The Ship Model Forum

Talos was a huge (3.5 metric tons), high altitude, long-range, hypersonic missile that, while effective as a SAM, suffered by being paired with problematic (reliability) fire control system: since a surface-to-surface anti-radiation version was built (RIM-8H), where there other uses of Talos besides the MQM-8G target drone back in the 1950s or 60s?

For example, RIM-8 had an ant-surface capability, so was it possible to build a dedicated anti-ship missile?

What about a land attack version using ICM submunitions, or a nuclear land attack with W30 warheads.

Are you talking about the possibility of those additional missions at the time the missile was in service, or updating the missiles for those uses today? I'm assuming the former.

It seems the fundamental problem with the land-attack and long-range anti-ship missions would be targeting and guidance.
For land attack: How accurate was inertial guidance at that time for a missile flying a non-ballistic trajectory? Alternatively, would the Regulus model of having guidance beacons along the flight path be even practical in most tactical scenarios? Lacking precision guidance, you'd need a nuclear warhead. Are there any scenarios in which the entire command chain process required to authorize nuclear use would actually take advantage of the Talos' speed and forward location, and which could not be met by already existing means of nuclear delivery systems, keeping in mind the risk of nuclear escalation? Sure, the W30 was a third of Hiroshima, but that's cold comfort for the enemy. At the same time, the W30 wouldn't be quite large enough to ensure "tactical" targets could be reliably destroyed either, with a 20 psi zone spanning only four city blocks - unlikely to find an enemy fleet that would cluster their targets so closely in wartime.

For anti-ship, how would you 1. identify the target and 2. get the Talos to the ship? It seems like the same problem that contributed to the demise of the TASM, where the shooter had no way to discriminate the target at the missile's maximum range and therefore could not actually employ a missile, lacking an on-board target discriminator, at that range. You could have a ship or aircraft closer to the target that can positively ID it, but then you'd just use that ship/aircraft to do the kill (nevermind that only recently the West developed the capability to hand off missile guidance partway through the flight, so this wouldn't even work in the 60s).
Meanwhile, even assuming a smart enough guidance system existed in the 60s/70s, where would you put it? I don't see room for an active radar or infrared/optical sensor in the missile body: https://www.okieboat.com/Copyright%20im ... 24%20C.jpg And that's even before you start trading warhead size and fuel for guidance systems (or vice-versa).

If you're really wanting to make it into a dedicated anti-ship weapon, I'd trade range (fuel) for warhead size, keeping it for use in situations where you could actually identify the target and guide the weapon to the target, and maximize the damage that would cause.

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De quoi s'agit-il?

Very thoughtful points Timmy!


Additional missions while in service from mid 1950s through the seventies.

Yes - this was also an issue for ballistic missiles of the era like the MGR-1 Honest John, and air launched cruise missiles like AGM-28 Hound Dog.

The question also depends on the nature of the target – early 1960s inertial guidance was sufficiently accurate for nuclear, or chemical weapon delivery against air defenses (SAM sites, radars, airfields and so forth). Keep in mind that until submarine launched ballistic missiles like Polaris were fielded in quantity, strategic deterrence largely relied on manned bombers, which had a number of issues.

The anti-radiation RIM-8H was a different animal, and might be the basis for an anti-ship variant.


The reality is that the current command system evolved from a very “wild west” mentality about nukes. There is a reason that the USA and Soviet Union each fielded tens of thousands of nuclear weapons simultaneously.

I am not sure exactly how the USA and USSR avoided nuclear war in the 1950s and 1960s giving a fairly cavalier attitude about tactical and strategic weapons by today’s standards.

If that is cold comfort, look at current Chinese doctrine on nuclear weapon employment, and also the Indian and Pakistani doctrine.


Using the standards of the day, I do not think that this was the issue it is now; in other words, if it was not a friendly warship, it might well be engaged, particularly if it was emitting enemy radio and radar frequencies.

Targeting by radio detection is adequate in these scenarios. Two, preferably three lines of bearing are sufficient for targeting.

I suspect that the Russian P-800 Oniks has, or creates similar issues.



Logical!