by simoni » Tue Dec 23, 2008 4:18 pm
The first modern small vessel I know of that was modular multi purpose were the Danish Flyvefisken class. This concept continued on with the MEKO ships built in Germany.
One of the test beds for the trimarine naval vessel concept was the Triton in the UK that is now owned by a company I work for on occasion, Gardline. By all acounts she rolls on wet grass.
A trimarine is, however, faster than a similar displacement monohull, and at loiter speeds has greater fuel efficiency.
But I do not think the ships are the disaster some think they may be.
Yes, there are proven European and other small ship navies that have vessels very suitable for littroral operations.
Also, I must say I am a bit surprised by the apparent short endurance they have.
The one thing that strikes me is that the USN is - without debate - the single most powerful maritime force ever created.
However, in saying that, it was built to fight and win WWIII and project power against adverseries that were sponsored by the USSR - with access to anti ship missiles for example.
With that capability the USN has become used to very expensive, powerful assets, and people get used to having that overwhelming force.
The USN is very much a blue water outfit, with a global reach and mission, and was tailored to confront - as JFK said - a ruthless, monolithic enemy.
Since the fall of the USSR the mission profile has changed utterly.
You dont send a carrier group to deal with pirates in Somalia, as a Merchant Marine officer, I wish you could - but you dont use a sledgehammer to crack a nut.
Besides, there are not enough carriers to go around, they are a strategic resource, and each unit of this type needs a massive, personel heavy support group.
They are pretty much on call for much bigger scenarios - e.g. China/Taiwan - India/Pakistan - Turkey/Greece - North / South Korea type situations.
These situations are all in fairly confined waters like the Persian Gulf, Yellow Sea, Red Sea, Adriatic sea, Japan sea, east and south china sea, Red sea, Indonesia and Neighbours etc.
The point about personnel numbers is also important, navies are getting smaller with a greater degree of automation.
I dont wish to sound callous - but there is also a growing risk factor.
There are a lot of Kilo, Scorp�ne and modern 201 thru 212 types in those areas, and the number is growing, not to mention developing concepts like the French SMX-23 which are develping in sophistication, automation and ability - we have seen huge strides with conventional submarines, in AIP for example - and they are becoming more affordable and easier to operate with fewer crew.
That is a real threat to a carrier group.
Lets not forget the damage done to the USS Cole, a destroyer that was damaged with a small boat that rammed it. 17 sailors were murdered in that attack, and a vessel as strategically important as a DDG did not deploy from 12 October 2000 - the Attack, until 8 June 2006 when she re-deployed off Lebanon.
If an LCS suffered the same type of attack, the consequences would not be as strategicaly damaging.
In developing a vessel of this type, one has to think of lessons learned and risk management.
It seems to me, having several of these smaller independent littoral vessels they will be able to operate independently or semi independently as part of a small task group - somewhat like the USN submarines blockading Japan in WWII.
A vessel of this type does not smack of gunboat diplomacy either.
It feels older than that, like when the British would send a frigate, just to show who ruled the waves - and in this I can see the argument that a multi role frigate based on a proven european modular design or even a development of the Oliver Hazard Perry or even the USCG's superb cutters might be adapted to do the same job at potentially a lower cost.
But looking at these ships, with the ro-ro ramp and helos, the capability to carry and land and support small to medium task groups - whether thats for evacuations, interventions or humanitarian aid.
In every case above, a vessel of this nature (or an equivalent frigate) can take action without the political repercussions of a larger surface group.
I think the concept for a flotilla of Brown water, Green water or whatever description of littoral one wishes to use is as a concept very astute and relavent at this period.
In addition to the horn of Africa/ East Africa / Red sea region with Yemen, Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia the other major region where I could see these vessels being deployed for prolonged periods where a larger surface group could put a strain on resources and cause political resorces is West Africa.
The UN has recently - and its about bloody time as well - expanded the rules of engagement for UN troops in Congo.
In support of that, and in dealing with unforseen developments across a very unstable region with important resources (oil in Nigeria, gas in Ghana) and Russias developing policy of using energy supply as a a lever - this concept of vessel I beieve has a vital and valid function in the future.
