The Italian Navy in WWII, what went wrong?

[bengtsson]

Just completed reading a half dozen books about the Italian Navy and Royal Navy in the period 1940-43. The books on the Italian Navy being:
"The Italian Navy in World War II" by Commander Marc Antonio Bragadin 1957
"The Italian Navy in World War II" by James J. Sadkovich 1994
"The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940-43" By Jack Green and Alessandro Massignani.

I wanted to read these to get a more Italian point of view.

On the Royal Navy I just finished :

"The Malta Convoys" by Richard Woodman 2000 [I highly recommend this book ]

"A Sailors Odyssey" by Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham 1951

Both sides in the Mediterranean fought with some real handicaps up until late 1942 when the British position improved due to the US getting more invovled and a great increase in British war production and improved weapons systems.
I can't help but think after years of reading about the convoys on both sides and the air/naval battles that there was a fundamental problem with the Italian Navy when it came to bringing it's surface warships into action at critical times. There were a number of times where simply going into action with half as much desire to fight as the RN showed could have turned some key moments to the Italian Navy's favour. What do others think was wrong with the Italian Navy or was there anything wrong? Meant as a general question
Bob B.

[RNfanDan]

In a word: LEADERSHIP

Specifically, the lack thereof.

Even with the RM's disadvantage in technology (i.e., radar), their ships were quite capable of a good knock--but, more than once the Italians turned away from favorable tactical positions, sometimes even to the surprise of the British themselves.

To be fair though, I don't believe there was a surface fleet anywhere that could match the Royal Navy's willingness to fight. They feared nothing afloat, and this attitude allowed them to prevail even in unfavorable circumstances. Italy had no Somervilles or Cunninghams, and were nowhere near as institutionalized as the Royal Navy.

[1Big Rich]

If you think the RN lacked the will to fight, you need to examine the examples of Mimbelli in Lupo and Fulgosi in Sagittario, let alone de la Penne in the Decima MAS (10th Light Flotilla).

To return to your original question, there was plenty wrong with Italy, but as the above cases point out, the Regia Marina was a very professional service.

First, the Fascist handling of the economy resulted in the RM being fiscally challenged in the interwar period. This is why the RM gave up on night fighting training, to save money. (The RN, conversely, when finances intervened, turned to night fighting to give the units they wouldn't be able to afford to update the best fighting chance possible.)

Second, Fascist politics hurt the RM. The Fascists had been in power for a long time, and political connection could be more important in promotion than ability. Also, the declaration of war caught a significant portion of the Italian merchant fleet outside the Med, and those ships were immediately lost to wartime use. And, worst of all, the RM took a back seat tot he Regia Aeronautica. (Fascists and totalitarians are often enamored of their air forces, new, fast modern. Something as basic as a navy to defend a peninsula and islands, cross narrows and fight another navy, that's from a bygone age. Plus air forces can been seen as a demonstration of power by the entire country. The navy can only been seen by those on the coasts at most.) As the poorer stepchild, the RM had no indigenous air power. The reliance on the RA for reconnaissance and air cover severely impeded the RM. The relationship between the services bordered on the ridiculous, with ships and planes from nearby home bases passing in close proximity to one another unable to communicate. Such communication had to go through SuperAero or SuperMarina in Rome.

Fourth, the strategic situation in the Med was unique in the war. RN was a large navy on the strategic defensive globally, and especially in the North Atlantic. In the Mediterranean, the strategic offensive and defensive regularly switched between the two sides, as each tried to run convoys across the central Med and then tried to stop the other side from doing so. Note though that alone among the Axis navies, the RM won their war to convoy supplies. 91% of personnel and 85.9% of supplies transported to Libya were delivered safely.

Finally, the in the grand scheme of things, the RM capital units had to be husbanded. Early in the war, the RM knew very well they were in combat with the largest navy in the world, and that navy would GLADLY trade them capital ship for capital ship. Later the RM had to be preserved because the writing was on the wall after the US entry and the fleet would be a bargaining chip postwar. The RM could not afford to risk its capital ships foolishly Unless conditions were right, and the failures of the RA frequently insured they weren't, the RM had to consider the preservation of their capital units first. This is also the reason the likes of Mimbelli and Fulgosi could afford to be aggressive; their ships could be risked. Iachino for example could not afford to take such risks. And, if all this weren't enough, Italy's industrial base wasn't up to extensive repairs of capital ships or ships in general. Look at the example of Dulio at Taranto. In being repaired, she was also being updated and was never returned to service. Heck, Taranto was possible at all because the Italian factories couldn't keep up with the orders for torpedo netting once war was declared. Had they been able to do, the attack would have been pointless as all ships would have been covered.

