Anti Ship Missile concerns

[bengtsson]

If this story is true, then the Navy has alot to come to terms with right now! http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= ... refer=home

Bob B.

[Werner]

I have been concerned for the entire Gordon England tenure. He is the fox guarding the chickens.

The only obvious countermeasure for this weapon is a large task force which has several air defense ships along the threat axis, and airborne assets far over the horizon looking for the missile and poised to shoot it down.

[Guest]

Indeed, if the story were true, the world will end.

[bengtsson]

So far, they have not even had a similar missile to test a defence system against. I wonder will they dare put construction programs on hold to force a move to provide a defence against this missile?
You can't counter a system you are not able to build an example of yourself. If you can't provide a viable target, how do you know any system you have will hit it. Besides, this missile is sub based, cutting you warning time down to really no time at all. The warhead can and will perform supersonic evasion. Good luck hitting it! The anti ship missile is just coming into it's own as a true ship killer. My short time as a submarine sailor is looking better all the time

Bob B.

[Filipe Ramires]

Hmmm, interesting. What is the data on these missiles (warhead and speed for instance). Somehow I was never a great defender of ASM missiles...being kind of more submarine guy I still believe that the torpedo, though much slower and with less range then an ASM, is the best way to take out a ship completely or at least giving the ship a long one way ticket to a dry-dock.

[Jose Chaica]

IMO, the time of the Big Carrier Task Force is long gone...These news are just another nail in the coffin...
Smaller, more maneauverable ships (or submarines in this case) packing great firepower -missiles- and with emphasis on local/limited warfare are the future. Carriers have just turned themselves into big, juicy targets for any "rogue" nation....

.

[Werner]

IMO, the time of the Big Carrier Task Force is long gone...These news are just another nail in the coffin...
Smaller, more maneauverable ships (or submarines in this case) packing great firepower -missiles- and with emphasis on local/limited warfare are the future. Carriers have just turned themselves into big, juicy targets for any "rogue" nation.... .

The big carrier task force is no different than any surface force of one or more ships. When the Soviet Charlie appeared, the same people pronounced the carrier dead. The plain truth is a carrier task force is the most defensible surface force there is. The large flight deck means you can launch CAP, still the best defense against missiles, and helicopters or drones with decoy enhancers will greatly complicate the attack.

Remember, 20 miles out this missile is still just another subsonic cruise missile. Presumably, the Hawkeye would have picked it out of the ground clutter a hundred miles out and organized defenses. The ASW force is supposed to keep the sub at least that far away.

This missile may be the "death knell" for smaller carriers those of France or Britain, because they do not have a large enough air group to mount a sufficient defense.

[Jose Chaica]

...When the Soviet Charlie appeared, the same people pronounced the carrier dead. The plain truth is a carrier task force is the most defensible surface force there is. The large flight deck means you can launch CAP, still the best defense against missiles, and helicopters or drones with decoy enhancers will greatly complicate the attack....

That was the time when the Soviet Union WAS United States sole enemy. Today, it�s a whole different world. In that day, US forces knew (almost) exactly WHAT/WHERE/WHEN to expect , in case of open conflict. Nowadays, I�m not that sure... But yes, until proven in contrary (it�s a matter of time...either missile or US budget), a Carrier Task Force is a most powerfull opponent. Also, a large flight deck, might mean exactly the same as a large egg basket...

.

[Guest]

Some people find it hard to reconcile themselves to the dual truth that big carriers are both irreplaceably useful and irredeemably vulnerable.

[Werner]

Some people find it hard to reconcile themselves to the dual truth that big carriers are both irreplaceably useful and irredeemably vulnerable.

You say that so blithely, even though no carrier has been sunk since 1944 by enemy action.

Because the air group can be adjusted, a carrier remains the weapon most able to address change. No stealth destroyer will be able to react to a new threat without a major rebuild.

[Guest]

Some people find it hard to reconcile themselves to the dual truth that big carriers are both irreplaceably useful and irredeemably vulnerable.

