The Ship Model Forum

German is not waging a naval war, so the disadvantage conferred by her position in purely naval war doesn't matter a great duel. But there are other ways to make use of a navy than to pursue a naval war. Germany could have used her navy more effectively to bring about a better situation on land in France, and that would be worth the sacrifice of the navy.

Germany fantasized about one day becoming a true maritime power, and is loath to sacrifice the navy she imagined she would need later. But she is really jump too far ahead. She could never get to the stage where the navy is really vital to her without first gaining a dominant position on the continent and then spending years, if not decades, to eclipse Britain in the manner Napoleon embarked upon doing but had to cut short because of Moscow. In the meantime German leaders were dazzled by the glory of Trafalgar, when the much more appropriate lesson was Napoleon's indifference to the outcome of that same battle.

German navy of 1914 showed every indication of being able to do far better against the English than Napoleon's fleet were able to in 1805. Yet even if the High Sea Fleet were to suffer as the French fleet did, it would not be a huge deal. So why did they not try?

I thought Germany hat a cut-to-fit fleet based on the assumption they would be "Copenhagened" ... short range torpedo craft with light guns for the kind of effort Britain would make inside the Jadebusen. I don't believe they thought a lot about Trafalgar. After all, Tsushima would be the important naval lesson of their age.

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If an unfriendly power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war.

-- "A Nation at Risk" (1983)

No, the German fleet was disigned as the risk fleet principle by Von Tirpitz. The very essence of Risk fleet principle is a fleet highly capable of fighting a large fleet action in North sea so that there is grave risk to British naval supremacy in confronting it. There were some school of thought, mainly by arm chair tacticians, that argued Britain would attempt to impose a close range blockade just as they have done in Napoleonic wars. No one with a brain could have taken this seriously. The impossibility of using a coal powered fleet to sustain a close blockade in enough strength contain a high sea fleet that could sortie fully fueled at any time is too self evident.

A coal powered fleet has to be in port a very substantial portion of the time. Thus only a distant blockade, sustained at a location beyond where the Grand fleet battlefleet, upon receiving information of High sea fleet coming out, can have adequate time to sortie from its own base and intercept the high sea fleet, can possibly work.

The lessons of Tsushima were largely tactical. It is doubtful if that battle is seen to harbour any strategic lessons for a European war in general. The details of Trafalgar itself is also not directly relevent. It is British reputation for the ability to utterly crush an adversary's battlefleet that exerted the main infleunce. Much of British naval supremacy is based on that reputation rather than any of the strategic or tactical steps leading up to that battle. Weather rightly or wrongly, reputation of Trafalgar still attended the British in 1914. But even if we ignore the fact that the German fleet of 1914 is far closer to professional parity with the RN than napoleon's navy in 1805, and a trafalgar style victory where the Highsea fleet is all but destroyed and British fleet and naval power emerged essentially diminished is extremely unlikely, there still remains the fact that even if this unlikely outcome were to eventuate, it still would have had as little decisive impact on Germany's land power as Trafalgar had on Napoleon's.

So Germans were really very timid. They have little to loose by gambling the high sea fleet, yet they still didn't do it.

I suppose a good question is would the British have striven to avoid a fleet action early in the war. She had the superior geographical position to enable her to maintain the blockade most of the time while refusing battle on Germany's terms. Would she have done it, or would she, suffused with the spirit of Trafalgar, welcome a decisive battle early in the war?

If it had been British doctrine to refuse battle on account of the uncertainty of outcome and the disproportionate effect a bad outcome would have upon the British compared to the same for the Germans, can High Sea fleet still force a large scale fleet battle?

Mind you in this scenario, high sea fleet, understanding the relatively higher importance of the enemy fleet to the enemy war effort, would accept action with the whole of Grand fleet in order to more rapidly precipitate a decisive confrontation.

The Risk Theory was not for the German fleet to challenge Britain on its own. On the contrary, the theory presupposed some other naval threat with which Germany could combine. The idea actually was to make Britain need Germany as an ally, which is why this policy was such a complete failure; it had the exact opposite of the intended effect. And when it came time to find some other power to threaten Britain, both France and Russia ended up on Britain's side. So who was left? Austria? Italy?

