The Ship Model Forum

FWIW, the term used in the 1940s for carriers was "Joe Lewis with a glass jaw".

Not only the pilot rotation, the IJN also had a very elitist carrier pilot school with ridiculous entry requirements and very long training times. On top of that pilots in the IJN were not eligible to command ships later in their careers, the carrier captains weren't ex-pilots, so it was also a bit of a dead end career choice. The whole structure was far too rigid to adapt to make up for combat losses. This is described in quite a bit of detail in the chapter on aviation in "Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941".

Also Japanese carriers in particular were very much more "eggshells" than their American counterparts.

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Vlad

The USN certainly did view CVs as valuable before the war. We think of the Essex class as wartime ships, and indeed they were. But ten of them were ordered in 1940, with two more in 1941. A further ten were ordered in August 1942. In the event most were not laid down until after the war started, I'd guess because there just weren't enough large building slips to accommodate a dozen fleet carriers along with the fourteen battleships that were also on order before the war.

From memory, the RN was able to build six battleships during the war, along with seven fleet carriers and quite a number of light fleet carriers.

The IJN was limited pre-war by its economy. The Navy consumed almost a third of the budget while the superbattleships were being built. It's hard to imagine how they would build much more of anything.

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... Brian

DavidP & Vlad, thanks for the corrections.

Now that I think about it, the issue I remember with fuel involved the preparations prior to the Battle of the Phillipine Sea where a lack of fuel impacted the amount of flight time the fleet's pilots received prior to the battle, which is not the same thing as training new pilots.

But now that we are on the subject, did the training issues brought up by Vlad apply to land based IJN pilots too? Same rigid structure? What about IJA pilots? Did they run out of trained pilots late in the war, and if so, what were the reasons?

It should be to be expected that a force, which suffered repeated terrible defeats could not compensate that - e.g. also the German Luftwaffe could not compensate for the losses of trained pilots.

For sure the training regime was not optimal and could have been much better, but after losses at Midway, Philippine Sea and the raids prior to be Battle of Leyte it is difficult to imagine how they should have compensate for the losses.

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In the pre-war era, the IJN trained their pilots on the best of the best philosophy. Only about 1% of each class received their wings. They did produced some of the finest pilots in the world. It was in keeping with the Samurai tradition but it was inadequate for a modern war of attrition.

After the war started, when they expanded the training program, a lack of fuel limited the flying hours each student received. Thus reducing the quality of the graduates. Late in the war, the fuel shortage and war demands meant that students who had just passed the primary phase were sent to operational units.

Much like the Allies in WW I where British pilots with as few a 7-8 hrs. of solo time were sent into combat. The Germans had the same problem late in WW II.

Admiral John Byng wrote:
If the Japanese were interested in carriers they could have done two things.
1. Build more carriers.

[/quote just some dude] During the period of time in which the naval treaties were in effect, the maximum total tonnage of aircraft carriers allowed was fixed by treaty, and both the Japanese and US built up to their respective maximums. Examining how many carriers were laid down (or converted) after the expiration of the treaty and completed prior to, say, the Battle of Midway, results in the Japanese having completed the Zuikaku, Shokaku, Shoho, Zuiho, and Junyo. The US completed only the Hornet. If interest in carriers is to be based solely upon numbers built, then clearly the Japanese had far more interest in carriers than the US did during this time period, right?[/quote]

Admiral John Byng wrote:
2. Improve the efficiency of their training methods for pilots and aircrew.

[/quote]Yes, they shouldn’t have let a little thing like a lack of fuel interfere with the training of their pilots.


So I’m trying to understand where this idea that the Japanese didn’t think highly of aircraft carriers is coming from. It certainly doesn’t seem to come from the historical record, as Japan out built the US in carriers prior to Midway, went on a carrier building frenzy after Midway, and used carriers as their main naval force literally from the first day of the war all the way until they ran out of trained pilots and were forced to use battleships again out of desperation. Note especially how neither Japan nor the US used their slow battleships with their fast carriers, but somehow the US is credited with being “forward thinking” for leaving the slow battleships behind, while the Japanese are accused of “conserving their battleships” for doing the exact same thing! The Japanese showed on the very first day of the war that they were willing to discard their prewar doctrine. So can someone please explain to me (using actual historical examples) of how exactly the Japanese thought more highly of their battleships than they did their carriers?[/quote]




The Japanese abandoned the Washington Treaty in 1934. So they had seven years before they attacked Pearl Harbor to build aircraft carriers and train pilots, instead they embarked on building 3 giant battleships. Their thinking is clearly that they need a force of carriers (which i concede was forward thinking) but that they need the biggest battleships which is completely wrong as the wartime careers of Yamato and Musashi shows.

