The Ship Model Forum

Laser Target Designators (LTDs) have the advantage of helping to assure that multiple weapons are not servicing the same target, while remaining enemy units are not targeted. This is a common problem in combat, particularly when confronted with multiple simultaneaous targets. With LTD weapons, You look through your NODs, see the laser splash on a target and know that someone else has targeted them so you move on to the next target. Easy day.

Javelin is also a one shot weapon. The latest versions of Hellfire (laser designated) are also fire and forget.


Javelin is also a good weapon, but it was not designed to run the thermal guidance unit 24/7, ergo there is a substantial delay from turning the unit on, to the command launch unit being ready for engagement. I am sure there is an answer to this, but it is definitely an issue.

I also remain unconvined about Javelin being completely effective against small boats, given it is a shaped charge weapon. I have seen an uparmored suburbans hit by EFPs that would have punched through an M1A tank: the blast went completely through the cabin, but the suburban was driven out of the ambush.

Going back to Bob's scepticism; the point remains that small boat swarms are a cheap, and likely effective way of scoring damage on sophisticated and expensive warships if an enemy is willing to loose crew and their small craft. What is needed are tactics, RoE and weapons that can defeat the threat. As I noted, Iranian swarm tactics were defeated in the 1980's by fairly simple, unguided weapons (primarily blast/fragmentation) like 2.75" rockets, 7.62 miniguns, and cluster bombs (primarilly area effect weapons). All of which were much cheaper than anything we have come up with in this discussion. These weapons are

I also note that the biggest single factor in killing small boat swarms during Operation Ernest Will was the determination to actively hunt down boghammers rather than adopting a defensive fleet posture and waiting to get hit. Nothing would stop this nonsense quicker than having effective SUCAP that obliterates a small craft swarm the first sign of hostility. Employment of lethal/non-lethal energy weapons use could also significantly tip the balance in favor of the fleet.

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Bob,

More excellent points.

I never thought it was a particularly wise idea to send carriers into the gulf. A child could look at the tactical situation and see the folly of this. Realistically, the entire stretch of water could be covered by fixed wing air, and not necessarilly TACair either. This mission has maritime patrol written all over it. P-3s and P-8s should be the primary force of choice. The PG should not be a place where we routinely deploy forces of greater value than a DDG unless we actually are going in to acheive a significant objective and are willing to employ force to suppress ISR networks, ensure air superiority, and neutralize all threats. If the Navy sees a continuing requirement to deal with small craft swarms; it ought to consider a some of the weapons employed on the AC-130 (Griffon, 25mm, perhaps the 120mm mortar, etc) . If we need to use the carrier air wing, the Navy should consider deploying a squadron to allied bases for operations.

I also note that predator drones can carry cluster type munitions, and could be used in conjunction with maritime patrol aircraft to extend coverage and reduce response time.

I also think that there is a good deal more will to to "use the boot" amongst American politicians and the public than we give them credit for. The OBL raid was a full on example of a gutsy call. How many tactical Navy commanders get this point?

Back on topic, I think that the small craft swarm is a great example of why armor and passive protection is valuable, and may actually be more important than "stealth" in warship design.

New Toy for us to consider in Fire Support:

"Ground Launch SDB" : a Small Diameter Bomb I strapped to an M26 (MLRS) Rocket motor. Paperwork indicates a 'doubling of rocket range'. 'Doubling' probably includes the glide portion of flight, thus the M26 rocket propels the SDB to 40000ft and then the SDB glides to target. 'Doubling' M26 range nets about 40 miles, yet the M30/31 version for MLRS already gets 37 miles. I wonder if the intent is to retro-fit M26 motors already in inventory. Curious what the range would be on a M30/31 rocket motor. This also allows the weapon to 'turn' - most rockets are direct line fire, the glide could allow this weapon to 'shoot around corners' or the backside of a given hill.

Naturally, this would be a fit for any MLRS rocket at sea application - ala POLAR, yet it is conceptually identical to SMARTROC, just on land.

