A shipbuilding disaster

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Re: A shipbuilding disaster

by Avery Boyer » Tue Feb 05, 2008 5:23 pm

And can anyone forget San Antonio and her "issues" you know, little things like leaks and steering problems....

Re: A shipbuilding disaster

by phil gollin » Tue Feb 05, 2008 5:23 pm

Neptune wrote:
I think you don't really follow what I mean by classification... Classification of warships is TOTALLY different from classification of Merchant Ships. Merchies don't use any part of warship classification rules, they all have their own rules (oil tankers are different from gas tankers, all of them are different from Bulk carriers etc. ) All types of ships have different rules, including warships. .......
But you are missing the point that the Lloyds rules are merchant classification modified to include warship type requirements so as to end up with a Lloyds classification that is suitable for warships.

Re: A shipbuilding disaster

by Werner » Tue Feb 05, 2008 2:47 pm

The LCS was approaching a late-flight Burke in cost!! That's why it was canceled. A half-billion is a bit steep for a ship with point defenses and a 57mm gun. Even the proponents of LCS admit it's primary abilities are carried by deployed platforms (helicopters, autonomous surface and submerged vehicles). That, and a 900 mile range at full power don't militate for production.

Re: A shipbuilding disaster

by Neptune » Tue Feb 05, 2008 2:28 pm

I think you don't really follow what I mean by classification... Classification of warships is TOTALLY different from classification of Merchant Ships. Merchies don't use any part of warship classification rules, they all have their own rules (oil tankers are different from gas tankers, all of them are different from Bulk carriers etc. ) All types of ships have different rules, including warships.

Still wondering about those designed and built concepts too. At least one should be continued, they are already designed. They can fix the errors, arm it a little better and off we go. But they really don't seem to be able to choose... Maybe the strong lobby's of each of the designers/shipyards are behind this? Showing that they have more or less equal political power too?

Re: A shipbuilding disaster

by phil gollin » Tue Feb 05, 2008 1:44 pm

The RN had/has its own standards for warships.

What has happened is that the Lloyds standards (MERCHANT) have been adjusted to include those features of naval design deemed essential. This was done in conjunction with the RN so that the resulting standard rules was acceptable, but capable of use by ordinary merchant builders.

That still doesn't explain the original quote when the two LCS contracts were "design & build".

.

Re: A shipbuilding disaster

by Neptune » Tue Feb 05, 2008 12:12 pm

Quite wrong on that Phil. Lloyd's rules are not "Merchant" Rules per se. They are adapted to warship building and created by Lloyd's (similar to other classification societies), which means they are based on a HUGE amount of experience in shipbuilding. Their experience surpasses ANY Navy's and their clients are much much much larger in number than any Navy.
All together it means they are much more suited than the people, like Werner mentioned, that are picked out of a bunch, then appointed to do a job they haven't done before etc. Navies only start with new ships very occasionally, like 1 every 5 years or 1 every 10 years, for other Navies it goes even slower. How do you expect any warship designers etc. to gain experience in such matters? If you're lucky then you can do two or three different types of ships in your carreer in Navy service.
Compare that to Lloyd's, or other classification societies, who have to lead dozens of ship designs every year, check them, adapt them, evaluate their active ships and designs, create or adapt rules, evaluate again, study accidents onboard, disasters and failures etc. And this on a huge scale. I think the rules set by them, even for warships, will be quite suitable. I've seen one of the warships built by their standards and I must say I was impressed. Don't forget that when you leave the quality control of a ship to a classification society, you are also sure that they are following up the design AND construction AND delivery. Something that is not really well regulated in political contracts, where the president and possibly his party can loose their power during the planning or construction of a ship, leading to reappointment of certain positions etc.
I hope that someday they come up with a new design in US, because it's getting about time for that. Somehow I do hope they can just adapt the Burke for the new age electronics. I don't think that anything overly expensive and way too futuristic is needed and I don't see the point of looking for something like that.

Re: A shipbuilding disaster

by phil gollin » Mon Feb 04, 2008 5:52 pm

Werner wrote:Regarding the LCS, the Admiral remarks that "n layman's terms, this was similar to building a 20-story hospital using building codes for single family residences and not recognizing the failure until the building inspector arrived."


Yes, and very unlikely (almost impossible) if the designer and builder are the same company.

