The Ship Model Forum

Probably has as much to do with the British wanting to give Diego Garcia back to the natives and the Japanese pushing us out of Okinawa..

Since Midway was turned into a nature sanctuary, Guam is the Pacific base closest base to Hawaii

Perhaps that�s why Guam is being turned into an island aircraft carrier.
�Currently, about 6,500 servicemembers are stationed in Guam. By 2014, Guam�s military population could reach 35,000, counting servicemembers, family members, Department of Defense workers and other staff needed on base, according to the governor�s office.�
http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?sect ... chive=true

Naval and Air Force build up is also keeping pace with the Marines and Army.
�The ramp-up is already underway. Andersen has hosted continuous long-range bomber deployments since 2004, and the base began construction in 2006 on a $242 million Expeditionary Combat Support Training campus.�
�Andersen also expects to gain a permanent tanker presence as soon as fiscal 2009, and the base is slated to receive the first of seven Global Hawk surveillance drones in 2009 or 2010.
The Navy plans to build a transient nuclear aircraft carrier-capable pier at Apra Harbor and beef up its submarine presence, and the Army plans to put a ballistic missile defense task force on the island.�
http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2008/ ... m_051008p/

[off topic]Oh yeah, the Sigmas where delivered with Exocets, but Indonesia cannot get an export license for re-loads. I suspect this will be related to its suspect Human Rights record, and the fact that whilst Mistral could be considered a 'defensive' system, Exocet could be considered 'offensive' and potentially destablising to the region, and in the same way that the US is often selective with what they are willing to sell to countries in the region. Anyway, anti-ship re-loads or not, Sigma is a good modern ship for their needs in a navy with many ageing vessels. [/off-topic]

First thing: Very odd, I was on the Sigma's and they were quite well fit for the Exocet, I'd be suprised if there was no adaptation at all for C-802's. Also very strange that they are allowed to buy French anti-aircraft missiles, which which she was already fitted on the hand-over, while they cannot buy anti ship missiles from that same country...

As for the German subs, they can only do it now. Planned induction of that weapon is only in 2014, not exactly something "common" yet is it? Improvement over '70's yes, but that doesn't really mean that theoretically the Kilo can't fire something similar before 2014. You can't use a future weapon to to say we are so much ahead and prove Russian/Chinese technology dates back from 70's.

Thanks for the link though, I wasn't home in that period.

As for locking on, an anti-ship missile is doesn't really go for the largest target anymore, those times are long past. They recognise their target signatures by now and soon (if they didn't already) they'll probably learn to go after the smaller targets rather than the big container ships. The real purpose of it is to give a confusing echo by the motion of the sea, a missile fails to track its target this way. However I doubt such things, the echo changes with direction of view, but that's about it. I didn't see it disappear up till now. Becomes as large as a buoy on radar, but that's about it.

Neptune wrote:Well practically I haven't seen the CHinese offer the Song or anything else on the market. And the Kilo was also offered and sold to Indonesia, a country which can buy anything it wants given their purchase of the Dutch Sigma corvettes.

The Indonesians cannot get what they want, which is why they are having to replace the Hawk fleet, and buy C-802 missiles instead of the Exocets they wanted for their Sigmas. They bought Kilos because there was no way that a Western country would sell them a top of the range Sub, and the Indonesians could not afford any western sub. Russia offered a lot of credit to make these arms deals, because unlike the west, and like China, it views arms deals as purely business deals. Anyway, those Kilos will offer good value for money and be cheap to operate for Indonesia.

The anti-aircraft missile I have never seen confirmed anywhere although I remember some old programs (from the germans) in that direction. And stealthy casing is something I have always laughed with given that I see stealth ships often enough on our radar and I fail to see the big difference compared to all the effort they are putting in such matters.

Stealthy warships are not invisible, its about reducing its RCS, so when the enemy fire an anti-ship missile that is looking for a big target, it ignores the warship as being small. Instead it will hit any 'unstealthy' ships that are in the area instead, like Merchant vessels!

As for the German anti-air missile (IADS), they test fired it here last Thursday, 29th May.