You say that so blithely, even though no carrier has been sunk since 1944 by enemy action.

Because the air group can be adjusted, a carrier remains the weapon most able to address change. No stealth destroyer will be able to react to a new threat without a major rebuild.

We've only ever fought 3rd world countries with zero navies since 1945. If you think it is an tribute to carrier survivability that none were lost or made mission kills by action of enemies such as these, then I have many highly attractive used cars to sell you.

[Guest]

We are almost developing a Japanese mentality in terms of focusing on immediate measurable performance qualities as a sort of sand for the ostrich to avoid the need to prepare the proper psychology and material base to deal with inevitable carrier losses. Carriers are vulnerable and valuable. We will have to accept that some will be lost in a real war against peer powers with real industrial and technological bases of their own in order to arrive at a good mix of forces. If we abhor carrier losses, then either we will not utilize our carriers fully, thus both making them somewhat a waste of money and not be able to achieve what we can, or we will not fund carriers we really need, and therefore not be able to achieve what we can.

Face it, carriers will likely be lost if there is a war, so have a few spare and be prepared to build replacements.

[Werner]

3M-54 Klub
SS-N-27 Sizzler

The Novator Design Bureau developed the Club anti-sub/ship cruise missile system [sometimes referred to as the Klub, Biryuza and Alpha/Alfa]. There is some confusion as to whether the SS-N-27 designation applies to this missile, or to the P-900 Alfa [industrial code 3M-51 ] , although the best evidence suggests that the 3M-54 Alfa is the SS-N-27, rather than the 3M-51 Alfa.

The Club missile system is designed to destroy submarine and surface vessels and also engage static/slow-moving targets, whose co-ordinates are known in advance, even if these targets are protected by active defences and electronic countermeasures.

There are two 'known' modifications of the system; Club-S (for submarines) and Club-N (for surface vessels). The Club-N can be installed in vertical launch cells or in angled missile boxes. Both systems are based on common hardware, the only difference being the design of the missile launchers and missile transport-launching containers.

Five types of missiles - 3M-54E, 3M-54E1, 3M-14E, 91RE1 and 91RE2 - have been developed for the Club ASCM. The Club-S can be armed with a 3M-54E or 3M-54E1 anti-ship missile, 3M-14E submarine-to-coast missile or a 91RE1 anti-submarine torpedo. The Club-N can be armed with a 3M-54E or 3M-54E1 anti-ship missile, 3M-14E submarine-to-coast missile or a 91RE2 anti-submarine torpedo.

The missile is 6.2 meters long, which is the same as the length of the standard torpedo tubes used by Western navies. It is designed according to the double-stage cruise scheme. The first solid-fuel stage ensures the missile's launch from a universal vertical launcher of a surface craft or from a submarine torpedo tube with a diameter of 0.533 meters.

The 3M-54E missile has a range of 300 km. For the majority of its trajectory it flies at a high subsonic speed. The first stage drops off when the missile reaches the prescribed altitude and its second stage sustainer engine goes into action. This is the time when the missile's wing and tail assembly unfold. The altitude of its flight goes down to 10-15 metres above the sea surface and the missile heads towards the target in accordance with the target designations, fed before the start into the memory of its board guidance system. The targeting on the cruise sector of the trajectory is effected by an inertia navigation system. The end sector of the missile's flight with the homing head active proceeds only five metres above the water surface. At 60 km from its target the third, solid-fuel stage separates from the missile, accelerates to supersonic speed and overcomes the defence zone of the target vessel.

In spite of its relatively small launch weight of 1,570 kilograms, the missile has a range of 300 kilometres and a powerful 450-kilogram warhead, which can blow up very large surface craft. The missile's moderate weight allows even warships with a small displacement to take aboard quite a few of such deadly weapons.