The only likely scenario is if the LCS's were being built (like some of the latest RN auxiliaries and warships) to militarised versions of ordinary (merchant) rules (in the RN's case special LLoyd's rules). But those affect the very basic ideas about design and still wouldn't really fit the quoted comments.

Re: A shipbuilding disaster

by Werner » Mon Feb 04, 2008 5:16 pm

Regarding the LCS, the Admiral remarks that "n layman's terms, this was similar to building a 20-story hospital using building codes for single family residences and not recognizing the failure until the building inspector arrived."

Re: A shipbuilding disaster

by NAVMACS_V2 » Mon Feb 04, 2008 4:55 pm

I work developing software for the army. Last month we got a new green suit to run the project office that oversees our development effort. He doesn't understand the most basic concepts about computers or software. He doesn't understand why we can't find and fix all the bugs before we field the software. Just like the last green suit we had he took a few acqusition management courses and got promoted into a cushy billet and is now more concerned with empire building than producing anything. He has that "we didn't have computers when I started out so why do we need them now?" mentality that still permeates the upper levels of the pentagon. And about the time we get him to understand what the hell we are doing and why it is important he will either retire or be transferred out and we will in all likelihood get another clueless green suit to sit in his chair and issue useless directives that they think is 'management.' Unfortunately contractors are often at the mercy of these individuals who swing considerable clout upstairs. A few months ago a contractor tried to go over their program manager's head to show why the program was way over budget and behind schedule was because of the PM's repeated reorganizations and failure to finalize the requirements for the system. The contractor was rewarded by having their contract terminated for non-performance and the work awarded to another company.

Re: A shipbuilding disaster

by phil gollin » Mon Feb 04, 2008 4:42 pm

Werner wrote:
....... because of the ship's designation as LCS, The American Bureau of Shipping standards for type "LCS" were applied and the ships were designed to freighter and cruise ship standards. This error required extensive rework and cost overruns. ......
I cannot believe that. The two LCS designs were "design and builds" - there is no way the firms concerned didn't know what they were building.

.

Re: A shipbuilding disaster

by G. Shoda » Mon Feb 04, 2008 4:21 pm

Re: Commercial standards for military ships. Seems like incredible stupidity by several officers. They were probably detailed to the job after having completed previous assignments in family service/community relations. :heh:

Re: A shipbuilding disaster

by Werner » Mon Feb 04, 2008 2:37 pm

I can't believe nobody questioned the application of commercial standards to a combat vessel until it went into major cost-overruns.

Re: A shipbuilding disaster

by bengtsson » Mon Feb 04, 2008 2:32 pm

I'm not surprised Werner. This has been building for a long time. We have come a long way from the patriotic captains of industry who built the Navy of WWII in record time with record quality and then went on to supply sailors of my generation with the capable warships of the 1960-70s. I fear the corruption has gone very deep in the whole system. We are our own worst enemies at the start of the 21st century. Too much greed, not enough patriotism. Sorry some will not want to hear that, but it only takes eyes to see it. Also, there is a great deal of pure incompetence at work as well.

Bob B.

A shipbuilding disaster

by Werner » Mon Feb 04, 2008 2:20 pm

In this month's US Naval Institute Proceedings, author Rear Admiral William J. Holland surveys the wreck that is the USN's shipbuilding programs. After a description of some of the recent LCS debacle, he speculates that it will take a minimum of 20 years to straighten out the procurement mess. The chapter headings sum up the gist: "Foggy Characteristics Yield Concrete Problems", "Form Not Always Follows Function" (in which I learned that the authority responsible for warship construction has no official authority to direct construction! This authority is reserved to "political apointees with short tenures and little experience").

The chapter "LCS: Little Cruise Ship" shows the Navy's incredible incompetence to oversee contract work. For example, because of the ship's designation as LCS, The American Bureau of Shipping standards for type "LCS" were applied and the ships were designed to freighter and cruise ship standards. This error required extensive rework and cost overruns.

"We Knew How To Build Ships" discussed the shift in the programs from building a warship to meeting abstract financial goals. He suggests a "Navy Yard" system of construction in parallel with the vendors would keep the programs honest and competetive.

In "A Business-Model Failure" he concludes with the remark "The Navy acquisition community has a death-wish".

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