Still, for all its faults and those of the nation/political system it served as well as its sister services, the RM did well in their war. Don't believe the hype that the Italians couldn't fight or were reluctant to. (Again, I'd point to my examples at the beginning of this post.) The British put a lot of that out there, in part to cover the fact they had broken the German codes. (Rommel, BTW, was a stickler for detail in his communiques, being very specific to litres of petrol or oil he needed, and precisely when and where. Didn't take a genius to figure out how long it would take a convoy to reach that point from Italy.)

My thoughts,

[phil gollin]

................... Fourth, the strategic situation in the Med was unique in the war. RN was a large navy on the strategic defensive globally, and especially in the North Atlantic. In the Mediterranean, the strategic offensive and defensive regularly switched between the two sides, as each tried to run convoys across the central Med and then tried to stop the other side from doing so. Note though that alone among the Axis navies, the RM won their war to convoy supplies. 91% of personnel and 85.9% of supplies transported to Libya were delivered safely. ..............

I really disagree with this idea that seems to be quoted occasssionally.

The Italians got a certain amount through. However, the amount sent was insufficient and the amount that got through was insufficient, both overall and specifically in times when operations rerquired it. 91% of an insufficient amount = insufficient.

In addition, the Italians (and Germans) failed to actually efficiiently distribute the supplies once it crossed the mediterranean. They did not institute coastal convoys and use marine logistics to get the materials near to the front.

There is no use trying to claim as a success a system that failed to get sufficient supplies across the med and then failed to get them to where they were needed. The Italians (and Germans) did not understand the logistics of getting the supplies to the front and their failure to understand helped the Allied cause immeasurably.

[Laurence Batchelor]

"What do others think was wrong with the Italian Navy or was there anything wrong? Meant as a general question"

Lack of training interwar in all things import for the upcoming naval war.
Seamanship, Navigation, Gunnery, torpedo exercises, both from surface vessels and submarines.
Lack of leadership qualities in their officer selections, and a poor understanding from a technical, organisational and inter-service co-operative and operational planning perspectives from their hierarchy.

I was just about to comment on the Italian convoy situation and I see Phil's already done it!

the Regia Marina was a very professional service.

Having read many RN action reports this to me does not seem to be true. Often RN officers discovered RM sailors were drunk onboard their warships and discipline was a total nightmare.
This played out in most of the larger RM ships to having poor abilities to sustain damage i.e. damage control, they normally turned turtle and ran once hit, they had little stomach for a fight.
The only evidence I've read of RM officers doign what they were supposed in combat where some of their destroeyr Captains.
But they were the exception to the rule.

First, the Fascist handling of the economy resulted in the RM being fiscally challenged in the interwar period.

The same goes for the RN who were starved of money throughout the interwar years.
The RN perhaps had the worst of it of any major power in WW2 from a naval perspective.
She had to fight a naval war against three opponents globally; had to defend the largest merchant marine in the world; protect a very spread out global empire and finally do all that with ships which had come out of reserve and were probably less modified interwar from rebuilds than any fleets the other major powers had.
Thank god for British ingenuity and the bulldog spirit!

]"This is also the reason the likes of Mimbelli and Fulgosi could afford to be aggressive; their ships could be risked. Iachino for example could not afford to take such risks. And, if all this weren't enough, Italy's industrial base wasn't up to extensive repairs of capital ships or ships in general. Look at the example of Dulio at Taranto"

They were quite capable at doing major rebuilds in the 1930s.
Not putting in place sufficient infrastructure to support her warships at the beggining of the war is one thing and purely understandable.
However, it is UNFORGIVEABLE not to learn from their lessons and sort out these problems by 1942.
The simple fact of the matter is the RM rarely learned from their mistakes.
Their early naval defeats should have started alarm bells ringing and the situation quickly rectified as a priority.

Think of what the RAF would have achieved in the Med with half the aircraft the Regia Aeronautica was given.
Think of how the RN would have exploited having a battle fleet with a distinct speed advantage and moreover moden capital ships!
Think how the RN might have used so many 8-inch gunned cruisers in the Med that the RM was given.
I could on, but hopefully you are all beggining to see the RM had the tools to do the job.
I'm sorry to be harsh, but they just did not have a professional body of sailors to do the job.

[Guest]

Think of what the RAF would have achieved in the Med with half the aircraft the Regia Aeronautica was given.
Think of how the RN would have exploited having a battle fleet with a distinct speed advantage and moreover moden capital ships!
Think how the RN might have used so many 8-inch gunned cruisers in the Med that the RM was given.
I could on, but hopefully you are all beggining to see the RM had the tools to do the job.
I'm sorry to be harsh, but they just did not have a professional body of sailors to do the job.

