The Ship Model Forum

A book I am reading from 1932 by E. Keble Chatterton called "The Big Blockade" has made me bring this discussion back from the grave.
Although more to the point of Royal Navy strategy, it does point to a big problem for the German High Seas Fleet.
Mr. Chatterton points to the few feeble efforts by the Royal Navy Blockading force to get at the German and neutral ore ships coming down the Norwegian coast from the Narvik railhead for the Swedish iron ore mines.
In short the RN used a patrol line G of three ships plus a couple armed trawlers close in to try and snap up a few ore ships. One was taken by a trawler, but that was about it for the effort. German supplies came on a steady basis. Mr. Chatterton also points out that had the British decided that it was worth the trouble to push Norway into the German camp, but nevertheless keep them isolated by naval blockade, the RN would have forced the High Seas Fleet out to break the blockade of the Narvik ore shipping lanes inside Norwegian waters. It would have been either lose your war economy or fight in the North Sea.
My question, "would it have been worth it, in 1915-16, to try and force the war economy of Germany into collapse"?
Since the German fleet was so inactive, Mr. Chatterton also points out that a determined raid or two by a single German BC willing to sell itself in order to roll up the blockade lines may have been worth the effort, as neutral shipping [the USA] was making efforts to ship to neutrals for overland or Baltic transhipment or direct to Germany large cargos during the 1914-16 period.

Bob B.

Would a close blockade of Narvik have brought Norway into the war on the side of the Central Powers? Basing a detachment of the High Seas Fleet in Bergen or Narvik could have been a negative consequence for Britain.

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If an unfriendly power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war.

-- "A Nation at Risk" (1983)

Bob I wonder if that book is the inspiration of a warfilm I have of the same name.

'The Big Blockade' but its mainly about the early years of WW2.

To answer your question:

"would it have been worth it, in 1915-16, to try and force the war economy of Germany into collapse"?

It may have been, but not until 1917-18 when the German economy was really finding it difficult to cope with an acculumation over the years of the global blockade.
The earlier date I think would have difficult to implement so soon in the war.
If you take this major strategical change then Gallipoli will have to be postponed or cancelled also.

Though in hindsight, stopping the ore traffic from Sweden may have better a better course of action.

What ships would be used for such a blockade in 1915-16? submarines? armed merchant trawlers?
Surely after a few sinkings the Germans would start to implement coastal convoys for this vital war cargo, that would esculate things and then what? send cruisers in or the big boys?

Question back at you chaps, Whats stopping a new railroad system being implemented in WWI to take the ore to a southern Scandinavian port?
Thus bypassing any British blockade off the coast of Norway.
Apart from the Geography it has to be built through of course!
I'm thinking in wartime, if the needs are there, these things are normally done no matter the cost in men of material.

Good questions Laurence. The "Big Blockade" is the history of the 10th cruiser squadron in WWI. This was the collection of Armed Merchant Cruisers the RN fitted out for the blockade lines held throughout the war.
Since the bigger liners could keep the sea much better than old cruisers, they ended up with the job. I haven't seen the movie you mention.
The Swedes had two railheads, one at Narvik and one in the north Baltic. But the Baltic was frozen up for half the year. So Narvik was of prime importance in both World Wars for the German war economy. I think the expense of long haul trains the length of Sweden [it's a long country] made it very expensive to do the journey all by rail, plus at that time I think there were huge gaps in rail system. Even in 1940 it was too difficult a journey as the Germans invaded Northern Norway to get control of Narvik.
The RN made one try at the ore ships in the summer of 1915. The armed trawler "Tenby Castle" was able to take a German ore ship Pallas. Next she took a Swedish ore ship and handed her off to HMS India. After that she chased and sank by gunfire another German Fredrich App. As support the trawler could call upon three RN AMCs on patrol line "G" off the Norwegian coast.
This became such a threat to the German communications that something had to be done about it. U-22 ,amoung other U-boats ,operated against the British Patrols of Norway and was able to sink HMS India. This helped reduce the pressure on Germany's ore traffic.
Norway was a bit pro German. The radio station at Narvik was known to "Jam" RN radio traffic between the Armed Trawlers and AMCs operating against the Ore Trade. It would have meant going inside Norway's territorial waters to close off the trade.
Lots of neutral cargo reached Norway, Sweden and Denmark and thus on to Germany. Britian had to keep track of shipments and ration each nation to s set amount of certain goods and take the rest over and above that.
Had the attacks continued on the Ore Trade, Germany might have had no choice but to try and roll up the patrol line "G". Battlecruiser raid most likely.

