The Ship Model Forum

Well in my mind I think it was a shame that the Alaska class had short services lives. I know 20/20 hindsight is a good thing for us, but with the post war shaping of the US Navy you think the Alaska class would have lasted longer. Great looking ships with great fire power.

According to navweaps.com, the 12"/50 Mark 8 on the Alaska class was longer than the 12"/50 Mark 7 on the Wyoming class (which was actually a 12"/49.5) both in bore length and rifling length, fired different shells for both the AP and HC rounds (1140lbs AP, 940lbs HC for Alaska, 870lbs AP, 770lbs HC for Arkansas), and used different amounts of powder when firing those shells (275lbs Alaska, 335lbs Arkansas). So they didn't use the same shells, and I don't think that the shorter barrel liner of the Arkansas would fit into the longer barrel of the Alaska (although I could be wrong).

the thing is, when the war ended, the demise of the alaska class can be attributed to several reasons:
1. the direct threat for which they were designed, namely commerce raiding cruisers, had never materialized.
2. when sized up against their contemporaries (such as the us iowa class, the russian sovietski soyuz class, etc.), they matched up well when it came to speed, but very poorly in terms of firepower and armor protection.
3. the job of protecting the fast carriers, as was proposed by admiral king, could be better served with more numerous, cheaper, and less manpower intensive cruisers and destroyers.

_________________
Under destruction:
1/350 Yamato
1/350 Titanic

The thing that doomed the Alaska was not that they were too weak to match against last generation of fast battleships, but that they were too strong to match against what the Soviets were deploying, which was merely a handful of semi-heavy cruisers with 7.1", not 8", guns, and a series of relatively inefficient cruisers which on paper only matched the Cleveland class. Basically the Soviet Navy had nothing which existing 8" US CAs could not handily deal with. So Alaska was superfluous.

_________________
Assessing the impact of new area rug under modeling table.

Big gun warships in general were superfluos. In an age of jet aircraft and large Carrier Battle Groups, big guns were an ornament from by gone days. If a few were kept for invasion bombardment, then well enough. But as a component of Sea Control, big guns had little practical use. Unless we were going to attack our western allies, BB guns had no one to fight anyways. Carrier Air Groups and Shore Based Naval Air operated at ranges that a big gun would never come into play.
Alaska's were more ships in the World War one mode than in any 1945 and post 45 world. The rise of Essex Class Carriers and their Cruiser and DD escorts sounded the death of the big gun in naval warfare.
You know I feel it my duty to bury the idea of the big naval gun in the second half of the 20th century
Now if we are talking the High Seas Fleet versus the Grand Fleet, then we have a subject for the Big Guns. Off topic, but related to smaller big guns. Why did the German carry their love for the 11inch gun over into their post WWI rebuilding program? Dogger Bank showed that the 11inch was too small for long range gunnery like the 13.5 of the RN Battle Crusiers.


Bob B.

The Germans carried on with 11" guns after WWI because 11" guns were the largest allowed the German Navy under Versaille. The Germans did a lot to make their post WWI 11" gun as powerful as possible. The 11" gun on the Graf Spee and Scharnhorst had higher muzzle velocity of any WWII era heavy naval gun, and had a maximum range superior to US 14" guns. Although not the most powerful overall, obviously, it was the most powerful heavy naval gun pound for pound to see service in WWII. The gun itself was more powerful than US 12"/50 used on Alaska. The German tradition of making exceptionally power naval guns for its caliber continued with the 16" guns planned for battleship H. These had far higher muzzle velocity and were far more powerful than US 16"/50 MKVII on the Iowa, and interms of muzzle kenetic energy made up more than half of the difference between US 16"/50 MKVII on the Iowa and Japanese 18.1"/45 on the Yamato. When you take this into account, then the H class battleships were not quite as underarmed as they may seem on the surface.