Gentlemen,

This is all fascinating stuff.

I agree that the German High Command was very timid in using the Hochseeflotte offensively in the early part of the war. This is of course understandable in the light of their hope to crush France in 3 months and have the war over by Xmas 1914. The most immediate opponent was France, followed by Russia, both continental powers against which the Navy was largely useless anyway. By the autumn of 1914, it was evident that the war would get into 1915 and beyond, so that actions against England became desirable, hence the battle cruisers stepping in for their dashes against the English coast. But that was more political than military thinking.

What I fail to understand is why everybody assumes that a German victory in a climactic high sea pitched battle, unlikely as it was, would have forced Britain out of the war. Surely, even reduced to a portion of its former strength, the Grand Fleet would retain enough forces to contain the Germans, who could only hope to gain the upper hand after a large victory, not total supremacy. The balance of power would be restored over time as the British building capacity far exceeded Germany's. Moreover, the Germans could never operate outside of the North Sea without bases on the Atlantic coast anyway, and those could only be gained by a successful land offensive. And even with a German-dominated North Sea, actual invasion of England was probably out of reach for the Germans.

The First World War was a total war, not a limited conflict, at last for Germany, France and Britain. Once committed to it, each great power could only hope to last longer than the time it took for their opponents to collapse. The French would never have sued for peace and would have to be overrun. The British would never leave the fight against a victorious Germany in control of the continent, as was evidenced in 1940.

Now, discussing what could have been done better by the Germans regarding their Navy, maybe the most obvious thing would have been never to build it in the first place. Tirpitz's Naval Laws were a primary factor for alienating Britain and force it to become a European power again, allied with France and Russia. And the crews of the Hochseeflotte could have been drafted in the Army, providing 5 or 6 additional army corps that could have made a difference if added to von Kluck's First Army at the right wing of the German sweep into France. Germany never needed a large battle fleet. Getting one was a corner stone of its eventual demise.

In terms of deployment, it might have made sense to send more, and more modern detachments overseas. Graf von Spee could have done even better than he did if provided with modern light cruisers, and possibly even a battle cruiser or two, or at least the Blücher. Reinforcing the Mediterranean squadron would have been a good idea too, maybe sending the pre-dreadnoughts and the armored cruisers to reinforce the Austro-Hungarian navy, or even better the Ottoman navy. Goeben and Breslau single-handedly managed to contain the entire Russian fleet in the Black Sea for the best part of the war. Just imagine what an entire battle line of German pre-dreadnoughts could have achieved in the Adriatic, the Med or the Black sea. No matter how successful in the end, their engagement there would have yielded much higher dividends than letting them rot slowly at their moorings in Wilhelmshafen, or becoming a liability to Scheer at Jutland.

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Jean-Paul Binot

This is exactly the point made by Wegener. He emphasized the fundamental failure of the German command to see that destroying ships was not the purpose of a high-seas fleet, but rather command of the sea was, which is a separate issue. The German navy was committed to itself for its own sake, so much so that it obscured the flaws in the theories underlying its own existence. The war shredded all the presumption and left the naval leadership facing the unpleasant reality of its irrelevance.
A quote comes to mind: Germans have never understood the sea.

I actually guess, the germans did not need to destroy the royal navy. They should have weakened it to the extent that britain would not be able to protect their colonies and shipping from the 3rd party. As that third party I really see Japan. From what I know, even if japanese were in allied camp (mainly to get a chance to occupy the german colonies like Tsingtao or Marianas...) and to fulfil (quite formally) the british-japanese treaty, they would switch the side quite fast if a chance would open to occupy a lot of british colonies unharmed... USA would most likely still stay neutral, as before 1917 german lobby was VERY strong there... And I could even imagine USA joining the war on the other side in fact, political discrepansies were strong between usa and britain on the turn of the centuries

So, if german navy would incur much losses to royal navy (even, say, on 1 to 1 rate of loss), the history could have gone other way...

Also, i think in 1914 austrians should have committed their navy much more agressively. Italy was neutral, and otranto straights free... See a squadron of their 4 dreadnoughts ravagin the shipping routes there.... If also agressively committed, it could have won italy for the central powers, and british royal navy would have been forced to send a lot of dreadnought forces to mediterranean.... Also, if italy would have entered the war on the german side, no alpine front => more divisions against france or russia and also italian troops against french....