You got right to the point that made me ask the question Laurence. The RN was devoid of aircover nearly all the time, except when they had a Carrier present. That was fairly often, but they carried small numbers of aircraft and not very modern aircraft at that. Still I credit the RN Carriers with being a real huge advantage for the RN. The lack of such hurt the Italian Navy. But still, the Axis put large numbers of aircraft over the sea at most times.
The Italians had that speed advantage which you mentioned and a good collection of heavy cruisers and fast modern BBs. Several brand new, large, fast, with heavy guns. Many destroyers and light cruisers, all quite modern and fast. I wondered how they could have failed to make better use of the surface ships even taking into account the rotten air supporrt they were given.
When force "K" sank an entire Italian convoy and sank one escorting DD and beat up two others, two 8in Gunned Italian Crusiers watched the action and then when they did act, sailed in the wrong direction to cut of force "K" on it's way back to Malta. That type of event is what makes me question "Why" a more agressive action couldn't, or wouldn't be taken. There are other examples as well of course.
Fast, Modern, well armed ships like the Italian surface navy had seemed capable of taking more of a role in defeating the Malta convoys and cutting British supplies to Greece and Crete earlier on.

Bob B.

[bengtsson]

Well, that was me above. How I got logged out I don't know

Bob B.

[Guest]

Besides going to war, there was nothing wrong with the Italian Navy.

[1Big Rich]

The Italians got a certain amount through. However, the amount sent was insufficient and the amount that got through was insufficient, both overall and specifically in times when operations rerquired it. 91% of an insufficient amount = insufficient.

Needless to say, I disagree Phil. The navy did what they were asked to do. The RN did no less. Are you prepared to call the FAA an failure due to the 'insufficient' aircraft at its disposal from 1939-1942? Or is Cunningham a failure because the sinking of the floating drydock in Malta limited him to 'insufficient' ships like the rebuilt QEs or Rs instead of allowing him the likes of Hood, Repulse or Nelson? Or is Somerville a failure do to the 'insufficient' nature of the Eastern Fleet in face of the Kido Butai?

I see all of these as doing quite well with what they were tasked to do with the resources at hand. Why is it different for the Italians?

In addition, the Italians (and Germans) failed to actually efficiiently distribute the supplies once it crossed the mediterranean. They did not institute coastal convoys and use marine logistics to get the materials near to the front.

How is that the RM's fault? Privy to any meeting notes where and admiral said the overland distribution of supplies would be better?

Laurence,

Having read many RN action reports this to me does not seem to be true. Often RN officers discovered RM sailors were drunk onboard their warships and discipline was a total nightmare.

Other than the Pola lying crippled at Matapan, what examples of this can you cite?

This played out in most of the larger RM ships to having poor abilities to sustain damage i.e. damage control, they normally turned turtle and ran once hit, they had little stomach for a fight.

So when Warspite hit Cesare at that incredible range of Calabria and cut her speed to 18 knots, why didn't Cunningham finish her? Or how did Veneto[/] make port after being torpedoed? Italain damage control was up to those challenges.

Pyhrric victories might give us later day historians and enthusiasts something to talk about, but the men at the time had to deal with the realities of the situation. The RN could afford to risk and loose its capital ships. As I said above, the RM could not.

The same goes for the RN who were starved of money throughout the interwar years.

As I pointed out when I mentioned the RN had turned to night fighting. The Admiralty knew it wasn't going to be able to update or replace all its ships in the interwar period, as it knew it was handed an inferior weapon when the FAA was returned in 1937. Night fighting gave those forces the absolute best chance to be useful.

The RM simply made different choices.

They were quite capable at doing major rebuilds in the 1930s.

That was during peacetime. And, if you study the history of the period, the rebuilds were a lower-cost alternative to building the new ship the Italians needed, such as their 15" BC design from 1927-28 and their 13.5" armed BC from 1933.

Are you prepared to similarly criticize the RN for the time it took to repair Liverpool? Or for using US yards for repairs when their own facilities were overwhelmed?

Their early naval defeats should have started alarm bells ringing and the situation quickly rectified as a priority.

Precisely why a Gufo first deployed aboard Littorio in September of 1941.

Regards all,

[Guest]

(The RN, conversely, when finances intervened, turned to night fighting to give the units they wouldn't be able to afford to update the best fighting chance possible.)

