The Ship Model Forum

Given the historical record as a base, discounting the Kaiser's fear to commit the fleet, what would your orders be for the German High Seas Fleet in 1914-16?

My thought is to avoid a "decisive" battle. The outcome of such an engagement can be politically managed or discounted by the British press. The High Seas Fleet is trapped in the North Sea by the RN's "Distant Blockade" in Scotland. Their only real impact is on British morale, by changing the way British politics thinks of the war at sea.

I think the Scarbourough raid was more politically and militarily important than usually credited. More operations to deny free use of the East of Britain and the nearby waters would have put decisive pressure on the British government to act rashly at a time when it could have made a difference.

A commitment of the entire high seas fleet to a series of actions off the Thames, with light forces stopping the Channel and the North may have been able to push Britain into a separate peace.

Certainly, a heavy force off the Thames would attract the Dover force and/or the Battlecruisers, either of which (or both, actually) could easily be destroyed in detail by the assembled High Seas Fleet. The old battleships and cruisers in the channel would be no match for modern dreadnoughts, cruisers and destroyers. The force in Scapa could be rendered impotent by strikes at the nearest points of Britain. They would have to permit these strikes or move the Grand Fleet south.

Destruction of the Dover force would have materially and morally impacted the BEF in France.

Clearly the British were playing the "long game". German caution only fed their victory. Destabilization of their plan at any point would have collapsed the "long game" and put undue pressure on the commanders for victories under circumstances less favorable to the UK, for example, by splitting the Grand Fleet in order to provide more local defense in the South.

The German failure to take advantage of offensive mining (as learned in the Russo-Japanese War) is also a major blunder. Germany had several superb minelayers, but I do not believe they were ever employed in British coastal waters. Submarines laid the limited minefields there.

Comments?

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If an unfriendly power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war.

-- "A Nation at Risk" (1983)

With hind sight, I think the Germans should have pushed for a decisive, one throw of the dice battle early during the war. Early in the war was when the High sea fleet was at its closest to parity with the Grand fleet during the entire war. Even if the German fleet were to be materially overwhelmed in 1914, it still had a good chance of weakening to British fleet to such an extend that Britain, if not pushed out of the war altogether, would be force to withdraw its resources from France and enable the Germans to overwhelm France. Events of subsequent 4 years all show clearly that the France, left by herself, does not have the resource or the population to hold out indefinitely against Germany. Unlike during the Napoleonic wars, the state of Russia in 1914 is such that if Germany crushes France, she would win the war, whether high sea fleet emerges intact or not.

I think in High sea fleet, Germany had a war winning weapon, even if not necessarily a battle winning weapon. But Germany did not understand it and did not utilize it.

An all-out push eastward against Russia. The prospects for a fight against Britain are about as gloomy as can be. Historically, when the Germans did drive eastward, they had success. If they can hasten Russia's fall, that frees up a lot of German and Austrian commitment. Maybe Italy stays out of the fight.

The Germans should have invested entirely in a submarine fleet vice a dreadnought one - 20/20 hindsight of course.

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No Quarter Asked - None Given

I actually think, a anti-trade war would be the best turn. Utilizing everything - massively converting cargo ships to AMCs, and assisting them through a blockade by the means of battleships and cruisers, light cruisers, supported by armoured and battle cruisers raiding coastal shipping at daily basis in north sea and channel... Actually DOING SOMETHING against a transport of the british war material to france.. Active minelaying, starting a program about 100-200-300 subs built per year from mid-15 or so... Subs should ravage the shipping unlimited where they can, be it western approaches, channel zone, or north sea. Or maybe even mediterranean... Also bringing the austrians to commit their strong Viribus Unitis class battleships offensively (without italy in war, otranto straights would be open).
At the same time, concentrate army effort against russia, trying to get the rich industrial basis and wheat fields of the ukraine...

More or less, try to bring the british navy to a dispersion as large as possible...

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I agree with the ideas of fleet action near Britain early on in the war, the chances of the HSF achieving anything spectacular elsewhere are dim, as both Britain and Japan have far more modern vessels for long-distance interdiction missions. I don't think doing anything drastically different, such as building submarines, will have the desired effect, as that usually presupposes the other side to not react. Historically, Germany did not have shipyard capacity as Britain did, nor was the U-boat production in WW1 as expansive as in WW2. It therefore seems more logical to me that the existing resources cannot be drastically altered and should simply be put to best possible use. As long as the admirals thought of their fleet as not being expendable in the interests of the greater war goals of course, such "good use" is academic. They should have had a Japanese admiral in charge

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Gernot Hassenpflug
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High sea fleet would hardly play much of a role against Russia. In any case, it was clear that even if Germany can overwhelm Russia on land early in the war and force Russia to sue for peace, it still can't count on being able to crush the Anglo-French in the west in any reasonable amount of time. I think in terms of material resources, France and Britain combined were still stronger than Germany. Also, in 1914, Russia was not as crushed and dispirited as she would be 3 years later. Defeats in east Prussia not withstanding, it was not entirely clear if Russia would fold rapidly in the east, and it was also not clear if, by concentrate on a decisive invasion in the East, Germany would not open up opportunities for the French and the british to make decisive gains in the west.

