The Ship Model Forum

Just to clarify, there were no battleships built after 1942. The Iowa's were designed in 1938, ordered in '39-'40, and laid down in '40-'42. Their speed, in particular, was locked into the design in '38. Check Wikipedia for a succinct summary of the design and build chronology.

Battleships, as they currently exist, have no significant AAW or ASW capability and would be useless as carrier escorts. Even if fitted with Aegis and VLS for AAW escort duty, it would be pointless since we have plenty of Burkes and Ticos which not only have AAW but also ASW capability.

Hope this helps you as you rethink your thoughts on battleships.

Regards,
Bob

Well, Dave asked, so... Much of the following has already been discussed privately but is presented here for public consumption.


All right, I'll take a shot a presenting the mission summary. This starts with answering the question, "Who will the BB fight and, closely related, where will the BB fight?"

For the next 20 years, the foreseeable answers to who the BB will fight are Iran, N. Korea, and China. Where the fight will occur is within 20 miles of the coasts of these countries and the approaches leading to them. Thus, in order to get within 20 miles of the coasts it may/will be necessary to fight our way to the area. This is particularly true for China which is in the process of developing a several hundred mile zone of exclusion. This leads us directly to the resulting missions.

Primary Mission. There is only one primary mission and that, of course, is delivery of ordnance on shore targets. This is self-explanatory and is the entire reason for the BB's existence.

Secondary Mission. There is a secondary mission and that is ASuW. Both as a requirement to carry out the primary mission (fight our way in) and as a standalone mission, ASuW will be necessary due to the ever decreasing numbers of carriers, declining air cover, and ever increasing size of the Chinese surface fleet. It is quite likely that the first mission in a war with China will be to eliminate surface opposition. Unfortunately, this is a difficult mission to fill given the lack of a good anti-ship missile and launch system.

Rather than list all the rest of the lower priority "fill in" missions, it might be better to list things that are specifically not a mission.

AAW - this is not a mission; any AAW capability will be provided only as necessary to carry out the primary and secondary missions
ASW - this is a fairly self-evident waste of a battleship; any ASW capability will be provided only as necessary to carry out the primary and secondary missions
MCM - ditto
SOF (other than as it relates to the primary mission)

Anything not listed above would be a candidate for the filler missions such as gunboat diplomacy, show the flag, Third World exchanges and training, humanitarian assistance, convoy escort, etc.

It is vital to note two further things which will have a profound impact on the required capabilities of the BB:

1. The BB will operate independent of a carrier group.
2. The BB will operate as part of a group.

An underappreciated aspect of the entire mission discussion is that the BB will be part of a group. This means that it is not necessary to place all the mission requirements solely on the BB. The requirements can be assigned to, and distributed among, the other members of the group. Thus, the BB missions should, more properly, be considered as the BB group missions. For example, AAW, while not a mission, is obviously going to be needed to safely carry out the missions. But, assuming that the other group members are Burkes (and possibly a Tico), the AAW responsibility can reside with them. Thus, the BB only needs a rudimentary (on a relative basis) self-defense capability to deal with "leakers". The same applies to ASW. Anti-ship capability will probably have to reside largely with the BB since the Burkes have limited ASuW capability.

Independent operation implies both a lack of air cover and a lack of surveillance and over-the-horizon detection (no Hawkeyes, no coverage). In a conflict with China, in particular, satellite surveillance may be non-existent. The BB will likely be required to provide its own surveillance in the form of extensive UAV operations. Whether this is better assigned to the Burkes or to the BB, I don't know.

Once the missions are finalized, the required equipment should become readily apparent.

Agree? ... Disagree?

Regards,
Bob

Alright!

Carr has thrown his input in! Is there anyone else? Just looking at this picture:you really see the potential of this platform. This project was just so, so perfect.
Any more mission statements or a list of missions and justifications by the contributers?