Here is reference 'in the wild' : http://defense-update.com/20121207_fire-support.html

I have another reference which I need to verify I can post.

The real value of this concept is to enable re-targeting of the weapon in flight: a handy feature if your target is a mobile SAM battery, a self propelled howitzer, or any target that can move.

Vertical impact capability in GMLRS obviates the need to "shoot around corners" and is effective in dealing with reverse slope defensive positions.

The "problem" with MRLS is not the motor, but the warhead: specifically the sub-munitions, which are now considered to have an unacceptable dud rate. The Army and USMC are looking to buy a substantial number of unitary warheads turning an area effect weapon into a single large bomb.

While this is a well intentioned effort to eliminate a battlefield hazards to friendly forces and civilians, this really duplicates capability offered by air delivered weapons, while simultaneously depriving friendly ground forces of the means to deliver neutralization fires, particularly against deep targets (10-20 km behind enemy lines). How ground forces intend to spot/track high value 'point' (8-10 digit grid coordinates) targets dozens of miles behind enemy lines without an aircraft or drone is yet to be articulated. There are not that many SOF/LRRRPs to go around. Assuming that we will continue to enjoy dominance in space is questionable. Old school GRMLs avoided this issue with the ability to obliterate an entire grid square 1000m x 1000m with a battery salvo!

Also note the cost is duplicative as well, you pay for a SDB and a GRMLS rocket motor so this is at least a $50K weapon. For rough comparison, a 2000 lb bomb + a JDAM kit is < $5K. This is a bit unfair as the whole point of SDB was to enable tactical aircraft to conduct precision engagements against multiple targets that did not require 500LB and larger bombs to kill them.

SDB is a great idea for low intensity urban warfare, but I question the concept on a cost effectiveness basis, let alone its utility against a against a major regional power. The Russians now use their multiple launch rocket systems to deliver thermobaric weapons yielding near-nuclear weapon effects (overpressure and thermal) against area targets - the West is cutting its own throat.

If the concept is to re-purpose existing M26 rocket motors, this would have a lesser impact in regards to duplicative cost (there would be a cost in refurbishing for use with the SDB, of course) as the existing M26 rounds are already sunk costs, and replacing their submunitions with a unitary warhead (the SDB) solves the dud/persistence issue of the submunitions.

No.

First, this is a great example of the economic concept of opportunity cost: there is no savings by changing warhead type. You are comparing apples to oranges. Refurbished MRLS rockets can be fitted with *any* warhead DPICM (M77 or M85) original), M31 unitary warheads, PGMs, training rounds, VX (chemical), the SDB, and so-on. Thus the cost savings is the savings is the savings not having to buy a new round of the *equivalent type*: e.g. upgrading a rocket with an M31 warhead, there is no "savings" between upgrading an M31 into a SDB version.

Second, and far more importantly, while I believe the SDB is a useful additional capability, the Army and the USMC are procuring unitary-type GRMLS warheads instead of ICM/DPICM warheads. This represent a major departure in artillery doctrine - arguably the concept of neutralization fires has been unchanged since WWI. The MRLS family of weapons were designed to deliver highly lethal neutralization fires primarily useful for counter battery fire, and converting them into systems designed to engage point targets. This is akin to proposing the conversion of belt fed machine guns into sniper rifles. Worse, this choice is being driven by factors largely divorced from the requirements of conventional war. For example, I have seen estimates that ~90% of U.S. artillery rounds fired in the first Gulf War were DPICM. While this seems exagerated, there is no doubt that DPICM is the preferred high lethality munitions type for tube and rocket artillery.

No.

First, this is a great example of the economic concept of opportunity cost: there is no savings by changing warhead type. You are comparing apples to oranges. Any cost savings is the savings is the savings not having to buy a new round of the *equivalent type*: e.g. upgrading a rocket with an M31 warhead, there is no "savings" between upgrading an M31 into a SDB version because you have failed to take into account the lost opportunity of buying something else (an upgraded M31).

