The Ship Model Forum

I have something for you guys to think about. The Ukrainians have a Slava-class CG that they are looking to sell or finish for themselves. With the thirst that the Chinese have for high-end Russian equipment, they have been interested in this ship for the past several years.



If the Chinese were to buy and complete this ship, how do you think they would complete this ship, and how do you think it would wind up being fitted? The SS-N-12s are still very, very dangerous missiles, and they have a great potential to damage USN ships, but then again, while the 12s are very capable missiles, the launchers could be completed to fit the SS-N-22s and maybe 26s.

What kind of weapons, radars, CIWS, and helicopter fit might this ship have if it were completed by Russia for China or if it were completed by China?

Thanks, guys. I hope you have ideas to contribute.

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Proper Preparation Prevents Poor Performance

If you believe that the most likely point of conflict between the USA and the PRC will be over Taiwan , then you must consider what China needs to invade Taiwan. China would likely rely upon land based air, submarines, ballistic and cruise missiles for A2/AD against the USN, rather than depend upon her surface fleet. The PLAN amphibious fleet however, is a work in progress.

In that case, the Ukrainian Slava might best be outfitted as a fire support platform to support amphibious operations.

An NGFS platform would be fitted with a navalized version of the 300 mm BM-30 Smerch, firing 9M55 or 9M528 rockets with ~240 kg warheads (PLA designation PHL03/AR2). So 2 x 12 tube 300mm systems, 4 x twin AK-130 130mm/L70 dual purpose gun mounts (8 tubes total), and 2-4 x Kashtan CIWS-M CADS. Strip out th SS-n-22 and SA-N-7, as well as the helo hanger to make room for the guns and rockets.

This would create a down and dirty NGFS platform to fulfill, what I hope is not, an immediate operational need.

If the PLAN wanted platform for open ocean operations, the modifications would be entirely different.

for NGFS with Russian cutting edge equipment, maybe even mounting this sick bastard (intended for both sea and land mounting):

http://russianmilitaryphotos.wordpress. ... s-testing/

http://www.defence.pk/forums/land-warfa ... llery.html

I would think the Chinese would want the vessel to act as consort/escort to their 'new' carrier.

SA-N-6 was a good air defense system in its day, and I imagine the Russians would like their customer to pay them to upgrade/modernize that system.

SS-N-12 in the form installed is really old - probably no viable rounds of the original type remaining. They have upgraded the missile to the P-1000 version on other vessels - but even that version is over 20 years old. I see three options here - replace all with SS-N-22, upgrade the SS-N-12 system as mentioned above under SA-N-6, or go with the refurbished 1990's P-1000 missile. While it may be tempting to replace all with SS-N-22, considering how much effort has been (purported) to be put forward on anti-USN CVN weapons, I would think the would want one of the later two options, as the longer range and heavier warhead of the SS-N-12 adds more to a potential Chinese CVBG than more SS-N-22 (which they already have onboard their Russian DDGs).

I'm not sure an SS-N-19 would be able to fit here, or if it has the same lack of upgrade issue. Allowing the Chinese to have an 'older' generation of missile allows them to 'save face' and make the case that the system is 'outdated anyway' to the world stage (after all, they would be helping provide a nuclear capable cruise missile to another country...)

I would really not expect much to change in the way of sensors, as the Russians would also like to upgrade those for you at your cost.

Now, the above interactions assume the Chinese and the Ukrainians engage the Russians for support of the existing systems. The Chinese may be happier buying the vessel as-is and doing upgrade and refurbishment themselves (reverse engineering an SS-N-12 or SA-N-6 today would not be that hard). Naturally, that would strain Chinese/Russian relations, and it may be more worthwhile to keep Russia happy than gain one vessel.

I don't think the Chinese think about groups of ships the same way we do. The Ukrainian Slava is not just another hull to buy and to reconfigure with guns and other things. The Slava-class ship is purpose built to be an extremely potent ASuW platform, and it is. They are credited as being as fall back ships as a possible alternative to the Kirovs. While the SS-N-12 is not a "new" missile, it is still a remarkably capable missile, and the Slavas carry 16 of them. Especially if fired in a group, their super high speed makes the missiles a real concern to the Aegis system.

I don't think they would have a Slava with their carrier group. It would be like putting a battleship with a carrier group; while expanding the group's capabilities, it could be part of its own potent group. (For risk of repeating myself) the Slavas are not AAW ships like our CGs and DDGs. They are ASuW ships with a good self defense ASW system.

Their Sovremennys are extremely potent ships because of their eight SS-N-22 missiles. A Slava with 16 SS-N-12 (P-500 or P-1000) or even completed to carry SS-N-22 or 26 would be a remarkably valuable offensive asset to add to their fleet. Those are the reasons why I would leave it as an ASuW instead of trying to make it a NSFS ship.

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Proper Preparation Prevents Poor Performance

I agree with what you are saying, but differ in my assessment of how a single ship would fit into a Chinese naval strategy.