-navydave

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Proper Preparation Prevents Poor Performance

That was true in the 1980s and 1990s but not today. A ship of that size would need a Ship Self-Defense (SSDD) AAW system. The Spruance class was a good example of a ship with an SSDD. Spruance class ships had the NATO Sea Sparrow system which was more powerful than a CIWS. The Mk23 Target acquisitions system had a 2D radar on the main mast to locate and track targets that were queued from the AN/SPS-40 radar. There was the combination tracking and illumination radars Mk91 and Mk95 on top of the hanger and the Mk29 launcher for the RIM-7P. In the late 1980s some Spruance ship has the AN/SPG-60 connected to the air defense system to track and illuminate targets for VL NATO Sea Sparrow launched from the VLS.

Today a BB would need to have an 8-cell SSDD length Mk41 VLS for quad packed ESSM. The radar to acquire low altitude targets is the AN/SPQ-9B along with a AN/SPS-48G(V) and a few Mk91/Mk95 pairs would provide the SSDD capability. CIWS would be provided by a RAM system and one Phalanx 20mm Block 1B.

All this is needed because the threat from anti-ship missiles has changed radically. It used to be that threats were mainly the STYX/Silkworm missile which cruised at high altitude and made a high speed dive on the target. Today the threat is from missiles that are more like the Harpoon: the Russian SS-N-25 'Switchblade', SS-N-22 'Sunburn', PRC Sea Eagle, and other Exocet like missiles. The detection time on these missiles is shorter than older ones. Even with escort from an Arleigh Burke with the updated AN/SPY-1D(v) the new Aegis software and speedy computers which give it strong low altitude detection capabilities the ship will need more than just CIWS.


For ASW the BB needes a lot of passive defense. The ship sould be very quiet. Electrical motors are a must, no reduction gears connected to turbines. A top speed of 22 to 27 knots should be sufficient and the all electric design should be powered by the latest generation of diesel alternators. The hull should minimize turbulence and cause a minimum amount of noise. Degaussing equipment will need to be very sofisticated as the magnetic footprint of ths ship needs to be kept to a minimum. Volume of fire and range outweigh the need for a large bursting charge. In a perfect world a 155mm or 175mm naval gun to fire fin stabilized rounds out to 25 to 30 nautical miles with either IR or GPS guidance. Going after hardened bunkers shouldn't be a high priority for this gun. The rounds need to be optimized for anti-personal and light vehicle targets. Naval Gun fire support is most effective at breaking up enemy infantry movements. A 12 inch self loading mortor should be developed also.

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║ Seasick║
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That falls well within my concept of a "... rudimentary (on a relative basis) self-defense capability ...". What does not fall within is Aegis or full blown NTU.

However, we're still at the mission definition stage rather than fitting out, unless you're saying you agree with my masterful analysis of missions and, having been both overwhelmed and filled with admiration, you're ready to move on to the equipment discussion?

Thanks,
Bob

Ok, the beginning of my thoughts:

Primary mission:
All-weather surface dominance in a non-permissive environment.

Definition: All weather is self explanatory, but also assumes 24 hour a day availability of operation. Surface dominance: Elimination of any/all surface targets, be they ashore or at sea. Focus on shore targets. Non-permissive: A high or extreme threat situation where the enemy does not wish the asset there, and will take overt action to discourage its presence (they will fire on the vessel).

Currently, much effort is put into keeping units safe to prevent the political/media fallout of casualty. We commonly try and find some negotiated settlement with a belligerent party. These belligerent parties know we will eventually cave into demands as they threaten the wellbeing of the people around them. It is schoolyard common sense that there is a time when you must stand against a bully and force them to act or back down. This vessel would be intended to force that action.

This unit would intentionally go into harm’s way, to wade through the threats, expose, and then eliminate them. This is the big boot which kicks in the door. It is brutish and offensive. If potential enemies are not offended by the presence of this vessel off their coasts, they are missing the point.

The vessel would be expected to be the forward-most major unit in an event where there is interaction with a hostile force. This could include extraction of personnel from a region when events go south, or a forced landing of Marines ashore.

What does it provide that other platforms do not?

Overt presence. This vessel would be visible and undeniable to the enemy. The belligerency of this vessels presence should force action. The intent is to drive a response from the offending party – either they engage this vessel or they cease the actions which required it to be moved to them in the first place. Passive armor allows the vessel to by physically closer to the enemy than any other vessel, functioning as a forward pivot point for maneuver warfare. The enemy can stand against, run away from, or bow down to the vessel -any meets the purpose of driving a response.