They certainly had enough fuel to make war on China.

Perhaps my point should have been that the Japanese didn't think highly enough of aircraft carriers. They built some very good ones and used them very effectively (because they had excellent aircraft at the beginning of the Pacific campaign). Rather they favoured their battleships by keeping them out of harms way. One instance of this is Midway. Instead of using battleships to bombard the island (as the US did later in the war) they keep them hundreds of miles away. They might also have been useful to protect the carriers by providing more targets and with their AA guns too.

The US embarked on a huge aircaft carrier building programme soon after Pearl Harbor, the Japanese were not building carriers then.

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In 1757 Admiral John Byng was shot "pour encourager les autres". Voltaire

I am not sure that is true. The German's also did not have the necessary training regime in place at the start of the war and they did not rotate pilots with combat experience in the way the US and Britain did so they ended up wasting good pilots in combat instead of passing on their skills.

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In 1757 Admiral John Byng was shot "pour encourager les autres". Voltaire

Japan renounced the Treaty in 1936 (not 1934) and built afterwards two big carriers and several light carriers.

But they also continued with building battleships. Japan completed her last battleship in August 1942 - Great Britain completed her last battleship in 1946, the United States in 1944.

At the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor the USN was building five carriers, the IJN was building four carriers.

I am not sure, what your argument is. There was no navy fully realising the possibilities of aircraft carriers before World War Two - and there was also no navy, which realised that the concept of the battleships was obsolete.

BUT: it was the Japanese navy, which have built probably the strongest carrier force before the war and it also started the war in the Pacific with an attack with its carriers - clearly demonstrating that they had an advanced concept for its time. The use of carriers instead of battleships at Midway in my opinion demonstrates that they understand at least the usefulness of carriers (which is not the same as the understanding of the uselessness of battleships). They know that the battleships were vulnerable to attacks by aircraft - they had demonstrated that very clearly against the USN at Pearl Harbour and against the RN (sinking PoW and Repulse). Therefore it made sense to attack with carriers (I am not sure if they understand how vulnerable their aircraft carriers were).

I think you do not understand the significance of the very different industrial capacities and size of population. With the start of the war in the Pacific it was clear that Japan will loose it - except if it cause the United Staates to loose their head. This was also obvious to the Japanese commanders, e.g. to Yamamoto. Japan could not built on the same level as the US and they could not replace the losses on the same level.

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The Yamato's were build to overcome the imbalance the Washington Treaty put on the Japanese navy battleship force. And in 1937, when the ships started to be built the carrier wasn't considered the ruler of the seas. And at the time their carrier forces were relatively equal.

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Building 1/200 Nichi.'45
viewtopic.php?f=59&t=152105

Well, your last paragraph says it all. Japan was idiotic to start a war they could never win. My point is that if they had understood carrier power better than anyone else they would have ditched the useless Yamato class battleships and built big carriers (not Junyo, Ryujo etc. which were little more than escort carriers) and sorted out their ridiculous training regime and that may have given them another year to wait for defeat.

I agree it made sense to attack with their carriers, it did not make sense to move their battleships from one spot to another using up increasingly more scarce fuel without risking any kind of engagement.

I got the information on the Washington Treaty from Wikipedia:

"On December 29, 1934, the Japanese government gave formal notice that it intended to terminate the treaty. Its provisions remained in force until the end of 1936 and were not renewed. Japan effectively ignored the treaty in 1936."

Japan could have started construction in 1934 even though the Treaty was nominally in force, if you look at the Myoko class displacement for example, it is clear that Japan did not really pay much attention to the stipulations of the Treaty anyway.

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In 1757 Admiral John Byng was shot "pour encourager les autres". Voltaire

But that is a completely different topic This is true for all Axis powers, they were gamblers and thought that it would be worth to risk everything. The result is well known: they lost nearly everything and were responsible for millions of deaths and the devastation of their countries.


But did anyone argue that they understood carrier power better? Or did you argue that all others understood carrier power better than the IJN? For the first question you are right: they do not concentrate fully on carrier power, but stick to built battleships for the final, decisive battle, which never happens the way the IJN expected it to be (as in Tsushima). Therefore the battleships were there at Midway: for the decisive battle against the USN. They were deployed at every situation the IJN command expected such a battle to be possible. But they also stopped to built battleships before the RN and USN, even converted some of the battleships to carriers (Shinano, Ise class).