Well practically I haven't seen the CHinese offer the Song or anything else on the market. And the Kilo was also offered and sold to Indonesia, a country which can buy anything it wants given their purchase of the Dutch Sigma corvettes.

As far as I know the Russian subs are also built from non-magnetic steel. The anti-aircraft missile I have never seen confirmed anywhere although I remember some old programs (from the germans) in that direction. And stealthy casing is something I have always laughed with given that I see stealth ships often enough on our radar and I fail to see the big difference compared to all the effort they are putting in such matters.

Of course it is pointless to say the Kilo or Song would match anything near a U-212 which is actually younger than both and as you say from the West, which means without a doubt, better quality. Neither do I mean to say they are a real threat to USN, which I stated before. However, what I'm saying is that they shouldn't be underestimated and done away with so easily. They may still cause a decent headache to anyone and in the right environment are still a threat to USN's subs after all.

Neptune wrote:Please be so kind to tell me those things on the new German subs... X-rudders,

Non-magnetic steel hull, verified AIP, radar stealthy casing and sail shape, torpedo tube launched anti-ASW aircraft missile, specifically shallow water adapted navigation capability, and not to put too fine a point on it, sonar and electronic systems from manufactures whom, when they claimed their products to be more actually capable than what can be achieved in 1970s, people would believe.

And last but not least, 212A has supported actual successful export campaigns in countries that are not under either information or actual arms embargo from recognized leading naval powers, and thus have real basis to evaluate the merits of what they are being offered.

Please be so kind to tell me those things on the new German subs... X-rudders, not at all new, nor any real improvement in submarine capability. Propellors are the same seven bladed skew propellors (they tried with cut-off tips, but later replaced those and opted for the seven bladed skewed ones), so what else is there? Some electronic improvements yes, but nothing really special and nothing is sure about the electronics of the Chinese subs. Add to it that the Klub has a 200km range and is much more advanced than a sub-launched Exocet in the way of electronics and flight path control. The AIP is one improvement of course, but if the Yuan features an AIP that advantage get a lot smaller (of course the Kilo doesn't have it, but it means the Chinese capabilities are overall not so inferior).
There's a lot of big talk from the West, but globalisation has protruded much further than we realise. We have to face it that if we are not careful with the distribution of our technology that we are actually just giving away the biggest advantages, just for profit's sake. That is practically what is happening. The Song is btw equipped with German engines.

Submarine launched Exocets had been available since mid-1970s. Skewed propellers had been available since the late 1960s. Anechoic coatings have been used since late 1970s as well. It is not all together clear to me just what makes the Kilos actually in Russian service more advanced than the state of the art diesel submarine technology of 1979. So to say the Chinese boats were better is a relative reference to an unknown. Advanced engine is a meaningless description. What precise capabilities and properties do these engines have that were not available in late 1970s?

Take German 212A or 214 for example, one could point to specific capabilities as well as features to show why they represents an advancement over what can be achieved in 1979. Except for the conjectural AIP units on the Yuan class, it is much harder to do the same for the Chinese boats.

The capability to launch Sub-launched missiles as well as their endurance and new, much more silent propellors and coatings. If that is not enough, then please tell me what other navies have developed to be new since 1970... No one really has anything spectacular nowadays, a sub remains a sub with torpedo tubes to launch torpedoes, missiles and mines, and all that has remained the same in any submarine operating navy. As far as we can see, the Chinese have more advanced diesel subs than the Russian Navy up till now (if not the Song or Yuan, then at least their Kilos are way more advanced than the Russian versions in service now).
However from this point of view, it is quite clear that they not intend to invade or attack anyone. Their diesel subs venture out occasionally to harrass the Japanese or US forces near Japan, but that's about it. They are still where they were before, meaning, defending the home land, using their subs as mobile minefields (practically what they use their Mings for).
Their nuclear subs are still developmental and it will take them a while to get mature. They do send fleets out for visits, so they do have some task forces with longer range as well as an improved amphibious capability, but I doubt they'd use it against anything except Taiwan.

