The Ship Model Forum

by **hondaman117** » Wed Jul 13, 2016 7:07 pm

FW_Allen wrote:
IIRC Ted Briggs' battle station was in what I would refer to as the "fighting top". Does anybody know where the other two survivors' battle stations were? I also discovered that the total loss of officers and crew was 1,418. That
Sorry, joining this one a couple of months late! I didn't see a complete answer, so here goes:

I am VERY familiar with Hood's casualties (having spent years helping compile data, photos, records, etc. on her crew. I can say that without doubt there were 1,418 men aboard that morning. 3 survived and 1415 were lost. This figure was subject to debate for some time...but it took time to determine that some people were transferred, some were in jail, some were in training...and some were AWOL (one of whom was not caught until after the war...sorry cannot go into it any farther). This last chap actually affected the official RN count...which stood at 1416 until our efforts. Working with the MoD and CWGC, we've since verified the actual figure at 1,415. What's the difference in 1 or 3 men? Its a BIG difference- we must ensure that only the correct men are properly memorialised.

As for Ted, we miss him very much. Nice chap indeed. Ted (along with Midshipman William Dundas) was located in the Compass Platform. This is the upper set of windows just behind the big cylindrical conning tower. Its NOT the Control/Spotting Top atop the tripod mast high above the bridge. Ted was manning phones and voice tubes at the back of the room. Dundas was forward near the chart table (slightly to port). This is the same room in which the Admiral, Captain and other senior squadron officers were located. Ted and Dundas both got out on the starboard side (Ted through the door and Dundas through one of the windows). Bob Tilburn was outside...he was located on the port side near the forward UP mount abreast the first funnel. He escaped from that very spot.

As for the rafts, Hood had recently been outfitted with numerous "Denton Rafts". These were small 3ft flat/square floats. I guess they kind of look like biscuits. Many folks assume they used the Carley Floats or life rings, but no. They DID have 'Mae West' life preservers, but for Ted at least, it proved useless...his was on UNDER his wool jumper and coat! Besides, the water was too cold to for them to remain immersed. He felt that the fuel oil might have helped insulate them a bit (they were completely caked in it) but even that didn't help after time had passed. If it hadn't been for Dundas keeping them awake, and the timely arrival of Electra...

I count myself very lucky...its one thing to read books and watch films, but its another thing entirely to actually know the men who were there. I've been very fortunate to know many crew from Hood (from the Empire Cruise to her sinking) and even some chaps from Bismarck.

Thanks for your input, I always like to hear the truth on historical events. I am envious that you got to talk with them and get to know them. I always enjoy meeting veterans and talking to them, they always have good stories to tell.

P.S. I'll probably be bugging you quite a bit when I get working on my 1/200 Hood later this year haha. I love the Hood Association website and plan on using it as a resource. I'd like my model to be a good representation of her and will be trying to correct as many of the errors as my skills allow.

by **Dan Banks** » Wed Jul 13, 2016 5:58 pm

All the what ifs are interesting, but the fact remains that the Royal Navy was tasked with eliminating the Bismark, and that's what they did. It is unfortunate that Hood was sacrificed in this effort, but Adm. Halsey's quote about eggs and omelettes might apply here.

by **biggles2** » Tue Jul 12, 2016 7:05 pm

Apparently, the reason the British lost Battle Cruisers at the Battle of Jutland was due to the practice of leaving the blast doors of the magazines open for quicker servicing. One report I read stated that 4" ammunition was stored along the corridors adjacent to the main magazines on the Hood. If the practice of leaving the blast doors open continued to WWll, then the hit that ignited the 4" could have started a chain reaction that ended up in the aft main magazine.

by **FW_Allen** » Tue Jul 12, 2016 5:44 pm

IIRC Ted Briggs' battle station was in what I would refer to as the "fighting top". Does anybody know where the other two survivors' battle stations were? I also discovered that the total loss of officers and crew was 1,418. That

Sorry, joining this one a couple of months late! I didn't see a complete answer, so here goes:

I am VERY familiar with Hood's casualties (having spent years helping compile data, photos, records, etc. on her crew. I can say that without doubt there were 1,418 men aboard that morning. 3 survived and 1415 were lost. This figure was subject to debate for some time...but it took time to determine that some people were transferred, some were in jail, some were in training...and some were AWOL (one of whom was not caught until after the war...sorry cannot go into it any farther). This last chap actually affected the official RN count...which stood at 1416 until our efforts. Working with the MoD and CWGC, we've since verified the actual figure at 1,415. What's the difference in 1 or 3 men? Its a BIG difference- we must ensure that only the correct men are properly memorialised.

