Early 1942 in the Southwest Pacific.

[Dick J]

For the first few weeks, the US Fleet had definite command problems. Admiral Kimmel, wanting to avenge Pearl Harbor and redeem his reputation, set plans in motion for the Wake Island relief. This involved all three CV's and apparently all of the available tankers. Before this could be accomplished, Kimmel was relieved and Admiral Pye put in temporary command. When IJN CV's showed up at Wake, Adm. Pye, apparently reluctant to have more losses on his watch, withdrew the US forces. Nimitz didn't take over until 31 Dec. Within 2 weeks of his arrival, Saratoga was torpedoed, and Nimitz only had 2 CV's to work with.

Yorktown wasn't available until Feb. '42, after she completed a troop convoy escort. Even still, tankers were in short supply. Tanker problems hamstrung the Wake op, and continued to be a problem. Use of Australian oil would have involved some diplomatic maneuvering which, while not impossible, would have taken a bit of time to coordinate. There was no joint command structure in place, and the alliances, while recognized as necessary by all allied parties, were still a work in progress. US CV's were experienced only in single CV ops, and taking on the IJN in the western Pacific would have stretched US resources, and command coordination, to the breaking point.

Pearl Harbor had a devastating effect on the confidence of the US forces, and for the first few months, Nimitz had his hands full with "minor" ops designed to build both experience and confidence. Beginning in April, things started to change. Confidence from the Dolittle Raid, and the edge provided by code breaking allowed the US to oppose the IJN in the Coral Sea, and that perceived success was built upon allowing the Midway victory. (The "single CV" tactics that the US was still following there proved very costly - actually threatening the victory.) That gave enough confidence for the US to invade Guadalcanal. Even though the need for the invasion was defensive, the op WAS offensive, as is any invasion. The US fleet immediately got smacked again, at Savo Island, and the battle turned defensive until 1943.

In hind sight, it is easier to recognize where one could have intervened to make a big difference. However, that is not so easy to recognize as it is happening, and is hard to accomplish without the confidence and experience that only combat ops could provide. Code breaking hadn't yet begun to show its promise before April. And the IJN ops prior to then were all in the original plans, which meant that code breaking could only provide executions dates - no details about what or where was even being transmitted during the "first phase". In short, we didn't know how or where to properly combat the IJN in the early months of '42, and didn't have the resources to lose in high-risk, long-distance operations.

[ar]

The figure is for Fleet oilers,. I did not do a count for the gasoline tankers.
Fleet oilers usually carry a percentage of the cargo in the form of gasoline.

On the matter of the Australian and New Zealand ports. I went over (briefly) the liner trade for the two countries. Quite large if I may say so. Empire and all that. In the war, and before December 1941 there was a great deal of large liner traffic going on. All of it was for troop movements as I recall. These were VERY big ships. To sustain this there MUST have been a costant flow of oil from the Persia oil fields. I don't think that this was interrupted even during the first months of 1942, although the allies must have been concerned. By March of 42 and I am GUESSING, that sea trade was routed to the south toward the Mauritius area before turning east to the Australian Bight, Freemantle and the Eastern ports away from possible Japaese inderdiction.
Your turn. Is this strike two for me or are you going to hit a home run.

After a quick count I have come up with about 36 to 37 tankers available by March of 1942. THis does not include gasoline tankers.
I also noted that two had been sunk by this date.

What is this number? Civil tankers or fleet oilers? American or Allied?

We talked about this before. You'd have to dispatch 7 tankers a week on the 60 day round trip to Australia in order to keep one carrier task force operating.

By your count, we only have half as many as we need, and this number may have to supply other theatres as well.

[Dick J]

Looking with hindsight, I don't understand why the cruiser force wasn't used to destroy the oil facilities to deny them to the Japanese. We didn't have the force to counter the Japanese, but we did have the capability to destroy the Japanese objective.

The oil facilities were divided into two types - wells and refineries. Scattered wells make dificult targets, and the refineries were destroyed by the Duch as they withdrew. The Japanese were forced to send all the crude back to Japan for refining, which cost them dearly. We had no remaining "quick strike" targets, and no means to stop the IJN from taking possession.

[Laurence Batchelor]

AR perhaps your talents are needed elsewhere:-

http://www.shipmodels.info/mwphpBB2/vie ... hp?t=23585

[ar]

I forgot to add the cargo trade, which was VERY large. An empire thing.
Would not be surprised if bunkering facilities and storage at Adelaide Sydney and Melbourne combined were far greater than at Hawii. And that leaves out Brisbane Freemantle, Darwin and the New Zealand ports.
Is this strike three?

