Could Russia have won after Tsushima?

[Guest]

At the time of Russo-Japanese war Russia was far stronger than Japan in both finance and man power. Russia's key industrial outputs was 6 times that of Japan, which was essentially the same ratio of superiority that the United States was to enjoy over Japan in 1941. Although Japan scored numerous major military victories over Russia, the fact remains that Russia was not seriously damaged. At the conclusion of Tsushima, her victories not withstanding, Japan was bankrupt in finance, and her available pool of manpower was exhausted. Russia still have vast manpower reserve, and her finances were still strong.

Could Russia have continued to pursue the war to arrive at a better conclusion?

[Mark Petersen]

Russia was also at the end of a very long and thin supply line via the Trans-Siberian RR as far as ground operations are concerned. Could Japan of slipped special operations troops into Siberia with the intent of disrupting rail traFfic? A handfull of men equipped with explosives blowing a bridge or two could cause havoc. Did Russia have the ships to attempt to bring the fight at sea to the IJN. Remember the ships would have to duplicate the long voyage that Rozhestvensky's Second Pacific Squadron made. The Pacific Squadron bottled up in Port Arthur could well of suffered the same fate as the Spanish Navy seven years earlier at Santiago had it attempted to break out of port. But if the Russians had challenged japan and won the history of the Eastern Pacific would of been far different.

[Werner]

Don't overlook the political situation in Russia at the beginning of the 20th Century. 1905 is a particularly important year for them, and I doubt the country could have been coaxed into a protracted war in the Far East.

[Guest]

Yes, but since Japan was already bankrupt and exhausted in manpower, just by dragging the war on the Russians ought to be able to get progressively better terms.

[Werner]

Yes, but since Japan was already bankrupt and exhausted in manpower, just by dragging the war on the Russians ought to be able to get progressively better terms.

Possibly, but it is also possible that it wouldn't have been the Tsar's Russia who accepted the terms, but Lenin's or Martov's.

[Guest]

I doubt a Russian revolution in 1906 or 1907 would bring about a communist regime. But it would still be deeply harmful to the continuance of Czarist autocracy, which is what counts in the decision making, I guess.

[Werner]

Remember, Bloody Sunday was in 1905 and marks the "official" beginning of the "October Revolution". The Tsar's hands were tied by his military preoccupation, especially in the Far East. Dumping more of the treasury and conscripting a large force for an offensive in the Far East would have encouraged the Revolution by forcing more of the middle class into the arms of the Revolutionary leaders.

[Jean-Paul Binot]

It is quite right that if Russia had waited another few months, Japan would have entered the peace talks even weaker than was the case. Actually, Russia did not get such bad terms in the peace treaty precisely because the Japanese were so keen to get the war wrapped up. The Tsar told his envoy to the peace negotiations he would not pay a kopeck of compensation and would not concede any Russian territory, and he got his way on that.

In fact, the price Russia paid for its defeat was the destruction of much of her armed forces, with the temporary eclipse and loss of prestige associated with that, but overall the war was not quite as disastrous as it is often made in history books. If it had not been for the revolution of 1905, that had only indirect connection with the war in the Far East, history would not make so much of Russia's defeat the Russo-Japanese war, which was probably not more damaging than its defeat in the Crimean war had been.

True, Russia lost the war. That meant that all the sacrifice in blood, money, guns and warships was for nothing. But in a larger sense, Russia only lost a foreign naval base that it had not really built nor conquered, and that it did not need. It had to concede influence in Korea to Japan, but how important was that in actual terms for Russia itself if not for Russian capitalists? Even so, it took Russia less than 10 years to recover, and the Tsarist regime was much less likely to fall in 1914 than it had been in 1905.

[Lesforan]

Very interesting...

If the 1905 Revolution had succeeded (an interim government followed by a Communist one), Russia could well have sat out WWI. According to the ideology of the times, WWI was simply a war between the ruling classes of the Western countries involved. A Communist Russia would have best sat out the war until the warring powers had worn themselves down by attrition. When the optimum level of debilitation had been reached, the Red Army could then intervene if the Comintern felt an economical victory could be achieved.

[Roger T]

If the 1905 Revolution had succeeded (an interim government followed by a Communist one), Russia could well have sat out WWI.