Granted there is absolutely no doubt that the latest Chinese submarines would incorporate fairly recent electronic component technology unavailable in 1970s. But that does not automatically translate to having signatures and mission capabilities superior to what was available 1970s. Focusing on actual capabilities, besides the conjectural AIP unit in Yuan class, with emphasis on conjectural, which of the features you mentioned represents a significant leap in capability above what would have been deployed in a state of the art conventional submarine from late 1970s?

Utter nonsense. Since 1991 China has commissioned 2 new type 93 SSNs roughly comparable to early model LA class; 2 new type 94 SSBN which do not have missiles, which have never yet launched any missiles, and which have never yet conducted any operational patrols; 9 Type 39 indiginous Diesel electric subs which were roughly equivalent to early 1970 technology, and 12 Kilo and Kilo derivative SS which are roughly equivalent to late 1970 technology. That makes 24 new submarines in 18 years, none of which exceed 1980 technology.

Sorry to read it so late, but that's wrong. These 12 Kilo's contain only 2 really old 877EKM type and 2 newer 636 types (which was actually never given to the Russian Navy itself).
The other 8 of the class are 636M class boats and are hardly anything near 80's Technology. They are equipped with new, more silent engines together with a seven blade skew propellor (regular Kilo has flower shaped six blade prop) along with Klub missiles (200km range) and new electronics. So, late 70's tech is a bit far fetched.
The Song class (039) contains already 14 boats by now and can also fire sub-launched missiles (and reportedly has a French sonar, of a not so early design)
Add to these 2 Yuan class subs which look a lot like the Russian Amur/Lada design (also latest in their stable) and which might be fitted with AIP and other stuff (although nothing certain).
093 and 094 were believed to be launched only recently and nothing is really known about these.

However, I'm still certain this is not really a threat to current US forces or nation.

War is not always about the wallet. For example, read Tuchman's The March of Folly. ISBN:0394527771

clausewitz once wrote that war is merely an extension of politics by other means.

if china seeks to become a superpower, she is primarily trying to do that from an economic standpoint. the build up of her naval assets is an ends to that means. this is not an entirely new concept. the british and the dutch used their fleets in the days of sail to protect far flung colonies, trading posts, and trading vessels. the us navy has and is being used as a political tool to protect political/economic interests abroad.

in the case of china, there are 2 objectives which require naval assets:

1. securing vital raw materials (specifically oil and natural gas) with which china can fuel its industry. the south china sea supposedly has large reserves of oil, particularly in the disputed spratly islands. unfortunately for china, these are at the very edge of effective range of fighter aircraft on hainan. not to mention that the islands are merely a collection of low lying reefs. note that more recent aggressive movement in the spratly chain conicided with the americans being thrown out of its base in subic bay, philippines

2. the taiwan issue -- china wants taiwan back for 2 reasons -- economic power and sheer pride (chinese politicians have long term memories on the order of centuries; for them, once a part of china, always a part of china -- why do you think getting hong kong and macau back was such a big deal). the mainland will never allow taiwan to become independent. they would much rather get it back intact, but they will do anything to prevent its loss. however, any military conflict over taiwan would presume active intervention on the part of the us seventh fleet.

given these 2 parameters, a naval build-up makes sense. china would not have to project power globally. what for (besides that costs money). but to achieve these objectives, power would have to projected locally. building aircraft carriers was one possibility. this would allow movement toward the south in order to seize control of the south china sea area, and at the same time protect amphibious forces moving toward taiwan. for years, china has acquired derelict carriers in the hopes of reverse engineering them so that they could build carriers of their own. however, china appears to still be years away from building an aircraft carrier, and certainly not on the scale of the nimitz class carriers they would face off against.

the next best option, which is possibly what they are doing, is to build a submarine fleet (with regard to the spratlys issue, china seems to have taken a political track; from what i have heard in philippine press, the chinese have proposed cooperative ventures with the other claimants to the islands). the logic behinds submarines would be to ambush any hostile fleet which might be trying to intervene in a taiwan dispute.

Gerarddm wrote:Why was SOSUS scrapped? I understood it provided valuable service?

