I would have paid real money to have had been in those conversations, I'll be jealous of you until the day I die.
Many times I have considered purchasing your book, but did not due to my general frustration with the Spruance class, which I consider a great design which was under built due to politics/money. I will have to purchase it now to add to my 150+ book library, my Wife will be SO pleased to see another book come in....
You make many points which I have never seen before and are directly in conflict with other sources (the definition of a good book, by the way...).
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The DDG 993 was not a DXG design, in the original sense of DX/DXG. The USN never requested proposals for the DXG design, because as Norman Friedman wrote, the contract design of the DD 963 class provided for a future conversion to a DDG, primarily by installing Tartar D and by replacing the SPS-40 air search radar with SPS-48. (Also, VAdm Weschler, the DD 963 project manager, concluded that the complexity of a new-start DXG was beyond the capabilities of the total package procurement method.) Or, an extant DD 963 could be modernized for undersea combat with towed array sonar.
"Contractors were asked to bid on runs of 30, 40, and 50 DXs, and 25 and 35 DXGs. In early 1968, it was expected that all DXs would have been delivered by 31 December 1977, all DXGs by one year later. CD contracts were awarded to Newport News, to Avondale (who had much DE 1052 experience), to Todd Shipyards, to General Dynamics (Quincy), to Litton Industries (Ingalls), and to Bath Iron Works. The competitors were narrowed to General Dynamics, Litton, and Bath for the DP stage, and Litton was awarded a contract for 30 destroyers in June 1970"
(Freidman, pg 376, col 2 paras2 and 3)
These 30 contracted to Litton are the Spruance class. Naturally, Hayler would come later as an add-on of sorts. This tells me Friedman is of the opinion that DX was Spruance, and they did request proposals for the DXG ("asked to bid"), but only awarded a contract for 30 DX. The last two lines of your above quoted passage I am in 100% agreement with.
Of course, as we know, the Kidd class commissioned with Tartar-D and SPS-48 instead of the SPS-40 given to the Spruance class, exactly as you state. They gained the SPS-49 in NTU.
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There was not a design requirement for one extant DD 963 to be modernized for both warfare areas. The decision about which way to go in updating the ships was in 1975 intentionally left to the future, to depend on operational requirements. The undersea warfare upgrade was chosen in the 1980s. To call the DDG conversion design "DXG" is really not technically accurate, notwithstanding that it appears as "DXG" in [i]US Destroyers
"The basic design provides for both modernization and an AAW conversion (i.e. DDG)."
(Freidman, pg 377, col 2, para 1)
"As for DXG, it was ordered, but not by the U.S. Navy but by Iran, which originally asked for six but then cut the order to four in view of the escalation to a unit price of $330 million. With the fall of the Shah, the new Iranian government was more than willing to part with these expensive ships, which the Imperial Navy had termed cruisers rather than destroyers. All four were bought under the FY 79 supplemental appropriation for a total of $1.35 billion, a bargain at current rates (in FY 79 six FFG & cost $1.2 billion) to become the Kidd class."
(Freidman, pg 377, col 2, para 3)
Again, Friedman's opinion is clearly that the Kidd class are DXGs. I do put weight on his choice of the word "and" in the first quote.
With a nod to the fact that the DX/DXG concept had many forms before Spruance, as does any concept through production process, I look forward to finding the difference between Spruance/Kidd and DX/DXG in your book.
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The contracted DD 963 design (by Litton to a NavShips requirements specification) provided for the AAW update with the Tartar D system from an extant DD 963. The DDG 47 concept, later CG 47, came about only after the DD 963 contract was signed with Litton. The adaptation of the contracted DD 963 design (by NavOrd) for Aegis did not provide for conversion from an extant DD 963. The Aegis office (then in NavOrd) agreed to fit Aegis as a new installation within the margins for Tartar D. To keep the Aegis DDG alternative alive, the DD 963 office (then in NavShips) retained the DD 963 margins in evaluating engineering change proposals.
As you say (I think), the Aegis deckhouses could not be installed as payloads on an extant DD 963. Instead the Aegis structures and the DD 963 strength members were merged in the DDG 47 design. Again, the design agency for DDG 47 was different than for DD 963 and DDG 993.
Just to be clear here, the only reason I brought the Ticonderoga design in was to illustrate the inherent flexibility of the basic design. I don't want to give the impression that I believe a DD-963 can be modified into a CG-47 - those changes would be far too great. The differences between DD-963 and DDG-993 are not as great.
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The LAMPS mark III project was underway before the USN acquired the DDG 993 class in 1979. The test ship for LAMPS mark III was FFG 8 and was already at sea with the SH-60.
The Kidd class was ordered an built for the Shah of Iran - 'he' decided what equipment they were to have on build (And yes, I REALLY appreciated the extra air conditioning while onboard). Their LAMPS I and lack of SQR was already decided by the time the USN took over the ships. Sikorsky's S-70 was only selected to become the platform for LAMPS III in 1978 - the ships had been ordered and construction began well before that. First production SH-60B Seahawk flight was 11 Feb, 1983, and first deployment was in 1985 - both well after the Kidd class commissioning dates (1981-1982).
Again, as primarily AAW assets, the Kidd's would not have been first on the list to get refit for LAMPS III.
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With ships in service, the actual situation in the 1980s was different than on paper in the mid-1970s. The actual SQQ-89 and ABL/VLS conversions of the DD 963s increased their displacements to 9,200-9,300 tons, partly for lead ballast. The DDG 993 design featured a strengthened hull that could support 10,000 tons. There was no way to increase the hull strength of an extant DD 963 to support DDG weapons on top of the SQQ-89/VLS upgrade, and there would be stability problems even had the hull strength existed.
Naturally, the refit done in the 80's may not have been a perfect match for the potential refit envisioned (AAW conversion) during the design process. I doubt much data existed on the mk 41 VLS in 1970. That the SQQ-89/LAMPS III refit may have 'eaten up' the margin, orginally designed in, to convert to DDG is quite different than the DDG conversion being impossible.
Based on the opinions of the operators of both classes of ships, what I experienced while onboard, supported by data in Friedman’s book (and other references, although they could be 'borrowing' from Friedman), I continue to stand by my opinion that there should have been no issue with refitting Spruance Class destroyers to the Kidd standard.
I look forward to finding out what those issues might be when I read your book.
I am in no way offended, in fact I find healthy debate inspiring, as it drives each party to look deeper into their beliefs and/or assumptions - and that is the best way to learn.