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PostPosted: Mon Jul 19, 2010 2:49 pm 
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We have seen well thought out proposals and great idea building on “What-if” for the Iowa, Spruance, and Des Moines class here.
This link provides a great read, which I found to line up very well with the missions and roles put forward for any/all of these What-Ifs.

http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications ... Battle.pdf

Naturally, there are those who think the only answer to every problem is a Carrier. It is my opinion that this publication gives a good account of situations where a Carrier is not needed (and therefore far too expensive to the taxpayer), and in fact may be a liability due to size of the total CVBG force, and non-alignment with the capabilities needed.

I do not advocate getting rid of carriers and never have, however, this helps illustrate the issues we face where we need a balanced fleet based on capabilities, not simply as many CVBGs as possible.

I think this supports not only the ‘What-if’ work already done here, but also starts the wheels toward what other ‘What Ifs’ might fill the needs expressed in the publication…


On a side note, I find this passage on page 23 particularly interesting:

“Since the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996, when the United States responded to aggressive
Chinese behavior toward Taiwan by sailing two aircraft carriers into the
Strait, China has moved to shift the military balance in the Western Pacific in its
favor by fielding systems capable of driving up the cost of US military access to
the region to prohibitive levels.”

This is Alfred von Tirpitz’s risk theory, 100 years later.

The more things change, the more they stay the same…


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PostPosted: Mon Jul 19, 2010 6:44 pm 
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The following would also seem to be of interest in this forum.
http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications ... bat_Sh.pdf

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PostPosted: Mon Jul 19, 2010 7:37 pm 
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SumGui wrote:
We have seen well thought out proposals and great idea building on “What-if” for the Iowa, Spruance, and Des Moines class here.
A battleship or a heavy cruiser today? What :censored_2: retard on the "What-If" forum would be stupid enough to suggest there was any use for a ship designed in 1930? Nope. Mr. Guiman, you're wrong, and any possible use for battleships is dead. Just ask Seasick.

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PostPosted: Mon Jul 19, 2010 8:22 pm 
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SumGui wrote:
This link provides a great read, which I found to line up very well with the missions and roles put forward for any/all of these What-Ifs.

The article is interesting but highly simplistic, taking into account only the "enemy" capabilities and failing totally to consider the effect of U.S. actions and capabilities and the resulting impact on the central thesis.

If anyone cares to discuss the article at length, we can open a dedicated thread. If not, enough said about it.


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PostPosted: Mon Jul 19, 2010 8:45 pm 
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I'm curious Carr and would welcome a mature discussion on the matter. I love these realistic thought experiments :thumbs_up_1:

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PostPosted: Mon Jul 19, 2010 8:54 pm 
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Carr,

Who are you? Welcome to the forum. I have a feeling you might have though-provoking input to provide! :heh:

I think this subject is a harvest for a good exchange of ideas.

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PostPosted: Mon Jul 19, 2010 10:04 pm 
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Cliffy B wrote:
I'm curious Carr and would welcome a mature discussion on the matter. I love these realistic thought experiments :thumbs_up_1:

OK. Upon further thought, I guess this thread is appropriate for a continued discussion. Here's a brief summation of my contention. Perhaps it can serve as a springboard for more in-depth consideration if warranted.

Disclaimer: There is nothing wrong with the article's conclusion, per se, only the analysis on which it is based and the depth of the resulting conclusion.

The central thesis, as I read it, is that the U.S. is in danger of facing overwhelming anti-access/area denial (to use the article's terminology). Overwhelming is defined as either (or a combination of) a technological or psychological threshold beyond which the U.S. will be unable or unwilling to pursue its desired goals due to the real or perceived cost.

The mechanism(s) of this denial is a combination of cruise/ballistic missles, mines, subs, aircraft, etc. The article suggests that by adding up the numbers of enemy platforms (and associated capabilities) we can foresee a difficult (rapidly becoming unacceptably difficult) path to achieving our goals. On the face of it, this is an appealing and seemingly obvious conclusion. The fallacy is that the article makes little or no allowance for U.S. actions and capabilities. For instance, the tactical challenge of placing a carrier battle group in sufficient proximity to China to conduct meaningful air operations is viewed strictly from the perspective of the number of weapons and platforms that China can "throw" against the carrier. Certainly, in a one-sided scenario where the carrier announces its presence and then simple sits and attempts to fight off the resulting attacks, the results might well be unfortunate. This is precisely the way the article presents its case. What the article does not consider is the way the scenario would (or should) actually develop. A carrier group would be difficult to find and without adequate targeting data no amount of missles would be effective. The most pessemistic assessments of China's over the horizon targeting capability suggest that it will be many years yet before they have an effective system. U.S. subs would be launching strikes against known missle launching sites and airfields. A relative evaluation of the U.S. missle defense system (Aegis) versus Chinese ASM's would suggest that Chinese missles are more closely akin to target drones than serious threats, given a comparitive lack of on-board ECM, terminal maneuvering, and terminal guidance. Carrier air defense and offensive air strikes would seriously degrade Chinese offensive capability.