All-weather, 24 hour a day operation with response time measured in minutes and seconds. A fire mission should be accomplished immediately from tasking, enhancing support to the war fighter ashore and making the most of an emergent intelligence opportunity. We now have enemies who like to run back into general populace when the engagement goes south for them – let them outrun a 16” projectile.

Volume of fire. No other platform can deliver the magnitude or ordnance this vessel can. Within its sphere of influence, buildings, vehicles, and enemy personnel should continue to exist only when this vessel allows it. The volume fire capability does not only enhance effectiveness through the saturation of one target, but also through the ability to engage and keep under fire multiple targets simultaneously.

I personally think that the DP weapon aboard a modern battleship should be the 8"/55 mk 71.

I realize that it is apparently not necessary, but personally, if the ship were to engage another ship, a mere 9 16" guns, which had a pretty low firing rate, a gun that could punch straight through a ship should be in line. The 5"/54 is also not the best DP weapon out there. Besides, the only thing that kept this weapon from going into production were budget cuts.

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Current builds:
Hobby Boss 1/700 Type VIIC U-Boat for my AH

Planned builds:
3 more 1/700 AH submarines

Does anyone else have input before we move on?

_________________
Proper Preparation Prevents Poor Performance

Dave,
I think that all you're going to get on Mission. Now I think its time for the Design Board to take over.

Russ

Roger, stand by for more very soon, gents.

_________________
Proper Preparation Prevents Poor Performance

I agree, you guys have re-hashed the mission enough into a very solid set of a requirements; its good to go!

Could we get a recap on weapons layout please? The more detailed the better? I'll add some input in that area. I'm also more than happy to do some line drawings or concept drawings if needed.

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Drawing Board:
1/700 Whiff USS Leyte and escorts 1984
1/700 Whiff USN Modernized CAs 1984
1/700 Whiff ASW Showdown - FFs vs SSGN 1984

Slipway:
1/700 Whiff USN ASW Hunter Killer Group Dio 1984

Hey, guys, I have to apologize for keeping you guys waiting (especially Russ). I am spending a lot of my time getting back in shape for the next Navy PFA, learning a LOT about the Navy's lightweight torpedoes, and learning about ASW. Carr just distracted me (...what a jerk) with a concept for a new Flight of Perry-class.

..by the way, Bob, 32-cells, no fewer There is room, and Harpoons are too easy. If you can, why not. There is nothing like a surface ship getting its @$$ wooped by an ASW ship.

Thanks to the contributions by Seasick and SumGui. Hooyah, guys. I will be back in a minute.

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Proper Preparation Prevents Poor Performance

Alright, now that we have input from some thinkers, I would like to comment on what they had to say.

While the MK32 TAS was supposed to be installed aboard all 4 battleships in 1993 (hence why the Wisconsin's main mast was built with a larger platform than the other four while the other 3 ships were to receive a similarly large modification matching the mainmast). Both of those are out of date and are have been replaced by the wonderfully effective SPQ-9B 360 degree radar. They cue up ESSM and provide the platform with 100% radar horizon radar picture.

I disagree. Carriers are noisy as and in fact they are twice as noisy as a WWII configured Iowa-class battleship. Like a carrier, a battleship would need to be as fast as possible. Either new construction ship or Kentucky here would carry half the acoustic signature of a CVN. Super speed (such as 33+ knots) is just as important to the battleship as it is to the aircraft carrier in that it needs to arrive on station as soon as possible, because there are guys waiting for support. That is paramount. The speed of 22-27 knots you describe is a handicap that I would suggest you would wind up criticize by saying "the battleship can only reliably achieve 25 knots, so it is ineffective. By the time it arrives, the decisive engagement will be over". Seeing past this, the faster it goes the better. Since the available power plants will produce 280,000shp the ship should achieve 35knots cruising (without breaks to cool off the turbines) and 39-41 sprinting (with cooling time).

