New look at the loss of Kirishima

[Tim Jacobs]

There's an interesting piece in the newest issue of Warship International (Vol 44 number 4) concerning the sinking of Kirishima. The article is authored by Richard Worth (Tiouru on this board), Robert Lundgren and Sander Kingsepp.

Here are some of the key points:

The numbers often quoted for hits received and types of hits are from USSBS interegations of LT Hiroshi Tokun, a gunnery officer for the secondary batteries. He said about nine x 16 inch hits and about 40 x 5 inch hits. He is also the person who claimed the captain gave the order to scuttle. His account became the standard account.

The authors took another look at the available sources and came to other conclusions. For a start, when the number of hits are compared to shots fired, the 16 inchers came up only a third as accurate as the 5 inchers.

Other eyewitness accounts are available:

Gunnery officer LTCDR Ikeda's account (Tokun's superior) indicated 14 large caliber, sixteen medium caliber and six unspecified hits below the waterline. The authors note these are probably large calibur because 5 inch fusing would likely prevent submarine penetration.

Supply officer LT(jg) Kobayashi was on the battle bridge with CAPT Iwabuchi and CDR Korno. He saw the action and heard the orders given by the CO and XO. His account reads at least 20 large caliber hits, more than 21 smaller hits and five or six torpedoes. It is known no torpedoes hit, but it lends credence to Ikeda's account of 6 hits below the waterline and how the situation could have been perceived in the heat of battle.

There is some discussion of prewar gaming at the Naval War College that gave the Kongo class a rating of "12," meaning they could be expected to absorb up to 12 penetrating 14 inch hits before succumbing. Kirishima's armor was not up to the task of defeating 2700 pound 16 inch shells. So, Tokun's description to USSBS of a ship without steering but otherwise capable seems unlikely after up to 20 x 16 inch hits.

The next part talks about the hits. All were within a 10 minute timeframe and the exact sequence is not know. However, some keys points are clear:

The first salvo was a straddle with one near miss drenching the bridge. Hits started being received on the second salvo. The two forward turrets were knocked out by penetrating hits. Turret 3 was knocked out of action due to lost hydraulics. Turret 4 was also incapacitated, but it doesn't say how. Six submerged hits were spaced fairly evenly along the hull, two of them directly outboard of the hydraulic pump rooms. Four hits clustered on the stern as Kirishima started a turn and one submerged hit was directly on one of the rudders.

LTCDR Yoshino, Kirishima's flooding control officer, described "desperate attempts" to keep the ship on an even keel. Eventually, the Captain decided to flood the propulsion spaces. This may be the root source of Tokun's scuttling remark as he could have mistaken counterflooding for scuttling.

Other data: a historian who participated in Dr Ballard's 1992 expedition provided the authors with unpublished images of the wreck. No torpedo damage was seen, so the wreck cannot be Hiei. The port rudder is "at an extreme angle" and the starboard rudder has a piece missing.

A big mystery is Kirishima's wreck is missing everything forward of the conning tower. The authors have no explaination for that.


My comment: from this article, it looks like Washington's gunnery accuracy was much better than previously documented. It also sounds like Kirishima was pounded into wreck and left in sinking condtion.

credits: Warship International Vol 44 Number 4, Loss of HIJMS Kirishima, pgs 329 - 331, authored by Richard Worth, Robert Lundgren and Sander Kingsepp. http://www.warship.org

[Werner]

A fine review! Thank you. I cannot wait to see the article myself.

[Ultimo Tiger]

Has there ever been a comprehensive examination of her wreck?

In fact, was the anything forward of the conning tower ever fond?

[chuck]

How did large caliber shells fired at close range avoid ricocheting off the surface and ended up with an underwater trajectory?

[Werner]

How did large caliber shells fired at close range avoid ricocheting off the surface and ended up with an underwater trajectory?

That's an interesting question given the 10,000 yard engagement range and Washington's shells, which were, I believe, 4 crh at 1,800 f/s.

[Werner]

As I recall from the Tosa experiments, relatively normal shells striking short at 10-15,000m tended not to ricochet, but submerge and travel a relatively straight path, striking under the armor. It might just be possible Kirishima is the starring example of the "diving shell" principle the Japanese strove to perfect in the interwar period.

The problem for the Japanese was the distance the shell could travel underwater and remain effective. Normal shells lost 90% of their energy within 100 calibers. Along with changes to the windscreen, the Japanese also gave their shells a "boat tail" shape to improve their underwater travel. Also, hitting the water usually started the japanese trigger mechanism, which required further changes. It was noted that Japanese surface shells striking light structures above the waterline often traveled well past the ship before detonating; probably an indication of the long fuse times necessary to implement the "diving shell" doctrine.