Second, and far more importantly, while I believe the SDB is a useful additional capability, the Army and the USMC are procuring unitary-type GRMLS warheads instead of ICM/DPICM warheads. This represent a major departure in artillery doctrine - arguably the concept of neutralization fires has been unchanged since WWI. The MLRS family of weapons were designed to deliver highly lethal neutralization fires primarily useful for counter battery fire, and converting them into systems designed to engage point targets. This is akin to proposing the conversion of belt fed machine guns into sniper rifles. Worse, this choice is being driven by factors largely divorced from the requirements of conventional war. For example, I have seen estimates that ~90% of U.S. artillery rounds fired in the first Gulf War were DPICM. While this seems exagerated, there is no doubt that DPICM is the preferred high lethality munitions type for tube and rocket artillery.

Third, MRLS with SDBs do not solve the dud problem with M77 and M85 rounds, they represent a trade-off in capability. If you buy only SDBs and PGM unitary warheads, you gain the capability of precision engagement, and with SDB, engagement of moving targets, but at a significant cost per munition, and you loose the ability to deliver all weather neutralization fires. And the financial cost difference between weapons is significant. If you were facing the North Korean army, would you want your MLRSs loaded with SDBs and unitary warheads, or would you prefer the ability lay down immediate neutralization fire on enemy artillery units and to do so before the first enemy round impacted on a friendly unit using counter battery radar for targeting? If you go with SDBs, the first problem will be to deconflict with TACAIR, and then to muck around getting some asset "eyes on target"; this turns a 15-30 second firing solution into a multi-minute affair. What rocket would you want to use on an enemy munition dump, fueling point, infantry, etc? I ask how many times a ground unit is going to engage targets 40-70 km behind enemy lines without "eyes on target". This is traditionally the range at which aerial interdiction occurs, because TACAIR really works well where it can influence the battlefield, without having to worry about de-conflicting with friendly ground forces. If TACAIR or drones are there, then they can drop the SDB and be done with it. If I were in the infantry, I would much rather assault a position that had been worked over with DPICM, than unitary warheads or

No. You based your response on assumptions of what you read, not what I posted.

I referenced M30/31 as a range comparison and out of curiosity of rather M30/31s motor would really gain any range, since the M26 motor will already propel the SDB to 40k feet. There is no reference to 'upgrading' M30/31 to SDB within the documentation I read.

Neither M26, M30 or M31 should be confused with M26A1 or M26A2.

M26 carries 644 M77 submunitions to approx 32km

M26A1 carries 518 M85 submunitions to approx 45km
M26A2 carries 518 M77 Submunitions to approx 45km

There was no unitary option for any form of the M26.

M30 carries 404 M85 to 'over' 60km
M31 carries a unitary warhead to 'over' 60km.

M26A1 and M26A2 have the same payload.
M30 and M31 have the same payload.
Neither matches the payload of the M26.

These payloads are NOT the same size, thus not the same weight, and are not interchangeable outside of a depot-level rebuild of the weapon. An M30 fitted with the M26 payload would not have the same flight characteristics.

M30/31 first flew after GW I - so if MLRS was used as part of your 'artillery rounds' calculation it would generate a false high number - ALL MLRS rounds were filled with submunitions - there was no other choice available for the M270 MLRS system in GW I. GW I also was the last time we cleared high concentrations of Military equipment without worrying about collateral damage. That will not universally be true in the future - so MLRS needed more flexibility, thus the M31.

This proposes to put an SDB on an M26 rocket, making a weapon which only had a 644 M77 warhead into a unitary warhead weapon with nearly twice the range. So what this would do is take a legacy rocket motor with range which does not keep up with the new rounds, and issues with usability due to 644 M77 submunitions, and doubles its range, provide a unitary warhead and improves its terminal accuracy.

The M26 rocket motor with an M31 warhead would not reach the approximately 40 miles of combined range. It could not loiter in glide or be re-directed after launch like SDB could. Comparing M31 to M26/SDB is a red herring.

MLRS is limited if it has only submunitions available to launch, and it is limited if it has only unitary warheads to launch. The ideal state is both capabilities to service the proper target type at the proper time.