The first modern small vessel I know of that was modular multi purpose were the Danish Flyvefisken class. This concept continued on with the MEKO ships built in Germany.
One of the test beds for the trimarine naval vessel concept was the Triton in the UK that is now owned by a company I work for on occasion, Gardline. By all acounts she rolls on wet grass.
A trimarine is, however, faster than a similar displacement monohull, and at loiter speeds has greater fuel efficiency.
But I do not think the ships are the disaster some think they may be.
Yes, there are proven European and other small ship navies that have vessels very suitable for littroral operations.
Also, I must say I am a bit surprised by the apparent short endurance they have.
The one thing that strikes me is that the USN is - without debate - the single most powerful maritime force ever created.
However, in saying that, it was built to fight and win WWIII and project power against adverseries that were sponsored by the USSR - with access to anti ship missiles for example.
With that capability the USN has become used to very expensive, powerful assets, and people get used to having that overwhelming force.
The USN is very much a blue water outfit, with a global reach and mission, and was tailored to confront - as JFK said - a ruthless, monolithic enemy.
Since the fall of the USSR the mission profile has changed utterly.
You dont send a carrier group to deal with pirates in Somalia, as a Merchant Marine officer, I wish you could - but you dont use a sledgehammer to crack a nut.
Besides, there are not enough carriers to go around, they are a strategic resource, and each unit of this type needs a massive, personel heavy support group.
They are pretty much on call for much bigger scenarios - e.g. China/Taiwan - India/Pakistan - Turkey/Greece - North / South Korea type situations.
These situations are all in fairly confined waters like the Persian Gulf, Yellow Sea, Red Sea, Adriatic sea, Japan sea, east and south china sea, Red sea, Indonesia and Neighbours etc.
The point about personnel numbers is also important, navies are getting smaller with a greater degree of automation.
I dont wish to sound callous - but there is also a growing risk factor.
There are a lot of Kilo, Scorp�ne and modern 201 thru 212 types in those areas, and the number is growing, not to mention developing concepts like the French SMX-23 which are develping in sophistication, automation and ability - we have seen huge strides with conventional submarines, in AIP for example - and they are becoming more affordable and easier to operate with fewer crew.
That is a real threat to a carrier group.
Lets not forget the damage done to the USS Cole, a destroyer that was damaged with a small boat that rammed it. 17 sailors were murdered in that attack, and a vessel as strategically important as a DDG did not deploy from 12 October 2000 - the Attack, until 8 June 2006 when she re-deployed off Lebanon.
If an LCS suffered the same type of attack, the consequences would not be as strategicaly damaging.
In developing a vessel of this type, one has to think of lessons learned and risk management.
It seems to me, having several of these smaller independent littoral vessels they will be able to operate independently or semi independently as part of a small task group - somewhat like the USN submarines blockading Japan in WWII.
A vessel of this type does not smack of gunboat diplomacy either.
It feels older than that, like when the British would send a frigate, just to show who ruled the waves - and in this I can see the argument that a multi role frigate based on a proven european modular design or even a development of the Oliver Hazard Perry or even the USCG's superb cutters might be adapted to do the same job at potentially a lower cost.
But looking at these ships, with the ro-ro ramp and helos, the capability to carry and land and support small to medium task groups - whether thats for evacuations, interventions or humanitarian aid.
In every case above, a vessel of this nature (or an equivalent frigate) can take action without the political repercussions of a larger surface group.
I think the concept for a flotilla of Brown water, Green water or whatever description of littoral one wishes to use is as a concept very astute and relavent at this period.
In addition to the horn of Africa/ East Africa / Red sea region with Yemen, Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia the other major region where I could see these vessels being deployed for prolonged periods where a larger surface group could put a strain on resources and cause political resorces is West Africa.
The UN has recently - and its about bloody time as well - expanded the rules of engagement for UN troops in Congo.
In support of that, and in dealing with unforseen developments across a very unstable region with important resources (oil in Nigeria, gas in Ghana) and Russias developing policy of using energy supply as a a lever - this concept of vessel I beieve has a vital and valid function in the future.