I certainly find your points fascinating, Seasick. I think I am starting to see where you are coming from concerning all of the comments you make in my threads. Please correct me if I am wrong. It seems that you are operating off the presumption that there will always be an aircraft carrier around to support/conduct operations, because everyone is working in a carrier battle/strike group. Most of my comments and ideas, however are based on the fact that there is not always a carrier around, and in the coming years with the draw down of the carrier force there will not be a carrier around a lot more often. There will, however be as many and more escort ships, in the fleet, and they will be forced to operate in independent groups entirely without carrier support.
The shift in thinking is drastic, and the situation of large carrier numbers to smaller carrier numbers requires an outside look at how we use the ships on hand, hence the economic choice of battleships operating in strike groups in place of the carriers we are losing and about to lose (only costing 58million/year vs 398/year) and the situation of small surface strike groups consisting of DDGs and a CG. So, the priority in thinking now is: groups acting independently of carriers, so they are going to need to be able to survive without carrier support, and that means means they have to do significantly more on their own.
AAW is taken care of with Aegis; no carrier or major improvement in shipboard systems needed there. ASW, on the other hand, needs a significantly more capable ASW capability. While our ships are receiving significant upgrades in their sonar capability, upgrades that makes even diesels vulnerable, the failure point has always been crew proficiency, and proficiency comes with mission focus. Rotating ASW duties around the ships in the group does not build proficiency. Developing skill proficiency is just like developing your body. If you want to be proficient and developed in your body and strength, you have to practice your skills and improve upon them in the gym, on the track, or on the pull-up bar. We practice AAW skills all the time so our multi mission ships are very good AAW ships, but they are horrible ASW and ASuW ships.
The first solution to having refined and effective ships skilled in ASW is having ASW focused ships, such as the Spruance-class again. However, since the entire Spruance-class has been destroyed, we need to start over. We would have to construct new ASW ships. Thankfully, building a non-Aegis Burke is pretty cheap and very, very easy. This is particularly one of the projects I have been working on for the CNO, and my final proposal is about to go up the chain to the CNO for official consideration and hopefully a funded feasibility study by NAVSEA.
You also make an interesting point of counting all of the helos in the entire group instead of counting the helos on a single ship. When a ship is conducting ASW operations, not all of the helo equipped ships are participating, and some of them physically cannot. Only "X" number of ships are hunting and using their helos at a time, and the other ships not on duty are using that time to conduct maintenance on their helicopters. So, those helos are not available for ASW work. As official as the statement that 8 helos in a 4 escort ship group "should" be enough may be, it is not practical, effective, or safe. In this situation adding a the larger capacity to an ASW focused DD, making it a "DDH" becomes not just practical or preferable but essential.
Because the thought process is in the realm of "carriers are not and will not be around when we need them" I suggest that there is indeed a role for (in this thread's case a Spruance and in the case of my proposal non-Aegis Burkes with modified electronics and weapon systems) multiple helo destroyers, and those ships could greatly benefit the groups they operate in and the fleet as a whole.
In addition to the expanded ASW capability of having 4 helos on board it would enable SOF elements to conduct a lot more missions they cannot otherwise conduct...which then leads to consideration of an expansion the ship's armament itself.
_________________ Proper Preparation Prevents Poor Performance
|