This ability and training for night fighting was totally inadequate when encountered more motivated opponents. In confrontation with Germans it proved very, very mediocre (especially when considering Destroyer actions).
I don't even dare to think about night confrontation with Japanese Navy

[Guest]

(The RN, conversely, when finances intervened, turned to night fighting to give the units they wouldn't be able to afford to update the best fighting chance possible.)

This ability and training for night fighting was totally inadequate when encountered more motivated opponents. In confrontation with Germans it proved very, very mediocre (especially when considering Destroyer actions).
I don't even dare to think about night confrontation with Japanese Navy

Which world war are you talking about? Was there any major night encounters between the RN and the Germans during WWII?

- Chuck

[Laurence Batchelor]

Needless to say, I disagree Phil. The navy did what they were asked to do. The RN did no less. Are you prepared to call the FAA an failure due to the 'insufficient' aircraft at its disposal from 1939-1942? Or is Cunningham a failure because the sinking of the floating drydock in Malta limited him to 'insufficient' ships like the rebuilt QEs or Rs instead of allowing him the likes of Hood, Repulse or Nelson? Or is Somerville a failure do to the 'insufficient' nature of the Eastern Fleet in face of the Kido Butai?

I consider the RM did NOT do what it should have done.
I could site many examples, but for starters:
1) Put a naval blockade around Malta, they had the aircraft and submarine numbers to form a comprehensive recon/patrol screen.
If they had concentrated their entire strength at this central key focal point they could have overwhelmed any RN/FAA response, at least for a short while until help arrived from Gib and/or Alex.
2) The RM should have used their submarine fleet better throughout the entire Med campaign which overall put in a poor showing when you compare its results to the few U-boats which operated in the Med and/or the RM MTB's.
I believe the the RM had the 3rd largest submarine fleet in the World in 1939.
Again they were given the tools to do the job and they failed to crasp their chance.

Other than the Pola lying crippled at Matapan, what examples of this can you cite?

I've read it for the ships which where headed for internment also in 1943.
Judging the time gap between Matapan (where morale should have been high!) and the surrender in would see it was endemic in their service.
I've read other action reports from RN destroyer Captains when observing RM sailors how they 'behaved in an inorderly manner' and their 'officers had little control'.

So when Warspite hit Cesare at that incredible range of Calabria and cut her speed to 18 knots, why didn't Cunningham finish her?

Well Conte di Cavour was sitting their ready to face Warspite after Cesare was hit at 12miles , it was NOT as simple as you make out.
Cunningham also was on his own for most of the engagement facing better battleships with a 5knt speed advantage and 8" cruisers firing at him ON HIS TOD!
Malaya and Royal Soveriegn were too slow and too far back and out of range to offer support.
Which they tried to do at least by firing at the RM to cause some confusion, but they fell short.

I also put forward the point which has never been fully resolved and that is as the RM destroyers began to form up to lay smoke to cover the RM's retreat, Cunningham may have been preocuppied with a torpedo attack coming his way out of the smoke.
With him being an old destroyer man he might have been overly wearly especially considering the greater distance he was from his base than the RM was from theirs.
He could ill afford to get cripped especially considering the the Italian's air dominance.
Finally let us remember it was the RM which broke off the engagement do you think an RN capital ship would flee for an air cover umbrella (which they didn't have in the strength the RM had) after 1 shell hit and a small containable fire?

Or how did Veneto[/] make port after being torpedoed? Italain damage control was up to those challenges.

If one modern 45,00ton battleship cannot take one aerial 18-inch torpedo hit then her designers should be shot! it was no big deal.
She was hit in the outer port propellors I believe and took 1.5hours to get her underway again shipping 4,000tons of water.
Compare that to Orion's damage at Crete in May 1941 and the distances travelled to port for both ships.
I think that puts the Italian's achievements of damage control into perspective against the British, the later would have never got Orion home.

Pyhrric victories might give us later day historians and enthusiasts something to talk about, but the men at the time had to deal with the realities of the situation. The RN could afford to risk and loose its capital ships. As I said above, the RM could not.

I disagree it depends on the ships in question.
The RN could NOT afford to loose a QE class battleship before enough KGV's were ready or lose Nelson and Rodney for that matter either for use against a Littorio or a Bismarck.
She could NOT afford to loose Ark Royal, Eagle or Formidable for service in the Med.
The very fact she did from sinkings, damage and airwing depletion and coped speaks for itself.