I could continue to cite U.S. actions that would, in reality, mitigate the presumed threat but the point should be obvious. It is not enough to consider only the enemy side of the equation. The capabilities of both sides must be weighed in order to draw a valid conclusion. The article is reminiscent of publicly stated views of the Soviet Union during the Cold War where the Soviets were presented as having technology and capabilities at least as advanced as our own, if not more so. The reality, of course, was that Soviet technology was found to be antiquated, unreliable, and vastly overstated. That's not to say that the Soviets didn't have some weapons that bore serious consideration, only that the totality of the threat was nowhere near what was stated. Similarly, the Chinese and Iranians have, by and large, technology that is a generation or two behind, an inadequate maintenance and support system, and a lack of institutional knowledge about how best to employ their weapons.

Again, this is not to say that the threat should be dismissed. Indeed, the trend is a sobering and noteworthy one but hardly cause for alarm.

Final disclaimer: My thoughts, data, and conclusions are based strictly on open-source literature. I have no access to classified information which could, possibly, render my conclusions invalid. I am also only an armchair analyst rather than a trained naval tactician. Hey, you get what you pay for!

Thoughts, gentlemen?

Regards,
Bob


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PostPosted: Tue Jul 20, 2010 9:33 am 
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See the above post for exactly what the publication should do – start discussion – or, at least, your own analysis.

I completely agree that it is simplistic, and full of doom-and-gloom. It presents a ‘worst case’ scenario by minimizing any US advances while assuming technology and numbers all fall into place for the threats.

I think the pub functions as an example of a threat environment some may have not considered. I think the two threats mentioned are less relevant than the specific challenges postulated.

For these challenges, is a CVBG always needed or even the right tool for the job?

I think not - many of the alternatives worked on in this forum would provide the proper response at an appropriate level.

Shoehorning a CVBG through the Straits of Hormuz has always been a risky move. It has been made necessary by the crippling short range ‘do everything but do nothing well’ overpriced multirole aircraft that have reduced CVBG effectiveness, as well as a bureaucratic focus on that now limited, and always expensive, tool to the exclusion of all others.


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PostPosted: Tue Jul 20, 2010 12:05 pm 
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Bob Carr writes:
"The most pessemistic assessments of China's over the horizon targeting capability suggest that it will be many years yet before they have an effective system. U.S. subs would be launching strikes against known missle launching sites and airfields."

However, the article also points out that prior intelligence estimates of the rate of Chinese technological developement have consistently under-estimated the speed of Chinese progress. "Many years" is a rather indefinite number, but apparently the Navy/Air Force interpretation of "many years" is such that they are actively working on a plan to deal with the situations outlined by the report, right now, rather than waiting a few more years.

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PostPosted: Tue Jul 20, 2010 1:29 pm 
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Russ2146 wrote:
However, the article also points out that prior intelligence estimates of the rate of Chinese technological developement have consistently under-estimated the speed of Chinese progress. "Many years" is a rather indefinite number, but apparently the Navy/Air Force interpretation of "many years" is such that they are actively working on a plan to deal with the situations outlined by the report, right now, rather than waiting a few more years.


Have to agree. It is always safer to assume your enemy is ahead of projections.


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PostPosted: Tue Jul 20, 2010 1:40 pm 
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And that Iranian scenario......

ONR Corporate Strategic Communications
Arlington VA (SPX) Jul 20, 2010
The Low-Cost Imaging Terminal Seeker (LCITS), an Office of Naval Research (ONR)-sponsored technology, could soon give the U.S. Navy and coalition military ships an upper hand in swiftly defeating multiaxis attacks by small swarming boats.
Managed by ONR's Naval Air Warfare and Weapons Department as a Future Naval Capability (FNC), LCITS equips the unguided Hydra-70 rocket with a low-cost imaging infrared guidance solution to more accurately strike an intended target.
The seeker is composed of three main subsystems: a targeting integration system aboard the helicopter, a digital smart launcher and the guided imaging rocket.

