by Jack Ray » Mon Jul 16, 2007 8:48 am
More from the Wall Street journal.
As China Grows, So Does Its Long-Neglected Navy
Warship-Buying Spree Prompts New Worry In Washington, Tokyo
By Gordon Fairclough
Wall Street Journal
July 16, 2007
Pg. 1
KAOLAO, China -- On one side of a rocky promontory jutting into the Yellow Sea here sits a ramshackle fishing village, its wooden boats pulled up on the beach. On the other, lie well-guarded berths that are home to some of the most advanced vessels in the Chinese navy: heavily armed attack submarines.
The stealthy subs, their black conning towers and tail fins rising above the water, are one of the most potent signs of China's ambitious effort to modernize its armed services, particularly its long-neglected navy.
Many believe China's growing ties to the world economy and its dependence on imported oil and raw materials will ensure China's "peaceful rise," as Beijing's leaders have pledged. But these same commercial interests -- and the need to defend them -- are also driving China to pursue military might.
"The oceans are our lifelines. If commerce were cut off, the economy would plummet," says Ni Lexiong, a fellow at the Shanghai National Defense Institute and an outspoken proponent of Chinese sea power. "We need a strong navy."
For Chinese strategists, the country's rapid economic growth -- which underpins the Communist Party's continued hold on political power -- and its military advancement are now inextricably linked. "Security issues related to energy, resources, finance, information and international shipping routes are mounting," says a government white paper published last December that lays out China's defense policy.
In response, China says it will spend nearly $45 billion on its military this year, an increase of about 18% from 2006. It has also embarked on a ship-buying spree, acquiring advanced vessels from Russia, and also building its own. Over time, the strategy could remake the maritime balance of power, first in Asia, and then in the rest of the world.
China's leadership insists that the world has nothing to fear from a better-armed China. The navy, known officially as the People's Liberation Army Navy, is still smaller and less capable than that of the U.S., which has more than 100 major surface combat ships, including 11 aircraft carriers. China has 76 main surface combatants and no carriers, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Chinese fleet is also untested in modern naval warfare.
But as China's navy becomes better equipped and farther ranging, it is causing alarm bells to ring in Washington, Tokyo and Taipei. The U.S. is strengthening its forces in Asia, partly in response to China. It is also encouraging Japan to boost its own military and naval capabilities, and is even cultivating ties with Mongolia, on China's northern border.
"The improvement in the Chinese military is significant. That is obviously of interest to us and to everyone in the world -- and appropriately so," says Adm. Timothy J. Keating, commander in chief of U.S. forces in the Pacific.
Much of China's concern stems from its dependence on foreign oil. China imports nearly 50% of its oil and is more dependent on imported Middle Eastern crude than the U.S. Roughly 72% of China's imported oil now comes from the Persian Gulf and Africa on tankers that pass through the narrow Strait of Malacca -- a strategic choke point -- between the Indonesian island of Sumatra and peninsular Malaysia.
President Hu Jintao has referred to the potential vulnerability of his country's energy supplies as China's "Malacca dilemma." The country has no ships stationed permanently near the straits.
China also depends on the outside world for a host of other raw materials -- from copper to coal and iron ore -- required to keep what is now the world's fourth-largest economy humming. Nearly all of China's trade moves by sea from the country's east coast. Many exports are carried by China's own burgeoning fleet of merchant ships.
"Economic globalization entails globalization of the military means for self-defense," Zhang Wenmu, a professor of strategic studies at the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, wrote last year in China Security, a military-affairs journal. "With these complex and expanding interests, risks to China's well-being have not lessened, but have actually increased."
At the submarine base here in eastern Shandong province, there are signs of the naval shift. Submarines shelter behind breakwaters between sea patrols. Chinese subs have been detected in the waters around Japan and as far into the western Pacific as Guam, site of important U.S. military installations.