She could not afford to loose the R-class in the Indian Ocean as they formed a powerful fleet in being and who knows what were Japan's intentions at the time.
Was she going to invade India from the South and use Ceylon as a staging post?
The Admiralty had to try and cover as many of the likely possabilities as they could with the remants of the warships she could scrape together.
I think the RN really only gambled with their cruisers and destroyers in the Med.
Crete for destroyers and the Second Battle of Sirte are good examples for both.
The RN would risk cruisers and destroyers in those examples to either get the men off or get the supplies through.
You don't get anywhere in war without taking risks.
Fortune favours the brave and all that.
What shines through for me with the Admiralty in WW2 is often they were the best at taking calculated risks which paid off immeasureably for them.
Maybe they were lucky? but it happened so often I think that's less of a possability in all situations.

As I pointed out when I mentioned the RN had turned to night fighting. The Admiralty knew it wasn't going to be able to update or replace all its ships in the interwar period, as it knew it was handed an inferior weapon when the FAA was returned in 1937. Night fighting gave those forces the absolute best chance to be useful.

You must put Britain and Italy's war preparations into perspective.
War was forced on Britain in 1939 whereas Italy could join the war at a time which best suited her - it was her fault if she was not well prepared!
The night fighting exercises I've read about for the RN in the inter-war period were not excessive or costly.
I've read about once a year on the Atlantic exercises the destroyers and the capital ships would undertake one large exercise each year.
Usually this was an interception by the estroyer flotillas on a battle line at night and to deliver a mass torpedo attack.
In the Med I've read the night-time fighting exercises where mainly limited to destroyers only.
Thus in both instances it was always the destroyers doing the attacking.

I've never read specifically that their capital ships or 8-inch gunned cruisers were ever intended for a night-time fleet engagement.
Of course indirectly if these same destroyer Captain's were promted and became cruiser or capital ship Captains by WW2 they might have used their destroyer training to gain an advantage in capital engagements at night.
I also don't think the Admiralty fully knew of their FAA inferiority in 1937.
They knew its progress had been retarded but did not realise how bad it was until about 1941 when they could see what their enermies had, especially Japan.

That was during peacetime. And, if you study the history of the period, the rebuilds were a lower-cost alternative to building the new ship the Italians needed, such as their 15" BC design from 1927-28 and their 13.5" armed BC from 1933.

Treaties? also anything Italy built from scratch would demand a French esponse, which in turn, would make Germany build their response etc.
So the major reconstructions were a way around this.
It gave the RM a distinct advantage, or so they thought at the time, against the French.

Surely much of this 'unprepareness blame' can be laid at Italy herself.
If a nation has protentions to make it 'Mare nostrum' then it should alocate sufficient resources to accomplish it's own objectives.
The fact they didn't is their own fault.
The fact Italy jumped into the war hastily with the fall of France and it wished to reap some of the spoils before Germany got everything seems rather a total lack of a longterm strategy and planning.
No one forced war upon her. I repeat she entered it when it suited her.
If her infrastructure was inadequate (and here I mean industrial and shipbuilding) why did she not put in place these things between signing her pact with Germany in May 1939 and June 1940 when she declared war?
She had a full 11 months to prepare for war then!
She only had to look across to British yards at that time to see how important ship repairing was (which largely slowed down British new construction).
Again failing to see lessons which were being learn from bitter experience and adapt accordingly - she only has herself to blame.

Are you prepared to similarly criticize the RN for the time it took to repair Liverpool? Or for using US yards for repairs when their own facilities were overwhelmed?

No not really as she never envisaged a naval war against three very different opponents at the same time.
The fact that she was able to adapt accordingly shows how the nation had good flexible planning, reactive armed forces and a willing leadership.

Precisely why a Gufo first deployed aboard Littorio in September of 1941.

So what had the RM been doing about radar development between 1937 and 1939?
It seems to me the RM and RN had began to develop radar seriously at about the sametime (1937 onwards).
Why then did the RN get a working air warning radar set at sea by 1939 and it took the RM another 2 years?
Further why did she not realise its significance between May 1939 and June 1940 as Germany (her ally!) had a working gunnery set on Graf Spee in 1939.
The very fact that it took heavy losses at Matapan for them to open their eyes again shows poor planning, poor intelliegence, poor technical and scientific leadership.
All things which would dog the RM and Italy throughout the rest of the war she had chosen to embark upon.
Anyway I've typied enough!
Cheers for a throught provoking discussion.
LB

[Quest]

This ability and training for night fighting was totally inadequate when encountered more motivated opponents. In confrontation with Germans it proved very, very mediocre (especially when considering Destroyer actions).
I don't even dare to think about night confrontation with Japanese Navy

Which world war are you talking about? Was there any major night encounters between the RN and the Germans during WWII?