The figure is for Fleet oilers,. I did not do a count for the gasoline tankers.
Fleet oilers usually carry a percentage of the cargo in the form of gasoline.

On the matter of the Australian and New Zealand ports. I went over (briefly) the liner trade for the two countries. Quite large if I may say so. Empire and all that. In the war, and before December 1941 there was a great deal of large liner traffic going on. All of it was for troop movements as I recall. These were VERY big ships. To sustain this there MUST have been a costant flow of oil from the Persia oil fields. I don't think that this was interrupted even during the first months of 1942, although the allies must have been concerned. By March of 42 and I am GUESSING, that sea trade was routed to the south toward the Mauritius area before turning east to the Australian Bight, Freemantle and the Eastern ports away from possible Japaese inderdiction.
Your turn. Is this strike two for me or are you going to hit a home run.

What is this number? Civil tankers or fleet oilers? American or Allied?

We talked about this before. You'd have to dispatch 7 tankers a week on the 60 day round trip to Australia in order to keep one carrier task force operating.

By your count, we only have half as many as we need, and this number may have to supply other theatres as well.

[Werner]

The figure is for Fleet oilers,. I did not do a count for the gasoline tankers.
Fleet oilers usually carry a percentage of the cargo in the form of gasoline.

On the matter of the Australian and New Zealand ports. I went over (briefly) the liner trade for the two countries. Quite large if I may say so. Empire and all that. In the war, and before December 1941 there was a great deal of large liner traffic going on. All of it was for troop movements as I recall. These were VERY big ships. To sustain this there MUST have been a costant flow of oil from the Persia oil fields. I don't think that this was interrupted even during the first months of 1942, although the allies must have been concerned. By March of 42 and I am GUESSING, that sea trade was routed to the south toward the Mauritius area before turning east to the Australian Bight, Freemantle and the Eastern ports away from possible Japaese inderdiction.
Your turn. Is this strike two for me or are you going to hit a home run.

Do you play that game?

If you remember your 1940/41, Churchill took up all the P&O Liners to move forces around, especially the ANZACs to Africa. Roosevelt even lent him some liners.

Fleet oilers were in such short supply in 1940/1 that the idea to convert over a dozen to AVG (XCV / CVE) was pared back to four - the Sangamons. As far as the War Mobilization Board was concerned, fleet oilers had the same priority as fleet carriers and just ahead of destroyers. This is when the Alaska and Montana were suspended -- to build oilers!

Halsey complained when Leahy took away the Scouting Force/Battle Force oilers to lend to Churchill and some cruisers for escort. in early 1941 the plan was to keep one division of the Battle Force at sea. By December, the lack of oilers meant they could only sail about one week in four. Didn't you wonder why there was only one fleet oiler in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack?

A year later, the Board moved amphibious landing craft and personnel transports up to top level, above oilers and fleet carriers.

By the way, the Sangamon class were so superior to all other CVEs that if there was no shortage of oilers they would have been the only type ordered. The late war repeats were all Sangamon-based.

[Laurence Batchelor]

So far your basing this whole long range operation out of Australia only on oil supples.

What about other naval supplies or are your only focused on oil?
Do you have shares in it or something?

I'm thinking along the lines of a running a supply of bombs and torpedoes for your carrier aircraft.
AA ammunition, shells , cordite et al for your ships.

I simply don't think the fleet train is there to support this for the USN.

All of these Australian ports you mention have minimal dry-docking ability.
They do not have substantial naval port facilities or the required infrastructure.
For example the only dry-dock I can see any of the USN carriers being able to use would be the one at Sydney.

Your right though they had a far amount of bukerage, what with all the liners.

[ar]

Warner, you went off point. Sorry but you are----OUT!!!
I only play God's own game, cricket.

[Werner]

So far your basing this whole long range operation out of Australia only on oil supples.

What about other naval supplies or are your only focused on oil?
Do you have shares in it or something?

I'm thinking along the lines of a running a supply of bombs and torpedoes for your carrier aircraft.
AA ammunition, shells , cordite et al for your ships.

I simply don't think the fleet train is there to support this for the USN.

All of these Australian ports you mention have minimal dry-docking ability.
They do not have substantial naval port facilities or the required infrastructure.
For example the only dry-dock I can see any of the USN carriers being able to use would be the one at Sydney.