_________________
Assessing the impact of new area rug under modeling table.

That makes sense if they were limited to the 11 inch as an upper limit. You have to give them credit for squeezing all they could from the 11inch naval gun. This kind of struck me as I was reading about the battle of the Dogger Bank. German sources state that the German Navy was surprized at the ranges the British chose to engage, as the Germans had not intended to engage at those ranges. The Germans claimed that their 11inch was at that time not so accurate out to it's maximum range. The 13.5 performance was not a happy surprize. It must have made the thought of the 15inch Gun BBs coming on line a less than happy prospect.
Still the weakness built into the British BCs had not made themsleves apparent yet, if the British BCs had passed Lion and gone on in pursuit, maybe one would have blown up. No reason why not. I think a longer gunnery action, just by the law of averages would have blown up a British BC that day.

Bob B.

Although the protection of British BCs were weak, that weakness never contributed to a British BC blowing up during WWI. The propensity of British BCs to blow up during Jutland has been convincingly demonstrated to be the result of pool ammunition handling practice rather than inadequate protection. This has been known to the British naval inner circle shortly after Jutland, but was covered up by the Admiralty because important parts of British naval chain of command had been complicit in encouraging poor ammunition handling practice in order to speed up rate of fire. The subsequent ostentatious effort to improve protection around the turret area of British battlecruisers was completely a deceptive feel-good champaign to show the men of Grand fleet that something was being done.



In that particular action, the law of averages could have blown up BCs on both sides. Up to the Dogger Bank action, German ammunition handling practice had been just as poor as British handling practice. During that action the German battlecruiser Seydlitz very nearly blew up when she was hit in one of the aft turrets. The ammunition flash over demolished the two aft turrets, blew off a mushroom cloud clearly photographed from the British line, and kill all 160 men in the aft ammunition handling rooms. The Germans learned their lesson and improved their handling practice, so by Jutland they've eliminated this problem. Unfortunately during Dogger Bank, no British battlecruiser suffered similarly catastrophic ammunition fire, so no lessons were learned. When Jutland came, the British retained their poor ammunition handling practice.

_________________
Assessing the impact of new area rug under modeling table.

I would say that poor protection contributed to British BCs blowing up. You can't blow up without the shell penetration first. A small point .
Sure the Seydlitz could have blown up, but she didn't. It was not a good sign though.
The British had major defects in handling powder, no one disputes that.
AT Dogger Bank, the British BCs were as likely to blow up as at Jutland. If Dogger Bank had continued another hour or so, the chance a British BC blows up is quite good. They went up rather fast under fire at Jutland.

Bob B.

There was turret penetrations in both British and German BCs in Jutland. Flashover inside penetrated British turret was almost certainly responsible for each of the BC lost, and came close to causing the Lion to be lost. There was no major ammunition flash over inside penetrated German turrets. So difference in protection of the turret didn't really contribute to the difference in behavior after penetration. In some ways, the bad press that dogged the Fisherian concept of battlecruiser is not wholly deserved.

So the later Lexington class which was based on a similar concept would still be weaker than their Japanese counterparts, but perhaps would not be quite the white elephants they've been tagged to be.

_________________
Assessing the impact of new area rug under modeling table.

There is no doubt that the British desire to keep up a high rate of fire clouded their views when it came to safety. The Germans got the lesson at Dogger Bank rammed home to them in spectacular fashion when Seydlitz's after turrets went up. I'm surprized that crewmen had access to open the door into the forward turret and thus cause both to go up.
Under proper precautions a penetration should not cause a magazine explosion. Thus the Germans took alot of hits at Jutland, but did not blow up. The British could very easily have lost 4-5 BCs that day. Here is my question, if the main Battle Fleets exchanged fire for a hour or so, would British BBs be vulnerable to the same fate as the BCs. Was their any difference in the way powder was handled, and who made that decession. The captain?


Bob B.