As for Ted, we miss him very much. Nice chap indeed. Ted (along with Midshipman William Dundas) was located in the Compass Platform. This is the upper set of windows just behind the big cylindrical conning tower. Its NOT the Control/Spotting Top atop the tripod mast high above the bridge. Ted was manning phones and voice tubes at the back of the room. Dundas was forward near the chart table (slightly to port). This is the same room in which the Admiral, Captain and other senior squadron officers were located. Ted and Dundas both got out on the starboard side (Ted through the door and Dundas through one of the windows). Bob Tilburn was outside...he was located on the port side near the forward UP mount abreast the first funnel. He escaped from that very spot.

As for the rafts, Hood had recently been outfitted with numerous "Denton Rafts". These were small 3ft flat/square floats. I guess they kind of look like biscuits. Many folks assume they used the Carley Floats or life rings, but no. They DID have 'Mae West' life preservers, but for Ted at least, it proved useless...his was on UNDER his wool jumper and coat! Besides, the water was too cold to for them to remain immersed. He felt that the fuel oil might have helped insulate them a bit (they were completely caked in it) but even that didn't help after time had passed. If it hadn't been for Dundas keeping them awake, and the timely arrival of Electra...

I count myself very lucky...its one thing to read books and watch films, but its another thing entirely to actually know the men who were there. I've been very fortunate to know many crew from Hood (from the Empire Cruise to her sinking) and even some chaps from Bismarck.

by **RaceFuel** » Thu May 26, 2016 2:14 pm

The British, for all their love of naval history and lore, are not particularly sentimental peoples when it comes to grand preservation actions. It's only by the intervention of a private party that Belfast is still with us today.

Hood was a loved ship by the British people, but immediately after the war there were much more pressing concerns than saving an old battlewagon. Just like what happened with Warspite..even if Hood had survived DS and the rest of the war..she would have been in extremely rough shape by 1945 and likely would have been sent to the breakers by 1950 at the latest. A big part of her fame is her loss at DS and the near complete loss of her crew, without that..she'd have been less famous, much like Arizona.

by **hondaman117** » Thu May 26, 2016 1:46 pm

Admiral John Byng wrote:
I suspect that Vice Admiral Holland was aware of PoWs deficiencies in work-up and perhaps the problem with the turrets. He may have been attempting to concentrate fire on Bismarck as she posed the greatest risk. Even if they had disabled, or even sunk PE then Bismarck would still be there. As it was there wasn't time to do much damage to PE even if he had chosen her as the target.

The main goal of the British was to keep the Bismarck from getting to the Atlantic, they had plenty of ships that could stop the PE, but if Bismarck made it they had nothing to stop him from wreaking havoc. At the beginning of the battle Holland ordered fire on the lead ship because they thought it was Bismarck. What they didn't know was that when the British had lost radar contact the PE and Bismarck switched places because the blasts of Bismarck's guns had knocked out her forward radar. When the British regained contact they saw two dots and assumed nothing had changed. Combined with the similar silhouettes of the two ships, it is easy to see the mistake. Captain Leach on POW recognized the error and fired on Bismarck, this may have been the reason why POW was able to get hits on Bismarck and Hood didn't.

According to files, Hood and POW had already made a 20* turn to better intercept the Germans, and they were in the middle of executing a second turn to unmask the rear guns as Hood was hit. The discovery of the wreckage confirmed this as the rudder was locked to port by the worm gear mechanism. Whether they were close enough to be safe from plunging fire or not we'll never know as it is impossible to tell exactly where Bismarck hit Hood.

In the end, even with the loss of Hood the British achieved their goal. The hits by POW forced Bismarck to return to France for repairs and ultimately sealed his fate. The only thing I think they should have done differently was POW should have lead, not Hood. Knowing Hood was susceptible from fire and that POW was a true battleship with better armor, it should have been in front to absorb more fire so Hood would be at less risk from being concentrated on. However as we now know POW was malfunctioning, so the British would likely still have to retreat, but maybe POW AND Hood would have survived to fight another day.

On a separate note, I find it depressing that the British didn't save a single Battleship. I think it's entirely possible that if Hood had survived the war she would have been saved. She spent so much time as the face of the Royal Navy the public would have been outraged if she was scrapped.

by **Admiral John Byng** » Thu May 26, 2016 1:01 pm

DavidP wrote:hood could still been used as to what she was designed for to take out cruisers & in this case prinz eugen. once prinz eugen was gone 1 way or the other then could shift her fire to Bismarck.

