The Ship Model Forum

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One thing that really impresses me about the early war USN is the manpower recruitment and training. VAST numbers which were turned around from civilians to reasonable sailors quickly and continuously. ( Likewise, the (presumable) continuing training on the ships/establishments they were sent to - a tribute to the professionalism of the existing USN personnel. )

Ditto, of course, for the US Merchant Marine, which expanded to an even greater extent.

I have never seen a decent (i.e. non propaganda) book about these expansions despite their importance to the US's war effort.

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taskforce48 wrote:It was certainly a grab bag of old doctrines, Politics and honestly a lot of arrogance. I really like Ian Toll's Pacific Crucible, focuses on the Pacific but there is some discussion of what was happening in the Atlantic at the same time.

Matt

Interesting you should reference politics. I was particularly struck by this in the reading of 'Pearl Harbor:Final Judgement' The authors are Henry C Clausen and Bruce Lee. The ISBN for the copy I have is 0-85052-390-7; there is also an interesting book on the war as seen by the IJN. I don't have it at hand at present but will post the details in short order.

Samuel Eliot Morison. 'The author had access to primary naval documents and naval personnel of the period. ' The author was on the ships and at the battles.

There is an alternative to the fifteen volume series, 'The two-ocean war' which Morison produced later as an abridged version. It's pretty good and more accessible.

Yes, he got rid of "G", enter Bill Halsey & Richmond "Kelly" Turner.

I would add "How They Won The War In The Pacific, Nimitz and His Admirals" to the list. Written by Edwin Hoyt. One of Nimitz's greatest concerns was that peacetime Admirals are not prepared for war and generally were not aggressive. He had a few and leaned pretty hard on them. He was particularly short on solid Carrier Task Force Commanders.

Pretty good read on what topics that you were asking for information on.

Good luck,

Mark

Thanks to everyone for the good suggestions. Got my summer reading list set now.

Hi Stevinne;

One thing that is very important to the understanding of conflict is to obtain a good picture of the setting in which events took place. The best source of information for providing such information about the navy during WW II is Samuel Eliot Morison's "History Of United States Naval Operations In World War II." It is a fifteen volume series written in 1947, ponderous reading, but it certainly gives the reader an accurate account of what people were thinking with the information they had at the time. The author had access to primary naval documents and naval personnel of the period. Even today it is regarded as a primary research tool for naval historians. Though the sheer size of the work is daunting, it is written in an eminently readable style and read in small doses presents a fascinating picture of the period. It is something like trying to consume a fifty four pound roast turkey, impossible to do at one sitting, but portioned out over time provides immense nutritional value.

Regards, rjccjr

Pb_Legend wrote:To the OP, I can second Toll's Pacific Crucible, which btw is available on Aubible so that you can continue to think/"read" while you drive.

Since you mentioned Guadalcanal specifically, it's also worth reading Hornfisher's Neptune's Inferno. It's a captivating book that gives you a narrative sense of the battles for Guadalcanal, while also (iirc) discussing many of the shortcomings of the Navy at the time.

Adding to the above and taskforce48's post, I would say read all of Hornfischer's and Toll's works on WWII.
Eagerly awaiting Toll's Twilight of the Gods, in September, to round out his take on the Pacific War.

To the OP, I can second Toll's Pacific Crucible, which btw is available on Aubible so that you can continue to think/"read" while you drive.

Since you mentioned Guadalcanal specifically, it's also worth reading Hornfisher's Neptune's Inferno. It's a captivating book that gives you a narrative sense of the battles for Guadalcanal, while also (iirc) discussing many of the shortcomings of the Navy at the time.

Also worth pointing out that the entire world had the Great Depression to deal with in the decade prior to the war. To the degree that countries found relief from those economic problems, much of it - for example in late-1930s Germany but also in the US, UK and Japan - was eventually revealed to be pre-war rearmament. (Probably in France and Italy too, but I don't financial statistics to hand for them.) Certainly by the late 30s both Germany and Japan had economies that were heavily war-industry driven. The rearmament laws that passed at the expiry or revocation of the arms treaties in 1936 clearly heralded an era of deficit spending in the US and UK that led to significantly increased military preparedness and economic health in the late 1930s and (for the US) early 1940s.