The helicopter uses its targeting system to lock onto and track the target's position and velocity, and transfers the information to the rocket launcher prior to weapon release. Once locked onto the target, the weapon follows the LCITS commands to the target.

From a pilot's perspective, the entire process can be handled in a matter of seconds, increasing the number of targets that can be engaged in a short amount of time. LCITS can also engage targets in a 120-degree cone centered off the nose of the helicopter at ranges up to 7 kilometers.

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PostPosted: Tue Jul 20, 2010 1:45 pm 
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And both scenarios...........
Raytheon and a U.S. Navy team used a combined-beam fiber laser to shoot down four unmanned aerial vehicles in flight during an over-the-water engagement.
The UAV targets were engaged and destroyed using the Navy's Laser Weapon System guided by Raytheon's Phalanx Close-in Weapon System sensor suite. LaWS is made up of six industrial-use lasers that simultaneously focus on the target.

Attachment:
laser-phalanx-close-in-weapon-system-lg.jpg
laser-phalanx-close-in-weapon-system-lg.jpg [ 11.61 KiB | Viewed 3219 times ]



Now a UAV is not a cruise missile but it looks like this particular program is heading that way.

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PostPosted: Tue Jul 20, 2010 2:22 pm 
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As to the study's concern over compromised forward bases from which to re-supply and re-arm, the press release on the following item took note of the device's ability to remove/insert a container into a confined space. That attribute has absolutely no significance in regard to the way cargo operations are conducted today. However, it does have significance in a situation in which there is no pier/shore crane availability but you do have a protected anchorage, Ulithi lagoon for instance, available to conduct support ship to combatant resupply and rearming, LCS mission module switch out. and potential missile pod (similar to the Army's MLRS pod system) switch out.

Attachment:
large-vessel-interface-lift-on-lift-offlvi-lolo-crane-lg.jpg
large-vessel-interface-lift-on-lift-offlvi-lolo-crane-lg.jpg [ 15.95 KiB | Viewed 3215 times ]

viewtopic.php?f=14&p=342829


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mlrs2.jpg [ 43.6 KiB | Viewed 3215 times ]

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PostPosted: Tue Jul 20, 2010 2:36 pm 
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Another validation that the report has substance, the Air Force participating in a Naval Exercise. http://www.strategypage.com/military_ph ... 14482.aspx

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PostPosted: Tue Jul 20, 2010 5:41 pm 
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SumGui wrote:
Have to agree. It is always safer to assume your enemy is ahead of projections.

It is unless you pad your assumptions to the point of self-paralysis. For example, a flurry of articles recently, including Proceedings, have trumpeted the end of the carrier because China now has cruise/ballistic missles. Our carriers are now just floating targets, totally helpless. Well, I'm sorry but just because you have a missle that technically qualifies as a cruise/ballistic missle, even though it's based on obsolete (by our standards) technology, doesn't make you capable of any great military feat. If you trace the open-source history of the Chinese missle program, you'll see that the technology they're based on is still a generation or two behind the curve. Compared to Aegis capabilities they're probably little more than target drones.

Just to be safe, though, we should probably assume that the Chinese can sink every ship in our Navy with just one missle. In fact, we should probably surrender now and start learning to speak Chinese. - Now, of course, that's a ridiculous, sarcastic statement but some of the doom-sayers and hand-wringers aren't far from it.

We should make reasonably conservative assumptions and proceed accordingly. A reasonable assumption is that while the Chinese are continuing to improve their technology, they are 20 years away from being able to challenge today's Navy let alone whatever we have then.

Americans have a tendency to assume that every other country is better than us at everything, whether it's military technology, health care, economics, or whatever, even in the face of clear evidence that that isn't the case. It's a cultural thing, I guess.

SumGui, this was not a criticism of you or your statement (which I agree with). This was just a chance to point out the fallacy of taking that tendency too far.

Regards,
Bob


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PostPosted: Tue Jul 20, 2010 6:44 pm 
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All things can be taken too far - both the underestimation and the overestimation.

I think my posts from above show that I am in violent agreement with you!

We have examples in history where we underestimated our opponent (say, the Japanese before Pearl Harbor...) and overestimated (Iraq/the 'mother of all battles'...)

Overprepared is better, but there needs to be a limit to it.


