Maxim,
While you bring up good points, I believe our points of view and points of reference are not gelling. The big deal is that for the past 8-9 years most of the Navy has been screaming that it does not have enough ships, enough manning, enough individual offensive power, enough quantity to meet the existing mission demands. Now, with 2 ship collisions, 2 more ships out of commission (not to mention Antietam that is out for grounding), and 17 more Sailor deaths on our hands, the gross over-work on the existing fleet has been caused by a reduced number of ships with an equal or increased mission.
This immediately calls for more ships to perform existing missions. What kind of missions? Defensive capability is taken care of by the CG and DDG fleet. Presence is often over gunned with DDGs or CGs that could otherwise be taken care of by corvettes such as a lengthened Cyclone-class PC with a 76mm gun, Harpoons, and a SeaRAM operating ScanEagle UAVs on the regular or OHP FF or FFGs operating in an elevated role with a modern SSDS, UAV, and helicopter capability. Offensive combat capability has taken a hard hit since the DDG-51 FlightIIA were authorized to be built without the Harpoon configuration they were designed to have (on a platform between the stacks). Indeed, the 5" gun is not a reliable offensive weapon because of its shorter range and lack of effective ammunition. Someone might want to credit tactical tomahawks as anti-ship weapons. Despite advertisements, they are not, nor can they reliably be.
So, over-work and stress on the force has led to an increase in lapsed qualifications, deferred training, and an abhorrantly common "acceptance of risk".
"We need those RCBs that are in Kuwait down in Bahrain, because we have to perform an escort. We accept the risk. We know it would be by far the longest transit of that type of craft yet. We accept the risk. We know they are experiencing hard maintenance problems. We accept the risk. We know they will transit near Iranian waters, but we need them in Bahrain. We accept the risk." - Boom. One of the two breaks down due to lack of maintenance and poor training lead to them both being captured by Iran.
"We need those DDGs on patrol in the 7th Fleet. We know they are not up on their qualifications. We accept the risk. We know they failed elements of their INSURV. We accept the risk. We know we will skip another yard period. We accept the risk." - Boom 2 DDGs suffer collisions and 17 Sailors very, very needlessly lose their lives in peace time.
The Fleet Wide review comes out lambasting the over-worked and over stated "Can-Do" attitude of the Navy that leads to unnecessary acceptance of risk and unacceptable loss of life...and then immediately says some combatant commanders will have to accept the risk to meet the mission. - Boom. Too many missions and not enough ships...wait for the next thing.
Ten more ships, Perry-class FFGs reintroduced to the fleet after an 8-12 month modernization and SLEP to free the attention of 10 CGs or DDGs would not only help the goal of 355 ships but would also relieve the pressure of 10 more high-end ships in areas they are not needed. The HM&E upgrade the CGs got could add another career to the OHP lives without much cost.
Having SLEP/HM&E OHPs is similar to having battleships to relieve the unnecessary deployment stress on carriers. CVNs routinely go where they are not really needed, because something more than a SAG of a CG and DDGs or an LHD and a couple DDGs cannot accomplish, so the next step up is the attention of a CVN. That next step up is a HUGE one that diverts an enormous amount of resources that should either be used elsewhere where that kind of power is needed, or left at home so its crews and rest, train, and prepare. Send a BBSG instead, and an equal or greater affect will be made. If kinetic operations are needed, the BB could meet nearly any mission performed within 75nm (11" and 13" sabot guided and ballistic projectiles) in the past 10 years. Equally, there is no need for a CG or DDG to be committed where a modernized Perry FFG or an upgraded PC could do the job.
You made the point that the cost to benefit of having the Spruances around was not with it. I disagree. Even by today's standards, the Spruances were the best ASW surface ships we have ever had. If they needed to be made "more valuable" to justify their retention or reactivation, a Kidd-like AAW modification (ie see the ex-Paul F Foster SDTS mounting the SSDS-2) and an additional 64 Mk41 VLS cells in place of the aft NATO Sea Sparrow launcher could have been made providing 15-20 more poor-man Aegis ships to fill the presence and war-fighting roles of current DDGs and CGs. See the CG-52 HM&E costs. SSDS-2 comes in at a whopping $10M. The most expensive, not that expensive, parts would have been adding a SPS-48G, SPS-49A(v)1, SPQ-9B, 2-3 SPG-62 illuminators, and a new aft mast.
We would have had what the rest of the world considers a "cruiser" with 2x 5" guns, 125-128 Mk41 VLS, a fast reacting non-Aegis WDS, and a fantastic ASW suite. Granted, while having the AAW mission added would have reduced the effectiveness of the ASW mission, the added value would have been incredible. If the 7 Sprucans that had not yet been upgraded to Mk41 VLS forward had been modified as well, they could have been fitted with the same AAW system but with a Mk71 8" gun with 450 21-45nm ballistic and Excalibur (range from interviews I had with a BAE Excalibur engineer) rounds and 50 65-70nm guided RAP rounds, and 32-48 cells forward and 64 aft. That combination would have produced the most effective warship built since the guide missile heavy cruisers (CAG) USS Boston and USS Canberra.
Modernizing ships is not nearly as costly as you posit. A prime example is the SLEP being performed on the Blue Ridge and Mount Whitney. Both ships are receiving a "modest SLEP" that has/will double their expected lives from 35 to 70 years of active service.
It's not that hard. It's not that expensive. If maintenance is accomplished on time, it does not increase like you suggest.
In the near term, the reactivation, SLEP/HM&E and modernization of 10 Perry FFGs is the first step. The rest is to bring back our remaining amphibious ships and turn them into mini aircraft carriers.
_________________ Proper Preparation Prevents Poor Performance
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