The indications seems to be the bad ammunition handling practice in which men were effective told to bypass safety interlocks in the ammunition handling train in order to increase rate of fire was condoned throughout the chain of command in battlecruiser force, reaching all the way to the top with Beatty. But it was restricted mainly to the battlecruiser force, which trained separately and was based at a different location from the battleship force. Rate of fire was not emphasized over ammunition safety in Jellicoe's force. So Jellicoe's force would be much less susceptible to the problems afflicting Beatty's force. So It would seem Admiral Beatty had much to answer.

However, Beatty's command decision during the actual battle was sound, and he was the hero of this unsatisfactory battle by doing his real job perfectly and effectively delivered High Sea fleet to Jellicoe's maw. So the Admiralty felt revealing that bad practice was pushed by the battlecruiser force's top command would destroy men's confidence in their commanders, and force the removal of Beatty, and removing Beatty would be taken by popular and world opinion as admitting defeat at Jutland, and would perversely also be seen by the world as some sort of effort to use Beatty as scapegoat to protect Jellicoe.

Pinning the blame on armor, however, would fault Fisher, who is no longer in office. So publically the blame was pinned on armor, and the additional armor shipped by British battlecruiser after Jutland was as much for maintaining men's morale by disguising the real source of the problem in the organization as for any physical protective value they afford.

_________________
Assessing the impact of new area rug under modeling table.

The one huge knock against Beatty was the way in which the Fifth Battle Squadron was handled in the opening moves of the BC action. That was dealt with in length in "Rules of the Game". It's hard to credit the way the 5th was handled. Beatty was perhaps not so accepting of this force as he might have been. One sure thing, being able to retire from the German's BCs and put the 5th between him and the German High Seas Fleet was a major plus for Beatty's continued survival . Fortunate that no hit were able to slow up any one of these BBs , for that would have been the end of anyone dropping astern. Another knock on Beatty by some, was the taking of the BC force across the front of the deploying Grand Fleet. SOme complain the smoke gave problems to the Fleet others claim it covered the fleets deployment. For me, the jury is still out on that. But the British having a large BB superiority and heavier guns would probably have been able to give as good as it got during deployment, it's not like the Germans were ready to assume a superior position.
One thing clear enough was that the BCs of the British were primed and ready to explode. With inferior armor to a BB or a German BC, Beatty should have known penetrations were likely and that all that powder was asking for a disaster. The British BCs just got one upped by the Germans when they chose a bit slower speed and a bit smaller guns in a trade off for superior armor protection. How hard it was to sink a German BC was plain from the pounding they took. It might well be true that no British BC would have been lost but for the dangerous powder handling. In fact a good chance

Bob B.

The main problem of the 5th battle squadron on that day was its failure to read Beatty's signal, thus placing itself far away from where it could effectively support Beatty's battlecruisers.

Once Beatty has sighted the High Sea fleet, his first and only job was to bring the main body of the High Sea fleet to the Grand Fleet in such a way as to enable the Grand Fleet to engage it from a favorible position. Attempting to temporarily improve the situation of his own forces in the process is completely secondarily and must not be pursued at all if it could hamper the work of leading the Germans to the Grand Fleet and ensuring the Grand Fleet sees the Germans first. If his battle cruisers and 5th battle squadron fled cleanly from the battleships of the High Sea fleet, the German battle cruisers might not have attempted to maintain contact on account of the drubbing they had taken from the 5th battle squadron. If the German battle cruisers did not maintain contact, that might have discouraged the battleships of the High Sea fleet from continuing a seemly futile pursuit of a faster force. So he needed to run in such a way as to enable the German battleships to support German battlecruisers in the chase. If he had to use one of the QE as bait and lost her in the process of luring the High Sea fleet to the Grand Fleet, no one would have counted that against him so long as he brought the High Sea fleet to Jellicoe.

Although the destruction of the battlecruiser became the most notable tale told of the battle, the main failing of the British on that day was actually with the main body of the Grand fleet. The Grand fleet's doctrine and and fire control all proved not up to the task of fixing the High Sea fleet and prevent it from evading engagement during daylight. The Grand fleet's doctrine also was not up to preventing High Sea fleet from cutting across its own track night to escape. The standing order to turn the battleships away rather than towards any suspected torpedo attack, which caused the Grand fleet to loose contact the moment when Scheer made his most risky move to extricate itself from battle with the High Fleet, was Jellicoe's.