Prior to that, most of the navies kept their ships in port if only to save on the cost of fuel oil, and manning levels were minimal or even less, also due directly to financial considerations.

One can argue that the US entered the war without the ships and men it needed, but fortunately the ground had been prepared in the pre-war years. Had the USN been truly unprepared, it would have taken far longer. It takes many years to go from concept to a commissioned ship with a trained crew going into combat. The dominant wartime classes of the USN - Essex, Cleveland, Baltimore, Fletcher, South Dakota and Iowa were all fully designed and on the ways in volume before the war. Similar arguments can be made about the TBF Avenger, F6F Hellcat and F4u Corsair - all of which were pre-war projects that came to fruition during the war.

Finally, there are few militaries in few wars that are thought to have been truly prepared, and most of those were the aggressors. England entered WWI supremely confident in its navy, but it was ill prepared in many ways - for example in ASW - even if it maintained command of the seas with its dreadnought fleet.

I would say that one thing the USN did have was an ability (and desire) to learn from their mistakes. Unlike the IJN, which placed an undue confidence in its way of waging war, the USN examined the defeats and setbacks and altered its weaponry and tactics to avoid having the same thing happen again.

The IJN did eventually learn from some of its erroneous ways but it was always a long and tortuous process.

On thing the USN did do and the RN failed to do until the very end of the war, was fit its destroyers, battleships and aircraft carriers with an excellent dual purpose medium calibre gun.

And of course, the USN had over two years worth of second-hand experience of warfare from the UK.

To add to the above, the USN was staved for funds during the 20s and for most of the 30s.

If it wasn't for the WPA (Work Progress Admin.), the USN would not have the Yorktown, the Enterprise and a number of CAs. These ships were part of an economic stimulus package during the Great Depression.

It wasn't just the USN. Although there were notable shortcomings in USN doctrine, and for example the TBD Devastator was utterly obsolete by the time the war started, every one of the navies had some major deficiencies, whether they were obvious at the start of the war or not. The KM was fundamentally short of ships (and boats). There were serious deficiencies in the torpedoes, especially those use by U-boats. These were similar to the defects faced by the USN submarine force, although the specifics were different. Arguably both the RM and KM should have done more with naval aviation. Damage control, as practiced in the USN, was essentially unknown in the IJN. Radar in the IJN was far behind the KM, RN and USN. Ditto RM. The RN was very short on ships, particularly destroyers, and had an almost overbearing confidence in sonar, which proved to be greatly misplaced although directionally correct. The RN had the right idea about using carriers for ASW but had neither the ships nor the doctrine to effect that until the 2nd half of 1943. You could argue that the fact that the RN used biplanes on its carriers throughout most of the war demonstrated that it had a massive gap in that department.

Each of the navies (with the possible exception of the RM) also had some significant advantages in preparedness, doctrine or technology compared to the others.

I would say that the USN looks worse in this regard mostly because of the massive advances in material and doctrine over the course of the war, rather than because it was all that dramatically unprepared at the start. And some of that improved doctrine came about as a result of the overwhelming material and technical advantages.

In some ways yes. In other ways no. War is a learning experience! Learn, adapt. The Navy was actually geared up in ship construction and recruiting before war started. But the lessons learned in damage control and tactics might take months before it reached the front. The ships that went into battle would make reports of happened and at what time. Noodle heads back in the states would dissect the reports and figure whats the best thing to do for a given situation.

You can't learn until you get experience.

It was certainly a grab bag of old doctrines, Politics and honestly a lot of arrogance. I really like Ian Toll's Pacific Crucible, focuses on the Pacific but there is some discussion of what was happening in the Atlantic at the same time.

Matt

I was driving today and thinking about the US Navy's performance at the start of WWII and in the Guadalcanal campaign and in the opening stages of the Battle of the Atlantic along the U.S. East Coast. Is there a book out there that discusses why the navy and its doctrine and training was so apparently ill-prepared for the war? I'm interested in learning if this was a case of group think gone wrong or just what can be expected when a navy that has't really faced a serious threat in 40 or 50 years has to get into battle for you life mode.