Your right though they had a far amount of bukerage, what with all the liners.

Can't have a fleet without ships. Almost any ship can be modified to carry shells and bombs point-to-point. Until 1944, little of this materiel was UnRep supplies, and the oilers actually handled most.

Asking a civil tanker and crew to perform UnRep, though, is a bit like putting a whaler into your line-of-battle at Trafalgar.

Australia had the Cockatoo dock which could handle any ship in the US fleet. I don't know of others except the George V in Singapore.

[ar]

Laurence, Laurence, Laurence, what am I going to do with you? And you are going to be an author?

So far your basing this whole long range operation out of Australia only on oil supples.

What about other naval supplies or are your only focused on oil?
Do you have shares in it or something?

I'm thinking along the lines of a running a supply of bombs and torpedoes for your carrier aircraft.
AA ammunition, shells , cordite et al for your ships.

I simply don't think the fleet train is there to support this for the USN.

All of these Australian ports you mention have minimal dry-docking ability.
They do not have substantial naval port facilities or the required infrastructure.
For example the only dry-dock I can see any of the USN carriers being able to use would be the one at Sydney.

Your right though they had a far amount of bukerage, what with all the liners.

[Werner]

Warner, you went off point. Sorry but you are----OUT!!!
I only play God's own game, cricket.

I don't see where I lost. The ball is too hard for my hand, though.

[Laurence Batchelor]

Laurence, Laurence, Laurence, what am I going to do with you? And you are going to be an author?

I'm trying to make you look beyond oil all the time!
Your obessed with it, anyone would think your JR!

Australia had the Cockatoo dock which could handle any ship in the US fleet. I don't know of others except the George V in Singapore.

Yes the Cocatoo is the only one, I couldn't remember the name.

Almost any ship can be modified to carry shells and bombs point-to-point.

But where is all this going to be stored for replenishment purposes safely for this supposed sustained battering of the Dutch Oil Refinies?
There are no substantial naval bases in Australia to store this at, surely enough supply cannot be kept 'on hand' in the fleet train?

Finally ar could the early 1942 USN airwings truly cope with all the land based aircover and mount a strike effectively?
I would have thought early war strike aircraft would not have a huge success rate at hitting their targets.
Remeber there still a little green still so your going have to account for navigational errors and the ordnance and bombing training of that period might mean they will have to launch strike after strike until the job is done.
I think the task force (if we can call it that!) would be very hard pushed, and they'd be sushi if a night action ever ensued!

[Werner]

Almost any ship can be modified to carry shells and bombs point-to-point.

But where is all this going to be stored for replenishment purposes safely for this supposed sustained battering of the Dutch Oil Refinies?
There are no substantial naval bases in Australia to store this at, surely enough supply cannot be kept 'on hand' in the fleet train?

Finally ar could the early 1942 USN airwings truly cope with all the land based aircover and mount a strike effectively?
I would have thought early war strike aircraft would not have a huge success rate at hitting their targets.
Remeber there still a little green still so your going have to account for navigational errors and the ordnance and bombing training of that period might mean they will have to launch strike after strike until the job is done.
I think the task force (if we can call it that!) would be very hard pushed, and they'd be sushi if a night action ever ensued!

Laurence, thoughtful arguments and conclusions!

I don't think the USN air wings were particularly able in 1942 because of machines. The aviators only needed experience to become the core of the best aviation unit the world had ever seen.

1942 USN surface officers, partivularly class of '37 and younger were completely up to the job and compare fairly well to their counterparts in the Senior Service (RN). Our leadership at the start of the war let us down terribly at times. That really wasn't sorted out until the end of 1942.

What's fun to think about in aviation is how fast the USN transitioned generations.

12/41 air wings were considered dangerously obsolete by 6/42, and by 1/43, yet another generation of aircraft had put in an appearance on the carriers, including the first built around war experience. The F6F Hellcat was literally a "crash" program to build a F4F Wildcat with the same or better performance to a Zero which crashed in Alaska in June, 42, and rebuilt like a UFO in some work of science fiction.

As for the Fleet Train, of course there was not enough. There was barely enough for the "Orange" plan, and not together with an European war. A few million tons later, and it's a different story. We talked a few months ago about the immense train of tanker convoys which would be required to keep TF38 operating in 1944. We have to remember Australia is not a military base, but has people who need to be sustained before we even consider a war effort. Her military was sent to Africa on the promise Churchill made to keep her and New Zealand safe. America kept that promise. It was very, very expensive to keep Australia supplied for civilian needs. It was our duty, though, to supply our allies. I hope they feel we did an appropriate job.