Edit to add - TACAIR is not always available, and if this would release TACAIR assets to other needs, then it in fact helps TACAIR. Drones would be a good platform to deliver SDBs, however they are limited in how much they can carry, and each weapon added diminishes endurance and complicates which hosts will allow you to fly (armed vs unarmed drones are treated differently). Ideally a drone would either focus on endurance, or carry 2 weapons for those cases where no other delivery asset could reach.

One more add - This month's Proceedings includes an article about maintenance in the fleet and attempts to rectify the poor material state:

http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedin ... face-fleet

Captures the intent to achieve a 40 year service life for the DDG-51 FLT IIA.

Dude, whatever…

Your responses indicate a lack of understanding of modern artillery doctrines (western or “Soviet”), how MLRS fits doctrine, how MLRS systems are supported logistically; and more broadly: how artillery fires get integrated with maneuver plans, how artillery fires get integrated with air support, as well as an understanding of current Pentagon budgets (what weapons we are actually buying).

MLRS is a corps level asset (some divisions get an attached battery) for delivering *neutralization fires*. If you do not understand what neutralization fire is and why it is important, then you do not understand the implications of what you are talking about. If you do not understand what a division, corps or army level asset is, then you do not understand the implications of what you are talking about.

Not everything that can be built or bought should be…


Again whatever…

No cost accounting would cite refurbishing/converting a weapon as a net savings over anything other than a weapon of the equivalent type.

MLRS is a subset of all artillery, both tube and rocket! You completely missed the point because you do not understand what neutralization fires are!

MLRS was designed specifically to deliver *submunitions* because those are the most effective munitions against division and corps level targets (artillery, command systems, FARPS, logistics depots, ammunition dumps, troop assembly areas, destruction of a key enemy units and so on).

Regardless of how it got delivered, DPICM is the preferred munition of choice on the conventional battlefield … because it works!



And that is the problem! How often do you think that any artillery observer other than an airborne FAC/FO will be in a position to chase moving targets (vice spreading fires)? Ground FOs will be severely limited in ability to spot SDBs against moving targets. Having a weapon loiter, really glide, over the target is going to constrain every aircraft in the area, as well as other artillery. This is not insurmountable, but it really raises a lot of issues.

And how many moving targets require a 250 lb warhead?

SDBs makes huge sense for TACAIR, it makes a lot less sense to shoot from a ground launcher.


You raised the whole “cost savings” nonsense…

I agree that having the capability is valid and have said so. The issue is that this is very limited use weapon, and combined with a broader procurement policy that favors unitary warhead weapons is eliminating the primary capability of the weapon.

MLRS is an organic corps level asset (some divisions get an attached battery) for delivering *neutralization fires* and forces can be task organized just as troops select munitions.

I would turn your argument on its head and ask when would deploy divisions or corps absent substantial threat from a major regional power. A major regional conflict (Iran or Korea) would see a far less restrictive ROE.


GMLRS and SDB type weapons represent a broader, fundamental shift in how fires get applied and I assure you that there is not a great deal of consensus on the topic even within the army and USMC, let alone amongst all of the services and our allies. Nice to have sure, but it seems like a niche weapon to be sure.

I am well aware that TACAIR is not always available; what you do not understand is the ramifications of firing a rocket 40,000 feet into the altitude and striking a target 40+ kilometers away is.

Do you think that just because ground visibility is limited that there will be no friendly aircraft flying (EW, TACAIR, drones etc.) that might be endangered by this weapon?

How far in advance do you think that the ground force commander has to coordinate with the air component commander before launching one of these weapons?

How many friendly troops do you think there are 40+ kilometers beyond the FLOT to spot for this weapon?

If the visibility is so poor that TACAIR cannot fly, how do you think the FO is going to range or designate for these weapons (hint lasers for ranging or designation are affected by rain, snow and dust too).