Only if a revolution in 1905 followed the same pattern as the 1917 revolution, and I don't consider that very likely. Partly because the communists weren't as well organised in 1905, partly because Russia wasn't nearly so traumatised in 1905 as she was in 1917, and partly because the communists coming to power in 1917 was by no means inevitable and depended on so many historical contingencies which were not necessarily reproducible at any other time. If there had been a revolution in 1905, it's very likely it would have resulted only in a more or less democratic republic, which may have flourished given the lesser stresses on Russian society. A non-ideological Russian republic from 1905 would have been subject to much the same international pressures as Tsarist Russia.

[Guest]

Very interesting...

If the 1905 Revolution had succeeded (an interim government followed by a Communist one), Russia could well have sat out WWI. According to the ideology of the times, WWI was simply a war between the ruling classes of the Western countries involved. A Communist Russia would have best sat out the war until the warring powers had worn themselves down by attrition. When the optimum level of debilitation had been reached, the Red Army could then intervene if the Comintern felt an economical victory could be achieved.

A 1905 Russian revolution almost certainly won't lead to communist regime. That 1905 Russian disturbance is some prelude to communist takeover is a misconception created by some ignorant ideological conservative commentators who as very little social insight or knowledge, who perused some Soviet propaganda about the origins of the October revolution, and thought it would be very clever to turn it against itself.

Turning a lie against itself, however satisfying it might be to those with an axes to grind, does not generate a true statement and is completely useless as a basis for fact finding.

[Guest]

The social impact and dislocation of 1906 is minimal next to those of 1917. In 1906, the chief complaint was humiliation of Russia and the desire to strengthen it against a repeat of the episodes. In 1917 the chief complaint was the general intolerable survival conditions in Russia. Those two are likely to lead to two very different types of coups. In one case, it is to strengthen the state by weakening the influences of parties considered detrimental to its prosperity and influence. In the other case it is wholesale overthrow of the state. By far the most likely outcome of a 1906 Russian revolution would be some sort of a right wing constitutional monarchy.

[Guest]

The connection between 1905 Russian revolution and 1917 Russian revolution is an extremely tenuous one. The notional deeper connection between them was invented by the Bolsheviks to strengthen their own apparent legitimacy by cynically recruiting the names of people to the communist cause whose actual persons have been executed by the Czarist regime and who therefore could not refuse to serve. This gives their cause an appearance of deep root and good pedigree, and disguise the fact that it is driven largely by a collection of opportunistic firebrand on the fringe of Russian society.

[Lesforan]

Anonymous Guest,

I'm sure you are aware of a competing theory about the 1905 "revolution".
According to this idea, the whole thing was a sham perpetrated by Tsarist agents provocatuers to expose the revolutionary elements by encouraging them to premature action.

I personally don't subscribe to that theory. I think there was a lot of popular discontent in Russia, fuelled by the disaster of the Russo-Japanese War. The Communists, although not strong enough to pull off a successful revolution by themselves, nevertheless assumed the leadership role in the attempt. A success here would then have been followed by a power grab, as later occurred.

Someday, I would hope that this period would be more widely understood.
Some important events in history of this era are either glossed-over or totally ignored. The most buried event in Western History has got to be the Western Intervention in the Russian states in 1919. Other major omissions are the American military interventions in the Phillippeans in the 1920's, and in Central America and the Caribbean in the 1920's and 30's. And the Russo-Finnish War of the late 1930's and the Finnish ionvolvement of WWII.

This leads me to the conclusion that what doesn't fit the mold of " what ought to have been" is expediently ignored.

[bengtsson]

It is quite right that if Russia had waited another few months, Japan would have entered the peace talks even weaker than was the case. Actually, Russia did not get such bad terms in the peace treaty precisely because the Japanese were so keen to get the war wrapped up. The Tsar told his envoy to the peace negotiations he would not pay a kopeck of compensation and would not concede any Russian territory, and he got his way on that.

In fact, the price Russia paid for its defeat was the destruction of much of her armed forces, with the temporary eclipse and loss of prestige associated with that, but overall the war was not quite as disastrous as it is often made in history books. If it had not been for the revolution of 1905, that had only indirect connection with the war in the Far East, history would not make so much of Russia's defeat the Russo-Japanese war, which was probably not more damaging than its defeat in the Crimean war had been.