Bob B.

i would have attacked the British Expeditionary force on its way to France......thats just me though.

Between August 1914 and Dogger Bank there was a crisis of confidence in the British Military institutions. That was the one time a major naval thrust could have had an impact out of all proportions to the military investment.

_________________
If an unfriendly power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war.

-- "A Nation at Risk" (1983)

I would have sent every operational U-boat in the German Navy to try and disrupt the Channel crossings of the BEF. If you mean a surface raid or general fleet attack against the Channel Traffic, then I doubt they would accomplish much. Wireless signals would have the entire shipping lanes empty by the time a surface force arrived and getting back home through the Dover Straights after chasing around an empty channel would have resulted in a general fleet action on very unfavorable terms.

Bob B.

At the beginning of the war there were few Uboats. English channel is in any case not a good place for U boat operation due to strong currents, possibility of saturation levels of surface patrol.

Pardon me for diving into this one late, but I've been off working for the past three months.

An excellent question to consider. I have to agree with Werner and Chuck on their initial assessments. If the RN was dispersed among several ports, the opportunity was there to destroy it in detail.

The main problem, as I see it, would be in being able to sortie the HSF without its being detected by the British.

Going off the top of my head (correct me if I'm wrong), the RN fleet was distributed on the east coast of Britian in three locations: Scapa Flow (main fleet anchorage); Roseyth (battlecruisers); Dover (covering force for cross-channel operations).

A first strike should have been directed at Roseyth. This would have neutralized the RN's fastest response force. You wouldn't have to breach the sub nets or even attack the BC's directly. Pummel that big, beautiful railway bridge that spans the harbor entrance with heavy shellfire and drop it into the channel. That would slow it down for awhile!

Move on down to Dover and put the hurt on the covering fleet and docks.

Then be prepared to fight the remainder of the Grand Fleet, which would be storming out of Scapa flow like a nestful of angry hornets. Put the BB's in the van: heaviest units vs. heaviest units.

Use Heligoland (home of some of my ancestors) as a base for raids against the North sea fishing fleet. This while the U-boats are squeezing off British food supplies from the New World and Empire.

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Les Foran
On the Oregon Trail

To be able to sortie the HSF without the Admiralty knowing would be very difficult to achieve.

One must always remember the ships were coal fired then and to get a whole fleet ready to sail is a very large logistical undertaking even in WW2. To ammunition and coal every ship in the fleet, to organise standing fleet orders and navigation plans etc meant that to get a whole fleet to sea in a kind of rush/surprise effort, as some suggest, is very difficult to accomplish.

Therefore I think you can discard this course of action. Furthermore the Admiralty broke the German HSF codes early in WWI (can't remember preciely when) but generally they usually had fair warning before 'anything was afoot' at sea.

The HSF's best chnace is to use the small number of U-boats it has at its disposal and send them into the channel at dusk or sunlight and prey on the cross-channel shipping. Probably also pull them out into more open waters at night and to then go in again if conditions are favourable. Keep repeating this until all torpedoes & shells are used up and then return to Wilhelmshaven etc.

The weakness in this is Germany doesn't really have any forms of intelliengence of what convoys are where, whats the escort composition etc so they kind of enter the English Channel blind and hope for the best. Perhaps they can use Zeppelins?, but I doubt they have more than a few that could fly out there and report back with wireless in 1914.

A strength though is if this is in 1914, anti-submarine netting is not really in place; there is a lack of destroyers and co-ordination on the Allied side. To my knowledge the RN convoyed just about everything across the channel from the beginning of the War so if a U-boat preys on shipping and is on the surface it does run the risk of getting detected and possibly nailed.