I suspect that Vice Admiral Holland was aware of PoWs deficiencies in work-up and perhaps the problem with the turrets. He may have been attempting to concentrate fire on Bismarck as she posed the greatest risk. Even if they had disabled, or even sunk PE then Bismarck would still be there. As it was there wasn't time to do much damage to PE even if he had chosen her as the target.

by **RaceFuel** » Thu May 26, 2016 9:06 am

robertmelvin wrote:
If, Hood and PoW was all that was available in the way of capital ships, then that was what the RN had to work with. They certainly couldn't send cruisers alone to try to kill Bismark and Prinze Eugen. One unalterable fact of war is that you have to work with the tools at hand, even if they are not ideal. As I understand it, the officer in tactical command took a calculated risk in trying to close on Bismark and P.W. to get out of the range at which plunging fire would be a serious concern. He lost. Simple as that. As Nimitz told Spruance and Fletcher before Midway, "you shall be guided by the principle of calculated risk". The fact is that even the best naval tacticians can calculate the risk, arrive at the best solution, and still loose the fight. Calculated risk is just that, risk. Even the best tactical decision can have a negative outcome. You have to accept certain incalculable factors, such as simple blind luck. My impression and understanding was that the tactical CO had two choices with Hood, close the distance or run. I don't see any any fault that could be attached to the officer in tactical command. He took a gamble that he had to make to have a chance to kill Bismark and he lost. That doesn't mean he made bad decisions. Anybody who has ever played cards for money will tell you that you can have a hell of a hand (I'm a stud poker player myself) and still loose.

Bob M.

No I know, I wasn't faulting the RN for having Hood there, since as I said before, she and PoW were all they had to work with to close the Denmark Strait to Bismarck and Prinz Eugen . What I meant by "under no circumstance" is that if any other capital ships had been available then they should have been there rather than Hood, except for maybe Repulse or Renown, since they were even weaker and more lightly armored than Hood. Ideally King George V and a worked up Prince of Wales would have closed the DS gap well, but KGV was too far south covering another gap.

What I meant by "turned too soon" is not a condemnation of the tactical risk they took, just that the turn was executed a little too soon, before Hood was out from plunging fire and wasn't able to absorb more hits to her main belt vs the upper belt or deck.

by **Fliger747** » Wed May 25, 2016 8:15 pm

Holland's real error was in calculating his line of approach, he had the opportunity to cross the T of the advancing Bismarck with a better approach angle, rather than being crossed and forced into an angling, converging approach that was less optimal.

Hard to say what immunity zone the Hood had against Bismarck's 15" rifles, which were a high velocity type and would be more effective against side plates than decks in comparison to the very heavy shell approach favored by the USN. Again I believe the thoughts were that visibility issues in the North Sea and Atlantic would favor shorter battle ranges.

Sea battles turn particularly on the unforeseen!

Cheers!

by **robertmelvin** » Wed May 25, 2016 5:33 pm

RaceFuel wrote:
Fliger747 wrote:The Brits have a saying: "When needs must, the Devil drives". It may be also that the course change was to open the "A Arcs" of the rear turrets. The close formation of Hood and POW may not have been optimal either, allowing Bismarck to change targets easily. Harry Harwood handing his cruisers against Graf Spee did much better, dividing the enemy fire.

Yes, desperate times!
The turn to port was to unmask X and Y turret, it was just executed too soon. However it's understandable that Adm Holland chose to do so, given that Hood was starting to sustain some fairly significant casualties in the superstructure. Had Hood closed the distance an additional 4,000 yards or so it's much more likely she would have been able to stand and fight longer, however in any situation she was living on borrowed time since any turn to disengage would have exposed weaker armor to fire.

Simply put, in no circumstance, should Hood have been there. Ideally she would have been out of commission, in a yard, getting taken down to her decks and refitted with new machinery, more armor, better sensors, optics, AA batteries, etc...but she wasn't.

If, Hood and PoW was all that was available in the way of capital ships, then that was what the RN had to work with. They certainly couldn't send cruisers alone to try to kill Bismark and Prinze Eugen. One unalterable fact of war is that you have to work with the tools at hand, even if they are not ideal. As I understand it, the officer in tactical command took a calculated risk in trying to close on Bismark and P.W. to get out of the range at which plunging fire would be a serious concern. He lost. Simple as that. As Nimitz told Spruance and Fletcher before Midway, "you shall be guided by the principle of calculated risk". The fact is that even the best naval tacticians can calculate the risk, arrive at the best solution, and still loose the fight. Calculated risk is just that, risk. Even the best tactical decision can have a negative outcome. You have to accept certain incalculable factors, such as simple blind luck. My impression and understanding was that the tactical CO had two choices with Hood, close the distance or run. I don't see any any fault that could be attached to the officer in tactical command. He took a gamble that he had to make to have a chance to kill Bismark and he lost. That doesn't mean he made bad decisions. Anybody who has ever played cards for money will tell you that you can have a hell of a hand (I'm a stud poker player myself) and still loose.