Defeat France, and Russia would eventually fold as she actually did historically in 1917, and then Britain would have no legs to stand on. Defeat Russia, and France and Britain can still hold out for a long time, and it was by no means clear if German can eventually prevail at all.

The key to the defeat of France in a war of attrition was the exclusion of the British resources from the meat grinder. The way to exclude Britain was to create the situation where the greatest jeopardy to her maritime supremacy no longer comes from Germany. This can be achieved by a titanic battle in which the High sea fleet is largely destroyed but the Grand fleet is crippled to such an extend that any little joe can threaten British maritime interests.

I think the key to German victory in WWI was always the defeat of France. Germany understood this before the war, but she staked so much on defeating the French in a quick, lightning strike towards Paris at the onset of the war that, when the French stopped the German lightening attack through Belgium, the Germans got flustered, had no clearly thought out strategic contingency plan against this eventuality, and lost sight of their priorities and improvise poorly on a strategic level as they went. From then on, they dithered and vacillated between focusing on France and focusing on Russia.

When the Germans were halted before Paris but achieved victory in East Prussia, the High Sea Fleet should have then sought a pitched battle against the Grand Fleet. Ideally this pitched battle should have been timed to occur perhaps just a few weeks before a second all-out western land offensive, say in may of 1915, so as to maximize the impact of the battle upon Britain's ability to take the strain off the French. Germany should also at the same time make it clear than France can expect lenient terms, perhaps the return of all her pre-1914 territory and the retention of her colonies and fleet, if she sued for peace at that time. If the French drops out of the war, then the war is over. A Germany holding territory in the east as far as the Ukraine and Belorussia does not need to worry too much about an intact France.

A very decisive time. Any outcome that didn't produce the Treaty of Versailles would completely alter the period after 1920 beyond recognition.

It seems the failure of the Kaiser's leadership makes him the defining man of the 20th Century.

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If an unfriendly power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war.

-- "A Nation at Risk" (1983)

That's a very tough call Werner! I have racked my brains over that one for decades. Germany was in such an awful strategic position and the RN was in such a good strategic position.
If the German army failed to get control of the Biscay ports , then I would have to look at North Sea warfare and submarine commerce war. I think you are most interested in how to use the High Seas Fleet. So I would say push an aggressive bombardment of the British East Coast. Force the RN to come down south at times when all your ships are available for the sorties. Try and bring a section of the Grand Fleet to action. Take some chances to accomplish that, but don't ever try for one massive fleet action. Like at Jutland, if the whole Grand Fleet shows up, run!
You'de need luck, but hitting the East Coast towns would force a RN reaction and give you your best chance to get lucky. Face it, with ship building rates, the Germans had only a year or so of opportunity. After that the odds were just too great.

All in all, I don't envy the German's prospects, but it would be worth a try.
I'de hit the commerce raiding alot harder. Both AMCs and Subs.

Bob B.

Even more to the point, it was the failure of Field Marshal Von Moltke the younger. Germany was stronger than France. German population was larger and Germany can mobilize 5 men for every 3 French. If Germany had focused all her might on attacking France, she has very good chance of success. Germany war plans called for the almost complete focus of Germany's numerical superiority at the beginning on knocking out France by seizing Paris in 30 days from the start of the war. The principle was Russia mobilizes slowly and Germany has enough territorial buffer on the east to absorbe any initial weak Russian offensive during the attack on France.

But Von Moltke lost his nerve on the eve of the war, and decided to draw off forces earmarked for France to defend East Prussia against Russia. As a result, the German forces in France, while still numerically superior, did not have the strength to encircle Paris and overwhelm the French. The French were able to decisively halt the Germans before Paris and throw them back. The force drawn off to East Prussia did manage to pull off a spectacular double victory against the Russians, but that is small comfort next to the German defeat before Paris. Germany scored a tactical victory over Russia, but at the expense of the complete defeat of her overwar strategy.

When the Kaiser celebrated German Victory over Russia in East Prussia, Von Moltke, now the outgoing chief of staff, exhibited his only moment of lucidity in the 3 month old war. He replied to the kaiser "Sire, but we've already lost the war."

I disagree with you. The superficial tactical position of the High Sea fleet, in the context of struggle for sea control, was poor relative to those of Britain. But in overall strategic situation, Germany was in the best position of all of major powers. She had a central position, she had menpower superiority against her chief adversary, an army better than any others, an industrial superiority over everyone else, she had the only strategic plan that was feasible, she alone amongst the major powers had a vast strategic tool in the form of a high sea fleet that could bring her victory, but whose loss would not mean her defeat. She did not appreciate the true role of the High sea fleet. Lossing high sea fleet is not total diseater. But using it can bring total victory.