India is making substantial purchases of the Novator 3M-54 Alfa missile to equip Kilo class submarines and its new frigates. The first two Indian 877YeKM submarines (Kilo class, according to NATO classification) will be armed with the latest Russian 3M-54E antiship cruise missiles. These missiles will also be fitted onto three frigates which are being built to order for the Indian navy at the Baltic shipyard in St Petersburg. Each of the frigates will carry eight antiship missiles which will be launched from vertical launch containers on the bow of the ship.

It is believed that an air-launched variant will be purchased to arm the Tu-142s currently in service and the six to eight additional aircraft being sought by the Navy. If an air-launched version of the Alfa is procured, it is anticipated that India's Tu-22M3s will eventually be equipped to fire them.

As with any Radar homing missile, it is subject to electronic countermeasures. The USN currently has a large array of on-board countermeasures and off-board decoys, including the new NULKA.

A 200Kg warhead is something well-understood, and it would defy the imagination to expect even multiple strikes with warheads of this size would incapacitate or sink a USN supercarrier.

[Guest]

That depends on if the 200kg warhead puts the flight deck out of action.

Experience shows the flight operation could be severely disrupted with comparatively little physical damage to the carrier herself.

[Guest]

The success of ECM against attack is a very fickle thing, and balance can expected to be tipped back and forth many times in short periods as each side make modifications to specifically defeat what modification the enemy just introduced. If the US starts a war, then the chances are it would be started when the US is temporally ahead. If the enemy starts the war, it can be expected that the enemy would also have chosen his moment to gain the same advantage. So the upshot is we will definitely loose the electronic fight if we have no ECM capability. We can still count on loosing the electronic fight a very significant percent of time even if we do the best ECM in the world, provided we are facing a worthy, technologically adroit and responsive enemy with full skill to use, modify and refine their own electronic assets.

[Werner]

Since neither of us has any idea what the current state of ECM is, I guess we'll have to leave the argument.

[Guest]

The fact that every exposure of some vulnerability sent us to looking for heads to roll shows we are totally out of touch with reality. It is as if we expect it to be our right to maintain a level of both qualitative and quantitative dominance as to make our forces essentially invulnerable, while at the same time nursing an increasingly troubling inability to take real losses.

1. The fact that we are vulnerable doesn't mean someone on our side screwed up. Our enemy is as smart and resourceful as we are, and they will increasingly be as skilled as we are. We should start with the assumption that 50% of the time we will be bested even when no one on our side screws up. To avoid being bested more than 50% of time let's concentrate on fixing each issue as it arises so that the enemy does not best us more than once with each effort.

2. The rest of the world is richer, more resourceful, and have much greater store of human capital than USA. We will likely fall very hard if our national policy is based on maintaining absolute supremacy in both quality and quantity to the point of invulnerability, with no well prepared fall back position.

3. We need to accept that good things cost lives. That is to say worth while national goals are worth a commensurately lengthy butcher's bill. While there are reasons for not going to war to control the MiddleEastern oil, "No blood for Oil" is not one of them. Face it, secure dominance of middleeast oil reserves is worth 10 million casualties and more, provided that price will secure the objective. There are other reasons why we should leave Iraq. The casualty count is not one of them.

[Werner]

You have a tendency to see every enemy system as overwhelmingly superior and USN systems as hopelessly inadequate. I have a friend at the Pacific Missile Range Facility. He is a lot more sanguine about the ability of the SM-2/3 to meet the range of threats extant or anticipated for the next decade.

[Guest]

You have a tendency to see every enemy system as overwhelmingly superior and USN systems as hopelessly inadequate. I have a friend at the Pacific Missile Range Facility. He is a lot more sanguine about the ability of the SM-2/3 to meet the range of threats extant or anticipated for the next decade.

Good for him.

[Guest]

I don't make assessment of the relative vulnerability of US carrier forces now. I am seriously disturbed by the mentality that abhors every casualty, and use every exposure of vulnerability as an excuse to go head hunting in the cannibalistic sense.