Prior to this latest request, there was already to be little testing before the respective governments were hopelessly committed financially:
GlobaSecurity wrote:
DOD plans to begin procuring large quantities of aircraft in 2007 with less than 1 percent of the flight test program completed. By 2010, it expects to have procured 126 aircraft with only 35 percent of the flight test program completed. Concurrently testing and procuring the aircraft adds to the program’s cost and schedule risks.
One can only conclude from Lockheed's "reluctance" to be measured by aircraft tests, even the prior schedule, that the aircraft falls far short of the performance targets and will be a hopeless "white elephant".
The failure makes sense when you see they are hoping to get nearly F-22 performance out of a single-engine hybrid airframe. Instead of putting all the eggs into this one basket, they ought to be procuring five or six different, lower cost, dedicated mission airframes. This would get aircraft into service more quickly and at lower cost and risk.
Typically, "stage two" of a purchase like this will be a series of extra-cost upgrades and retrofits which
may allow the aircraft to meet it's specification, but only after Lockheed gets to "go to the well" many more times and return with buckets of taxpayer cash.
Lockheed nearly went out of business because Reagan put the P-3 bomber on a "firm fixed-bid" track. The last run of aircraft were delivered substantially below Lockheed's cost because of the rate of inflation leftover from the Carter years.
Lockheed and the other vendors need to shoulder more of the development risk and cost. If some of them go out of business, perhaps the industry will have room for new entrants. Currently, those bureaucrats who buy the aircraft system owe their jobs to the system, and they all too frequently move from an oversight position directly into the contractor's employ to serve as an advocate for the system to buddies in the service and foreign agencies. This should stop.
It is all too obvious there is no "free market" in military procurement, but a cartel which is directed by and for the benefit of the senior management at the vendor companies. This should be crushed, even if we have to buy systems abroad for some time until new players can enter the game.
If the Navy has any brains, they would be taking a census of restorable A-7 and A-6 airframes, so light and medium attack aircraft can reach the fleet at any time in the next two decades. The existing F/A-18A/B and C/D need to be refit with life extending upgrades and more efficient engines, and the buy of F/A-18E/F needs to be extended. I don't know what to do for the Marines except perhaps order up some conventionally powered aircraft carriers in the 60,000 tonne range which can provide LHA functionality and a flight deck for CTOL aircraft. This should be done
now. An A-6E carried more bombs than an F/A-18A with three times the range before buddy fueling was required. The proposed plastic replacement wing could easily be implemented for a few months' budget from the F-35. New engines could greatly improve fuel economy and performance with no weight penalty. The engines mounted in the Gulfstream V executive jet could be installed and would nearly double the available thrust, range and fuel economy.
One way or another, the siphon of funds to the Iraq war will end in two or three years. It is time to look beyond this chapter of history and tend to the repair of US military systems, which have been badly depleted and run down.