- Chuck

Not only major encounters decided about ability for night fighting
RN has only such a one with Italian Navy. Needles to say,thanks to possession of radar, it was an "execution" rather than fighting (Matapan)

I meant skirmishes of light forces in pre-radar times like Dunkirk 1940, Cromer 07.12.1939, Wolf Rock 24.11.1940 where RN had opportunities to show what it had learnt about night fighting

[bengtsson]

A navy that chooses to not prepare to fight at sea during the hours of darkness really could be described as having something wrong with it.
Excuses for that shortcoming would sound pretty hollow.
I understand the lack of radar within the Italian surface units was a big handicap and the RN made good use of radar for detection and radar ranging on the targets. Still I'de say not preparing for night fighting showed up one real problem with the Italian surface forces. One that cost it alot of it's ability to fight when it otherwise could have done some serious damage. Just as the force "K" convoy battle I posted about above. Two heavy cruisers watching 2 light cruisers and two DD's shoot up a convoy that already had a good sized Destroyer escort. An active move by the two Italian Heavy Cruisers of the convoys covering force could have done some serious damage to the RN force "K".


Bob B.

[1Big Rich]

Laurence,

I consider the RM did NOT do what it should have done.
I could site many examples, but for starters:
1) Put a naval blockade around Malta, they had the aircraft and submarine numbers to form a comprehensive recon/patrol screen.
If they had concentrated their entire strength at this central key focal point they could have overwhelmed any RN/FAA response, at least for a short while until help arrived from Gib and/or Alex.
2) The RM should have used their submarine fleet better throughout the entire Med campaign which overall put in a poor showing when you compare its results to the few U-boats which operated in the Med and/or the RM MTB's.
I believe the the RM had the 3rd largest submarine fleet in the World in 1939.
Again they were given the tools to do the job and they failed to crasp their chance.

Why would the RM have to blockade Malta? Not only does it give the RN's excellent submarines easy prey, it provides serves a small/medium navy up on a platter to the largest navy in the world.

With respect to Malta the RM had to do was interdict supply to Malta. This they did, well enough to force the RN's maximum efforts to resupply such as

RM submarines were large, had good range and were well armed. Their fatal flaw was they were notoriously slow-diving boats. This flaw frequently put them in harm's way, and they couldn't get out of that way.
Just a quick review of RM subs scuttled or rammed should give an indication of how slow they were:
Ferraris was damaged by aircraft and subsequently sunk by Lamerton, Glauco was scuttled west of Gibraltar after being crippled by Wishart, Calvi was scuttled in the Atlantic, Provana was rammed then scuttled off Oran, Torricelli scuttled
the Red Sea, Baracca was rammed by Tigris,Caracciolo scuttled to avoid capture off Bardia, Naiade scuttled after action with Hereward and Hyperion, Berillo scuttled off of Egypt,and from the Adua class Durbo, Scebli, Uarsciek were scuttled with Dagabur and Tembieri rammed, Argento off Sicily, Asternia and Avorio off Bougie, and Perla and Galilei were captured.

What the RM really had to do was survive. But I've made that point.

've read it for the ships which where headed for internment also in 1943.
Judging the time gap between Matapan (where morale should have been high!) and the surrender in would see it was endemic in their service.
I've read other action reports from RN destroyer Captains when observing RM sailors how they 'behaved in an inorderly manner' and their 'officers had little control'.

I've read that as well, plus the near mutiny aboard Cesare during the sail to internship. I'd think any lower deck would at least have the thought of scuttle cross their minds as opposed to surrendering their ship.
Still, that's has nothing to do with going into combat, and I can't blame men leaving their homes an families in a country where a ground war is going on from getting drunk as they go off to relative safety.

Well Conte di Cavour was sitting their ready to face Warspite after Cesare was hit at 12miles , it was NOT as simple as you make out.

Warspite was backed up not only by Malaya and Royal Sovereign, but Eagle as well, so it's not quite as simple as you make out, either.

Cunningham also was on his own for most of the engagement facing better battleships with a 5knt speed advantage and 8" cruisers firing at him ON HIS TOD!

Better battleships? Are you serious? Twenty guns firing 1,1157 lb shells against three ships with 24 rifles firing 1,938 lb shells? Warpite alone had a greater broadside than either Italian battleship by nearly 50%.

He could ill afford to get cripped especially considering the the Italian's air dominance

Excellent point. So Cunningham is justified in not continuing pursuit due to enemy dominance in a given category, but the Campioni's withdrawal after damage to his ship is not? Seems a double standard...

She was hit in the outer port propellors I believe and took 1.5hours to get her underway again shipping 4,000tons of water.

Actually, Veneto was under way within a few minutes of loosing power. But she made it home. Would that Prince of Wales, which could still do 10 knots after her A-bracket hit, could say as much.