While this is a well thought out point I would disagree. Since the battleship is acting in place of an aircraft carrier in important areas of interest needing more than CGs can provide but not worth a CVN, the ships will need to be able to deliver CVN amounts of ordnance. Remember, the BB is not simply a NGFS/NSFS weapon, it is replacing an aircraft carrier. As a result it needs to deliver a massive amount of ordnance. As the Iowas are, they deliver appro 6 times the ordnance of an CVN. A Montana would deliver approx. 8-12 times that.

Thus I would disagree with and discard the recommendation for a 155mm or 8" soft ordnance delivery system in place of the 16" Naval Gun System; especially since in this situation the 16" guns and support systems are already in place and ready to be installed on the pre-comUSS Kentucky. Like Seasick pointed out, however, the latest Sea Sparrow (ESSM) is the paramount defensive missile system for this ship. SM-2 of CGs and DDGs is unnecessary and a drain on the ship's resources.

So, now on to the mission of the configured battleship Kentucky:

Situation:
The US Navy issued a decree saying that it needs 12 aircraft carriers (ships that can deliver the same ordnance as an aircraft carrier) to protect the United States of America and its allies and 10 aircraft carriers to itself alone.

Well, that has worked out okay, but now the Navy is looking at only having 9 active aircraft carriers. Two of those are in the yards and unavailable for deployment at all times for the foreseeable future. The USS John F Kennedy (CV-67) was decommissioned 12 years(!!!) ahead of scheduled, because of horrible maintenance decisions], and the Enterprise (CVN-65) is being cut early. One could accurately say that the Kennedy (CV-67) was gang raped like a victimized school girl. USS Kitty Hawk was decommissioned 5 years before schedule, and Constellation was decommissioned 8 years before schedule. (So, we are already down 3 aircraft carriers.)

CNO Roughead has said that in order to save money the USS Enterprise should be decommissioned as soon as possible. He claims this is reasonable, because "the US can do with 10 carriers until the USS Gerald Ford is put in commission". I super disagree with that. That's taking it down to the situation that we cannot sustain any casualties amongst our carrier force at all (combat or accident causalities). In addition to all of that, as of 2009 President Obama has said the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) will not be refueled. That fact alone removes the last straw to the US Navy's ability to defend the United States of America.

This results in a fleet of 9 aircraft carriers by the time the Enterprise is decommissioned . This is not just unacceptable but dangerous to the security of the United States of America.

All of these decisions have been made as a result of extremely restricted (and some would say irresponsible) budget choices. These choices have been made by pursuing the DDX/DDG-1000 and LCS programs as aggressively as the Navy has. This has resulted in a national security crisis of a falling of capital ship levels to a pre-WWI level.

The reaction to this must be immediate, economical, and swift. The way to accomplish the task of bringing the force level back up to 12 capital ships (ships capable of delivering aircraft carrier levels of ordinance) in as little time at the greatest economy is the immediate modernization and reactivation of the Iowa-class battleships. We have already established that the battleships are extremely economical and cost effective.

In Russ's scenario, the (pre-USS) Kentucky's hull has been preserved and is ready for completion upon a modern weapons system and configuration is decided upon. Because of its WWII protection methods and planning for sustaining attack, unlike modern warship design, this super-survivable Iowa-class hull is a perfect vessel for 21st century technology in a ship actually meant to go into "harm's way" in the modern combat environment.

The USS Kentucky's (as well as any battleship in a modern environment) purpose and missions would be as follows:

Purpose:
Replace lost aircraft carrier numbers (hulls) without costly reactivation and yearly costs of decommissioned CVs or the costly refuel of the USS Enterprise in addition to that of the USS Abraham Lincoln.

Missions:
Operate as the centerpiece of a battleship strike group (BSG) independent of aircraft carriers.

