The Ship Model Forum

Bob, I notice that the Japanese battleships were only a minor factor as well in this engagement, a day's sail behind the mobile force of carriers.

The exception, of course is the Haruna class, which had been specifically revised in the '30s to escort the carriers and serve as a counter to the American or British 8-inch cruisers, scouting for them at the edges of the main force.

The Japanese and US idea for employment of cruisers and destroyers was rather differently formulated; the torpedo bearing ships were expected to engage the US main body in the night prior to the main battle, they would take heavy losses but would "more than level the odds" for the morning gunfire engagement expected in Japanese op-plans.

This is the reason a few cruisers were converted into super-torpedo cruisers with 40 tubes on a 5,500 ton hull. It's also the reason they did so well in the Solomons. That kind of night-time engagement was part of their pre-war training.

Werner wrote:
Nimitz probably knew the battleships were a supply nightmare and could not be employed profitably in "hit and run" strikes.

This is true Werner. It was probably Number 1 on Nimitz's list of reasons to fight any pressure to use Task Force #1. When asked to use his BB force Nimitz argued that he would be wasting his Carrier forces trying to give cover to the BBs instead of using his Carriers as the central element of US Naval strike power in the Pacific. I would need to consult my sources, but I believe Nimitiz was under alot of pressure to get the BBs into the fight. He wanted no part of them, and was happy to park them on the West Coast and give them a little 'busy work'. I believe he did send his first escort carrier to exercise with the BB force, looking into Escort Carrier's potential as Air Cover units for BBs. Both being fairly slow. The main question for Nimitz and the Japanese in early 42 was "What really can we do with these BBs"? It seems pretty clear from both sides that no "Pacific Jutland" was about to break out anytime soon.

Bob B.

For the record, the Second Mobile Force's "racetrack" was at 170W between 40N and 45N.

At 0500 3 June, TF17 Indianapolis & Honolulu was at 154W 50N, having departed Oahu 29 May.

For your alternative history, you could take the assumption that Fletcher would follow the track the cruisers laid out, or perhaps a little more Westerly. (Roughly 1,900 miles in 5 days; 380 miles a day).

With the attack on Dutch Harbor being a "total surprise", the Americans would have had 24-36 hours to depart and steam North before the reports from Midway came in. Assume an 8 hour communications delay and you can set the "panic point" at which the USN carriers would go West to Midway or carry on North to protect the Continent.

Remember, in 1942 the USN is also having logistical problems shifting from a peace footing to a war footing. The thirsty battleships were stationed at the end of the rail pipelines for a reason - to release tankers and supply ships for US forces in the Atlantic, ground troops in Iceland and Northern Ireland, lift and escort for the British war effort.

Nimitz probably knew the battleships were a supply nightmare and could not be employed profitably in "hit and run" strikes.

The battleship force was in San Francisco.

In fact the battleship force did sortie to a defensive position off the west coast in early June as an overlooked part of the Midway deployment. It was send there as a hedge against the chance that the JN-25 message traffic decoded at Pearl Harbor was in fact a gigantic ruse and the Japanese were really planning some other spectacular deep thrust Pearl Harbor style raid as revenge for the Doolittle raid.

Lesforan wrote:I don't believe Nimitz would have dawdled in Yorktown's repairs in any case. He must have been acutely aware that with his battleships either sunk or disabled .

Nimitz did command a Battleship Force that by April consisted of 7 Battleships escorted by Destroyers: Task Force #1. Leading up to Coral Sea, Nimitz left his Battleship force out of plans to meet the Japanese with all available USN Naval strength. Because he could not support the BBs with logistics, screening ships [these were needed for the Carrier Forces] or Aircraft. But especially because the BB force could not keep up with the Carriers. So inspite of the common wisdom that the USN was short of BBs due to Pearl Harbor, the USN had an intact and Battle Ready 7 BB task force. For obvious reasons, the force played no part in the Naval War at that time. April-June 1942.

Bob B.

Yorktown's repairs (estimated in the same way to Saratoga's damage at Jan 42 damage) ought to have taken six months. Even four would be pressing it.

I don't believe Nimitz would have dawdled in Yorktown's repairs in any case. He must have been acutely aware that with his battleships either sunk or disabled, and only two operable carriers left, he was at extreme risk. Both Yorktown and Saratoga would have to be rushed back into service.

Port Morseby would be much closer to the nearest major Japanese fleet base than Midway. The logistical problems of supporting a major operation would also be less.

How much more fuel and how many more tankers to sink the USA at Port Morseby? I am struck by the short leash immediately after Pearl Harbor. I wonder if the location of the battle was not partly chosen on economic grounds.

rtheriaque wrote:I think one fact is being overlooked... If US Intelligence is assumed to be in the dark, than Coral Sea doesn't happen, either.

I'd have to put more thought into the basic question before I could put more forth, but I wanted to add that to begin with!

Not necessarily. The IJN had scheduled the replacement of the penetrated JN-25 code by the yet unpenetrated JN-40 for about 1 month before Midway, but bureaucratic red tape postponed the switch. As it happened the JN-40 proved trouble some to decipher and it took USN some time and a great stroke of luck to penetrate it. So if the switch over from JN-25 to JN-40 had occurred on schedule, it would have occurred so close to Coral sea that the USN would have had enough time to gleam data from JN-25 to have warning of Coral sea before the switch over, but would not have been warned of Midway as a result of the deciphering blackout period that would covered all of may and probably for several month afterwards.

