maxim wrote:
Some more serious comments: a Tomahawk equipped battleship cannot have a greater strike range than a destroyer equipped with the same cruise missile. There are today even small corvettes equipped with long range cruise missiles. My comment referred obviously not to cruise missiles, but to extended range guided munition for the 16" guns mentioned by navydavesof
Also my comment to the peace time role referred to a comment by navydavesof
/edit: another small comment:
the Iowa class fired its 16" guns only against very weakly defended targets on shore: the nearly defeated Japan in 1945, which had lost its fleet (the remains were immobilised by lack of oil) and the big majority of its properly trained pilots; North Korea, North Vietnam and Lebanon without any proper defence, and the nearly defeated Iraq in 1991. Those ships were never risked in an attack against well defended land targets, e.g. earlier in World War Two or even earlier in the (Second) Gulf War in 1991.
Maxim,
Here's a number of points to nitpick on:
1.) The assertion that members of the
Iowa class only fired its guns in shore bombardment is wrong. The first two members in the class, USS
Iowa and USS
New Jersey, actually engaged enemy ships during the Operation Hailstone raids against the Japanese base in Truk lagoon in February 1944. The
Iowa sank the Japanese light cruiser
Katori while the
New Jersey sank the Japanese destroyer
Maikaze. There are numerous sources that confirm this such as
Combinedfleet.com:
Quote:
During this engagement, CINC, Fifth Fleet, Admiral Raymond A. Spruance (former CO of MISSISSIPPI, BB-41) flies his flag aboard NEW JERSEY. She engages LtCdr Hagio Tsutomu's (former CO of URANAMI) MAIKAZE at 7,000 yards. MAIKAZE fires a spread of torpedoes that passes between NEW JERSEY and IOWA following in trail. Later, gunfire from MINNEAPOLIS and NEW ORLEANS starts a fire aft that probably explodes one of the destroyer's magazines. At 1343, MAIKAZE, still firing, sinks with all hands. NEW JERSEY sinks SHONAN MARU No. 15 with her port side five-inch battery.
40 miles NW of Truk. IOWA engages KATORI and fires forty-six 16-inch high capacity (non-armor piercing) rounds and 124 five-inch shells. She straddles KATORI with all eight salvos. KATORI launches a salvo of torpedoes at the Americans. Just after the IOWA's fourth salvo, KATORI starts to list to port. After being under fire for 11 minutes, the cruiser sinks stern first at 07-45N, 151-20E. Reportedly, a large group of survivors is seen where she sinks, but none are picked up. Later, Captain Oda is promoted Rear Admiral, posthumously.
2.) To add to your point about a "battleship not having a greater strike range than a frigate", Bob chose to omit the importance of aircraft carriers, whose air wings have a much greater range than than the battleship's 16-inch guns.
3.) Battleships may have concentrated firepower of their VLS tubes/TLAMs to add to the 16-inchers when it comes to shore bombardment, but concentrating enough CGs, DDGs and SSNs can yield similar firepower.
Unlike battleships, submarines using their VLS to fire off Tomahawks offshore don't need the protection of numerous escorts; the submarines can rely on their stealth when submerged to remain undetected by the enemy, while a battleship requires a whole task group's protection from aerial, surface and sub-surface threats.
Lastly, despite what these battleship advocates continue to say about the merits and advantages of these leviathans, it is highly unlikely that any of the
Iowa class will return to service. Most, if not all, have been relegated to museums.
As said, the topic is about cheaper, realistic alternatives to getting the US Navy back to 355 ships. The discussion about the relevance and effectiveness of battleships (specially the modernized
Iowa class) in a modern threat environment, is tangential to the topic at best.
What's relevant to the topic include:
1.) possible reactivation of remaining mothballed
Perry class FFGs and other ships in reserve such as early flight
Ticonderoga class CGs (there's even been talk of
reactivating CV-63 USS Kitty Hawk)
2.) the looming deactivation of
9 Ticonderoga class CGs over the 2020s and how the Navy can still get to 355 ships despite losing these cruisers.
3.) Whether the US Congress will fund more Littoral Combat Ships or go fully with the
FFG (X) program; there is some resistance to abandoning the LCS program despite many officials' stated preference for the FFG(X). (the US Coast Guard's National Security Cutter program may be a good template for the FFG(X) )
4.) The issue of arming amphibs, such as the
San Antonio class LPDs and their successors, with VLS to make them more potent in
ASuW, ASW and AAW and thus need less escorts.
5.) the
Zumwalts- is only 3 enough? (perhaps an enlarged
Zumwalt can be the template for an updated battleship design)
6.) the
Columbia class SSBNs (
Ohio class replacements)
7.) Smaller/Riverine combatants such as the
Cyclones- do you need to build more?
8.) Integrating new technology such as drones, rail guns and lasers into a future fleet
9.)
Ford class carriers- do you still build all of the class members? Or can't you achieve the same global presence with the
America class LHAs which are effectively mini-carriers with F35Bs? Does the US Navy need to grow beyond the 10-11 carrier group requirement?
Food for thought.