When you drill through these issues you will find that the target set that can only be serviced by a ground launched SDB equipped rocket is very limited. I am much more concerned about the cost of this munition, as well as the reduction in capability of the force to fight and win conventional wars rather than drop gold plated bombs on individual third world insurgents.]No. You based your response on assumptions of what you read, not what I posted... .[/quote]

Gentlemen, let's not let this get personal. Try to keep it civil, please.

_________________
Timothy Dike
Owner & Administrator
ModelWarships.com

Unfortunate turn in tone from someone whose input I value, even though we don't seem to be able to communicate well.

The information was intended for anyone who wished to use is in our "what-if" discussions, which, by definition, are not limited by current doctrine or land-based legacy organizational concepts.

For me, delivery of effect to a target defines the utility of any weapon, and physical characteristics define rather it is realistically possible to mount and employ in the 'what-if' world.

While the Maritime application is theoretical, the SDB/M26 mating is not - my company has completed the wind tunnel tests. Once development is complete, we will see if the advantages added by the SDB are worth the economic cost to the budget masters of the beltway - but then, that is where so many of the systems we talk about in this sub-forum have gone to die.

As the offending party, my intent was not to insult or injure - apologies to anyone who feels that way, particularly Mr Sumi.

My frustration here is that mounting SDBs atop ground launched MLRS missiles comes at a time when the U.S. Army has multiple issues with the mainstay of it's artillery arm: the 155mm howitzer.

In effect, people want to provide what I see as a useful, but limited application niche weapon, while the service has backed away from the new NATO standard for 155mm weapons that it helped write the standard for, continues to rely upon 39 caliber towed systems which lack the range of the new high chamber volume weapons, and is saddled with a truly ancient self propelled gun.

This is like buying a $5000 stereo system for a 1986 Ford Tarus that has a transmission that will not shift into third gear. The problem isn't that the SDB + MLRS is a bad idea; the problem is the Army has much larger issues that need to be addressed at a time when defense dollars are very tight.

And there remain significant spotting and command and control issues for this weapon when fired by Army and Marine (ground) forces.

I can 100% agree with that, and could understand the frustration it causes when a service you have a passion for seems to not be executing the obvious and sensible - just like me with the USN/LCS debacle.

more weapons getting closer:

LRASM: Modification of the JASSM-ER for air or shipboard (via Mk41 VLS) use:

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/lra ... nch-06752/



Video by vendor, but neat looking nonetheless:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LvHlW1h_0XQ

Now there never seems to be enough VLS cells...

Hmm...clearly this is not an option for a DDG-51 Flt I refit, but a Cleveland class turret (or similar) with the 6"/47 replaced with 3 Crusader 155/56 gun systems...? Tempting.

Edit to add:

Going forward on the FH77 recommended earlier, what do we think of the possibility of working a 'Double Archer' (two Archer systems on a common mount for a double turret) into a naval mount?

20 auto-loading rounds on mount: "The howitzer has a continuous fire rate of 75 rounds an hour, an intensive fire rate of 20 rounds (i.e. a full magazine) in 2.5 minutes and a salvo fire rate of three rounds in 15 seconds. The MRSI capability, multiple round simultaneous impact, is up to six rounds.", or, in a double mount, 20 each.
http://www.army-technology.com/projects/archerhowitzer/

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Archer_Artillery_System

Range of 155mm rounds is still an issue when you add in stand off distance for a ship.

Between XM2001 Crusader and Archer (FH77) we have two examples of auto-loading separated charge, and thus, MRSI capability (i.e. auto-loading does not require fixed or semi-fixed ammunition), so one could also ask if AGS could be altered.

More GLSDB info, which I continue to believe would be a nice add to the Mk41 VLS.

http://www.boeing.com/assets/pdf/bds/me ... b_1013.pdf

http://www.defensenews.com/article/2013 ... meter-Bomb

Note that the data (granted, promotional data from the vender...) states "60 km beyond current Guided MLRS"

If accurate, that could put the range at 120km/64nm. certainly enough to be useful, even from offshore.

The MLU DDG-51 Flt I project is kind of thin on external changes to the potential base kit.