A short way down the coast at the headquarters of China's North Sea Fleet in Qingdao, warships -- including some destroyers equipped with powerful Russian-made guided missiles -- share the sprawling port with civilian container ships and oil tankers.
For most of its history, China's military, the People's Liberation Army, has focused on defeating domestic opponents of the Communist Party and fighting along the nation's land borders. The navy had a relatively small role in that mission and concentrated primarily on coastal defense. Today, the navy accounts for about 13% of the 2.3 million people in China's armed forces.
For the first 30 years of Communist Party rule, China remained primarily an agricultural country caught up in political upheaval. There was little foreign trade, and economic growth was so slow that there was little demand for resources from outside.
But as China began to open in earnest in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a series of geopolitical shifts and China's accelerating economy combined to radically alter Chinese leaders' views of the kind of military the country needs.
In 1996, during a standoff between leaders in Beijing and Taipei over Taiwanese moves to assert independence, China test-fired missiles near the island. The U.S. responded by ordering carrier battle groups to the area.
China's inability to prevent this U.S. show of military strength and support for Taiwan rankled political and military leaders in Beijing. They started to develop what is viewed by the Pentagon as an "anti-access strategy." The Pentagon says it is designed to limit the U.S. military's freedom of movement in Asia and, specifically, its ability to intervene in any conflict between China and Taiwan.
The cornerstone of China's effort is its elite submarine force. In recent years, eight new Russian-built, diesel-powered Kilo-class submarines have been added to the fleet, joining a growing number of new Chinese-built attack submarines, including some powered by nuclear reactors. The Kilo subs are especially stealthy and hard to detect when submerged.
China's navy now has nearly 60 submarines, according to U.S. estimates. Some of the newest are equipped with Russian-made cruise missiles that fly at supersonic speeds when they approach their targets and were specifically designed to attack and sink aircraft carriers, according to U.S. naval officers. Some subs also have advanced torpedoes, which home in on ships' wakes at high speed.
"They've decided that submarines are the best way to delay a U.S. entry" into any conflict over Taiwan by threatening U.S. aircraft carriers, says Bernard D. Cole, a retired U.S. Navy captain who now teaches at the National War College in Washington and studies the Chinese navy. "There's nothing harder than finding submarines. It's a very tough business."
China is also building its own surface warships, including frigates and destroyers, and fitting them out with Russian radars and antiaircraft weapons. Destroyers are the largest class of surface warship in widespread use by world navies. China's are equipped with guns and guided missiles and have a crew of 200 to 300. Frigates have similar armaments, but are smaller.
China's shipyards have been working on two new types of nuclear-powered submarines, which are undergoing sea trials, according to Chinese naval officers. And late last year, China received the second of two sophisticated Russian-made, Sovremenny II guided-missile destroyers, adding to its tally of Russian-built surface ships.
While the immediate driver of China's naval development has been the potential for conflict over Taiwan, its longer-term goals are much broader. Navy officers speak of developing three oceangoing fleets, one that would patrol the areas around Korea and Japan, another that would push out into the western Pacific and a third that would protect the Strait of Malacca and the Indian Ocean.
"The navy needs to be able to go wherever China has economic interests," says one senior Chinese naval officer who spoke on condition of anonymity. "China should have naval forces stationed at strategic points," the officer says, even though "this would certainly push China into more direct confrontation with developed countries."
China has helped finance and engineer the construction of a deep-water port in Pakistan that U.S. defense planners say could be used by Chinese naval forces in the future, giving them easier access to the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf region. U.S. military officers also believe China is operating listening posts in southern Myanmar to monitor shipping traffic through the Strait of Malacca.
China has also begun building a network of satellites that can be used to guide navigation by its own ships at sea, as well as to keep track of other countries' vessels. Chinese military leaders are even talking about building aircraft carriers -- which for decades have been the mainstay of U.S. maritime power.
Concerns over the potential cost of building and operating such an extensive navy have prompted some national security experts in China to argue against it. These critics say China should continue to be a so-called free rider, allowing the U.S. and its global navy to bear the burden of policing the seas.