For the second version you are wrong: there is no indication that the RN and USN understand carrier power better, at least not before the war or early in the war.

For the Great Britain it should be sufficient to point at the available carrier planes early in the war (completely inadequate, especially if compared to the IJN and USN ones or the land-based aircraft of the Axis powers!), for the United States the continues effort to built battleships (even after Pearl Harbour!) tells everything. E.g. as AAW ships to protect carriers more ships of the Atlanta/Oakland class would have been much better - and much cheaper, therefore much more of them could have been built instead of the Iowa class. Somehow the USN still thought that they needed battleships to protect the carriers against surface attacks. For sure they were useful as fast AAW batteries, but were a very expensive solution to that problem (with useless 16 in guns).

/edit: DavidP: is this really true? It is often mentioned, but the IJN used carriers for attacks already in the First World War (against the German base Tsingtao) and also in the 1930s against China. The carriers planes were the logical successors of the torpedo boats used e.g. for the initial attack on Port Arthur in the Russian-Japanese War, used as equalizer against a stronger battleship force.

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What else was Japan meant to do after he oil (and other material) embargo of mid-1941 ?

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stop raping and murdering their way across China and go home and build up their nation peacefully as they did after WW2

Actually, they did build carriers and train pilots. From the end of December 31, 1936 (the end of the Treaty) until December 31, 1942 (when the first Essex was commissioned), the Japanese built 7 carriers (to only the Hornet for the US), and had enough trained pilots to man them. Only in 1944 did they run out of trained pilots.

But yes, they did also build the Yamato class, and the construction of the Yamato class was clearly a mistake, but it was a mistake that was shared by all of the naval powers. For example, the last battleship that the Japanese laid down was laid down in 1940, but note that the last battleship the US laid down (Illinois) was actually laid down in 1945. 1945! So if building the Yamato class in the late 1930s-early 1940s was a mistake (which in hindsight it was), then wouldn't starting a new battleship in 1945 be grand folly? Of course, the US economy could afford such folly, but it was folly, and again, makes the Japanese decision to stop battleship contruction in 1942 and go "all in" on carrier construction (the first country to do so) appear to be very advanced (but of course, still not soon enough given hindsight).

One final note: During the 6 years period that I mention above, the Japanese completed 7 carriers (fleet and/or light carriers) and 2 battleships. The US, on the other hand, completed 1 (fleet) carrier and 6 battleships. If there is any country that should be accused of not putting enough value into carriers during this time, shouldn't it be the US?

Surely the reason lies somewhere in between, with each navy having a battleship camp and a carrier camp fighting for resources. All nations built a bit of both since at the time there was genuine uncertainty over their relative value.

In my opinion the real mistakes of the IJN were to overlook survivability and damage control. They also should have streamlined their spotting and flight ops. I remember reading (please confirm or refute if you can) that most IJN carriers didn't have crash barriers and required each landed plane to be taken below using the forward elevator before the next could land. Then there is the insistence on storing (and arming) planes in cramped and poorly ventilated hangars.

Operationally at least, the US seems to have been more forward thinking. They had the advantage in air group size per carrier and speed, flexibility and safety of carrier flight ops.

Indeed the IJN had a formidable and well drilled force at the start of the war but there were a host of issues under the surfac.

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Vlad

The IJN had the advantage with range, i.e. could often strike first.

The survivability of the early USN carriers was also not that good, as mentioned in the initial posting 4 of 6 of them were sunk. The other two at least survived damage (but also e.g. Shokaku survived heavy damage).

Also the damage caused by Kamikaze attacks late in war was often extensive and these carriers probably survived, because the USN did not had to retreat and had sufficient resources to salvage them (in contrast e.g. the circumstances, in which Hornet was lost).

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That was the RN, not IJN. If the IJN had operated this way, they could not have launched anywhere near the size of strikes that they did.

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... Brian

Thank you

Yes, range is a critical advantage but intelligence is an even bigger factor allowing for a first strike.

Slightly off-topic, where can I read more about carrier operating procedures of different navies?

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Vlad

Not just Taranto.

The Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor almost exactly as the USN did in Fleet Problem XIII of 1932. Where the RN may also have gotten the inspiration for Taranto.