Whatever Beatty did, Beatty did his part in setting the High Sea fleet up properly for a heavily unfavorable engagement against Jellicoe. Beatty did the only really important part of his job right. Jellicoe did not.

_________________
Assessing the impact of new area rug under modeling table.

Since I learned of this it has always mystified me. In Napoleonic times (and before) it was usual to station a frigate to repeat the Admiral's signals for each squadron in the fleet.
Was this not done at Jutland? Also, were signal lamps in use or were the distances too great?

Thanks,
Roger

_________________
In 1757 Admiral John Byng was shot "pour encourager les autres". Voltaire

The more I thought about the role of the British Battle Cruisers , the more I think that Beatty was a damn fool to sail his depleted little force across the front of the deploying Grand Fleet. Most people agree with this action as being needed to get to his proper position at the head of the fleet. Well, as you say, his job was to lure the High Seas Fleet into position. This he did. The 5th Battle Squadron had the great good sense to deploy at once to the rear of the British Line causing no disruption to the deployment. Beatty on the other hand went sailing right in front the deployment spewing smoke from funnels and guns on a day when visibility was no all that great. He should have, in my humble opinion, peeled off from his course and turned about to take up a position for scouting the activities of the High Sea's Fleet from the NW of that developing gunnery action, sailing south as necessary to keep a close eye on the moves of the germans and being in their way for a move west. Beatty did his job, the entire Grand Fleet was deploying to the East SE and needed visibility at maximum to open the gunnery action, their superiority required nothing from Beatty and his few big guns. He should have been the eyes to the North West reporting any moves made by the High Seas Fleet away from the Grand Fleets line.
And then there were those awful Armored Cruisers sailing about spewing smoke inbetween the fleets, enough said about those fools .
For what its worth, Beatty did his job, but went to far in my opinion. The Battle Fleet didn't need him at the head of the line once full deployment had taken place and the gunnery battle had begun. Scouting the Germans to ensure no escape and carrying big enough guns to sweep aside anyone getting in his way other than capital ships was what he should have been on about after the run to the north. And we all know how the Germans got out of the trap, Beatty in scouting position could have told Jellicoe everything he needed to know.

Bob B.

I am not sure what scouting position you had in mind for Beatty. The simultaneous battle turn ordered by Scheer was no a possibility foresaw by the British. The British did not believe such a maneuver under fire could possibly succeed. If the battle turn was not executed, then Scheer had just two choices, turn to a parallel course with the Grand fleet, or turn onto a reciprocal with the Grand fleet, then either force a battleline and duke it out with Grand fleet or keep turning and then run away. Either way the maneuvers would take Scheer a long time to execute as each ship must arrive at the designated point of turn before following the ship in the front. Jellicoe at near the center of British line could see perfectly well if Scheer should pull such a move. Beatty would also have upwards of 30-40 minutes to decide what to do from the front of the British line as the 16 German battleships in a line that stretch close to 10 miles turn one after another as each arrives at the same spot.

In addition to being prepared to scout ahead of the fleet if the contact is broken, Beatty actually has a direct tactical role once the battle was joined. Beatty must use the superior speed of his battlecruisers to keep the projected path of Grand fleet free of any attempt by German battlecruisers use their own speed to cross the T of Grand fleet, or at least use the threat of crossing Grand Fleet's T to either force the head of the Grand Fleet away from the High Sea fleet, or throw the head of the Grand fleet into confusion. Nor is Beatty's force too depleted to play this role. Beatty still possessed 4 battlecruisers from his original force, which at the onset of the main fleet action would soon to be reinforced with 3 more undamaged ones that was operating with Grand Fleet. Against this 7 Hipper only had 5, all damaged.