True, Russia lost the war. That meant that all the sacrifice in blood, money, guns and warships was for nothing. But in a larger sense, Russia only lost a foreign naval base that it had not really built nor conquered, and that it did not need. It had to concede influence in Korea to Japan, but how important was that in actual terms for Russia itself if not for Russian capitalists? Even so, it took Russia less than 10 years to recover, and the Tsarist regime was much less likely to fall in 1914 than it had been in 1905.

I think this analysis is correct. Russia lost many battles, but the Russians always seem to be slow starters and take long to get organized. Plus the battles were at great distance from European Russia, but in Japan's back yard. In fact as the war went on Japan won battles and took losses. Russia lost battles but built greater forces in the East as everyday went by.
By the time of the peace settlement, Japan had spent it forces while Russia was just getting geared up. Japan was glad to get a settlement. And Russia was having domestic troubles at home due to war losses and economics. Both sides won by ending it when they did. Had Japan insisted on going forward, they would have got nowhere. And the siberian railway was just getting into it's stride as supplies poured to the East. In those days, neither side felt it's very nationhood at stake, so peace was easy to make. By WWI, things had changed. Total war had arrived!

Bob B.

[Michael Potter]

If the 1905 Revolution had succeeded (an interim government followed by a Communist one), Russia could well have sat out WWI. According to the ideology of the times, WWI was simply a war between the ruling classes of the Western countries involved. A Communist Russia would have best sat out the war until the warring powers had worn themselves down by attrition. When the optimum level of debilitation had been reached, the Red Army could then intervene if the Comintern felt an economical victory could be achieved.

To stray a little from the original topic, a number of historians have recently developed a new account of the outbreak of WW1 that explains events that the usual model does not explain.

By this new theory, naval events are telling. Early in July 1914 German admirals Souchon and von Spee began preparing their forces for war. The telegram to von Spee survives. Its transmission followed a week-long meeting in Berlin. Historians suggest that during that meeting the German government decided that the time was opportune to attack Russia to set back its industrial growth.

Germany's pressure on Austria-Hungary to go to war against Russia's ally Serbia (it was Servia before the British rendered it as Serbia because "Servia" looked liked "servile") too followed the Berlin meeting. Germany's underlying concern about Russian strength was a known factor in pushing Russia to war against Japan in 1904.

German diplomats in 1914 considered it a victory that they induced the Russian government to declare war against Germany. Their evident motive was to persuade the German public in 1914 that Germany had to go to war in its own defense.

To me this new theory is strong. This new theory may not really be new, in that Britain and France seemed to understand it perfectly well in 1914. So I'd say that the question of whether Russia was involved in WW1 depended on its strength and potential in 1914, not on its own volition. Suppose (a "counter-factual" in historians' terms) in 1914 Russia were in disarray; then Germany had no need to start the war at all.

With Russia's actual situation in 1914, Germany initiated a series of events that precipitated WW1 on terms to Germany's strategic preference. By this reasoning, which again explains actual events that the usual theory doesn't explain, Russia had no choice about being Germany's strategic target and had no option to sit out a German attack.

Germany more than once attempted to pressure its anticipated adversaries into war against some other power. The Zimmermann telegram in early 1917 attempted to create a US-Mexican war, with the bait being that Mexico would win back Texas and other states. In 1940 von Ribbentrop attempted to persuade the USSR to go to war against Britain to seize India. Germany's interest in prodding Russia to war against Japan in 1904 indicates that Germany already firmly considered Russia a future target.

[JWintjes]

By this new theory, naval events are telling. Early in July 1914 German admirals Souchon and von Spee began preparing their forces for war. The telegram to von Spee survives. Its transmission followed a week-long meeting in Berlin. Historians suggest that during that meeting the German government decided that the time was opportune to attack Russia to set back its industrial growth.

Why oh why do I get stomach aches when people start talking about "meetings"? But seriously, the main problem here is the lack of archival evidence, much like the Poincare/Viviani meeting in Petersburg. I agree it's tempting to draw conclusions from the simple fact that certain people meet, but that's always a very dangerous business.

As for Spee's order, the chronology should be easy to establish - they get the signal on 07.07, if I remember correctly, that's after the assassination and after Germany declares its support for Austria. Interestingly, again if I remember correctly, the signal says "wait for ten days things to get sorted out" or something similar.