It all was makeable in fact ;o) As I studied history, I once wrote a presentation about the alternative WW1 scenario, based on what I wrote here ;o) Imagine great britain, russia and france fighting alone against germany, japan, austria, italy, turkey, with USA standing by as a referee, but also ready to jump onto a ownerless colonies....

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Further kits in preparation.

I think in High sea fleet, Germany had a war winning weapon, even if not necessarily a battle winning weapon. But Germany did not understand it and did not utilize it.[/quote]

I agree. Their failure to recognize that their excellent U-Boot flotilla was under utilized as a"Fleet" attack weapon even after the several success it had against RN Warships of the line... We will never know.
Fortunitly this was something the US Navy did not overlook 25 years later and demonstrated all too well in the Pacific against the IJN.

Yes, this is one of the most important points from the German point of view. Their Navy was not free to pursue anything but attempts to weaken the Royal Navy by actions in the North Sea as long as they had no access to the Atlantic. In their poor strategic position the Germans were very limited even though their Navy though smaller than Britains was still capable. Had the Army gained the Biscay Coast, the German's possibilities would have increased greatly. They could have forced the British out of Scapa Flow and their blockade position. It becomes a naval war full of potential for the High Seas Fleet if they can access the Atlantic.
Unable to build ships as fast as Britain, the Germans still would be in a difficult situation. But nevertheless, they could have engaged in much more damaging naval actions against British trade had they held even one good Biscay port. So in the end, the fate of the German Navy was very dependent on the success of the German Army. As long as the German fleet was stuck in the North Sea, Britain's sea trade was shielded behind the Royal Navy at Scapa and the body of the British Isles. Submarines came to the fore because there was nothing else for the German Navy to do.

Bob B.

And vice versa - the HSF provided a valuable role in the North Sea: it kept the British off Heligoland, it kept them from conducting Baltic Campaigns (any of which would have been more positive to the Allies than the meat-grind of Gallipoli) and it would have helped keep the Russian Empire going. With the HSF merely in being, the German Army had less to worry about on the Northern/Eastern front.

Given the materiel, the HSF did, I believe, about as well as it could have done.

But back to the question: orders to the HSF in 1914? I've only one!

"Ensure the destruction of code books when necessary."

Andy

Sounds good, but I'd add one more - "Ran an den Feind!" - "onto the enemy!".... search for the combat actively. Even a loss rate of 1 v 1 is acceptable, and as it seems, german ships were tougher then early british dreadnoughts... Ram at opportunity! ;o)

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Model kit manufacturer and distributor: https://b2b.modellbaudienst.de
Distributor of Very Fire, Snowman, Milania Master Korabel, Falkonet, Microdisign in EU
1:350 HMS Diana 1794 - nearly released
Further kits in preparation.

It's my understanding that the British civil population suffered a crisis of confidence in the Government in late 1914 and early 1915 as the ground war stabilized; the Scarborough raid and zeppelin attacks were blown out of all proportion by the press, and the loss of Hogue, Cressy and Aboukir was a devastating political blow. If Germany's fleet could have made a credible performance against the Grand Fleet, I think there might have been some political accommodation. Churchill, Kitchener and Fisher may have been out of the Cabinet with interesting consequences.

If the Germans were throwing their weight around in the North Sea, it may have been politically impossible to go on the offensive in Turkey. The ANZAC may have come to Britain as a home guard if invasion looked possible.

Destruction of the Channel Fleet as an early engagement would have crushed Jellicoe's confidence in the power of the Grand Fleet. Look to his demand for the US battleships as compensation for sending a squadron to Dover. If he had to send a much stronger force there to replace a lost Channel Fleet, I think he would stay behind the blockships in Scapa.

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If an unfriendly power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war.

-- "A Nation at Risk" (1983)

PetrOs, I disagree with you about Japan. Japan relied on the 1904 Treaty to gain influence among the Western powers, and to learn from the undisputed leader of naval powers of the time. Until 1915 or so IIRC they were ordering all large guns from the UK, even though ships were being built in Japan already. Japan was on a serious learning curve, and they were not about to jump off it - they knew very well how far behind their own industry was, and how important the the UK was as an ally. As I understand it, Japan was pretty shocked at the non-renewal of the treaty.