For now, the sea power advocates appear to be winning. China's President Hu attended a navy conclave in Beijing in December. "We should strive to build a powerful navy that adapts to the needs of our military's historical mission in this new century and at this new stage," Mr. Hu told the assembled officers.
China's expanding naval presence is already being felt in the Pacific. In October, a Chinese submarine armed with torpedoes and powerful antiship cruise missiles surfaced within firing range of the American aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk, part of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, during maneuvers in the Pacific Ocean east of the Philippines.
The encounter ended peacefully. But the admiral commanding American forces in the Pacific at the time, William Fallon, later told reporters that the incident could have "escalated into something very unforeseen."
The U.S. is the only country that regularly operates aircraft carriers in Northeast Asia. And U.S. officers feel that China's pursuit of weapons that can be used against carriers has put U.S. forces in its sights. "When you acquire those niche capabilities, it raises questions," says one U.S. officer assigned to monitoring Chinese military advances. "We're a little unclear on why they are focusing on those."
Adm. Keating, the new U.S. commander in the Pacific, says he is trying to get a better understanding of Beijing's motives and military capabilities. He is pushing for more access to Chinese forces and more exchanges and expanded joint exercises by the two navies.
The U.S. is also strengthening its military posture in Asia. "I don't think China necessarily has to be a threat. I don't think they've made up their mind yet," says one veteran Pentagon Asia specialist. "That's why we have to take a hedging strategy."
China, in turn, looks at these steps as all the more reason to push ahead with its military buildup. The U.S. moves also strengthen the hand of nationalists in China, who believe Washington and others are intent on blocking China's development. Such views are also held in the mainstream parts of the government.
"If we develop a strong navy with more advanced weapon systems, we have more choices. It's possible that China will join in a cooperative system headed by the U.S.," says Mr. Ni of the Shanghai National Defense Institute. "But we would also be ready to fight if we have to."
--Ellen Zhu in Shanghai contributed to this article.
More from the Wall Street journal.
[b]As China Grows, So Does Its Long-Neglected Navy
[i]Warship-Buying Spree Prompts New Worry In Washington, Tokyo[/i][/b]
By Gordon Fairclough
Wall Street Journal
July 16, 2007
Pg. 1
KAOLAO, China -- On one side of a rocky promontory jutting into the Yellow Sea here sits a ramshackle fishing village, its wooden boats pulled up on the beach. On the other, lie well-guarded berths that are home to some of the most advanced vessels in the Chinese navy: heavily armed attack submarines.
The stealthy subs, their black conning towers and tail fins rising above the water, are one of the most potent signs of China's ambitious effort to modernize its armed services, particularly its long-neglected navy.
Many believe China's growing ties to the world economy and its dependence on imported oil and raw materials will ensure China's "peaceful rise," as Beijing's leaders have pledged. But these same commercial interests -- and the need to defend them -- are also driving China to pursue military might.
"The oceans are our lifelines. If commerce were cut off, the economy would plummet," says Ni Lexiong, a fellow at the Shanghai National Defense Institute and an outspoken proponent of Chinese sea power. "We need a strong navy."
For Chinese strategists, the country's rapid economic growth -- which underpins the Communist Party's continued hold on political power -- and its military advancement are now inextricably linked. "Security issues related to energy, resources, finance, information and international shipping routes are mounting," says a government white paper published last December that lays out China's defense policy.
In response, China says it will spend nearly $45 billion on its military this year, an increase of about 18% from 2006. It has also embarked on a ship-buying spree, acquiring advanced vessels from Russia, and also building its own. Over time, the strategy could remake the maritime balance of power, first in Asia, and then in the rest of the world.
China's leadership insists that the world has nothing to fear from a better-armed China. The navy, known officially as the People's Liberation Army Navy, is still smaller and less capable than that of the U.S., which has more than 100 major surface combat ships, including 11 aircraft carriers. China has 76 main surface combatants and no carriers, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Chinese fleet is also untested in modern naval warfare.