Germany's pressure on Austria-Hungary to go to war against Russia's ally Serbia (it was Servia before the British rendered it as Serbia because "Servia" looked liked "servile") too followed the Berlin meeting. Germany's underlying concern about Russian strength was a known factor in pushing Russia to war against Japan in 1904.

That is a rather strange interpretation of Austrian policy immediately before WW1. They most certainly did not need any pressure to go to war against Serbia.

German diplomats in 1914 considered it a victory that they induced the Russian government to declare war against Germany. Their evident motive was to persuade the German public in 1914 that Germany had to go to war in its own defense.

One might add here that the archival evidence is far from clear or "evident".

To me this new theory is strong. This new theory may not really be new, in that Britain and France seemed to understand it perfectly well in 1914.

It is indeed not that new - variants of this have been in discussion ever since the early 1960s. Currently the discussion on WW1 is mainly moving away from the vexed - and probably not very fruitful anyway - question who "started" it to setting the July crisis into an overall socio-economical context. Watch Amazon for the new book Nicholas Lambert is preparing - that will certainly raise a few eyebrows.

With Russia's actual situation in 1914, Germany initiated a series of events that precipitated WW1 on terms to Germany's strategic preference. By this reasoning, which again explains actual events that the usual theory doesn't explain, Russia had no choice about being Germany's strategic target and had no option to sit out a German attack.

Again, that's probably not as old as the hills, but definitely as old as Fischer. It's not that his theories were not interesting, and he certainly opened the way for important research, but there is many an odd end (like Russia's mobilization).

Germany more than once attempted to pressure its anticipated adversaries into war against some other power. The Zimmermann telegram in early 1917 attempted to create a US-Mexican war, with the bait being that Mexico would win back Texas and other states. In 1940 von Ribbentrop attempted to persuade the USSR to go to war against Britain to seize India. Germany's interest in prodding Russia to war against Japan in 1904 indicates that Germany already firmly considered Russia a future target.

I'd hesitate trying to prove a theory by making analogies between pre-1914 foreign policy, post-1918 foreign policy and that after 1933. Even though on a personal level there was some continuity, particularly von Ribbentrop assured that there was little factual continuity.

Jorit

[Michael Potter]

Hello, Jorit:

I'll get Fischer's War of Illusions from the library, which has it. Dale Copeland, The Origins of Major War, cites Fischer that "Bethmann told the kaiser in September 1910, 'let us hope that if there is a war the attack will be aimed at Austria which will then need our assistance and not against us so that it is not left to Austria to decide whether to be loyal to the alliance or not.'"

Whether or not Austria needed the pressure, in 1914 Germany pressured Austria to war against Russia's ally Serbia, on penalty of losing the German alliance. On 8 July 1914 the German ambassador to Vienna told the Austrian foreign minister (according to the latter) that Germany would see any peaceful deal with Serbia as a sign of Austrian weakness "which must have repercussions on our [Austria's] position in the Triple Alliance and on Germany's future policy."

Copeland cites Fischer that Germany mobilized the navy that same day, 8 July 1914, more than 3 weeks before Russia mobilized.

[Werner]

I wonder how much of the record available to us is from proud men dissembling to improve their reputations. It is not even rare in our time.

[JWintjes]

Mike,

the trouble with Fischer's study - which incidentally started the "Fischer-controversy" back in 1959 is that 1) he started with a pre-conceived idea about who was responsible for the war - the reason being probably that he found an highly imnportant document dating from September 1914 lining out German war aims -, and b) he relied much on autobiographical evidence, particularly as some of the archival material was not available to him.

He made significant inroads in our understanding of what happened in that fateful summer, no doubt, but in many cases - at least that seems to be the current consensus - went too far in his interpretation.

This is most obvious in his treatment of Bethmann-Hollweg, who is displayed as an ardent imperialist and expansionist, whereas he should in reality be viewed with more caution - in fact, he early in July 1914 voiced concern over Austria not being able to contain a war against Serbia on the Balkans.

As for a German naval mobilization on 8th of July, that must be a typo - Germany's general mobilization took place only on 1st of August, and such an act would have been totally nonsensical; after all, the Austrian ultimatum was only sent on the 23rd/24th.

Souchon was not ready for battle before the end of July, which in any case is very telling.- he was in the Adriatic until the 28th.

Jorit

PS: This is a nice historical discussion, for a change.