The RN could NOT afford to loose a QE class battleship before enough KGV's were ready or lose Nelson and Rodney for that matter either for use against a Littorio or a Bismarck.
She could NOT afford to loose Ark Royal, Eagle or Formidable for service in the Med.
The very fact she did from sinkings, damage and airwing depletion and coped speaks for itself.

Given that the RN lost Barham, Ark Royal and Eagle in the Med, as well as the services of Nelson, Warspite, Queen Elizabeth and Valiant for a time and still won the war would seem to indicate that she indeed could.

The RN was still the largest navy in the world. The difference is if the RN looses six capital ships it is hurt, but England is still not in peril. If the RM looses six capital ships Italy is out of the war.

Treaties? also anything Italy built from scratch would demand a French esponse, which in turn, would make Germany build their response etc.

The various treaties are relevant only in that Italy and France were granted 70,000 tons of capital ships each by Washington. Either Italian concept would have been compliant.

Both were responses to Dunquerque and her precursor concepts, which the French started examining in 1925-26.

If a nation has protentions to make it 'Mare nostrum' then it should alocate sufficient resources to accomplish it's own objectives.
The fact they didn't is their own fault.
The fact Italy jumped into the war hastily with the fall of France and it wished to reap some of the spoils before Germany got everything seems rather a total lack of a longterm strategy and planning.
No one forced war upon her. I repeat she entered it when it suited her.

Your point certainly applies to the Fascist leadership, but how is any of this a fault of or in the Regia Marina?

She had a full 11 months to prepare for war then!

You're contradicting yourself. Either Italy jumped in hastily or had time to prepare.

No not really as she never envisaged a naval war against three very different opponents at the same time.
The fact that she was able to adapt accordingly shows how the nation had good flexible planning, reactive armed forces and a willing leadership.

Again, a double standard. It's acceptable for the RN to take extra measures or not accomplish what she could in peacetime when she finds herself in a war she's not prepared for, but it's not incompetence for the RM.

So what had the RM been doing about radar development between 1937 and 1939?
It seems to me the RM and RN had began to develop radar seriously at about the sametime (1937 onwards).
Why then did the RN get a working air warning radar set at sea by 1939 and it took the RM another 2 years?
Further why did she not realise its significance between May 1939 and June 1940 as Germany (her ally!) had a working gunnery set on Graf Spee in 1939.
The very fact that it took heavy losses at Matapan for them to open their eyes again shows poor planning, poor intelliegence, poor technical and scientific leadership.

I don't think anyone would argue that Italy was an electronics leader. Giulielmo Marconi's company was, after all, in England.
Still, I wouldn't count the RM as backward given the later deployment. At Denmark Strait, Suffolk had radar and Norfolk did not.

Similarly, the newly rebuilt Renown didn't have radar for her action with Scharnhorst and Gneisenau off of Norway. Her lookouts sighted the Germans at 10 miles.

Bob,

A navy that chooses to not prepare to fight at sea during the hours of darkness really could be described as having something wrong with it.

Is that criticism of Jellicoe's Grand Fleet?

Hindsight tells us the Italian decision was wrong. The men at the time could not have known. How many actual at sea naval battles had were fought in darkness prior to the 1940s?

Regards all,

[1Big Rich]

One more point:

I find it rather remarkable that the RN-philes are advocating the position that all the RN accomplished in the Med was defeating a bunch of incompetent nincompoops and the Yank in the crowd is the one saying they did much more than that!!

As infamous Canadian thespian William Shatner so succinctly put it, "Sometimes irony can be pretty ironic!!"

[Lesforan]

I would say, initially at least, Italy shared a common problem with the USN in the Pacific. An unexpected airstrike disabling their battleship force at anchor in home port.

Rather surprising that this event escaped mention in this thread.

[phil gollin]

The Italians got a certain amount through. However, the amount sent was insufficient and the amount that got through was insufficient, both overall and specifically in times when operations rerquired it. 91% of an insufficient amount = insufficient.

Needless to say, I disagree Phil. The navy did what they were asked to do. The RN did no less. Are you prepared to call the FAA an failure due to the 'insufficient' aircraft at its disposal from 1939-1942? Or is Cunningham a failure because the sinking of the floating drydock in Malta limited him to 'insufficient' ships like the rebuilt QEs or Rs instead of allowing him the likes of Hood, Repulse or Nelson? Or is Somerville a failure do to the 'insufficient' nature of the Eastern Fleet in face of the Kido Butai?
I see all of these as doing quite well with what they were tasked to do with the resources at hand. Why is it different for the Italians?

