The Ship Model Forum

Here's one for Navydavesof; a blog about the lack of NGFS in Libya:

http://www.informationdissemination.net ... qus_thread

My background is aviation, so I get the air power argument. But I'm also Army, I understand the role and advantages of artillery. I gotta admit, I have to agree - the lack of NGFS off Libya seems.....not good.

Thank you for that link. It's interesting. The coolest thing is that the standard 16" rounds were old hat even in 1992. The 51nm 11" sabot rounds were developed and ready to be used after the BBs were to get the Mk160 GFCS in 1993. For the little cost in reactivation, maintenance, and munitions they would be great assets to have...especially in the face of monetary cutbacks, decommissioning carriers, and the poor performance of AGS and 5" ERGM.

With SLEP, the BBs could stand in place for 20 years (so sayeth BAE) while replacements are designed, perhaps with the 12" automatic main battery Dahlgren has fielded and either AGS or Mk45 Mod4 secondary battery.

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Proper Preparation Prevents Poor Performance

Why does anyone want NGFS for the Libyian operation ?

Sanity please.

.

because it's so close to the shore that we can save a WHOLE lot of money by not shooting $150 million worth of missiles. Instead we can shoot maybe as much as $5 million in projectiles.

Thanks for being part of the "I don't care how much it costs" club. You guys are pretty rare these days.

Sanity, please.

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Proper Preparation Prevents Poor Performance

Yes. Almost everything in Libya is near the coast. Closest thing that we have to BBs today are B-52s/B-1Bs with satellite guided bombs. Lots of relatively economical fire support there. Does seem a shame to waste those BBs, however.

Jack

News reports state that B-2 bombers have been used in the Libyan effort. As far as I know, all the B-2's are based in the continental U.S. I wonder what the cost of a round trip mission to Libya is? It can't be cheap. When you factor in fuel, crew, weapons, pre- and post-maintenance, etc., it's got to be hundreds of thousands of dollars, maybe more depending on what all you choose to include in the cost equation. War is expensive!!

Can a B-2 make the round trip unrefuelled or does it require in-flight refueling support?

Even IF there was an IOWA or two IOWA's off the coast of Libya, aircraft would still be needed to knock out the Air Defenses inland and other command and control locations.

The issue of DEPENDING on battleships for fire support would be that given that there are four of them available and that all are in commission. There would never be more than two available for deployment in a forward area ... likely only one with one in transit. So by the time the President and his French handlers had decided that the Libya government was about to kill a whole city of civilians in 48 hours and it was time to act. Where would the IOWA battleship be? For a good many years now we don't keep many ships in the whole MED area ... only passing through to the war zones. The likely spot would be outside the Persian Gulf where they could "act" against pirates? Yemen targets? They certainly were not providing fire support in Afghanistan or Iraq. I guess the IOWA could have been cruising in the Gulf waving at the Iranian Missile Boats. How long would it take for that IOWA to get off Libya? Likely after all the major targets have been destroyed by cruise missiles.

Both Air Power and Ship Gunfire to knock-out targets in urban areas with "good guys and bad guys" mixed require recon on the ground or a good number of drones overhead or both. You need to interface with the "good" guys so know "WHO" they are in the mix and to know where civilians are. I have not tried to figure out how many BURKE crews it would take to man four battleships, but given that the USN would likely NOT see their budget increased to pay for the battleships, how many other ships would need to be mothballed?

The pro battleship guys always seem to assume that the ship will be there on scene from the start of the need that it would be optimal for. If you have a war in a country close to the ocean that you "plan" on fighting for several years, then maybe.

I'm always amused by the extremism that seems to arise when the subject of naval gunfire support comes up. The anti-battleship people seem unable to recognize any situation, whatsoever, where big guns might be helpful and cost efficient. On the other hand, the pro-battleship people seem unable to recognize that other, equally useful forms of explosive delivery (airplanes, missiles, whatever) exist and can be highly effective.

There is a need for explosives delivery. No one disputes that. The question is how best to fill that need. What balance of planes, missiles, and ships would best meet the requirements? Any reasonable person or analysis would, undoubtedly, show that a mix of all possible methods is the best solution. Each method has its strengths and weaknesses. Airpower is good for rapid response if naval support is not immediately present. Naval power is good for sustained operations and quick response to changing local conditions, once they've arrived on the scene.

Naval gunfire is clearly a desirable piece of the delivery puzzle. The Navy's internal question is how to accomplish it. Is it better to have a battleship or is it better to mount 8" (Mk71) guns on destroyers? Valid arguments, based on cost, politics, manning, effectiveness, availability, maintenance, etc., can be made for and against either approach (or any other approach one can come up with).

Unfortunately, the Navy put all its gunfire support eggs into the DDG1000 (AGS 155mm gun) basket and that has largely failed. The question now is what's Plan B? I don't think the Navy has one, at the moment.

