chuck wrote:1. Long fusing does not hamper armor piercing.
2. North Dakota would not have sunk or have been critically damaged even if every Japanese 14" shell observed to hit successfully exploded inside the ship. There having been no underwater damage or any hits to the citadel.
3. Contrary to what you seem to say out of what appears to be pure reflex, the Warship International's Washington/Kirishima article makes the case that shorts resulting in underwater hits are not rare at all - having occurred 6 times, or once for every 2-3 claimed direct hits, in just the one engagement mentioned. Furthermore since the article claimed the Kirishima was not scuttled but actuall sunk, and not by any torpedoes either, one must therefore presume that it was the underwater shell hits that put the Kirishima in "sinking" condition because it requires admission of water to put a ship in a condition susceptible to sinking, or even to put the ship in a state requiring counterflooding the engine room to remediate. Consequently the article, if its claimes were true, would seem to make a rather convincing case that underwater hits are quite likely, and moreover hit for hit they are also quite likely to be much more decisive then direct hits, and therefore are well worth the effort to make them more frequent.
I tried to make my point simple, but...
1. The long fusing hampered
Kirishima in that the shells striking the superstructure passed a long way (I have the impression of 100 yards or so) through
South Dakota's
superstructure before detonating. Obviously, the cumulative effect of the entire superstructure was only sufficient to begin the fusing process which the fuse regarded as the the shell striking the water.
When you and I have discussed similar issues in the past, I notice you only consider hits within the citadel of the ship, when most of the battles since 1905 have shown how important C3I features in the superstructure are for the ship's ability to fight back, and therefore survive.
Bismarck was pummeled into a quite useless shape before her citadel was pierced. Even
South Dakota was a "soft kill" in this engagement simply because her electrical supply to radar and fire controls was interrupted for a few minutes. After-action comments regarding long delays on Japanese AP shells are not confined to this engagement.
It is interesting that
Kirishima appears to have greatly overestimated the range to target. Perhaps the targeting officer thought she was a smaller vessel.
2.
North Dakota was not present at the battle, having been expended in experiments in the 1920s. I don't know whether you mean
North Carolina's sister ship
Washington which was undamaged at all in the engagement, or
South Dakota, which in any event took (as I recall) all of her damage above the waterline. Unlike you, I cannot speak to the "commonness" of diving hits when you consider the engagement was extraordinary, with the 16 inch rounds fired from 10,000 yards down. I tend to think of capital ship engagements would occur at at least twice this range, with 15,000 being a satisfactory range for penetrating hits on both sides (speaking archaeologically, of course. Each player had his own preferred range which conferred a decisive advantage).
3. I don't know what to say about the ratio of direct penetrating hits and "diving shell hits", as opposed to near misses and so on. I will wait for more analysis from the experts.
What it seems is that we need to increase the effective width of a target when accounting the probability of hits and likely penetrating hits below the waterline. My question right now is why did the Japanese bother with all this when the net effect was to make the fuse time so long as to reduce damage except when the diving effect is fully in play.
It is possible this was an exceptional engagement, especially considering the quantity of commentary from
Kirishima about attempting to maintain stability; it is unclear to me whether the concern was in list or pitch, since there are comments as to the entire fore half of the ship being missing. Perhaps a magazine separated a vast portion of the fore quarter of the ship and the effort was to stop her from submarining. In any event, since we have little other comment regarding loss of stability in the other Japanese battleship surface engagements, I cannot make any inferences. Being totally ignorant of the Italian experience, it might be an illuminating time to investigate the battles of the Mediterranean.
A final comment: the new data only reinforces the efficacy of unit machinery disposition with no centerline bulkheads, and where possible auxiliary machinery rooms separating engine plants.
[quote="chuck"]1. Long fusing does not hamper armor piercing.
2. North Dakota would [i]not[/i] have sunk or have been [i]critically[/i] damaged even if every Japanese 14" shell observed to hit successfully exploded inside the ship. There having been no underwater damage or any hits to the citadel.
3. Contrary to what you seem to say out of what appears to be pure reflex, the Warship International's Washington/Kirishima article makes the case that shorts resulting in underwater hits are [i]not[/i] rare at all - having occurred 6 times, or once for every 2-3 claimed direct hits, in just the one engagement mentioned. Furthermore since the article claimed the Kirishima was not scuttled but actuall sunk, and not by any torpedoes either, one must therefore presume that it was the underwater shell hits that put the Kirishima in "sinking" condition because it requires admission of water to put a ship in a condition susceptible to sinking, or even to put the ship in a state requiring counterflooding the engine room to remediate. Consequently the article, if its claimes were true, would seem to make a rather convincing case that underwater hits are quite likely, and moreover hit for hit they are also quite likely to be [i]much[/i] more decisive then direct hits, and therefore are well worth the effort to make them more frequent.[/quote]
I tried to make my point simple, but...
1. The long fusing hampered [i]Kirishima[/i] in that the shells striking the superstructure passed a long way (I have the impression of 100 yards or so) through [i]South Dakota[/i]'s [b]superstructure[/b] before detonating. Obviously, the cumulative effect of the entire superstructure was only sufficient to begin the fusing process which the fuse regarded as the the shell striking the water.
When you and I have discussed similar issues in the past, I notice you only consider hits within the citadel of the ship, when most of the battles since 1905 have shown how important C3I features in the superstructure are for the ship's ability to fight back, and therefore survive. [i]Bismarck[/i] was pummeled into a quite useless shape before her citadel was pierced. Even [i]South Dakota[/i] was a "soft kill" in this engagement simply because her electrical supply to radar and fire controls was interrupted for a few minutes. After-action comments regarding long delays on Japanese AP shells are not confined to this engagement.
It is interesting that [i]Kirishima[/i] appears to have greatly overestimated the range to target. Perhaps the targeting officer thought she was a smaller vessel.
2. [i]North Dakota[/i] was not present at the battle, having been expended in experiments in the 1920s. I don't know whether you mean [i][b]North[/b] Carolina[/i]'s sister ship [i]Washington[/i] which was undamaged at all in the engagement, or [i]South [b]Dakota[/b][/i], which in any event took (as I recall) all of her damage above the waterline. Unlike you, I cannot speak to the "commonness" of diving hits when you consider the engagement was extraordinary, with the 16 inch rounds fired from 10,000 yards down. I tend to think of capital ship engagements would occur at at least twice this range, with 15,000 being a satisfactory range for penetrating hits on both sides (speaking archaeologically, of course. Each player had his own preferred range which conferred a decisive advantage).
3. I don't know what to say about the ratio of direct penetrating hits and "diving shell hits", as opposed to near misses and so on. I will wait for more analysis from the experts.
What it seems is that we need to increase the effective width of a target when accounting the probability of hits and likely penetrating hits below the waterline. My question right now is why did the Japanese bother with all this when the net effect was to make the fuse time so long as to reduce damage except when the diving effect is fully in play.
It is possible this was an exceptional engagement, especially considering the quantity of commentary from [i]Kirishima[/i] about attempting to maintain stability; it is unclear to me whether the concern was in list or pitch, since there are comments as to the entire fore half of the ship being missing. Perhaps a magazine separated a vast portion of the fore quarter of the ship and the effort was to stop her from submarining. In any event, since we have little other comment regarding loss of stability in the other Japanese battleship surface engagements, I cannot make any inferences. Being totally ignorant of the Italian experience, it might be an illuminating time to investigate the battles of the Mediterranean.
A final comment: the new data only reinforces the efficacy of unit machinery disposition with no centerline bulkheads, and where possible auxiliary machinery rooms separating engine plants.