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Gernot Hassenpflug
Find out how it works, then functionality and limits

Well, they were at the learning curve until around 1915-16, I know it well, but I also know about a lot of conflicts when at the same time japs and australians landing on the same island same time, or one party coming late for occupation. And also, the learning curve was quite over by 1914, shipbuilding industry was setup and running, 3 out of 4 Kongos, Ises, Fusos, destroyers, cruisers being built locally. When the war was going well for the allies, the japanese stuck to the treaty as it was profitable for them. Barely losses, no real cost (how many destroyers joined mediterranean fleet? Two? Three? Plus one or two cruisers hunting for raiders....) and large gains..And I suppose if british fleet would be reduced largely (say, a decisive fleet action costed around 10 - 15 dreadnoughts to each germans and british, leaving about 8-10 ships to royal navy... to face remainants of german, plus the fresh italian and austrian fleets in mediterranean) japanese would consider to at least occupy the "unprotected colonies" of singapore, british samoa, etc... They were quite confident in their army after the russo-japanese war...

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Model kit manufacturer and distributor: https://b2b.modellbaudienst.de
Distributor of Very Fire, Snowman, Milania Master Korabel, Falkonet, Microdisign in EU
1:350 HMS Diana 1794 - nearly released
Further kits in preparation.

Quite true. Here's a quote from a paper I wrote a few years ago:

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"Build few and build fast,
Each one better than the last"
John Fisher

It ought to have been obvious by 1907 that the US was a different kind of colonial power and the Philippines was moving toward self-governance at a fairly brisk (but irregular) pace. I would have thought the Japanese would have regarded the US role in the Pacific favorably in comparison to the UK's more-or-less permanence in her colonies.

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If an unfriendly power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war.

-- "A Nation at Risk" (1983)

On the contrary. Don't forget who "opened" the doors of Japan; who "liberated" the Philippines; who moderated the Russian-Japanese Peace Treaty; who took Guam at the end of WWI; etc etc etc. Although Japan wasn't yet completely hostile to USA they weren't very keen to forget what USA played with them in the past. For Britain, well, they had an Alliance with them and Britain was helping Japan to develop herself a lot. Just being brief...
A few good books on the subject are Paul Kennedy's "Rise and Fall of Great Powers" and Charles Kupchan "Vulnerability of the Empire".

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"Build few and build fast,
Each one better than the last"
John Fisher

Sorry to join the debate late in the day, been busy and not had time to read everything!

Right this could be a biggie!

@ Werner the quote your looking for off the top of my head is something like "Jellicoe was the only man who could loose the war in an afternoon" I think it was Churchill who first said it.

@ Chuck

"Jellicoe very much had that in mind during Jutland. Destroy the Highsea fleet, and Britain would gain much in reputation but little in distance to victory, for Germany would only be slightly weakened. Trafalgar did not defeat Napoleon"

Jellicoe was always preoccupied with preserving his fleet and not taking undue risk. That is why he turned away at Jutland through fear of a torpedo attack crippling his numerically superior fleet. We must always bear in the mind the sheer weight on this mans shoulders. Under his command he the largest battlefleet ever constructed, the cost in money, in crews, and to maintain it was simply mind boggling.

Being academic Trafalgar did defeat Napolean. It defeated his ambitions of conquests outside of mainland Europe. The defeat of the only other 2 naval superpowers (Spain & France) who could threaten the Royal Navy at sea Britain made sure that for the rest of the Napoleanic war she was safe from invasion and could thus land an army in Portugual and start to push Boney back leading to the freeing of Portugual and then Spain and then ultimately to his defeat. Trafalgar was the first key step in his mainland European defeat.


@ Guest (assume Chuck?)

"I don't think a Britain bereft of her battlefleet would continue the war if at the same time the French are lossing the land war."