Since radio communication was not yet thoroughly developed, Beatty needed to position himself where he has the best chance of seeing his own CinC, the progress of the battle, and what is coming ahead of the Grand fleet. Being at head of the line seemed to have been the best staging point to cover a maximum possible number of tasks that his battlecruisers might need to perform in the upcoming battle. So I think Beatty anticipated well what he might be called upon to do once the battle between Grand Fleet and High Sea fleet was joined, and acted correctly to position himself so as to be well placed to do most of them.

_________________
Assessing the impact of new area rug under modeling table.

If you assume being at the head of the fleet during the fleet gunnery action is Beatty's role, then he did the right thing. That is the first I have heard about being needed at the head to prevent the German BCs crossing the T. I need to think that over a bit. The British understimated German ship handling skills for sure. The High Seas Fleet was in a trap , but visibility was awful, that fact should have changed Beatty's mind about his role. Putting the High Seas Fleet between the NE Grand Fleet and a NW BC force would insure as far as possible continued contact with the Germans. As it was, Beatty steaming across the front firing and not keeping Jellioce informed about the High Seas fleet's position, battle order and course during this run didn't relect well on Beatty. If it was a fairly clear day, rare in the North Sea, then I can see Beatty getting his depleted force into position at the head of the Grannd Fleet. I have always seen the role of BCs in a fleet action as heavily armed scouts, not Battle Line participants once the BBs are engaged with each other.
I still believe that Beatty should have recognized how bad visibility was and that the day was drawing to a close, getting into a scouting position with a clear field of view would serve the Grand Fleet better I think. The British enjoyed a large superiority ,all that was needed was to keep contact to destroy the Germans. If forces had been more equal, then Beatty would need to operate as a part of the Battle Line.

Bob B.

The visibility was not so awful that Jellicoe's fleet could not see the German battleships should the German battleships perform the normal range of maneuvers thought possible by the British. If the Germans were to continue to run into the grand fleet, or make a sequential turn to escape the grand fleet, then much of the German fleet would remain in view of at least parts of the Grand fleet. Fundamentally, the British did not believe a fleet having its T crossed in the ideal 90 degree manner really could extricate itself from the predicament in a short amount of time. So the notion that Beatty should have anticipated the visibility problem probably does not stand based on what British thought the Germans could do.

Even as the Germans did the historic simultaneous turn to extricate from fleet engagement, the German fleet was still intermittently visible to at least some parts of the Grand fleet. The problem Jellicoe confronted was British tactical plotting is worthless, consequently Jellicoe's staff could not use tactical plotting to integrate the various sighting information reported by various parts of Grand fleet to arrive at an comprehensive and up-to-date picture of the battle. This bottle neck would afflict any report from Beatty, so its highly doubtful that a Beatty in a scouting role could bypass this log jam to add much situational awareness to the Grand fleet. The only thing Beatty might do was to attempt to disrupt German maneuver himself. Again, this call for an interpretation of where Beaty should be that conflicts with other scenarios.

The three problems that defeated Jellicoe were:

1. No effective way to integrate sighting reports from different parts of the fleet to construct a clear picture of the battle when the enemy is out of sight from the flagship. This is less of a problem for Beatty when the enemy is 50 miles away, and an approximate knowledge of enemy location, course and speed is all the tactical information that could be acted upon. This becomes a major problem when both fleets are in close engagement, and you need to know exactly how the enemy fleet is deployed and exactly what each part of it is trying to do.

2. No effective way to establish firing solution based on computed, rather than observed, enemy course and speed. So British gunnery can not engage enemies that are temporarily out of sight. Hence intermittent visibility essentially defeated the British ability to engage the High Sea fleet.

3. Doctrine that overemphasize the threat of long range torpedo attack. If Jellicoe had turned towards the High Sea fleet in a general chase rather than away from the High Sea fleet in an attempt to out run a mere 29 torpedoes that the Germans had fired, Scheer's battle turn maneuver would have failed.

_________________
Assessing the impact of new area rug under modeling table.