Cliffy B wrote:
I'm curious Carr and would welcome a mature discussion on the matter. I love these realistic thought experiments
OK. Upon further thought, I guess this thread is appropriate for a continued discussion. Here's a brief summation of my contention. Perhaps it can serve as a springboard for more in-depth consideration if warranted.
Disclaimer: There is nothing wrong with the article's conclusion, per se, only the analysis on which it is based and the depth of the resulting conclusion.
The central thesis, as I read it, is that the U.S. is in danger of facing overwhelming anti-access/area denial (to use the article's terminology). Overwhelming is defined as either (or a combination of) a technological or psychological threshold beyond which the U.S. will be unable or unwilling to pursue its desired goals due to the real or perceived cost.
The mechanism(s) of this denial is a combination of cruise/ballistic missles, mines, subs, aircraft, etc. The article suggests that by adding up the numbers of enemy platforms (and associated capabilities) we can foresee a difficult (rapidly becoming unacceptably difficult) path to achieving our goals. On the face of it, this is an appealing and seemingly obvious conclusion. The fallacy is that the article makes little or no allowance for U.S. actions and capabilities. For instance, the tactical challenge of placing a carrier battle group in sufficient proximity to China to conduct meaningful air operations is viewed strictly from the perspective of the number of weapons and platforms that China can "throw" against the carrier. Certainly, in a one-sided scenario where the carrier announces its presence and then simple sits and attempts to fight off the resulting attacks, the results might well be unfortunate. This is precisely the way the article presents its case. What the article does not consider is the way the scenario would (or should) actually develop. A carrier group would be difficult to find and without adequate targeting data no amount of missles would be effective. The most pessemistic assessments of China's over the horizon targeting capability suggest that it will be many years yet before they have an effective system. U.S. subs would be launching strikes against known missle launching sites and airfields. A relative evaluation of the U.S. missle defense system (Aegis) versus Chinese ASM's would suggest that Chinese missles are more closely akin to target drones than serious threats, given a comparitive lack of on-board ECM, terminal maneuvering, and terminal guidance. Carrier air defense and offensive air strikes would seriously degrade Chinese offensive capability.
I could continue to cite U.S. actions that would, in reality, mitigate the presumed threat but the point should be obvious. It is not enough to consider only the enemy side of the equation. The capabilities of both sides must be weighed in order to draw a valid conclusion. The article is reminiscent of publicly stated views of the Soviet Union during the Cold War where the Soviets were presented as having technology and capabilities at least as advanced as our own, if not more so. The reality, of course, was that Soviet technology was found to be antiquated, unreliable, and vastly overstated. That's not to say that the Soviets didn't have some weapons that bore serious consideration, only that the totality of the threat was nowhere near what was stated. Similarly, the Chinese and Iranians have, by and large, technology that is a generation or two behind, an inadequate maintenance and support system, and a lack of institutional knowledge about how best to employ their weapons.
Again, this is not to say that the threat should be dismissed. Indeed, the trend is a sobering and noteworthy one but hardly cause for alarm.
Final disclaimer: My thoughts, data, and conclusions are based strictly on open-source literature. I have no access to classified information which could, possibly, render my conclusions invalid. I am also only an armchair analyst rather than a trained naval tactician. Hey, you get what you pay for!
Thoughts, gentlemen?
Regards,
Bob