Anyone espousing either extreme of the battleship question is just demonstrating a lack of understanding of warfare, economics, and politics. A person can be against battleships because of the overall balance of factors (cost, manning, effectiveness, politics, etc.) while still recognizing their potential usefulness. Conversely, a person can be in favor of battleships while still recognizing their drawbacks and difficulties. Geez, people, have a position on the issue but relax a little.

Regards,
Bob "Even Keel" Carr

I believe that spending the money that would be required for activating four battleships and manning them and trying to keep them running would be better spent on putting larger guns or some other lower cost delivery system than Tomahawks on a larger number of ships like all or a large subset of the DDG BURKE's and/or CG BUNKER HILL's. The odds of one of them being close enough to where there would be a need is MUCH greater that one of the battleships. We never know where the next "Military" action will arise. Did anyone think we would be in Libya a month ago? Korea in 1950's and Vietnam in 1960's made sense for battleship and cruiser fire support. The fire support provided by the two battleships off Iraq in 1991 was of minimal value in the overall campaign. With the smaller size forces we have today, being able to react/strike quickly is the most important. We have achieved amazing degrees of improvement in accuracy for all kinds of weapons, take advantage of that, don't go down a nostalgia path. Our ability to strike a target we want without damaging surrounding civilians has sent a strong message to bad actors. In Tripoli, civilians are going about business even while attacks are in progress because they know we are NOT going to be carpet bombing them to hit one building or tank.

Anybody want to clue me in on what "NGFS" means or stands for?

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Carl Musselman
(Formerly Back-Aft Models)

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Hi Carl,

NGFS = Naval Gun Fire Support. And another factor in why it might be desirable in Libya is the President's announcement that he is sending in 2,200 Marines--in spite of previous assurances there would be no boots on the ground!

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Cheers,
John Snyder
Shady Grove Farm
Shady Grove Farm on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/ShadyGroveDuckEggs

Oh! Thanks, John. I thought for sure that it might mean National Guard of Florida State.

That was the only thing that could pop into my head.

_________________
Carl Musselman
(Formerly Back-Aft Models)

Photobucket
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YouTube Channel:
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCcH4XXgrwKkhbIHgFtIYhAg

Marines? Uh oh.

By the way, John (going off topic), great work on the DDG-51 PE, and thank you for the help holding my current order until I was certain I was not going to be evacuated from Japan. Your products and customer service are great.

_________________
Proper Preparation Prevents Poor Performance

Pleasure, mate--we're here to serve!

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Cheers,
John Snyder
Shady Grove Farm
Shady Grove Farm on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/ShadyGroveDuckEggs

NGFS is a very useful asset but I think the need to avoid civilian casualties means it is unlikely to be deployed in Libya.

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In 1757 Admiral John Byng was shot "pour encourager les autres". Voltaire

Admiral,

1. There isn't any substantive NGFS available anyway.
2. There is no reason that there couldn't be much more accurate Naval Gun Fire other than the fact that nobody but the Army has put any effort or money into developing the appropriate projectiles, such as Excaliber. The reason the Army has done it is that virtually all of the combat arms branches benefit from more accurate 155mm gunfire. Aviators don't see any benefit to themselves in gunfire and aviators now run, at the least, the US Navy.

Russ

Balance. It’s what all effective fighting forces have, and it’s what wins conflicts. It means having the flexibility to adapt to dynamic situations, and a support infrastructure that can help maintain “Plan B” when Mr. Murphy decides to invite Clauswitz and Sun Zsu over for some martinis.

I think carr hit on an interesting point: naval gunfire support draws all kinds of people out into all kinds of extreme arguments. The facts that settle these arguments are already written in stone: there is a time and place for direct air support, indirect air strikes (missiles), and good old gunfire support. World War Two, Korea, Vietnam, Lebanon, Desert Storm, all proved that naval gunfire support and direct air support complement each other, and that the use of missiles helps mitigates personnel casualties in politically charged scenarios (remember the “Powell Doctrine”).

Why are the Iowa’s no longer in commission? One word. Money. They were expensive to maintain in terms of manpower and budget in a Navy that was looking down the throat of a huge downsizing in the late 1990’s. They were effective, they could put massive amounts of firepower in very small areas, and they were huge and robust power projection platforms. Would they survive the threats of today? Possibly. They were built to survive a form of warfare that was based upon unguided projectiles. Later on they faced the Kamikaze threat (essentially a fragile cruise missile), and fared well. Would they be able to survive the gigantic “carrier killer” torpedoes and cruise missiles that the Soviet Navy introduced? Who knows? Actually, the US Navy probably found out once they sank the ex-USS America, but they’re not going to publish those findings anytime soon.

At present, the US Navy finds itself with a budget driven force designed to protect aircraft carriers, amphibious warfare, and to support “asymmetric warfare”. The funding gets split up between those three primary cultures and they fight tooth and nail for every last penny. Having an Iowa could very well mean having one less Nimitz out there.

