The Ship Model Forum

Plus 2 just in case

I see what you mean. The way these phased radars work is they pulse a certain number of times per second. So it seems there would be an easy fix to this. The two arrays could have an alternating pulse pattern. I am not a fire controlman, but this what seems to be feasible.



I don't know about the Baseline 9, but I do know that the Flight IIIs are planning for either a full AMDR or an AMDR(L) that incorporates SPQ-9B instead of the SPY-3.

Just so we're clear, this is still speculative. Only prototypes of these radars have been built, and they are going to change in iteration at least once before they get on any ships, DDG-1000, CVN-78, or DDG-51 Flight IIIs, AND AMDR may not even been ready for the Flight IIIs by the time they start rolling out in 2016. I have been looking around for pictures of the SPY-3, and there seems to be none out here on the interwebs. The stories and articles that are out there suggest that the SPY-3 is even bigger than the SPY-1. The things I have read inside the Navy about AMDR certainly state that SPY-3 is more along the lines of SPY-1K and not a volume search radar like SPY-1. The little arrays on the deck house on top of the DDG pictured above are designated as SPY-3 in Navy reports.

AMDR is the weapon direction system, not the radars themselves.

Here are a couple pictures of the Ford physical model and the highly developed CGI model:


Like I said earlier (forgive me for repeating) It's two radars, VSR and a horizon search. There have been different iterations of radars to make up the AMDR suite, and they have finally come down from the huge system they had originally envisioned for the giant CG(X)...N...thing. They might actually put the full blown system on the Cobra Judy Replacement ship. However, normal "surface combatants" can hold only smaller systems. The biggest ones they could fit on the DDG-51 Flight IIIs are the smallest and least effective VSR with a horizon search radar.

One of the advantages of using the CGN-42 is that it is a far more robust platform and can accommodate a heavier electronics payload. Since the Navy is all hot and bothered with the AMDR thing...why not put it on this tough ship? Hence why I am including both the SPY-1E (if the designation is still correct) and the SPY-3 right off the bat.

Now, like I said, the nomenclature might change or might be wrong. Names of devices aside, I have the VSR and the phased horizon search and illumination arrays.

Thanks for the interest and the comments

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Proper Preparation Prevents Poor Performance

I talked with my GMCS today, and after he thought about it for a minute, he said that if you keep putting system modules (the brain module) in the arrangement then you can keep stacking more and more together, but the advantage to having them separated is for damage control and internal access of the individual missile canisters. If one arrangement gets hit by something it's not wrecking the alignment of all the tubes because they're all in one big arrangment.

But yes, as long as you have the certain types of modules you can build them any way you like. One system module can only support 7 other modules, then you have to put another system module in. You can even arrange them in a crazy placement like this:

I could break them up into one 48-cell and one 32-cell arrangements so fewer missiles would be vulnerable to a casuality in any one arrangement...hmmmm.... ...Maybe it would be better to have them broken up into 48 and 32-cell arrangements...



Well, the reason why I chose 64 and 16 is because the USN uses 64 all the time. Lockeed does produce 48-cell in the...Mk41 Mod 12(?) version, I think, but of course...we don't use it. We only use 32 and 64. However, there is nothing stopping us from using that 48-cell version, too.

Here is a big question for you guys. I don't know why the Navy is sweating so badly about redesigning the DDG-51 Flight IIAs armament to be Flight IIIs. It is clear to me that the South Koreans already did it with their KDX-IIIs. These ships have 128 Mk41 VLS tubes, they have RAM, a Goalkeeper, a Mk45 5", 16 Korean variant Harpoons, and the Aegis WDS that is about to be upgraded to BMD...

Here's an awesome YouTube video on the KDX-IIIs:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V93zbMeO ... age#t=279s

...why not build those with US systems: AGS(L)/155mm Mk71, RAM, Phalanx Block 1B, SYP-1D(v), SPQ-9B, and Harpoon, as the CG-47 replacements? With the new Aegis system, Timmy states it as "Baseline 9" incorporating the SPQ-9B it would perform the basic IAMD functions they are going to start trying out in the next few years with the John Paul Jones. I am willing to put money down that Bath Iron Works and Gibbs&Cox could convert the KDX-III plans into US standards before we start construction on the DDG-51 Restarts. Here the USN could have a super capable DDG/CG with the DDG-51 Restarts while they're working on getting AMDR working.