You disagree about one of your (and the revisionists major claims) but don't give any evidence or reason. The Italians had insufficient merchant and escort ships and did not instigate major building programmes to rectify the situation (unlike the Allies). They did not have proper ASW tactics and didn't obtain advice from the Germans. They did not reorganise their merchant shipping on to a proper war footing to service the requirements of the state.

You go off at a tangent and ignore the fact that the Italian navy failed in one of arguably two of its main tasks (if not the main one) of supporting the Axis armies in North Africa. You merely gloss over the stuuning indifference shown.
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In addition, the Italians (and Germans) failed to actually efficiiently distribute the supplies once it crossed the mediterranean. They did not institute coastal convoys and use marine logistics to get the materials near to the front.

How is that the RM's fault? Privy to any meeting notes where and admiral said the overland distribution of supplies would be better?

Who else's fault was it ? The navy was responsible for naval affairs. To sit back and say to the army - it's your army you look after it is just plain silly. This comes of the revisionists trying to paper over the ALL the cracks in the performance of the Italian navy both at high level and low level. The High Command had no real idea about maritime logistics and had no idea about changing the organisation of the navy and merchant marine to get the service to the armed forces in North Africa that they required. Your idea seems to be that the (naval) experts sit in their chairs at the marina waiting for the army to pop along and ask to borrow a couple of boats - no way to run a war !

It is no good trying to look to other people to blame when the problem is a naval problem. What would you say if the navy had sent all the supplies over to North Africa and then found there were no troops there to use them ? Obviously not the Army's fault if the navy just wanted to do something without talking to other people (!)

[phil gollin]

One more point:

I find it rather remarkable that the RN-philes are advocating the position that all the RN accomplished in the Med was defeating a bunch of incompetent nincompoops and the Yank in the crowd is the one saying they did much more than that!!

As infamous Canadian thespian William Shatner so succinctly put it, "Sometimes irony can be pretty ironic!!"

No, you are trying to deflect the criticisms of your rather simplistic interpretation of the revisionists' arguments.

The revisionists, in general, try to demonstrate that performance at the lower levels of the Italian navy were of a high standard and have been ignored or denegrated due to factors outside of their control. In general this has been reasonably well received.

However, the revisionists have also tried to find reasons for the general poor results (arguable wording - but it is not meant to be derogatory). They emphasise such things as lack of fuel, lack of organic air, political interference, RN advantages in intelligence and radar, etc..... However, they tend to ignore the actual opportunities and performance of the Italian navy.

By ignoring the opportunities they put themselves most against the "traditional" Mediterranean historians. People generally looked at the means available to the Italians and the opportunities that were presented to them (mainly the Malta Convoys and the possibility of invading Malta, but also supporting North African operations). The general, and of course mainly British view, looked at these opportunities and were both relieved at not having to deal with them and, by extension, critical of the Italians for not having taken advantage of the very attractive opportunities).

One can have a sensible debate between the "why weren't the Italians more aggressive" and the "the Italian navy was hindered by larger concerns" but one cannot ignore one side totally and the revisionists often just think waving the magic wand of "oil shortage" or whatever absolves the Italian navy and high command of any requirement to have actually done something. It is the "over-egging" of the argument that tends to ruin the "revisionists" case.

In particular I find the maritime logistics argument supremely weak. It tends to revolve around a total ignoring of the requirements of the time and a mysterious ability to think that the Italian navy could exist and operate in a vacuum and had no necessity to actually do anything to win the war. Why does the Italian navy get a "bye" in terms of having to think strategically and to do something.

[bengtsson]

Certainly Jutland was 1916 and the battles in the Medit. were 1940-43. So some time did go by between the wars. The Italian's chose to not prepare for any night action between the wars when other nations did. So sure, it was a mistake. Navies expecting to fight larger navies often relied on obtaining night action skills to even the playing field. Germany in WWI, the Japanese in WWII as examples.
No one could be sure that aircraft would force alot of the surface actions at sea in WWII into night time actions.
All my question asked was "What ,if anything, went wrong with the Italian Navy's surface warship effort in WWII". Their performance was less than might be expected given the number of ships, their speed and strategic position vs the RN. The RN was commited all over the world and Italy was fighting in just the central medit basin. I still think , all things considered, their performance could have been better. Even without hindsight, I think they themsleves knew it could have and should have been better at the time.
I don't like to beat up on the Italian navy just for fun. I am a big fan of their ships and their naval history from the WWII period. It just seemed they were in too big of a hurry to turn away from any surface action. They had the means to some victories as sea, but it just didn't happen.


Bob B.