Also, if there was no US opposition in Coral Sea in early May, and the Japanese captured Port Morseby, would the Japanese have embarked upon Midway in June or would they have spent June consolidating their newly gained positions in the South, perhaps seeking a decisive confrontation in the South around the lifeline to Australia some time later, rather than near Midway in June? How much did the thwarted attempt to capture Morseby hasten Japanese effort to destroy the USN carrier fleet?

I think one fact is being overlooked... If US Intelligence is assumed to be in the dark, than Coral Sea doesn't happen, either.

I'd have to put more thought into the basic question before I could put more forth, but I wanted to add that to begin with!

chuck wrote:

Werner wrote:Turning back from Alaska may have allowed Fletcher the consolation of scooping up Ryujo and Junyo before getting cold feet and turning back to Pearl.

He would still be 3-4 days sailing from Aleutians and the Japanese northern force when the news of Midway attack would be flashed. Would he be allowed to keep on going North?

Look at the disposition chart in Morrison IV. The two Japanese carriers were assigned a holding racetrack half way to Midway.

Everyone also needs to remember the Japanese elephant sitting in this room. Fuel. Every act the fleet takes is predicated on the optimal use of fuel. If this operation failed, the next opportunity might not be before September.

Dan K wrote:
If that happens, then Yamamoto finds himself in a bit of an embarassing pickle. He loses the Alaska carriers without finding the US fleet and now, in turn, to save face, must risk the Kido Butai to again find the US fleet. The intiative shifts back to the US. Retaliatory IJN ops will be limited due to constrictions on fuel and logistics.

If US forces heads north and engage the Northern force in spite of the pounding Midway is taking at the same time, then the US force would not come into contact with the Japanese northern force for 3-4 days, or around June 8th. The Japanese would not know until that the US fleet is heading North. On June 8th, would Kido Butai have the fuel to head north in pursuit after having stayed in a combat zone and sustaining combat operations for 4 days? or even to take up station north of Hawaii for another 5-6 days in the hope of intercepting the US fleet on the way back?

Werner wrote:Turning back from Alaska may have allowed Fletcher the consolation of scooping up Ryujo and Junyo before getting cold feet and turning back to Pearl.

He would still be 3-4 days sailing from Aleutians and the Japanese northern force when the news of Midway attack would be flashed. Would he be allowed to keep on going North?

These are all very interesting responses. I agree with Devin that, w/o prior intelligence, Yorktown is not yet available as there is no dire need to rush repairs. Only Hornet and Enterprise are immediately available. And, the Aleutians attack is a surprise as well.

With his battlefleet impotent, only two carriers available for any sort of hard response, and most important, the loss of initiative borne of the intelligence scoop, Nimitz is immediately on the defensive and cannot risk his two remaining assets without more concrete information. They sortie to a position 200-300 miles N-NW of Pearl to await that info and head off a possible thrust towards Pearl.

Pearl might be within bomber range of Midway, but the reverse is also true. Nimitz has a good heavy bomber force available at this point that would be effective in neutralizing the land-based threat. If searchplanes do not quickly find IJN units around Midway, Washington will force his response to Alaska. That could be fortuitous, as his two carriers pack a far creater punch, with more experienced aircrews, than the IJN force that includes Junyo and Ryujo. They might do some real damage to the IJN Northern Force.

If that happens, then Yamamoto finds himself in a bit of an embarassing pickle. He loses the Alaska carriers without finding the US fleet and now, in turn, to save face, must risk the Kido Butai to again find the US fleet. The intiative shifts back to the US. Retaliatory IJN ops will be limited due to constrictions on fuel and logistics.

On the other hand, if US searchplanes do find IJN units around Midway in the initial searcj, I've no idea how it plays out.

Turning back from Alaska may have allowed Fletcher the consolation of scooping up Ryujo and Junyo before getting cold feet and turning back to Pearl.

Do we assume the USN intelligence was completely in the darK??

If so, I would expect Japan to seize Midway and then regroup in ambush position to nail the USN reaction force coming to the rescue. The USN would probably just have the two carriers available. I would expect the USN to eat the loss of Midway and leave the Japanese force hanging out there. Once the Japanese main fleet has to return home, then we hit Midway hard with carrier strikes and build our strength to use Midway as bait for the decisive battle with the IJN at the time of our choice and when we had maximum strength available.
WIth no forwarning, it would surely have taken some days to get a force out to Midway. What you don't want to do is take the Japanese bailt and go out weak and in the dark. Just what the IJN was looking for.

Bob B.

I think Yamamoto's idea was to peep into Pearl from French Frigate Shoals the day before and make sure the USN carriers had docked, then to draw them Northeast toward Alaska for a day before reports at Midway came in. That would draw the Americans into a "predicted" first base position, where Yamamoto expected them.

If the US carriers had sailed toward Alaska for a day or more they would, upon turning back to Midway, come across the racetrack of Kakuta's Second Mobile Force.

As it happened, I think the USN wound up closer and farther South than Yamamoto expected.

Yamamoto's plans typically require the USN to be a cooperating enemy, behaving much like modern computer game AI.

Gone Asiatic wrote:Perhaps he would have gone after the Alaskan bait?

Would Aleutians be an effective bait? Provided Aleutians came as much a surprise to Nimitz as Midway because the USN had no access to Japanese code, then even if the US forces sorties within hours from the Dutch Harbor attack, it would still be no more than a few hours out of Pearl when the Midway attack came. So it seems to me that the Aleutian attack would have had almost no effect on the strategic choices facing Nimitz on the morning of June 4.