Why not? Is someone willing to convert a Trumpeter 1/350 USS Lassen or Momsen model into that?

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Proper Preparation Prevents Poor Performance

Wow Dave, I cannot believe you are starting another great project!

Well, if no one else will I might have to add that to the list for next year....

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Proper Preparation Prevents Poor Performance

I had a great conversation with my Senior Enlisted Advisor today. He is a GMCS and he was a VLS C-school instructor. I asked him about the various arrangements of the VLS, and we quickly came to the conclusion that if we were going to make a VLS arrangement survivable, we would break them up a little more than they already are. In the case of the CGN-42 that has 160 tubes, I will break the VLS arrangements up into two 48 and two 32-cell arrangements. At each end of the ship will be a 32-cell and a 48-cell arrangement with independent systems. If a field artillery round strikes the VLS cell hatches or any other threat disables that entire arrangement, it will only be either 48 or 32-cells that are down instead of 64.

Now, I need to make the VLS modules reflect that. That's going to be some work!

Photos next time!!!

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Proper Preparation Prevents Poor Performance

So sorry about no pictures tonight, but I am really jazzed about the progress I made today on CGN-42. I got the flight deck reshaped, Millenium Guns placed, the bases to the Mk41 VLS made, and the Mk71s' elevator hatches fabricated. It was a good day for the nuclear powered cruiser!

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Proper Preparation Prevents Poor Performance

I have a question I would like to pose to the watchers.

I have come to the finding that the Millennium Gun would be preferable to the Phalanx Block 1B or Mk38 as an anti-boat capability ranging as far as 4800 yards out.

While the Phalans Block 1B can be used as a CIWS (and is principally used as a CIWS), I am not using it as my CIWS. I am using it as a replacement for the Mk38. I have substituted the SeaRAM for Phalanx for CIWS. SeaRAM has a far better kill ratio than the gatling gun of standard CIWS.

So, since the Millennium gun uses AHEAD ammunition, its hit ratio is a lot higher than that of Phalanx. It would seem that it hits more often than the .50caliber subprojectile the 20mm Phalanx round uses. This type of ammunition I think would be extremely useful for killing personnel onboard. While it is said to only fire AHEAD projectiles on navweaps it seems that the gun uses the same 35mm cartridge/chamber length. So, I would need confirmation of this, but it seems that any of Orlikon's 35mm ammunition could be run through the gun. With this in mind I think the 35mm rounds have a far better chance of killing a small boat than the .50caliber sabot or full 20mm rounds of Phalanx.

Bob pointed out that:

My thought process is that the weapon could have a belt mixed in a 1:4 ratio of AHEAD rounds to HE rounds. This provides heavy destruction of the small craft with HE rounds while immediately killing the operators and disabling the craft with AHEAD rounds.

Bob then expertly pointed out that:
It can be equipped with an EO/IR system just like the Mk38.


Bob then pointed out that:
I do not have any reliability numbers on Millennium gun yet. Those will be a deciding factor for me, but I know the problems Phalanx has. The rule "Two is one, one is none," applies to Phalanx. I am sure this could be different if the gatling gun was maintained better, but the gatling gun is the weak point to the Phalanx system. It is the part that breaks all the time.

Most expertly (and discreetly) pointed out that:
I like the cloud of subprojectiles it produces.

As long as the AHEAD ammunition actually penetrates its target, it would seem that the burst of each AHEAD round covers several square feet.

I don't know if this was a missile hanging from a target stand like we have seen with the 57mm gun, but here is what the damage to a target looks like.

The AHEAD ammunition detonates mortars. So, if the subprojectiles penetrate the steel wall of the mortars they will probably shred up a cockpit of small boat pretty well.

So, as we have talked about we know that Phalanx claims it requires 200 rounds to kill a missile or small aircraft. The MG claims 20-25. Phalanx carries 1500 rounds on board dictating a maximum of 7 targets destroyed. MG carries 250 dictating it a maximum of 10-11 targets destroyed.

We have seen on youtube Phalanx fire at missile targets for upwards of 5 seconds (approx 750 rounds) before fragments of the target splash down right next to the ship. We have also seen it fire repeatedly at a small craft and not seem to hit it much less disable it. We know that its ammunition is solid state and requires a physical impact to influence the target at all. Most of the time that ammunition is 20mm sabot rounds leaving a .50caliber (12.7mm) subcaliber round. From those videos we know that Phalanx will take many more rounds than claimed to take out a target.