It is plausible that with subs and aircraft/missles, surface ships may be a dying breed.

Because the Soviet submarine threat has vanished? And it might just be cheaper to deploy a completely new one should any threat worthy of such a system were to ever emerge again in the Atlantic, when compared to the cost of keeping the existing system in operational or reactivable state indefinitely on a speculation that it might still be adequate should it ever be needed again?

Why was SOSUS scrapped? I understood it provided valuable service?

It is plausible that with subs and aircraft/missles, surface ships may be a dying breed.

It didn't become really obvious in the west that the Soviets had adopting the arctic bastion strategy until about 1981. Lehman was simply responding to fact the had a real war broken out at the time, the bulk of Soviet naval assets will not be in North Atlantic and there is a good chance the USN would not have that much to do in the North Atlantic.

At first the Soviet SSB and SSN development was constrained by simply doing its very best to mimic what they perceive to be American developments in order to keep up. The Polaris building program left the Soviets so far in the dust for better part of 1960s it wasn't even funny. It wasn't until they developed their first satisfactory SSBN, the Yankees, when they finally had the technical leisure to starting thinking about developing their own technical approach to adopt to their own strategy. That was when they formulated the arctic bastion strategy in the late 1960s - early 1970s, But the first successful Soviet SSBNs seemed so similar to US Polaris and Pesideon SSBNs that it was natural to assume the Soviets intended to operate their SSBN in scattered patrols in the same way as Americans did. The Soviets seemed to have encourage this impression by actually sending out 1 or 2 SSBN on patrol off American east coast. But the bulk of their SSBN force was held back. Lehman's plan was actually somewhat late as a basis for long term US planning, as it turned out, because by 1984, when the US starting to think about penetrating the arctic bastion, the Soviets had judged that they had closed the ASW gap enough and were starting to think about sending their SSNs out into the Atlantic again.

chuck wrote:Your assumption about not planning for an attack on Soviet SSBN force appears to be incorrect. It appears that during the 1980s the US actually was thinking extremely hard about how to penetrate this arctic SSBN bastion, but was not coming up with a satisfactory answer because it was felt that the Soviets had a large lead in under-ice submarine navigation and warfare, and preventing the Soviets from knowing how large this gap was has become as important as closing this gap.

The idea of penetrating Soviet Northern waters was the brain-child of John Lehman in 1984. ReForGer was the central strategy of NATO for over two decades.

Your assumption about not planning for an attack on Soviet SSBN force appears to be incorrect. It appears that during the 1980s the US actually was thinking extremely hard about how to penetrate this arctic SSBN bastion, but was not coming up with a satisfactory answer because it was felt that the Soviets had a large lead in under-ice submarine navigation and warfare, and preventing the Soviets from knowing how large this gap was has become as important as closing this gap.

It also appears the Soviet doctrine did not automatically call for massive retaliation if parts of its SSBN force comes under ASW attack. If it did than all that was required was a tripwire force to trigger the SSBNs, not a protective cordon made up of almost the entire Soviet navy. Instead it appears the Soviet intention was to actively protect the SSBN force, accept some casualties amongst the SSBN force but keeping bulk of it intact in order to keep their options open. It also seems that the Soviets intended to hold the bulk of its SSBN force in reserve through the main phase of war in Europe and then subsequently use it as bargaining leverage to negotiate a successfuly outcome to the war.

You're speaking from the Soviet perspective. From the US perspective, the Soviet submarine fleet was meant to block reinforcement of NATO following the massive Soviet tank surge into Germany. Submarines armed with hundreds of cruise missiles were intended to lay waste to the shipping lanes between North America and Europe. The SSBNs could hit their targets from pierside in Northern waters. They only needed to transit to more secure waters of the White or Barents Seas.

ReForGer was practiced every year from 1967 to 1993 with that operational assumption in mind.

I think the only practical war planning assumed non-nuclear or a limited nuclear exchange. An attack on the Soviet SSBN bastion would either have to be a sneak knock-out blow, or the apocalypse. There is no sense in planning such a war scenario.