Question if I may, as WWI U-boats are not my thing, how effective were 1914 U-boats at attacking shipping with their torpedoes only?

To Les, the bridge I think you mean is the Firth of Forth Railway bridge which crosses the Firth of Forth and is in Scotland. If you were to shell it and bring it down it would land in those waters and not in the English Channel which is a few hundred miles to the South.

Also if you study what the HSF was trying to achieve before Jutland they were trying to engage Beatty's battlecruiser force on its own out of Rosyth, before Jellicoe from Scapa could come South and intervene. The idea was to then whittle down the Royal Navy's superiority in numbers of its Grand Fleet and therefore gain parity in numbers. This in turn would make the Royal Navy seriously less confident to then engage in a large fleet battle as they could potentially lose the war at sea in an afternoon etc etc.

Destroying Dover as a dockyard, really wouldn't cause much of a strategic advantage. Remember what the real point for the U-boats is, is to sink those fat juicy merchants crammed with the BEF and its equipment. This would make the initial push onto Paris in 1914 perhaps easier for the Germans as they would be facing a weaker British land force and only the French Army which would be further stretched to defend the points which the British may have been allocated.

Also remember to protect the Channel there is also elements of the French Fleet to contend with.

That bridge, only a few miles away from me here**, was considered a potential threat by the vessels based at Rosyth during the war. Rosyth is situated about a mile upstream of the bridge on the north bank of the Forth.

In reality, it'd be like shooting at one of those cage masts recently mentioned in another thread. You'd achieve next-to-nothing before half a dozen angry battlecruisers and supporting smaller vessels popped out to see what was up.
And you'd have to get both in-stream supports in order to block the Firth. Taking one out would probably leave the other cantilever still standing.

Andy

** I'm not a big bridge fan, but it's gorgeous in photos and even better in real life. A stunning piece of 19th century metalwork!

Laurence, Andy,

Thanks for your replies. It certainly was difficult to achieve surprise with a coal-fired fleet. Even the process of coaling raises a visible cloud.

Night attacks with U-boats in the channel would have been most effective. If what I have read is correct, most U-boat torpedo attacks took place while on the surface, augmented by deck gunfire.

Dropping the bridge would bottle any ships at Rosyth up in the harbor. Perhaps the bridge supports in the water would be vulnerable to torpedo attack.

Andy, I am a fan of bridges and have long considered this one perhaps the most graceful of any of its type. It would be a shame to destroy such a structure.

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Les Foran
On the Oregon Trail

Those early U-Boats attacked on the surface when they could. Being slow underwater, they could not chase a contact down while submerged. The torpedos were effective enough as early sinkings of British Cruisers proved.
I've read any number of books about the WWI U-Boats. They found it easy to chase down Merchantmen on the surface and take them in the manner of a surface raider. Torpedoes were used as a last resort or if Escort vessels were around.
But the main question about attacking the BEF ships. Well, they were pretty easy to protect as the Channel conflict proved throughout the long war. It was the lone Merchant vessel that a U-boat could snap up with ease. So I would have sent my U-Boats to the Channel to do what damage they could. But no way would it be decisive in any form.
Operational conditions for U-Boats in Channel waters seemed to pose no real problems. They came and went through the Dover Starights almost at will for the greater part of the war. It resulted in losses, but only near the end of the war did the straights become really deadly. Lots of obstacles to overcome in the mine and net barrages and asw ships, but mostly the U-Boats of the smaller UC/UB got through. Throughout the war they didn't mention the Channel from Dover to Lands End as being a difficult operational area due to currents or depth. Often the currents were used to carry the boats out of trouble and help with the Dover Straights passage as well. The shallow dept saved numerous U-Boats who when damaged could settle on the bottom and get things back in order with damage control. In deep water they would have been lost.
The Germans were just so badly placed, they had no easy or obvious course of action against a superior fleet in it's well placed blockading positions. As I said before, bombarding the East Coast and hoping for units of the Grand Fleet to be hit by U-Boats and caught by a larger German force was about all their options. A raid against the 10 Cruiser Squadron enforcing the blockade was worth a try with a BC or two after Jutland proved the hopelessness of a general fleet action.

Bob B.