Bob M.

by **RaceFuel** » Wed May 25, 2016 4:52 pm

Fliger747 wrote:The Brits have a saying: "When needs must, the Devil drives". It may be also that the course change was to open the "A Arcs" of the rear turrets. The close formation of Hood and POW may not have been optimal either, allowing Bismarck to change targets easily. Harry Harwood handing his cruisers against Graf Spee did much better, dividing the enemy fire.

Yes, desperate times!

The turn to port was to unmask X and Y turret, it was just executed too soon. However it's understandable that Adm Holland chose to do so, given that Hood was starting to sustain some fairly significant casualties in the superstructure. Had Hood closed the distance an additional 4,000 yards or so it's much more likely she would have been able to stand and fight longer, however in any situation she was living on borrowed time since any turn to disengage would have exposed weaker armor to fire.

Simply put, in no circumstance, should Hood have been there. Ideally she would have been out of commission, in a yard, getting taken down to her decks and refitted with new machinery, more armor, better sensors, optics, AA batteries, etc...but she wasn't.

by **Fliger747** » Wed May 25, 2016 3:35 pm

The Brits have a saying: "When needs must, the Devil drives". It may be also that the course change was to open the "A Arcs" of the rear turrets. The close formation of Hood and POW may not have been optimal either, allowing Bismarck to change targets easily. Harry Harwood handing his cruisers against Graf Spee did much better, dividing the enemy fire.

Yes, desperate times!

by **RaceFuel** » Wed May 25, 2016 2:34 pm

A lot of people seem to think it was British arrogance and supreme confidence in Hood that led to them sending her to fight Bismarck...I would argue that it was instead a sign of desperation. They needed ships to cover Bismarck and Prinz Eugens possible escape routes. The only two capital ships that could, in terms of firepower, hope to at least slow Bismarck and Prinz Eugen down, and were available, were PoW and Hood. A 21 year old battlecruiser in need of a refit and an unfinished, untrained and inexperienced battleship were clearly not the ideal ships to intercept Bismarck, but it was all they had that was close that could intercept Bismarck and Prinz Eugen before they broke out.

Adm Holland knew Hood wasn't the ideal ship for running down and engaging the newest battleship in the world, which is why he was trying to close the range so fast, to minimize the time her decks were largely exposed to plunging fire. Hood's main belt was actually fairly capable of standing up against a battleships main battery...from the Jutland era, so it would have been moderately capable of protecting her from Bismarck. The 20 degree turn to port at 18,000 yards was in result of the (incorrect) belief of Adm Holland that he had closed the range enough to get out from plunging fire and start absorbing rounds into the belt...obviously he was mistaken.

by **hondaman117** » Wed May 25, 2016 1:37 pm

Fliger747 wrote:One of the miscellaneous Hood references Listed her speed in earlier days as 31 knots and at the time of her loss as 28 knots. Anyone know of the veracity of this, it makes some sense as the ship eventually became of deeper draft due to armor upgrades etc.

That is correct. Like any ship the Hood had been continuously upgraded over her long career. By WWII these upgrades had added so much weight that Hood's draft was 4 feet deeper than intended. The main consequence of this was that the forecastle and poop decks were usually running with water in heavy seas, but it also dropped her speed to about 28 knots. Also, Hood was kept continually in service during the interwar period, so she was denied opportunities for major overhauls. She was scheduled for major refit in 1941, but the start of WWII delayed that as she was needed at the time. By 1940, her machinery was in such bad shape that she could only manage about 26 knots speed, and she finally got a machinery overhaul that restored her speed to 28 knots. Then while chasing Strasbourg she stripped a turbine requiring another overhaul. This was the last overhaul Hood ever received, so at the time of her sinking she had a top speed of 28 knots. Had Hood survived the encounter with Bismarck she would have eventually gotten the overhaul she desperately needed, but I doubt she would have regained her original 31 knot speed.

I'm very glad this thread is alive again, it's getting me hyped for my 1/200 Hood to arrive!

by **Fliger747** » Wed May 25, 2016 1:14 pm

https://books.google.com/books?isbn=1783469803

An interesting snippet from what must be a fascinating book about Hood. Apparently all three survivors were able to get mostly out of the water on these 3' square Biscuit Floats.

