There's an interesting piece in the newest issue of Warship International (Vol 44 number 4) concerning the sinking of
Kirishima. The article is authored by Richard Worth (Tiouru on this board), Robert Lundgren and Sander Kingsepp.
Here are some of the key points:
The numbers often quoted for hits received and types of hits are from USSBS interegations of LT Hiroshi Tokun, a gunnery officer for the secondary batteries. He said about nine x 16 inch hits and about 40 x 5 inch hits. He is also the person who claimed the captain gave the order to scuttle. His account became the standard account.
The authors took another look at the available sources and came to other conclusions. For a start, when the number of hits are compared to shots fired, the 16 inchers came up only a third as accurate as the 5 inchers.
Other eyewitness accounts are available:
Gunnery officer LTCDR Ikeda's account (Tokun's superior) indicated 14 large caliber, sixteen medium caliber and six unspecified hits below the waterline. The authors note these are probably large calibur because 5 inch fusing would likely prevent submarine penetration.
Supply officer LT(jg) Kobayashi was on the battle bridge with CAPT Iwabuchi and CDR Korno. He saw the action and heard the orders given by the CO and XO. His account reads at least 20 large caliber hits, more than 21 smaller hits and five or six torpedoes. It is known no torpedoes hit, but it lends credence to Ikeda's account of 6 hits below the waterline and how the situation could have been perceived in the heat of battle.
There is some discussion of prewar gaming at the Naval War College that gave the
Kongo class a rating of "12," meaning they could be expected to absorb up to 12 penetrating 14 inch hits before succumbing.
Kirishima's armor was not up to the task of defeating 2700 pound 16 inch shells. So, Tokun's description to USSBS of a ship without steering but otherwise capable seems unlikely after up to 20 x 16 inch hits.
The next part talks about the hits. All were within a 10 minute timeframe and the exact sequence is not know. However, some keys points are clear:
The
first salvo was a straddle with one near miss drenching the bridge.
Hits started being received on the second salvo. The two forward turrets were knocked out by penetrating hits. Turret 3 was knocked out of action due to lost hydraulics. Turret 4 was also incapacitated, but it doesn't say how. Six submerged hits were spaced fairly evenly along the hull, two of them directly outboard of the hydraulic pump rooms. Four hits clustered on the stern as Kirishima started a turn and one submerged hit was directly on one of the rudders.
LTCDR Yoshino,
Kirishima's flooding control officer, described "desperate attempts" to keep the ship on an even keel. Eventually, the Captain decided to flood the propulsion spaces. This may be the root source of Tokun's scuttling remark as he could have mistaken counterflooding for scuttling.
Other data: a historian who participated in Dr Ballard's 1992 expedition provided the authors with unpublished images of the wreck. No torpedo damage was seen, so the wreck cannot be
Hiei. The port rudder is "at an extreme angle" and the starboard rudder has a piece missing.
A big mystery is
Kirishima's wreck is missing everything forward of the conning tower. The authors have no explaination for that.
My comment: from this article, it looks like
Washington's gunnery accuracy was much better than previously documented. It also sounds like
Kirishima was pounded into wreck and left in sinking condtion.
credits: Warship International Vol 44 Number 4, Loss of HIJMS Kirishima, pgs 329 - 331, authored by Richard Worth, Robert Lundgren and Sander Kingsepp.
http://www.warship.orgThere's an interesting piece in the newest issue of Warship International (Vol 44 number 4) concerning the sinking of [i]Kirishima[/i]. The article is authored by Richard Worth (Tiouru on this board), Robert Lundgren and Sander Kingsepp.
Here are some of the key points:
The numbers often quoted for hits received and types of hits are from USSBS interegations of LT Hiroshi Tokun, a gunnery officer for the secondary batteries. He said about nine x 16 inch hits and about 40 x 5 inch hits. He is also the person who claimed the captain gave the order to scuttle. His account became the standard account.
The authors took another look at the available sources and came to other conclusions. For a start, when the number of hits are compared to shots fired, the 16 inchers came up only a third as accurate as the 5 inchers.
Other eyewitness accounts are available:
Gunnery officer LTCDR Ikeda's account (Tokun's superior) indicated 14 large caliber, sixteen medium caliber and six unspecified hits below the waterline. The authors note these are probably large calibur because 5 inch fusing would likely prevent submarine penetration.
Supply officer LT(jg) Kobayashi was on the battle bridge with CAPT Iwabuchi and CDR Korno. He saw the action and heard the orders given by the CO and XO. His account reads at least 20 large caliber hits, more than 21 smaller hits and five or six torpedoes. It is known no torpedoes hit, but it lends credence to Ikeda's account of 6 hits below the waterline and how the situation could have been perceived in the heat of battle.
There is some discussion of prewar gaming at the Naval War College that gave the [i]Kongo[/i] class a rating of "12," meaning they could be expected to absorb up to 12 penetrating 14 inch hits before succumbing. [i]Kirishima's[/i] armor was not up to the task of defeating 2700 pound 16 inch shells. So, Tokun's description to USSBS of a ship without steering but otherwise capable seems unlikely after up to 20 x 16 inch hits.
The next part talks about the hits. All were within a 10 minute timeframe and the exact sequence is not know. However, some keys points are clear:
The [u]first salvo was a straddle[/u] with one near miss drenching the bridge. [u]Hits started being received on the second salvo[/u]. The two forward turrets were knocked out by penetrating hits. Turret 3 was knocked out of action due to lost hydraulics. Turret 4 was also incapacitated, but it doesn't say how. Six submerged hits were spaced fairly evenly along the hull, two of them directly outboard of the hydraulic pump rooms. Four hits clustered on the stern as Kirishima started a turn and one submerged hit was directly on one of the rudders.
LTCDR Yoshino, [i]Kirishima's[/i] flooding control officer, described "desperate attempts" to keep the ship on an even keel. Eventually, the Captain decided to flood the propulsion spaces. This may be the root source of Tokun's scuttling remark as he could have mistaken counterflooding for scuttling.
Other data: a historian who participated in Dr Ballard's 1992 expedition provided the authors with unpublished images of the wreck. No torpedo damage was seen, so the wreck cannot be [i]Hiei[/i]. The port rudder is "at an extreme angle" and the starboard rudder has a piece missing.
A big mystery is [i]Kirishima's[/i] wreck is missing everything forward of the conning tower. The authors have no explaination for that.
My comment: from this article, it looks like [i]Washington's[/i] gunnery accuracy was much better than previously documented. It also sounds like [i]Kirishima[/i] was pounded into wreck and left in sinking condtion.
credits: Warship International Vol 44 Number 4, Loss of HIJMS Kirishima, pgs 329 - 331, authored by Richard Worth, Robert Lundgren and Sander Kingsepp. http://www.warship.org