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PostPosted: Tue Jul 20, 2010 7:08 pm 
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SumGui wrote:
...and overestimated (Iraq/the 'mother of all battles'...) Overprepared is better, but there needs to be a limit to it.

"And now we talk about Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Desert Storm was a drive-by shooting."
-Dr. James Bradford, Professor US Naval History, Texas A&M

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PostPosted: Tue Jul 20, 2010 10:08 pm 
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Russ2146 wrote:
Another validation that the report has substance, the Air Force participating in a Naval Exercise. http://www.strategypage.com/military_ph ... 14482.aspx

Russ,

The link seems to be to a RIMPAC exercise. The RIMPAC exercises date back to the early 1970's, if memory serves. For the last decade or so, it has been a joint exercise for the U.S. with all the services participating to some extent. I doubt that Air Force involvement was due specifically to any "new" Chinese threat, rather just a continuation of the routine series of exercises. Still, always good to see the services cooperate!

Regards,
Bob


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PostPosted: Tue Jul 20, 2010 10:28 pm 
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SumGui wrote:
All things can be taken too far - both the underestimation and the overestimation.


SumGui, Honest, I'm not picking on you. You just keep offering great lead-ins to my topics!

Another problem with overestimating opponent's capabilities is the resultant tendency to overbuild and overspend, creating budgetary problems that are unwarranted. Look at what the Navy is doing now. Every new ship is a billion dollars or more (generally, way more). If the Navy had its way, every non-carrier would be Aegis equipped, carry 500 VLS cells, and be capable of performing ASW, ASuW, AAW, MCM, SOF, and every other task that has an acronym. What's the result? Instead of a 300+ ship Navy, plans are being developed by Congress to reduce the number of ships to 220 or so. This is strictly a budgetary issue which the Navy has brought on itself. A realistic assessment of the various threats might lead us to conclude that instead of building more Burkes, maybe we should build four corvettes (kinda like what the LCS should have been) for the price of each Burke.

Food for thought!


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PostPosted: Wed Jul 21, 2010 9:52 am 
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I do not take logical, supported debate as ‘picking on’, and I believe criticism is healthy – it is the cornerstone of effective debate. If my comments inspire you to comment more, then they are doing exactly what I hope they would.

We once again seem to be in agreement! You seem to agree that overspending on a solution is not the way to go. I have put forward that I do not think a CVBG is the answer for everything as the example of overspending; you have more examples further down the food chain.
I think many of the potential solutions exist here with the ‘What If’ world.

One of the issues the Navy has is ‘everything-itis’. Every platform needs to do everything – and that means that each platform is overpriced and ineffective due to the compromise of ‘fit everything in’.

If my choice is between more dollars or lives lost, I will spend more dollars, but currently we are spending all our dollars in the wrong places. We need fewer carriers, effective and affordable patrol/escort replacement for the Perry’s, and probably a Cruiser in a historical cruiser concept – capable of independent operation - so we have an alternative to sending a CVBG when things start to heat up.

I’m also an advocate of returning BBs to service – we paid for them, let’s use what we paid for, especially when the capability there cannot be matched either offensively or defensively. On overmatch on our side is healty for Sailors and Marines.The latent capabilities that exist when you think of the 16” gun as a launcher for modern payloads is tremendous. And each one of those payloads gets launched expending warhead and propellant, leaving most of the expensive guidance parts for re-use for subsequent rounds (clearly, there will be some guidance parts on a given round, but not nearly to the magnitude of DSMAC/TERCOM). I would use the BB in a forced entry group, and that group should also add to the ability of an ARG to get ashore. Again, improving the capabilities of what we already have at minimum cost.

I do advocate improving what we have to improve effectiveness at the lowest possible cost. As an example, the brownshoe’s divesting themselves of the F-14, A-6 (and tanker) and S-3 for the F/A-18 has reduced the effective range of a carrier to about 200 miles, and given away true dominance in AAW, Strike and Sea Control. Even the E/F only adds about 100 miles. This reduces the effectiveness of each CVBG, thus requiring more CVBGs to cover a given area. They went Hornet so they could have numbers. If they had fewer carriers, they could populate them with a proper aircraft which will allow a return to the 700-1000 NM sphere of influence, and with modern technology, beyond. Updated A-6 and F-14, or a replacement for each, should have been the answer here – not just buying what happened to be there.

There is money to be saved in effectiveness, but not every dollar add pays back.


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