The MG on the other hand does not seem to me (yet, I still need to look more) to have published anti-boat tests, but we see on YouTube that it does penetrate the walls of a mortar, strike a missile down, and strike periscopes. We know its ammunition is 35mm in diameter, and AHEAD ammunition makes its foot print in the range of square feet.

All of these things principally apply over the Mk38 in my mind. While the Mk38 Mod2 is a lot better than the Mod1, I think this gun beats it out with its option of ammunition and rate of fire.

It's not that I don't like the Phalanx CIWS, it's that the 20mm Vulcan canon has proven that it is not well suited for the sea or small craft at range.

So, that's my current thought process of the MG over the Phalanx as an anti-small boat gun. I would like to hear others thoughts cocnerning this weapon.

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Proper Preparation Prevents Poor Performance

I'd think the burst ammunition of the MG would be great for small boats.

Most small boats will be fiberglass or aluminum, which will be easily penetrated by the MG AHEAD rounds. That should kill personnel, shred equipment and start fires.

I am a fan of the independent system though, and Phalanx's guidance has shown it is capable of guiding weapons other than the M61 (SeaRAM).

I'd be a fan of the Phalanx radar and EO such as the Mk38 Mod 2 added to a MG mount with an expanded magazine capacity.

..

Very much in agreement.

One of the realities of war is that targets get overkilled (repeatedly hit after "killed"), sometimes days afterward; and combined with shooting false targets drives ammunition expenditure through the roof. This is true on land, in the air, or at sea.


I think you are correct about the accuracy issue, but underestimate the effect of blast on a point target. AHEAD rounds largely solve the accuracy issue.

It is also fair to note that the Millenium Gun and similar weapons are also useful against other targets like indirect fire, and aircraft.

Guns also can be used to warn off potential targets without actual engaging them.

Guns are also not subject to many countermeasures that are effective against missiles.

What is in question are the economics of the issue. AHEAD type munitions are not cheap, and at some point it may indeed be more economical to accept that a PGM is a reasonable, or even better alternative. Setting up that analysis calls for a lot of testing (preferably live) and I do not think we are doing what needs to be done to figure this out.

These and similar systems are highly effective, and viable alternatives.

There are however counter measures, ranging from exotic to cheap.

I note that fire control radars could be devastating against crew and electronic guidance/detonation devices in a swarm boat attack.

Your thinking on this topic is, as always, quite clear and well thought through.

I think the real issue with small boat swarm attacks is not about weapons, tactics, and training, but rules of engagement (ROE).

Warship captains are not psychopaths and do not sail around reducing pleasure craft and fishing boats to smoking hulks just because they approach. Restrictive ROE makes it much easier for swarms to achieve surprise. Worse, it starts to constrain the thinking of captains and their crew.

..

Let me give you guys some first hand experience with this. This was one of the things I have done in the Navy. My warfare area requires me to be an SME with force protection, and I can tell you that you're 100% right. ROE is a big, big deal, mainly because Captains use it to cover their asses instead of using it to set up security barriers around the ship.

Next, security measures for ships are not in question or up for debate. There is a publication out that specifically lays out how and when (at what distances) ships are supposed to travel through the Continuum of Force to defend themselves: when they're supposed to issue verbal warnings, lasers, flares, warning shots, and finally deadly force.

These are established procedures, and the fact that the ships' COs don't follow them is mind boggling to me. As busto will affirm, distance is critical in a fight. You can bring a knife to a gun fight as long as you close to knife range before the guy with the gun can draw or use his gun. The time it takes a .50 caliber or 25mm weapon to disable or destroy a target boat requires that the boat be engaged a certain distance out. Those procedures I described earlier allow you to destroy that boat in the lethal zone.

Will the ships' COs do this? If they have common sense about physical realities, yes. If they're more concerned about political repercussions or how it's going to reflect on them, no. So, like Bob and I have discussed before, it's all about a CO's mindset. Is he really ready for combat, or is he a desk-jocky who happens to be driving a ship?

As happened in the beginning weeks and months of the Battle of Guadalcanal, naval officers were very arrogant and over confident. Then Savo Sound changed its name to Ironbottom sound. However, we should not let history repeat itself.

It's the attitudes of the officer corps and the sailors that makes the difference.