1. Operate offensively in areas of interest.
2. Operate as a sea-domination force (destroy up to 5 surface targets up to 80nm)
3. Operate in areas inaccessible/undesirable to aircraft carriers
4. Operate in areas of high priority to free aircraft carriers for more important areas of interst
5. Destroy shore targets at short or long range with massive amounts ordnance
6. Provide Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS/NSFS)
7. Support amphibious operations (invasion and on-ooing operations)
8. Perform surgical low-cost/high effect 16" strikes
9. Perform surgical or "alpha" level strikes up to 1000nm inland with TLAM
10. Provide NSFS to on-ground elements
11. Blockade
12. Air control for ASW, SAR, and patrol
13. Host and support SOF
14. UAV intelligence gathering
15. Electronic intelligence collection and tactical deception
16. Refuel accompanying ships in group
17. Influence other nations' political/military decisions
18. Show the flag in foreign waters and ports
19. Operate and fuel all types of helos used by the USN (SH-60, CH-53, V-22)
20. Flag Support
21. Defend itself against air threats (missile or aircraft)
22. Provide itself with point defense systems

In order to accomplish these missions we would have the following:
ASuW: 16" guns - a precision (laser/GPSGPS-guided) capability currently out to 47nm
. 8" guns - a precision (laser/GPS-guided) capability currently out to 21nm
. Harpoon ASM - 60-80 nm anti-ship missile capability
. Mk110 57mm rapid-fire horizon anti-small boat gun

AAW: ESSM (Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile)
ASW: None

Armament:
9x 16"/50caliber Mk7 Mod1 naval guns
4x 8"/60caliber Mk71 Mod2 guns
4x 57mm Mk110 super rapid-fire guns

128 x Strike Length Mk-41 VLS tubes for 120 TLAM (Alpha-Strike capbility) and 8 for 32 ESSM
64 x Tactical Length Mk-41 VLS tubes for 64 Harpoon CIII ASM
Total:
192 Mk-41 VLS tubes

Defensive close in weapon systems:
4x Mk15 Block1B Phalanx CIWS
2x RAM
4x Mk38 Mod2 25mm remotely controlled guns

Electronics:
SPS-49(v)5
SPS-48G
SPS-67
SPQ-9B
SLQ-32(v)
3x SPG-62 Mod1(with track and scan capbility), or SPG-51D/E, or Mk95 bug-eyes
Standard electronics package such as SATCOM, etc.
OUTBOARD AN/SSQ-108(V)
NIXIE
Cooperative OUTBOARD Logistics Update (COBLU)
...and a bunch of other incidental stuff like TACAN, etc.

Aircraft:
2x SH-60B LAMPSIII helicopters in below-deck hanger aft of Turret 3
8-12 UAV (Pioneer BlockIII and/or SCANEAGLE) for gunfire spotting, laser designation, and intelligence gathering

Power plant:
8× 35,000 hp gas turbines (GE - LM 2500+) 280,000shp
6 × 4,000 kW diesel generators (Fairbanks Morse Engines) as just-in-case generators

Do we have any more inputs?

_________________
Proper Preparation Prevents Poor Performance

....

Hey, Peter!!!
About 900. No more. In comparison to an aircraft carrier (3500) it's not a monster at all. It's an economy capital ship.

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Proper Preparation Prevents Poor Performance

The BSG is going to have 4+ ships operating together. It will be the focus of intense enemy surveillance (satellite, radar, aerial, etc.). A little extra quieting of the BB won't accomplish much and certainly should not be implemented if it impacts speed. Speed is vital, although reaching a fire support position for troops in trouble would be the least of the reasons why (if we have people ashore who need fire support and don't already have it, then we've screwed up monumentally in planning and the BB's fire should be directed at the Pentagon). The speed requirement comes from tactical necessity. Speed provides the best ASW by making it impossible for subs to intercept (barring dumb luck putting them directly in the path) without "going loud". Avoidance is easier than combat and ASW is not a BSG mission. Speed is necessary to allow rapid penetration to a target area (same as WWII carrier groups did in early WWII) from an initial, distant, undetected point (appear out of nowhere). Speed provides the ability to deal with enemy surface groups from a position of tactical advantage by being able to choose and dictate the time and place of engagement.




Destroying both hard and soft targets is exactly the mission of the BSG. "Artillery" in the general sense has always recognized the existence of both types of targets and utilized rounds appropriate for each. I would assume this would continue with the BB. I'm not an expert on BB guns/ammo so someone tell me if the BB does not (or could not) have both types. The idea of a 12 inch mortar is interesting but what would it offer that a BB's set of 16"/8" guns would be incapable of?


The mission list is fine although it reads suspiciously like a Powerpoint presentation generated by the Pentagon.