Right now, and for the next 15-20-years, I do not see the PLAN strategy to engage in a blue-water conflict with the USN. That capability is coming, but really is a second, or third step. On the other hand, I find it credible that the PRC might invade Taiwan during that time frame. A successful invasion with no further offensive action against regional allies; retreat behind a formidable maritime strike reconnaissance network, a wall of submarines, and mining the straights. The US would have no good strategic options in response. I see the Chinese building up is their A2/AD network, as well as their amphibious capability. This is consistent with with their strategic interests.

I do not see where a single ASUW cruiser really furthers Chinese goals, and I doubt that the Slava in question has more than 20-years of hull life making a dream of using it as an independent SAG somewhat unrealistic. It just does not fit where Chinese interests.

A couple of things to consider are that the best missile shooters the Chinese have are the second hand Sovremmnyys armed with 8 SS-N-22s each. Other than those missiles, those ships are nothing special. This singe Slava offers twice the capability in a single hull. In the big scheme of things a single ship may not be a super tide changer, but it would certainly shape the US response. At the very least it would draw an SSN off whatever else it was doing to address it.

While that is probably true, they would have the Slava for the same reasons why they would have the Sovremennys: as missile platforms.

Two things to keep in mind with this statement is that the Slava would not likely be in the Chinese fleet until 2015 or 2018, which pushes its influence out to 2028 or (I think) 2035. Just like the Russian Slavas do every time they set sail, a Chinese Slava would make the USN think twice, because it offers 16 missiles that have a good chance of defeating Aegis ships and damaging and mission-killing a carrier.

I agree that the single ship would not likely single handedly win a conflict, but its number of missiles would likely shape the battlefield, and they would certainly shape the battlefield if it was combined with one or two other missile shooters like the Sovremennys.

With as squeamish as the USN is, such a threat might even keep a carrier from going where it needs to go. A battleship, on the other hand, would likely be a little more ballsy

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Proper Preparation Prevents Poor Performance

As you pointed out, the Chinese think differently than us, and in their terms in of their priorities and requirements. Right now, PRC strategic goals (e.g. capture Taiwan) require a sea denial strategy and procurement program. It makes sense for the PLAN to prioritize amphibious assault, submarines (specifically diesel electric boats), mines, and most significantly - an extensive land-based maritime air surveillance/strike force.

The best missile shooters the Chinese have are the People's Liberation Army Air Force and People's Liberation Army Naval Air Force!

And there is the political tool it would be effective as, even if it was not as effective on the battlefield.

This is essentially Tirpitz's risk theory, with the Chinese being Germany and the US in the role of the UK.

Theoretically, if they get the ship and somehow think it is worth their effort, they would totally remodel the superstructure, replace the masts and radar with Chinese AESA panels similar to the ones found on the Varyag and type 052C/D destroyer. They will probably replace the S-300 installation with similar installation as on type 052C/D destroyers. They may have some more modern anti-ship missile to replace the Bazalt installations.

Actually, the Chinese were offered this ship in the late 1990s but refused it.

This ship would fit even worse today in either the likely procurement or naval strategy for PLAN tham she did in the late 1990s.

1. There is nothing in this ship that is still state of the art. It wasn't quite state of the art even 20 years ago. In most respects this ship is already substantially behind what the Chinese seem to be able to already do with domestic technology. The Chinese tend not to buy technology they already have.

2. This ship also offer no new capability to the Chinese Navy, except the Bazalt missiles. It is not clear if Ukraine actually has any functional Bazalt missiles it can sell or give away. The Chinese would require Russians support just for the missiles, which may not be forthcoming. In any case, the full potential of the Bazalt missiles also depends on Soviet maritime surveillence satellite constellation and Tu-95 maritime surveliiance assets. That is now defunct. So any additional capability afforded by the theoretical range of few Bazalt would be sketchy. In a slava the Chinese would have 16 tubes filled with missiles which, realistically, can not reliably used except in a way similar to the Moskit missiles they already have in large numbers.

Realistically, the current Taiwan government is anti-independence and in international relations has acted in concert with the mainland to support what is perceived as common "Chinese" interests against other regional players. As a result, the odds of direct conflict in the near future between US and PRC over Taiwan has receeded. So I think the Chinese now are even less likely to make foreign weapon purchases purely to boost their capabilities in short term. Instead, their procurement strategy would reflect their long term planning to build up domestic research, development and manufacturing capability across the board to match the US, not get some obsolescent second hand weapon just for a short term boost in capability to meet some contingency. They would strongly prefer to build the most modern ships they can, than acquire second a obsolete ship that boast some capability they temporaily lack.


So no Slava purchase, except possibly as scrap.

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Assessing the impact of new area rug under modeling table.

If that is true, why did they buy the Sovremennys and why would they maintain them? What rational would be different between buying and/or operating a Slava vs a Sovremenny?

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Proper Preparation Prevents Poor Performance

The first two Sovremennies were bought in the 90s, and the two upgraded EM versions in 2005. The rationale for the first two is obvious - China had not the domestic capability to build anything that advanced yet. The second two is less clear, but I would wager on them being both a source of technology transfer/reference and as insurance in case China's domestic designs didn't work out - which they did. Thus, no further purchases of the Sovremennies.