There needs to be an institutional change in their training as SWOs and sailors in their force protection procedures. This will keep USS Cole style attacks from happening again, and it will enable the crews to effectively engage in combat during the rigors of heavy maneuvers, etc

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Proper Preparation Prevents Poor Performance

An obvious hard kill is always desirable, but rarely possible. The main issue is in Battle Damage Assessment - or "is the target down and can I move to the next one?"

(here is a great example of the problem in a NPS paper. While the paper's topic uses tank engagement, and Line of Site is used where we would probably say Detected by Sensor, the basic tenants would be applicable here. WARNING! The math contained within this paper can cause a migraine! http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA465243 )

A basic engagement chain:
1 - Acquire target
2 - Attack Decision
3 - Engage target
4 - Engagement Result

So, this goes:
1 - Sensors
2 - ROE
3 - Weapon
4 - Sensors

Sensors really are the driver, and the speed of feedback from those sensors post-attack.

MG should be an effective 'Weapon' part of this cycle - but it is not a sensor and can't really take responsibility for the sensors role. Neither can Griffon or Hellfire or the like.

No matter the weapon, an engaged target will be obscured by the results of the attack (smoke, IR surge, etc), at least temporarily. If there are no obscurants from the attack, you have missed, and should continue to engage.

The Gun has the added ability to fire warning shots, where a missile makes this economically untenable over time, and demands an immediate reaction from the target upon launch.

I like the MG because it can act as CIWS (anti-missile) and small boat defense. This does not mean it will be better than Hellfire or Griffon against small boats. Actually the 120mm AMOS (mentioned by Busto in another thread) might be better than all of them against small boats (with the rounds coming at the small boat almost from the vertical), I'm just not sure about accuracy against fast moving targets at distance. Once engaged, the missile systems may be a better weapon, but most ROEs would probably make the gun the first reactor in a given engagement.

So really, MG AND Hellfire/Griffon would be nice...

The entire engagement cycle has been a problem since the beginning of time and will never be completely solved

I agree that the details below are indeed factors in the engagement of small craft, but from an operational stand point, I must side with Busto in his point that it's ROE that makes the difference. To me, it's the ROE of the particular vessel that makes the difference. I was discussing this with a blue-water worker of mine today, and this is what he said:

"We were cruising through the Straights of Hormuz, and we saw small boats racing toward us. We went through our whole force thing."

Me: "Continuum of Force."

"Yeah, that. We went through all of the steps, so we asked the bridge to fire warning shots."

Me: "You asked the bridge to fire warning shots?"

"Yes."

Me: "Why?"

"Because that's how it works. The Captain has his fingers in everything."

Me: "*sigh* You're kidding me."

"No. No. They told us to hold fire all the way up until the target was inside our cut-outs."

Me: "That's how the Cole attack happened, man."

"I know. It's so stupid."

Me: "It'd be alright if our ships had an armor belt to detonate against. It wouldn't cause any damage."

"yeah, well, that's not how it works, man. These officers are so concerned about being politically correct and not killing the wrong people. If those boats wind up getting too close to my ship when we're warning it over and over again they don't have an excuse."

Me: "Yeah, I agree. We cross language barriers with lasers, flares, and warning shots. There's no excuse. If they're dumb, they're dumb, and they're subject to natural selection."

"Yeah. I wish we had those heavy cruisers and WWII ships you talk about."

The conversation continued, but that's the meat of it. Our modern ships are built with an administrative mentality and NOT a combat mentality.

This CGN is build with a combat (WWII) survivability factor into it.

If our bigger ships hand adequate and proper hull protection, terrorists would not be able to blow a lethal hole in the side of one of our ships. Our ships need belts of armor to protect them from mines and terrorist attacks.

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Proper Preparation Prevents Poor Performance

A mortar system could indeed perform this role with devastating pre-planned fires: It would be a naval equivalent of final protective fires (essentially a pre-plotted artillery strike designed to put a wall of shrapnel between a friendly unit and the enemy (and hope he is stupid enough to try and assault through it).

There are issues with this, however. First, there is a minimum range for most mortar systems. Second, indirect fire is extremely indiscriminate, friendly units, civilians, and enemy will all suffer equally if caught in the impact zone. Third, there are some control of fire issues that will have to be addressed.

I would put something like AMOS on a a SOF insertion platform, or a large landing craft in a heartbeat, but a ship...?



Well said.