Admittedly her magin was thin, and depends on steady and clearheaded leadership, but in August 1914, I would have bet on germany.

She goofed. Germany squandered the strength of her position and allowed events to transpire in such a way as to excentuate all of the weaknesses of her position. But that doesn't mean Germany's position was intrinsically weak at the onset.

What was it Kitchener said to Jellicoe? "You may not win the war this week, but you could lose it."

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If an unfriendly power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war.

-- "A Nation at Risk" (1983)

Jellicoe very much had that in mind during Jutland. Destroy the Highsea fleet, and Britain would gain much in reputation but little in distance to victory, for Germany would only be slightly weakened. Trafalgar did not defeat Napoleon, nor would a second Glorious first of June in 1916 defeat Wilhelm II. But cripple the Grand fleet and Britain is done, both for the war and for her tenure as a major global power. Many Germans also spoke confidently of this, Admiral Von Tirpitz, for example, but too bad for the Germans because thet did not take to heart what they spoke of with such overweening conceit.

The central position that gave Germany an advantage on land also imposed a decisive disadvantage for a war at sea against Britain. The German naval war plans of this period acknowledge this fact by strenuously ignoring it and saying only that there was no hope in a fleet action. It was Wegener who put the situation into words; he was branded a heretic and shunned. If the Germans had taken time to confront their geographical disadvantage, they might have offered some radical alternative, like an invasion of Norway.
The French, during the Franco-Prussian War, correctly identified the proper use of naval forces in a war between the two countries; they handed rifles to their sailors.

In 1870 the French navy was so vastly superior to the Prussian flotilla, yet barred from entering the Baltic, that 90% of it had nothing to do.

The Germans were right in assuming that in a struggle for sea control of the type such as that waged during the Anglo-Dutch wars, Britain's geographic superiority would have been hard to overcome. That would indeed be a depressing prospect if the fleet both had to fight and had to continue to exist. But Germany did not think clearly and did not realize her fleet was for a whole different purpose altogether. She was waging primarily a continental war such as that waged by Napoleon. The continued existence of her fleet was not essential for her. For her the fleet was a luxury, and a very competent, skilled and well equipped luxury. Her success did not depend on the continued existence of this luxury. But she could have traded this luxury for Britain's departure from the war, and that would have almost certainly guaranteed her victory over France.

The German population were undernourished as a result of the blockade by the Grand Fleet. However, even if the High Seas Fleet attained a decisive victory, there would be nothing to stop Britain from continuing the blockade with her submarine force. From a naval standpoint the Germans simply have a longer row to hoe. Britain's natural position deprives the continental powers of ready access to the New World's food basket.

Furthermore, a British blockade could still continue in the North Sea, which would greatly minimize the political impact on neutral powers. Germany's blockade of Britain has to occur in the Atlantic, which is a more provocative location for neutrals.

If Germany could have maintained a flow of cereal grain and beef to the home land, I think the war would have ended in her favor.

I wonder if she threw her weight against Russia, would she be able to consolidate the gain into effective crop production in time to save the Western Front?

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If an unfriendly power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war.

-- "A Nation at Risk" (1983)

The effects of a blockade was the result of a long war, 3-4 years. The advantage conferred by the superior position of Germany I referred to puts Germany in a favorable position to win a short war, 1-2 years.

If Germany had implemented the Von Schliffen plan well, she would have beaten France by the end of 1914, before any decisive British contribution to the western front, and she would undoubted have also beaten Russia by the end of 1915. Then a decisive commitment of the High sea fleet to weaken the Grand fleet should convince the British to also forsake the war, now virtually unwinnable anyway. Germany's supply situation by the end of 1915 was still by no means critical. Even if Schliffen plan had failed, I think Germany still has the means to pushing through, deprive the French of substantive British aid, and overwhelm the French before its supply situation becomes critical in 1917 or 1918.

I am also by no means certain that if a to-the-death fleet action were fought in 1914, Britain is very likely to emerge with any semblance of battlefleet at all. By the the end of 1914, the numerical superiority of the Grand fleet over the highsea fleet was very tenuous. The combat power of the opposing fleets were probably at parity. I don't think a Britain bereft of her battlefleet would continue the war if at the same time the French are lossing the land war.

I have to agree with you on this. I read Wegener and he understood Germany's situation quite well. The German Navy suffered from an awful strategic position. The German Army of course had a good central strategic position.
Germany didn't pursue a naval approach to the war. They were content to hold their coast line and hope for a bit of luck against the Grand Fleet. The result was just what we saw in the war. To change things Germany would have needed to use it's army to gain the North West coast of France or else pursue an invasion of Norway via Denmark.
The submarine war just seemed to come about for lack of anything better. As luck would have it, they were given a break in that battle by the long time it took to institute the convoy system.
Britain had the key to the lock on Germany's access to the greater maritime world. That key was the Royal Navy and they kept the lock shut tight.

Bob B.