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De quoi s'agit-il?

The Raguda P-270 "Moskit" (Mosquito) [NATO reporting name SS-N-22 "SUNBURN"] and the P-500 Bazalt (Basalt) [NATO Reporting Name SS-N-12 "SANDBOX"] are both out of production. Russia is phasing them out and replacing them with a new missile: P-800 Oniks (Onyx) [NATO Reporting name SS-N-26] Its been in production since around 2000 and fits neatly into the launcher for SS-N-12, SS-N-19, and SS-N-22. Simplifying the supply chains by replacing the old weapons with a single new one. Production of the SS-N-19 ended in 1994 and never restarted.

If the PLA-N gets its hands on a ex-Slava I suspect it will need significant time in dry dock to become operational. The Chinese government has lots of money in tax revenue from outsourced American production and can pay for it without borrowing money abroad.

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║ Seasick║
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Besides the fact the slava would be only one odd duck in the PLAN, where as sovremennys were a 4 ships class? So they get much more for the logistic buck with sovremennys?

The sovremennys were purchased 15 years ago when Chinese domestitic capabilities were quite pathetic and far less than what they have now, and international situation were far different.

In terms of capabilitiy, At the time when the chinese bought the sovremney they had no domestic warship with any area air defence capabilities whatsoever, no domestic warships with better antiship capabilities than the equivalent of Exocet, no domestic warship with any antisubmarine capability better than knock off of mk46 torpedos launched for shipboard tubes, and no domestic warship with any form of tactical data link or command communication better than encrypted voice radio. Sovremennys were a colossal improvement to Chinese capabilities, and propelled them from 1950 level to 1980 level in one bound.

In terms of international situation, in the late 1990s when china bought the first pair of sovremennys, and early 2000s when the exercised the option for the second pair, taiwan was led by strongly pro-independent, anti-china presidents. Both took overt steps towards open independence, and it really looked as if Taiwan could suddenly declare independence and war would break out. The Chinese navy was desparately trying to boost its capabilities as fast as it can. At the same time, Russian was at the very worst part of its post soviet ecomonic decline,and was ready to sell anything for hard cash.

Both of these situations have changed. Today the Chinese technologies in many fields they match early to mid 2000 western technology. Taiwan is led by a pro-china president and is in no danger of declearing independence until at least well after 2016, when the current president's terms expires. In the mean time, Russia has grown much more cautious about selling weapon and military technology to china, both because the Chinese are by proficient in copying the best Russia has, and because Russia eyes china wearily as a very dangerous potential opponent.

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Assessing the impact of new area rug under modeling table.

Ss-n-19, like the ss-n-12, depended of the soviet maritime surveillance satellite constellation and maritime partrol aircraft fleet to reach its potential. The constellation fell apart after collapse of soviet union and was never replaced. The martime patrol fleet has also been thinned, and lost critical forward bases. So unique capabilities of these missiles would be inoperative after the early 1990s anyway.

As to Oniks, why would the Russians help the Ukraine sell a former soviet cruiser to china? If the Russians would be willing to sell oniks to china at all, it would be conditional upon the chinese purchase of a large package of Russian weapons. Not some Ukrainian cruiser.

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Assessing the impact of new area rug under modeling table.

This reminds me of a U.S. military poll in in 2008 that showed 97% of Kurds strongly supported the Iraqi central government. When examined closely, the question was interpreted as meaning the "IKG" in other words, the Kurds thought *their government* was "the" Iraqi government.

Your broader point is taken, but it seems unlikely that the U.S. really has an authoritative understanding of what the people in the PRC or Taiwan really think, or how intensely those views are held; and in any event, those views are subject to change and change rapidly and in either direction. It was less than ten-years-ago that there were widely expressed republican views in Taiwan. From the French and Indian war to the American War of Independence was a blink of an eye.

Indeed, we are often so intent on seeing what we think we ought to see for ideological reasons that we are totally oblivious to what is fairly obviously actually there.

Right now I think we are intent upon seeing the conflict between China and the US, and between China and Japan, that we think ought to be there because of our ideological beliefs about authoritarianism and democracy, that we are missing the conflict obviously brewing up between US and Japan, and between south korea and Japan, over Japan's obvious attempt to assert its own centrality and dominance over the US, South Korea and Japan alliance.

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Assessing the impact of new area rug under modeling table.

I'm not sure that Russia would want to sell P-800 Oniks to the PRC, first the P-800 was developed in cooperation with India, and relations between India and China are kind of cold.

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║ Seasick║
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China never signed the Missile Technology Control Regime. As a result, Russian, which did sign the MTCR, may not be able to legally export P-800 Oniks to China due to the missile's range.

But P-800 was largely a soviet development. India cooperated in the Brahmos, which is based on P-800, but is a different missile with longer range and higher speed.

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Assessing the impact of new area rug under modeling table.

Great points...