necessary.

by **Werner** » Sat Jun 23, 2007 5:50 pm

The USN for one would not have built second-class ships. They would have continued the CC1-6 program, the Omahas and their would be no 8-inch gunned ship.

The US Naval officers of the period were uniformly against the 7 and 8-inch calibers. There was a strong effort to force a modernization of the "Big 10" ACRs, which had 10-inch guns and would have been among the most powerful cruisers in the world. BuEng said they could be re-engined cheaply to get 26 knots. More than that would require structural changes.

The BuOrd thought they could be made powerful enough for cruiser work at long ranges and last effectively until 1950.

by **Laurence Batchelor** » Sat Jun 23, 2007 5:43 pm

Taking the discussion on a slightly different tack, if NO Washington then would cruisers main armaments by the 1920s & 1930s have got closer to Capital Ships?

Could we ever see a 4 or 6 gunned 10-12-inch armed cruiser with minimal armour?

Or without the 8-inch cap would navies be happier to keep the costs down and stick with 6-inch and go for lots of numbers?

Am I right by saying from memory the Kent's were the first Washington inspired cruiser laid down by a signatory power in around 1926?
If so, did this mean Britain shot herself in the foot as everyone else merely responsed in kind and immediately in the first round of this naval building competition, each country had maxed out already?
Unless of course you ignore the cap and build bigger in your next cruiser class.

by **Werner** » Sat Jun 23, 2007 5:41 pm

The US hated "Standard Tons", because although it neglected the weight of feed water and fuel, it included stores. Since the USN expected to have to steam at least 10,000 miles before any replenishment was possible, the quantity of stores was significant. Of course, you could supply SPACE for whatever you wanted....

The other issue for the USN was the "feed water". US habitation requirements meant USN sailors required at least 5X the water requirements of British sailors. The treaty called the supply for fresh water showerbaths "feed water". More water and more tankage and more equipment.

I think more creative minds were necessary.

by **Guest** » Sat Jun 23, 2007 5:21 pm

A standard tonnage - weight of all hardware plus all supplies except feed water and fuel oil - was a definition contrived by the British to ensure the particular needs of the British global defense does not handicap the British ships in tonnage.

But the British didn't seem to take full advantage of their own artifice

by **Werner** » Sat Jun 23, 2007 5:08 pm

Since there was no treaty in the hypothetical, I did not realize we would be discussing "standard" tons.

In any event, "standard tons" were a number that could be adjusted and interpreted to suit the writer.

by ar » Sat Jun 23, 2007 4:27 pm

Eight to ten thousand tons standard gives you eleven to fourteen thousand tons full. This will give the necessary range. Number and type of guns are a different matter.

Werner wrote:8,000 tons is still a displacement in line with the "D" and Enterprise. Hawkins is more like 12,000 tons as I recall. It also had mixed firing after this had gone out of fashion in most other navies.

by **Werner** » Sat Jun 23, 2007 2:34 pm

8,000 tons is still a displacement in line with the "D" and Enterprise. Hawkins is more like 12,000 tons as I recall. It also had mixed firing after this had gone out of fashion in most other navies.

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