But as China's navy becomes better equipped and farther ranging, it is causing alarm bells to ring in Washington, Tokyo and Taipei. The U.S. is strengthening its forces in Asia, partly in response to China. It is also encouraging Japan to boost its own military and naval capabilities, and is even cultivating ties with Mongolia, on China's northern border.
"The improvement in the Chinese military is significant. That is obviously of interest to us and to everyone in the world -- and appropriately so," says Adm. Timothy J. Keating, commander in chief of U.S. forces in the Pacific.
Much of China's concern stems from its dependence on foreign oil. China imports nearly 50% of its oil and is more dependent on imported Middle Eastern crude than the U.S. Roughly 72% of China's imported oil now comes from the Persian Gulf and Africa on tankers that pass through the narrow Strait of Malacca -- a strategic choke point -- between the Indonesian island of Sumatra and peninsular Malaysia.
President Hu Jintao has referred to the potential vulnerability of his country's energy supplies as China's "Malacca dilemma." The country has no ships stationed permanently near the straits.
China also depends on the outside world for a host of other raw materials -- from copper to coal and iron ore -- required to keep what is now the world's fourth-largest economy humming. Nearly all of China's trade moves by sea from the country's east coast. Many exports are carried by China's own burgeoning fleet of merchant ships.
"Economic globalization entails globalization of the military means for self-defense," Zhang Wenmu, a professor of strategic studies at the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, wrote last year in China Security, a military-affairs journal. "With these complex and expanding interests, risks to China's well-being have not lessened, but have actually increased."
At the submarine base here in eastern Shandong province, there are signs of the naval shift. Submarines shelter behind breakwaters between sea patrols. Chinese subs have been detected in the waters around Japan and as far into the western Pacific as Guam, site of important U.S. military installations.
A short way down the coast at the headquarters of China's North Sea Fleet in Qingdao, warships -- including some destroyers equipped with powerful Russian-made guided missiles -- share the sprawling port with civilian container ships and oil tankers.
For most of its history, China's military, the People's Liberation Army, has focused on defeating domestic opponents of the Communist Party and fighting along the nation's land borders. The navy had a relatively small role in that mission and concentrated primarily on coastal defense. Today, the navy accounts for about 13% of the 2.3 million people in China's armed forces.
For the first 30 years of Communist Party rule, China remained primarily an agricultural country caught up in political upheaval. There was little foreign trade, and economic growth was so slow that there was little demand for resources from outside.
But as China began to open in earnest in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a series of geopolitical shifts and China's accelerating economy combined to radically alter Chinese leaders' views of the kind of military the country needs.
In 1996, during a standoff between leaders in Beijing and Taipei over Taiwanese moves to assert independence, China test-fired missiles near the island. The U.S. responded by ordering carrier battle groups to the area.
China's inability to prevent this U.S. show of military strength and support for Taiwan rankled political and military leaders in Beijing. They started to develop what is viewed by the Pentagon as an "anti-access strategy." The Pentagon says it is designed to limit the U.S. military's freedom of movement in Asia and, specifically, its ability to intervene in any conflict between China and Taiwan.
The cornerstone of China's effort is its elite submarine force. In recent years, eight new Russian-built, diesel-powered Kilo-class submarines have been added to the fleet, joining a growing number of new Chinese-built attack submarines, including some powered by nuclear reactors. The Kilo subs are especially stealthy and hard to detect when submerged.
China's navy now has nearly 60 submarines, according to U.S. estimates. Some of the newest are equipped with Russian-made cruise missiles that fly at supersonic speeds when they approach their targets and were specifically designed to attack and sink aircraft carriers, according to U.S. naval officers. Some subs also have advanced torpedoes, which home in on ships' wakes at high speed.
