Rick E Davis wrote:
Actually I was thinking more of how or if the modernization plans that the Admiralty had for HMS Hood would have been altered if the decision was made to send her to the USA. The cruiser HMS Delhi and others that went to the USA for extensive repairs in 1941+ due to overtasked yards (and lack of the material required??) in the UK, provided the seed for this thought. Delhi's use of 5-in/38-cal and Mk 37 directors was as much an evaluation by the Admiralty of these weapons in light of the shortage of other similar heavy AA weapons (they never seemed to be able to make enough 5.25-in mounts). I had read that more such use of USN 5-in DP guns may have happened if not for the USA entry in the war and our need for these weapons in 1942-43. I was assuming a badly damaged ship that would have required a lengthy rebuild anyway and the decision being made to rebuild her ... aka the West Virginia, California, etc. ... would have made the time involved considered acceptable. They certainly would have updated the fire control, radar, etc during the rebuild. Utilizing USN twin 5-in/38-cal mounts would have been relatively minor mod to the existing Admiralty design if only eight mounts were installed.
Of course if she had much less damage, then your scenario would have been more likely, since she would be returning to service much quicker. I would have thought that they would have attempted adding more armor as well in either case ... to the extent possible. HMS Rodney had a limited refit at Boston in 1941 and HMS Nelson had a major refit in late 1944 at New York. HMS Nelson was at least CONSIDERED for a replacement of her 6-in and 4.7-in guns with USN twin 5-in mounts. So it wasn't impossible for a USA refit.
My thoughts wonder how a rebuilding of HMS Hood in the USA would have impacted her War Service the rest of the war had she survived.
If Hood had not succumbed so quickly to a lucky shot, it is not all together clear to me that the engagement which followed would have resulted in her being particularly seriously damaged.
1. Hood's early fire was poor, but that must have been caused at least in part to the fact that she was firing ahead, and her Dreyer fire control table had no provision for correcting trunnion tilt that would result from the ship rolling in a heavy sea while firing ahead. When Hood was destroyed, she was in the midst of a turn that would have brought the Bismarck onto her beam, that would have markedly improved her fire control because while firing abeam, rolling would no longer induce trunnion tilt. Furthermore by opening the arc of X and Y turret, the turn would also have doubled her volume of fire. So immediately after the turn, we can expect Hood's fire to become twice as heavy and substantially more accurate than it has hitherto.
2. Green crew not withstanding, Prince of Wales's fire was accurate right from the beginning, thanks to her highly automated admiralty fire control table. she hit the Bismarck 3 times for the 4 times Bismarck hit her.
3. Lutjens was under strict orders to avoid engagement with superior enemy force, which he followed religiously on a previous cruise.
So the net conclusion seem to me to be that had Hood completed her turn, Bismarck would begin to rapidly take damage from combined fire of Hood and Prince of Wales. Without the hindsight bias cause by the actual fate of the Hood, which presumably wouldn't effect anyone at any time in the scenario where the Hood avoided that fate, it seems to me that no really sane commander in May 1941 would really have said the odds favored the Bismarck in an engagement against both POW and Hood simultaneously. In that case it seems to me that Letjins would opt to attempt to disengage while her slim speed advantage of the British squadron remains intact, rather than fight to the finish.