[Mac]

Werner,

You've fallen for the History Channel version that the Akutan Zero led to the develpoment of the F6F! The development of the Hellcat was well underway by the time the Zero recovered in Alaska was made operational and tested. The USN order for a fighter with a more powerful engine to replace the Wildcat came before the war even started. I think the initial order was placed in June 1941. The prototype with the 2000hp engine first flew in late July 1942. The increase in horsepower for the this prototype was a result of early war experience that showed the Wildcat was underpowered compared to the Zero.

The Akutan Zero was not discovered until the first week and a half of July of 1942. The rebuilding and repair of the Zero in San Diego didn't begin until early August 1942.

Check the timelines--a google search of "Akutan Zero" brings up quite a few results. It's amazing how far this rumor has spread...

Mac

[Werner]

Werner,

You've fallen for the History Channel version that the Akutan Zero led to the develpoment of the F6F!

Actually, I never saw the show you refer to. I refer to an article in US Naval Institute Proceedings, the technical and practical journal of the USN.

It includes the classic "Ranier" shot of a Zero in US 1942 colors and markings.

It states this Zero was put in the hands of several US "top guns" and the input was used to create the F6F as we know it.

The thought that the F6F was in development before June '42 is not counter to my argument. I said it was among the first generation of production aircraft to incorporate "war experience" in the design. The Proceedings article underscores that.

Three generations in a year. How long have the F-22 and V-22 been in design and testing? Twenty years?

[Devin]

The Dutch Harbor Zero leading to the F6F is one of those WWII myths. If Proceedings published something giving it credence, they'd better have some darn good evidence, otherwise it's very disappointing.

Yes, testing of the Zero did give great insight to the strengths and weaknesses of the aircraft and did allow for some tweaking of U.S. designs perhaps, but it was hardly the basis for any of them. That Zero was captured during the time of Midway in June '42. The F6F prototype, which became the production F6F-3 with very little modification, flew first on 26 June of that year. There was simply no time for the captured Zero data to influence the F6F and F4U designs (the F4U Corsair went into actual production in June of 42). And it was just as well; with good tactics, the F4F Wildcat was the equal of the Zero. The Hellcat and Corsair were far superior aircraft on their own.

For the original question, I have to agree with Laurence. Early in 1942 the USN simply was not ready to engage the Japanese Navy on an equal footing. Green US crews against war-hardened Japanese crews was not a recipe for success. It took the South Pacific carrier raids and Coral Sea to get the U.S. ships and crews up to speed for Midway. And Midway was a lot more luck. Yorktown was the only U.S. carrier there that day with practical experience in the ship-to-ship combat of the new era. Were it not for her skill and Enterprise's luck, the battle would have gone much differently. U.S. forces simply did not have the experience necessary to stand against the Japanese carriers until after that day, and it would be late '42, after the Guadalcanal battles, that the U.S. forces would be their equal.

Oilers, bases, support, supplies, etc. All good arguments. But if you set up all these requirements for a surface force and then said force gets obliterated in the first few days of battle, it doesn't matter.

-Devin

[Captain Morgan]

The Aluetian Zero was really more used as a testbed against the F6F which allowed tactic to be developed to defeat the Zero in combat. It was used to find areas of performance the F6F and F4U dominated in so the pilots could be trained to use them. The biggest advantage the new fighters had was much more power and speed. As they say in most athletic events. You can't teach speed, it has to be there from the begining. One method the Zero pilots used against the F4F (from an IJN Ace) was if chased by an F4F you climbed and if the F4F tried to follow it would stall well before the Zero. When the Wildcat stalled the Zero pilot would push right over and get on the tail and get an easy kill. When the F6F cam out from a distance it looked like the Wildcat, but when the Zero pilots tried the climbing away trick the F6F had such a greater reserve of power it just kept climbing and would then just hammer the zero with it's 6 .50 cal brownings.

[Werner]

That Zero also showed that a diving zero got rudder lock from the distortion of the rudder ans stabilizers.

[Guest]

It's amazing that the Japanese equivalent of the Hellcat and Corsair, the Mitsubishi A7M, started at about the same time as the F6F in 1940, and was still in prototype stage in 1945. Several other arguably superior Japanese land based fighters, Such as the Hi-84, started out in 1942 and were already in squadron service in 1944.

[chuck]

In many ways the logistic efforts of Japanese navy were inferior to those of the army during WWII.