I disagree she has the largest shipbuilding industry in the world at this time and the 2nd strongest economy. Any material losses can be made up quite quickly. Admitively her land army is small and poorly equipped, but she does have all her colonies to depend on which gives her further resources to exploit and also a sense of well being. She could also mobilise a million fighting men in a matter of months as she often did throughout the war. She is also an island nation and faced in vasion and far more dangerous situations in the past, did she ever back away from war? Furthermore I don't think she would ever pull out of the First World War regardless of the losses as well its to unBritish like in character!

"German navy of 1914 showed every indication of being able to do far better against the English than Napoleon's fleet were able to in 1805. Yet even if the High Sea Fleet were to suffer as the French fleet did, it would not be a huge deal. So why did they not try?"

The Royal Navy still had a whiff of invincibilty about it and respect steeped in 100 years of undisputed dominance of the world's oceans. Remember Nelson defeated a combined Spanish & French Fleet, with a numerically smaller force I might add. At Traflagar it was not just about defeating Bony, it was also about knocking out the only other 2 superpowers at sea. Germany knew to take on Britain in any naval war was a major risk, no matter how well armoured her ships were, no matter how well her gunnery was Britain normally in any naval battle often with numerically inferior forces for 100s of years tended to win. Germany would in order to win would have to buck this trend. Also remember the Kaiser was Queen Victoria's Grandson and he had originally wanted to build great a Navy as mighty and good as the Royal Navy for colonial expansion and worldwide trade it was not to build one to defeat the RN.
He looked to emulate it by following what Mahan had written, Germany wanted worldside trade markets and felt unjust as she was in many ways the more powerful economic power in Europe, why should Britain have access to all the best markets and trade? etc

Only when Germany invaded Belgium and Britain's 1839 Treaty meant she would defend Belgium's neutrality and thus war was declared on 4th August 1914 did that become Germany's naval objective. Of course there was the arms race beforehand but a naval war between both countries was not a given and planning for it was forced on the German high command late in the day. Germany in the end went for an adapted Mahan principle of a fleet in being and tried in vein to pick off small portions of the Grand Fleet in a hope to whittle down the numbers, a very poor naval plan in my book when all things considered.

In terms of what Britain would gain if she defeated the High Seas Fleet early in the war, the most important things she would gain would be International prestige and a greater freedom to disperse some of her maritime forces around the globe for trade protection or to invade other German colonies perhaps? say naval operations in East Africa. She would not have to worry such much about manning a huge fleet for North Sea operations. She would also be able to strangle Germany from naval blockade more quickly as she could operate closer to German waters (it would still take years to accumulate though but the effects could be speeded up perhaps). This could help stir up a greater public outcry in Germany from her populace about food shortages and make it much more a problem for Germany's war leaders.

Remember Germany employed many questionable policy's in WW1, not just naval. Unlike Britain she did NOT mobilize women into the workforce, making munitions of war or to work on the land and make agriculture more productive. Thus freeing up more men for the armed forces to replace losses etc. She was very much in comparison a poorer 'managed economy' in the war probaly due to her ideas for only a short war to capture Paris with her massive army which numerically was greater than any other single power she was up against and better equipped.

Going back to the naval, what Britain & Germany both lacked between 1914-1917 was an agressive enough Admiral willing to take calculated risks. An Admiral who was able to embrace new ideas faster and new tactical doctrines to gain the upper hand in the new industrialised naval war which was becoming more complex.
The war in that early period was too much about 'fleets in being' and 'engage only inferior forces with a good chance of success' etc.
Technology in warships had moved on at such a pace before the war it took many wars years until the man or the service could catch up. Note the late war operations off Zeebrugge or the planned carrier raids on the Zeppelin sheds at Cruxhaven which the armistice scuppered. Things like that were not even contemplated in 1914. By the end of the war one Navy at least had found a way to break the monotiny of the proceeding 3 years, Dogger Bank, Jutland et al aside.

Germany could not really hope to win the naval war against Britian unless she could develope her geographical and thus tactical position better. Her bases on German shores were quite 'hemmed in' and did not offer much freedom of operation from, though Zeppelins did help! I agree an invasion into Norway or some way to gain access to the Mediterranean would have forced the British Admiralty to maintain ships over greater distances in order to cover their dispositions, much like in WW2.

Right written enough now!