[Gone Asiatic]

As I recall from the Tosa experiments, relatively normal shells striking short at 10-15,000m tended not to ricochet, but submerge and travel a relatively straight path, striking under the armor. It might just be possible Kirishima is the starring example of the "diving shell" principle the Japanese strove to perfect in the interwar period.

The problem for the Japanese was the distance the shell could travel underwater and remain effective. Normal shells lost 90% of their energy within 100 calibers. Along with changes to the windscreen, the Japanese also gave their shells a "boat tail" shape to improve their underwater travel. Also, hitting the water usually started the japanese trigger mechanism, which required further changes. It was noted that Japanese surface shells striking light structures above the waterline often traveled well past the ship before detonating; probably an indication of the long fuse times necessary to implement the "diving shell" doctrine.

Suichudan they were called.

[chuck]

A big mystery is Kirishima's wreck is missing everything forward of the conning tower. The authors have no explaination for that.

Many battleships suffered magazine explosions during and very soon after capsizing without evidence of having suffered prior damage to the magazines. It appears that magazine explosion is easy to obtain during the process of turning an unflooded magazine upside down. Examples of battleship ships that did not appear to suffer magazine penetration but that blew up during capsizing or within seconds of completely capsizing include Kongo, Barham, Scharnhorst, Yamato, Audacious, amongst others. It seems to me that a explosion of the B magazine would explain the condition of the Kirishima wreck pretty well.

[Tiornu]

Hey, guys.
I'd like to mention that there was some glitch with the software used by WI. This resulted in the annihilation of all vowels with diacritical marks. I think four men were assaulted:
Hiroshi Tokun?
Shir? Hayashi
Ky?shichi Yoshino
Kor? ?no (surely the most abused. Korno?)
As mentioned in the article, Ballard did have a look at the wreck, and his film record confirms at least some of the underwater hits. Rob was treated to a look at this material by Ballard's people. How was it possible for such short-range gunnery to produce underwater penetrations? That's a really good question. I think we're all used to the idea that optimal range for such hits is out near 20,000 yards for large-caliber shells. I will note, however, that the Japanese came out of the RJ War with a new armor requirement--the fixing of a 3in flange extending beneath the main belt. Presumably these were meant to counter shells exploding close by the hull, but what if those shells had a reliable delay fuze and an explosive as stable as Explosive D? Japanese interest in submarining shells goes years back before the Tosa experiment, and there must be a reason.
We may also want to consider what happens in a ricochet. The shell actually travels under the water for a distance before emerging again and angling upward. How deep does it dig in? I don't know. Could this, in combination with a fortuitous trough along Kirishima's waterline, get a shell deep enough to get under the belt? Yet another thing I do not know.
I could start posting a list of things I don't know--for example, the explanation for Mariah Carey's success in the music industry--but there's not enough bandwidth in the world.

[chuck]

When the Japanese ordered the Kongo, they explained the requirement for a lower armor belt, not found in British warships, as having been found necessary to give the ship some protection when rolling heavily in a stormy sea.

[Tiornu]

That's interesting. What's your source?

[Tim Jacobs]

Mr Worth,

Glad to see you chimed in on this.

On the question of ricochet, Bill Jurens posted info on another thread viewtopic.php?f=14&t=37032 Here is an excerpt: "The general shape of the trajectory represents a portion of a circle, with a small straight section near the impact point. Shells which ricochet can often reach fairly substantive depths before re-emerging again; a richochet does not mean that the projectile bounces off the surface of the water, merely that the curvature of the trajectory, and the residual velocity, allow it to come back to the surface again after a short underwater travel. For an angle of fall of 15 degrees, this amounts to a depth of about two calibers. In such cases, a lot depends upon the slope of the surface being struck; the average wave slope typically being something in the vicinity of 10 degrees, and the usual ricochet angle being about 12 degrees, this means that ricochets are for angles of fall ranging from about 2 through 22 degrees from the global horizontal."

The WI article says the descent angle of the big shells was about 7 deg, so that would seem to fall in the 2 - 22 deg window Mr Jurens describes.

Are you aware of any studies done on the prevalence of underwater hits vs direct hits? That question was also raised in the other thread.

[Tiornu]

I haven't seen any studies on the incidence of underwater hits. I do have a friend who's putting the Samar battle under a microscope--this is the battle where you'd expect to find the most underwater hits--but I'm guessing it'll be a while before we see his results.

[Werner]

I'm surprised no one on this thread has mentioned the Davis Torpedo -- so I will.

The torpedo had as armament a short 8-inch gun and shell. When striking the hull, the torpedo would fire the gun completely through the ship's underwater plating.

The idea was not pursued for the >snip< reason that if we developed it, shortly all naval powers would have one too, and it was so destructive as to render all antisubmarine protection ineffective, placing the entire USN surface force at risk.

[chuck]

That's interesting. What's your source?

It is from one of the earlier issues of Warship, before 1990. But I can't recall at this remove exactly which one.