by bengtsson » Sat Jul 15, 2006 8:53 am
The most interesting aspect of Lundstrom's book is the way he makes clear that after Pearl Harbor the USN really was casting around for a way to fight the naval war. The old central Pacific offensive was dropped from the start. More due to the obvious power of Japanese A/C Carriers and landbased aircraft. It seems that Admiral King still was interested in what the BBs could do, but Nimitz and most others in command of the Pacific at Pearl Harbor were completely A/C Carrier minded. NOT because the USN had no BBs, but because they didn't dare use them without A/C Carrier escort. So from the start, the Pacific command saw the A/C carrier as the capital ship and the ship that would decide the 1942 battles. Conventional wisdom is that the USN had no battleline after Pearl Harbor, but they had 7 BB's in task force 1 at San Fransisco only weeks after Pearl Harbor.
The USN was interested in engaging in combat as soon as possible, because before Coral Sea, they felt that the USN's naval aviation would be superior to the Japanese. After Coral Sea, they changed their minds on that subject and were less sure of themselves at Midway. Nimitz telling Fletcher that he should not lose his carriers and if necessary, pull back and let Japanese forces take Midway. Nimitz looked at Midway as a chance to ambush the Japanese, if the ambush didn't come off, he was willing to give up Midway rather than lose a significant portion of the carriers force. As it was, the Japanse played their part almost to perfection and the ambush came off almost as planned. The US expected two Japanese carrier groups though. One two carrier force to come in close and pound Midway, the other two to act as cover force prepared from a distance to engage American naval forces if any turned up earlier than expected. As it was, this may have been a better plan for the Japanese. One force attack Midway, the other guard that force with decks loaded for an anti shipping strike. Working all 4 flight decks against Midway was the root cause of the big disaster for the Japanese, although lots of smaller things helped them on their way to doom at Midway.
Bob B.
The most interesting aspect of Lundstrom's book is the way he makes clear that after Pearl Harbor the USN really was casting around for a way to fight the naval war. The old central Pacific offensive was dropped from the start. More due to the obvious power of Japanese A/C Carriers and landbased aircraft. It seems that Admiral King still was interested in what the BBs could do, but Nimitz and most others in command of the Pacific at Pearl Harbor were completely A/C Carrier minded. NOT because the USN had no BBs, but because they didn't dare use them without A/C Carrier escort. So from the start, the Pacific command saw the A/C carrier as the capital ship and the ship that would decide the 1942 battles. Conventional wisdom is that the USN had no battleline after Pearl Harbor, but they had 7 BB's in task force 1 at San Fransisco only weeks after Pearl Harbor.
The USN was interested in engaging in combat as soon as possible, because before Coral Sea, they felt that the USN's naval aviation would be superior to the Japanese. After Coral Sea, they changed their minds on that subject and were less sure of themselves at Midway. Nimitz telling Fletcher that he should not lose his carriers and if necessary, pull back and let Japanese forces take Midway. Nimitz looked at Midway as a chance to ambush the Japanese, if the ambush didn't come off, he was willing to give up Midway rather than lose a significant portion of the carriers force. As it was, the Japanse played their part almost to perfection and the ambush came off almost as planned. The US expected two Japanese carrier groups though. One two carrier force to come in close and pound Midway, the other two to act as cover force prepared from a distance to engage American naval forces if any turned up earlier than expected. As it was, this may have been a better plan for the Japanese. One force attack Midway, the other guard that force with decks loaded for an anti shipping strike. Working all 4 flight decks against Midway was the root cause of the big disaster for the Japanese, although lots of smaller things helped them on their way to doom at Midway.
Bob B.