T

by **Fliger747** » Wed May 25, 2016 1:02 pm

One of the miscellaneous Hood references Listed her speed in earlier days as 31 knots and at the time of her loss as 28 knots. Anyone know of the veracity of this, it makes some sense as the ship eventually became of deeper draft due to armor upgrades etc.

Certainly a beautiful ship with super clean lines, the "almost" Fast Battleship.

One wonders how much more explosive effect is multiplied by the armored box around the magazines as most of the explosion results from the kiloton or so of propellent, which when confined creates quite an effect! Roma was destroyed by the Fritz X whereas Savanna was also hit in forward magazines (three!) and survived. It may be that the lighter structure yielded and immediate flooding prevented complete conflagration. Additionally the 6" used ammunition with a brass cased propellant.

Robert Tillburn was crew of a 4" midships on the disengaged side and went to the rail to throw up after his mount mates were killed by splinters, it was his position at the rail that saved his life when the fatal moment arrived. Apparently all three survivors got together on a "Biscuit Float". Any body know what these are?

Cheers: T

by **RaceFuel** » Wed May 25, 2016 12:58 pm

One thing to consider with Hood is that the RN at the time was very busy trying to get new ships worked up, like Prince of Wales and shuffling experienced crews to other ships coming in and going out of commission for refit, etc.

by **RaceFuel** » Wed May 25, 2016 12:53 pm

The debris field and remains of Hood show that it's completely certain that it was the magazines for X and Y turrets that went up. Given the range to Bismarck and Prinz Eugen when Hood exploded (18,000 yards) it was almost certainly a 15" AP round from Caesar or Dora that did the deed.

An 8" round from Prinz Eugen did set off a fire at the mainmast in the ready use lockers for the 4" guns, which created "one hell of a mess and killed quite a lot of people" according to Ted Briggs.

What is remarkable is that according to the crew of PoW, Hood exploded very quietly, so much so that even on board Hood they didn't realize at first what had happened, only reporting that "steerings gone sir" on the bridge after the explosion which broke the ships back and ultimately severed her in two.

by **robertmelvin** » Wed May 25, 2016 8:37 am

Fliger747 wrote: Actually the warm currents that wander up from the gulf stream make the North Atlantic marginally more habitable than the same latitude in say the Bearing sea, but yes the inevitable hypothermia would quickly sap even the strongest unwounded individuals.

T

I hit up Google for some maps of the Gulf Stream and from what I saw by the time it reaches the area of the Denmark Strait the Stream has lost a great deal of its thermal energy and has also become pretty diffuse, unlike, say, off the Florida coast where it is still compact, almost like a river flowing through the Atlantic Ocean. This leads me to suspect that any rise in the temperature of the waters there due to the Gulf Stream would be pretty nominal, not enough to make that much of a difference in how long it would otherwise take for hypothermia to get you.

IIRC Ted Briggs' battle station was in what I would refer to as the "fighting top". Does anybody know where the other two survivors' battle stations were? I also discovered that the total loss of officers and crew was 1,418. That is a surprising small figure to me for what I would have assumed the compliment of a ship Hood's size would have been. But, my initial supposition as to a larger compliment was based on comparing apples and oranges (I know, I should know better), being based on what the compliment of an early war USN battleship would have been. I that at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, the U.S.S. Arizona carried a total compliment of 1,731. Of that number 1,102 were killed. So Hood's compliment was just a shade under 300 officers and crew less than Arizona. I suppose that is getting to the "factoid" level though.

This has so far been a very interesting thread. Thanks to all for getting it started and keeping it going. And, it has been made even better by the fact that the dialogue has been thoughtful, cordial and conducted with mutual respect for each others' thoughts. I think we've all seen threads on any number of forums that didn't quite go that way.

Bob M.

by **Fliger747** » Wed May 25, 2016 12:03 am

With Hood's armored box being very close to the waterline, the force of the explosion would be somewhat contained upward and laterally, but expanding down through the bottom and most easily forward (it was believed to be the aft magazines for X and Y turrets) through the large engineering spaces and possibly causing sympathetic ignition of other "combustible/explosives". Looking at the Ballard photos, one of the more totally shredded warships! She of course had almost a total ordinance load remaining at the beginning of the battle when she was lost. One reason I tend to estimate that the force was mostly internally directed was the lack of a huge "noise". The huge column of flame noted may have been just that, torching erupting upward from the engineering spaces but lacking the explosive "boom".

WAG...

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