"They've decided that submarines are the best way to delay a U.S. entry" into any conflict over Taiwan by threatening U.S. aircraft carriers, says Bernard D. Cole, a retired U.S. Navy captain who now teaches at the National War College in Washington and studies the Chinese navy. "There's nothing harder than finding submarines. It's a very tough business."
China is also building its own surface warships, including frigates and destroyers, and fitting them out with Russian radars and antiaircraft weapons. Destroyers are the largest class of surface warship in widespread use by world navies. China's are equipped with guns and guided missiles and have a crew of 200 to 300. Frigates have similar armaments, but are smaller.
China's shipyards have been working on two new types of nuclear-powered submarines, which are undergoing sea trials, according to Chinese naval officers. And late last year, China received the second of two sophisticated Russian-made, Sovremenny II guided-missile destroyers, adding to its tally of Russian-built surface ships.
While the immediate driver of China's naval development has been the potential for conflict over Taiwan, its longer-term goals are much broader. Navy officers speak of developing three oceangoing fleets, one that would patrol the areas around Korea and Japan, another that would push out into the western Pacific and a third that would protect the Strait of Malacca and the Indian Ocean.
"The navy needs to be able to go wherever China has economic interests," says one senior Chinese naval officer who spoke on condition of anonymity. "China should have naval forces stationed at strategic points," the officer says, even though "this would certainly push China into more direct confrontation with developed countries."
China has helped finance and engineer the construction of a deep-water port in Pakistan that U.S. defense planners say could be used by Chinese naval forces in the future, giving them easier access to the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf region. U.S. military officers also believe China is operating listening posts in southern Myanmar to monitor shipping traffic through the Strait of Malacca.
China has also begun building a network of satellites that can be used to guide navigation by its own ships at sea, as well as to keep track of other countries' vessels. Chinese military leaders are even talking about building aircraft carriers -- which for decades have been the mainstay of U.S. maritime power.
Concerns over the potential cost of building and operating such an extensive navy have prompted some national security experts in China to argue against it. These critics say China should continue to be a so-called free rider, allowing the U.S. and its global navy to bear the burden of policing the seas.
For now, the sea power advocates appear to be winning. China's President Hu attended a navy conclave in Beijing in December. "We should strive to build a powerful navy that adapts to the needs of our military's historical mission in this new century and at this new stage," Mr. Hu told the assembled officers.
China's expanding naval presence is already being felt in the Pacific. In October, a Chinese submarine armed with torpedoes and powerful antiship cruise missiles surfaced within firing range of the American aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk, part of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, during maneuvers in the Pacific Ocean east of the Philippines.
The encounter ended peacefully. But the admiral commanding American forces in the Pacific at the time, William Fallon, later told reporters that the incident could have "escalated into something very unforeseen."
The U.S. is the only country that regularly operates aircraft carriers in Northeast Asia. And U.S. officers feel that China's pursuit of weapons that can be used against carriers has put U.S. forces in its sights. "When you acquire those niche capabilities, it raises questions," says one U.S. officer assigned to monitoring Chinese military advances. "We're a little unclear on why they are focusing on those."
Adm. Keating, the new U.S. commander in the Pacific, says he is trying to get a better understanding of Beijing's motives and military capabilities. He is pushing for more access to Chinese forces and more exchanges and expanded joint exercises by the two navies.
The U.S. is also strengthening its military posture in Asia. "I don't think China necessarily has to be a threat. I don't think they've made up their mind yet," says one veteran Pentagon Asia specialist. "That's why we have to take a hedging strategy."
China, in turn, looks at these steps as all the more reason to push ahead with its military buildup. The U.S. moves also strengthen the hand of nationalists in China, who believe Washington and others are intent on blocking China's development. Such views are also held in the mainstream parts of the government.
"If we develop a strong navy with more advanced weapon systems, we have more choices. It's possible that China will join in a cooperative system headed by the U.S.," says Mr. Ni of the Shanghai National Defense Institute. "But we would also be ready to fight if we have to."
--Ellen Zhu in Shanghai contributed to this article.