Midway, 5 June (Hawaii Time)
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- Werner
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- Werner
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And lopped several knots off the carrier force's speed of advance.Chuck wrote: If the combined fleet main force had been with Nagumo's 1st air fleet, in all likelihood the Japanese would have weathered the attack and would have been in the position to deliver a battle winning counter attack.
The diagrams from Shattered Sword make it pretty clear the Japanese AAA had little to offer in the way of protection against dive bombers.
If an unfriendly power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war.
-- "A Nation at Risk" (1983)
-- "A Nation at Risk" (1983)
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The several knot speed advantage bought them nothing. The BBs would have been tempting targets for the dive bombers and would probably have diverted some of the bombs, which they would have an infinitely better chance of surviving than the carriers.Werner wrote:And lopped several knots off the carrier force's speed of advance.Chuck wrote: If the combined fleet main force had been with Nagumo's 1st air fleet, in all likelihood the Japanese would have weathered the attack and would have been in the position to deliver a battle winning counter attack.
The diagrams from Shattered Sword make it pretty clear the Japanese AAA had little to offer in the way of protection against dive bombers.
If you don't want your main assets hit, and you can't keep your enemy from hitting, then provide your enemy with alternatives to hit.
- MartinJQuinn
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Hogwash. The main targets were the carriers. While the Marines and Navy aircrews from Midway did try divert to some alternate targets, the carrier airgroups were focused on getting the carriers.Anonymous wrote:The several knot speed advantage bought them nothing. The BBs would have been tempting targets for the dive bombers and would probably have diverted some of the bombs, which they would have an infinitely better chance of surviving than the carriers.Werner wrote: And lopped several knots off the carrier force's speed of advance.
The diagrams from Shattered Sword make it pretty clear the Japanese AAA had little to offer in the way of protection against dive bombers.
If you don't want your main assets hit, and you can't keep your enemy from hitting, then provide your enemy with alternatives to hit.
Martin
"Tomorrow is the most important thing in life. Comes into us at midnight very clean. It's perfect when it arrives and it puts itself in our hands. It hopes we've learned something from yesterday." John Wayne
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"Tomorrow is the most important thing in life. Comes into us at midnight very clean. It's perfect when it arrives and it puts itself in our hands. It hopes we've learned something from yesterday." John Wayne
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MartinJQuinn wrote:Hogwash. The main targets were the carriers. While the Marines and Navy aircrews from Midway did try divert to some alternate targets, the carrier airgroups were focused on getting the carriers.Anonymous wrote: The several knot speed advantage bought them nothing. The BBs would have been tempting targets for the dive bombers and would probably have diverted some of the bombs, which they would have an infinitely better chance of surviving than the carriers.
If you don't want your main assets hit, and you can't keep your enemy from hitting, then provide your enemy with alternatives to hit.
Even if the crew were completely successful in avoiding any targets other than the carriers, concentrating the Japanese forces would mean there would be 4 other, less important flat tops on which to disperse the blow.
So instead of 3 vital fleet carriers lost at a stroke, the chances are the loss could have been reduced to 1.5 light carriers plus 1.5 fleet carriers, a far better proposition than what actually transpired.
- MartinJQuinn
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So you mean no complex, chess piece set with moving parts everywhere, and all the eggs in one basket? Very un-Japanese like!! Besides, the 1st Air Fleets main asset was speed, as Werner noted, the other ships would have slowed them down.Anonymous wrote:Even if the crew were completely successful in avoiding any targets other than the carriers, concentrating the Japanese forces would mean there would be 4 other, less important flat tops on which to disperse the blow.
So instead of 3 vital fleet carriers lost at a stroke, the chances are the loss could have been reduced to 1.5 light carriers plus 1.5 fleet carriers, a far better proposition than what actually transpired.
Martin
"Tomorrow is the most important thing in life. Comes into us at midnight very clean. It's perfect when it arrives and it puts itself in our hands. It hopes we've learned something from yesterday." John Wayne
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"Tomorrow is the most important thing in life. Comes into us at midnight very clean. It's perfect when it arrives and it puts itself in our hands. It hopes we've learned something from yesterday." John Wayne
Ship Model Gallery
- Werner
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I think we have to remember Japanese carrier captains always had one eye on the clock and the other on the fuel gauge. They would have used the most efficient speed to accomplish the mission. Yamato and the others could never have kept up.
I also do not believe their tactics were fully mature by June '42. At least part of the command polity expected, nay demanded, a decisive ship-vs-ship action.
I also do not believe their tactics were fully mature by June '42. At least part of the command polity expected, nay demanded, a decisive ship-vs-ship action.
If an unfriendly power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war.
-- "A Nation at Risk" (1983)
-- "A Nation at Risk" (1983)
- MartinJQuinn
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Good pointWerner wrote:I think we have to remember Japanese carrier captains always had one eye on the clock and the other on the fuel gauge. They would have used the most efficient speed to accomplish the mission. Yamato and the others could never have kept up.
That is why the Yamamoto hung back from the 1st Air Fleet - to come in and "mop up" any cripples.Werner wrote:I also do not believe their tactics were fully mature by June '42. At least part of the command polity expected, nay demanded, a decisive ship-vs-ship action.
Martin
"Tomorrow is the most important thing in life. Comes into us at midnight very clean. It's perfect when it arrives and it puts itself in our hands. It hopes we've learned something from yesterday." John Wayne
Ship Model Gallery
"Tomorrow is the most important thing in life. Comes into us at midnight very clean. It's perfect when it arrives and it puts itself in our hands. It hopes we've learned something from yesterday." John Wayne
Ship Model Gallery
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That makes no sense. Due to the short range of their weapons, the battlefleet should have a much better chance of ship-vs-ship action if it were charging out in the front, rather than hanging back. Due to the fact that the US fleet had no battleships, every American ship was faster than Yamamoto's battleline. Consequently there is almost no chance of a ship-vs-ship action unless somehow the Americans accidentally when around Nagumo and then blunder into Yamamoto's force at night in the process. How this can happen is total mystery. The Japanese had not expected the Americans to be in position at sea at all on June 4. They had expected the Americans to still be in Pearl Harbour, and would only charge out to rescue Midway after the Japanese have already started taken the island, and therefore the American forces would charge in from the East of Nagumo.MartinJQuinn wrote:Good pointWerner wrote:I think we have to remember Japanese carrier captains always had one eye on the clock and the other on the fuel gauge. They would have used the most efficient speed to accomplish the mission. Yamato and the others could never have kept up.
That is why the Yamamoto hung back from the 1st Air Fleet - to come in and "mop up" any cripples.Werner wrote:I also do not believe their tactics were fully mature by June '42. At least part of the command polity expected, nay demanded, a decisive ship-vs-ship action.
In any case there were no American forces to justify deploying 7 battleships in a ship-vs-ship action. In such an action, 8-10 cruisers plus 4 Kongos would be entirely enough, and such a force would be fast enough to screen the 1st air fleet. Remember Kaga was a converted battleship, and is only capable of 27 knots.
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