Given that we have Mk110 and CIWS, what does the Mk38 do for the BB? I'm missing your intent on this.

Overall, this excellent. Build it!

Regards,
Bob

You are correct, sir. It is in a power-point presentation for those types. The actual "Missions", which I should have included first, are:
Anti-Surface Warfare
Land Attack
Naval Surface Fire Support (naval gunfire and tomahawk missile).

The sub-missions listed were for the audience following the thread. I assumed they knew those original first (however I should not assume. I should have followed the missions with the sub-missions).

In the place of a Montana with 4 Phalanx and 2 RAM I think you have a very valid point of over-redundancy. On a modernized Iowa where there are only 2 Phalanx CIWS and 2 RAM I would still suggest the 25mm in the situation that if the Mk110 goes down you don't have use your anti-ship missile protection system on boats.

Sounds like it will make a pretty fun build for Russ. The hanger will be a neat situation, too. I am looking forward to see if he uses the side-by-side double elevator hanger or the inline type. I am still weighing both for my Montana build.

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Proper Preparation Prevents Poor Performance

Dave,

Just had a wild thought.

Instead of two SH-60's, how about one SH-60 and one AH-1W? Whoops, too long unles we can get the rotor blades to fold.

Russ

Something arrived from HK today. As soon as I closed the door, I went and ordered some stuff to go with it. I guess the long lead time item is some one to pour four 8" Mk71 mounts.
BTW, the sea tested tube was 8"/55. Did Dahlgren come up with an 8"/60?

What are the advantages of the 25mm remotely controlled vs the 30mm Mk 46 mount?

Well, from a practical point of view, the reason to have 2 helos is because almost always one is down. It's really great if both are up at once, but that's not as common as we would like . So, if you split your capability type, you will lose one or the other when you need it.

From a tactical point of view, if you are doing covert operations you do not want a helo anywhere nearby just hanging out making a bunch of noise. AH-1s are cool but are only called in when things get bad, and even then they take a little while to show up. Gun rounds arrive a lot faster than a helo does, and the risk of the helo being shot down is greater than the gun rounds not being able to reach the enemy due to terrain. Also, as a point of comparison. There are not attack helos on DDGs performing special operations missions, just SH-60s. So, unless you have a really cool reason (and I would love to hear why you'd like an AH-1) I would suggest keeping it at 2 SH60s or HH60s.

....what you could maybe do is sneak one in between your two elevators and keep the 60s on the elevators all the time. It would be kind cramped, and you would only have one, but you could at least have one Cobra in there. I am not saying it's not at all practical but it would look pretty neat!!!

I think you are right. Once I get all of my stuff again I can send some to you.

Yes, they did develop one, they did not make one to my knowledge. The 55caliber prototype barrel was a lined barrel. The 60caliber barrel was to be a mono-barrel, just like the 16"/50caliber replacement barrels designed in the '80s.

Good question. The 25mm (Mk38 Mod2) is an autonomous bolt-on weapon system. The Mk46 is slaved to something else and has to be hard installed onto the ship. The Mk38 Mod2 has a 30mm option. With the exception of possible ammunition capacity differences, to me, the 30mm Mk38 Mod2 beats out the Mk46 hard-core.

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Proper Preparation Prevents Poor Performance

Russ,

I have been thinking about something that might apply to your design and build. There were a lot of designs for the Burkes that utilized "half" B-modules of VLS.
This means that they were literally 32-cell modules that were the 8-cell modules assembled in-line making up 32-cells. How we do 32-cells on the Burkes is that we have 4 8-cell modules set up in 2x2, and this is called an "A-module" VLS arrangement.

We all know the full 64-cell B-cell module version.

This other one I am talking about is still 32-cells, but it's a single strip of moduels of 4x1 instead.
This arrangement might be good for your new-build Kentucky and my battleship designs as well. The advantage to this arrangemetn is that it would not be instrusive as the full 2x4 64-cell nests common to US ships and would offer a large capacity while minimizing the foot print.

Food for thought. I look forward to seeing what yoy might come up with, Russ. Either a Montana or an Improved Iowa design, this year I would like to cut plastic on my own new-build battleship.

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Proper Preparation Prevents Poor Performance