It’s debatable whether or not an Iowa is needed offshore of Libya. Nine 16 inch guns, twelve 5 in guns, and eight Tomahawk cruise missile launchers on one ship could easily relieve three or four cruisers and destroyers in the support mission (although an Iowa would still need those ships for protection). What an Iowa doesn't answer is “what, exactly, is the role of the US military and the United States there?”, and "what, exactly, are the real long term missions of the US Navy?" A prudent historian would tell you that the US Navy needs to be prepared to fight many different kinds of wars, including past wars, and also provide for the means to ramp up to a type of conflict not yet seen.

Big guns had always been a part of the navy prior to 2000, and now that part of the balance equation is gone. It’s vital that the US Navy has that capability because sometimes there is simply no substitute for sheer weight of steel on a target. It’s why artillery is the king of the battlefield, and it’s why the Army and the Marines call for offshore support when there are no friendly guns ashore.

It’s always better to have something and not need it today, than to need it today and not have it.

Right now the US Navy doesn’t have something that it may very well need.

And here's the latest on NGFS in Libya. Look at the costs in doing by air/missiles. The solutions put forth are pathetic.

http://www.informationdissemination.net ... naval.html

Mr. Moonboy sums things up pretty well! Great job, sir.

The only corrections I must make are that DDGs, CGs, and BBs are not comparable. For some reason people think they are, but they are not, nor have they ever been. BBs are only comparable with CVNs. BBs deliver 4-8 times the ordnance of a CVN. DDGs and CGs are not in the same league.

So when comparing ordnance delivery capabilities in weights and tonnage, BBs can only be compared with CVNs. CGs and DDGs only carry as many TLAMs as a BB did in the '80s-'90s. If they went by NAVSEA's reactivation plan for BBs, BBs would have over 100 TLAMs, nine 16-inch guns with a 52+nm range, and ESSM.

One must remember. CGs and DDGs are escort ships. BBs are capital ships.


Very right, sir, and there is an existing system that could be installed aboard new construction DDGs and fire 8-inch rounds. It's called the Mk71 8-inch/60caliber MCLWG. The same magazine fitted for the Spruance-class DD could be incorporated into the new DDGs to carry 500+ 8-inch rounds in a mix of ballistic, guided, and guided extended range rounds.

Again with the 8" laser guided round. This round impacts the target with the same explosive effect as a Harpoon anti-ship cruise missile.

BAE would poop in their pants with pleasure the Mk71 was ordred. So would the entire SOF community, USMC, USAF, and US Army...oh, that's the whole military...except elements of the USN.

_________________
Proper Preparation Prevents Poor Performance

And this is the bit I struggle with the the great NGFS debate, it goes to extreme's too quickly.

Except for some slower than average people, there is no argument that the Army should ditch it's artillery regiments and replace them with armed reconnaissance / attack helicopter squadrons. After all, one Tp of Tiger ARH can put more HE onto a target than a Field Bty can, the Tp has a longer range, is more flexible (recce, 30 mm, rocket and Hellfire) and in some ways more accurate - but who in their right mind would remove all 105 and 155 mm guns for helicopters? They cost a hell of a lot, can only provide windows of cover, are effected badly by weather (hard to laser designate or use FLIR in a sandstorm) and require specialised (and expensive) logistics trains and support personnel. It takes ~3 years to train a helicopter mechanic; think it take that long for an artillery mechanic? Sure, a F/A-18 puts even more HE on target than a Tiger; but not as close, not as responsive and not as cheaply.

Compare to artillery. If it's in range it can provide rapid response in all weathers (for the ADF the Battle of Long Tan is proof of this) to a high degree of accuracy (with 25 m for 105 mm at Long Tan). It's cheap, can fire all day, can rope in untrained people to support and over a long period of time (ie, as long as the gun numbers and FO's are sorted, anyone can pack ammo up) and can put a massive amount of HE in. Artillery is still essential to the land army; it compliments aviation assets and provides commanders on the ground options.

So why is it different for the Navy. At RMC we were taught that you couldn't call in NGFS within one grid square. Speaking with Navy breathern caused much laughter; when HMAS Brisbane missed her target (with her first round) by 60 m one one of her last shoots the gunnery officer was very embarrassed. Obviously a 16" shell has a larger zone of danger than a 5" (but then again a 155 mm has a larger danger zone than 105 mm), but it can still br brought in accurately in today's world.

So Iowa's? Maybe not. They are expensive. But all those pro-CVN/anti-gun people need to understand that they aren't replacements, they are compliments. 5" is probably too small; at only 127 mm it's smaller than the standard medium artillery piece (either 152 or 155 mm). 6" would tie in well with current Army understanding of offensive support (obviously the US military would have experience with up to 8"), but I would think 8 - 12" would provide a balance of cost, range, rate of fire and effect on target.