Layout and design drawings of Alternative Hoods

[ar]

Have to tell you that you could not be more wrong, re he RN being behind in modern ships and technologies.
Look at what they ACTUALLY had in 1919.
QE cclass, probably the best of the time.
Hood. No equal for twenty years.
Hawkins class. No equal for ten years.
V&W class. No equal for ten years..
The only navy with aircraft carriers.
In 1919/20 the RN had the most modern ships of ANY navy. Nobody else came even close.
Had more experience in design, costruction and operations.
It was at that time the Worlds' best. It was supreme.
Othe navies had designs just as large/larger than Hood, but in many ways fall far short because of the things that I have mentioned above.
To give a contemporary example; A navy other that the US designs and builds a 90,000 ton carrier. Would it be as good as a new US carrier of the same tonnage? The answer is --- of course not. I will leave it to you to list the reasons why. Not a perfect analogy but one that shows the principle.
To my knowledge, no plans have been published of an alternative Hood.
It is not impossible that some sketch designs have been found somewhere.

PS Had the N3s been built, they would have been the most powerful ships in the world, bar none, regardless of ANY foriegn builds.

Hope that this helps.

On this I can agree. I do believe that it was politically and financially impossible to execute the program to construct new battleships. Even the USA, which had enough money and capacity to execute her war program (Lexington & South Dakota) lacked the political will. The ships were only started to coerce the other parties to the bargaining table.

I wonder whether that is actually so. We mustn't forget that unlike the USA or Japan, who enjoyed a more or less trouble-free period of capital-ship development, the RN by 1919 was rather behind when it came to having modern ships and latest technologies in front-line service. So the Invincibles (as I like to call the G3 design) as well as the N3s were actually not merely another step in an arms race, they were necessary to prevent the RN to be outclassed by US and Japanese construction.

And actually we're talking about an alternative Hood, which would have been a one-off anyway.

Oh, and perhaps ar could help me out here - have any plans of the alternative Hood designs been published?

Jorit

[Werner]

Master AR, you are leaving out the problem of Nevada and all-or-nothing protection. Nelson would be the first truly satisfactorily armored ship.

Queen Elizabeth and the "R"s were nice, but they had 1910 ideas of armor and in any event had been used hard in the war. They would need to be in refit for years.

Hood was a reasonable and powerful weapon. I see no reason to change her fit. The 15-inch gun was one of the best naval weapons ever built, and the 1920 tests imply strongly the 18-inch series under development would not be as good. From an economic point of view, having a separate powder and shell requirement for one ship is not too wise.

As for Hawkins, the unfortunate and unhandy 7.5-inch gun is the only thing that sets this class apart. You can tell from their immediate employment the Admiralty could not find a use for them. Why else convert one to a repair ship and another to a carrier?

In the area of the "V" and "W" destroyers, I completely agree with your assessment. I believe these are possibly as important to history as the Dreadnought herself.

Back to politics. If you agree with Churchill, all these instruments are going to be a minimum of ten years older before there is even the remotest chance for their employment in war. Meanwhile, the engineers scribble, steam turbines advance a generation or two and your fleet is a large body of second-class ships. Better to scrap most now and build for the X+10 date Churchill foresaw.

[Guest]

RN in 1920 was well aware of US protective schemes. But it was nevertheless confident that its QE class were the best battleships in the world, and furthermore that in general, each type of warship it possessed were equal to or superior to the best found elsewhere in the world. I suspect when training, experience and doctrines were combined with equipment, RN in 1920 were qualitatively the premier fleet in the world.

[ar]

Always judge a ship/class from the perspective of utilty. Do not take any one aspect, look at the thing as a whole. How much experience went into the thing; design, construction, operations. Not the paper specfications.

QE vs Neveda; One can argue forever. I chose the former for the reasons given above.

The Hood; no equal, despite some flaws. Every ship has them.

Hawkins; Of the five, one coverted/completed as carrier during the war. An understandable decision. The othere served as cruisers, with one serving to engage in experiments for a short period only before reverting back to a cruiser. The class was judged to be the FIRST true modern cruising cruisers.
Needed muscle to work the main armament, but so---? They had NO contemporaries in other navies. World beaters at the time without a doubt until the 8" gun treaty cruisers came along ten years later.

I forgot to include escorts, coastal forces and submarines, I will let others write on these. I have written too much.

Master AR, you are leaving out the problem of Nevada and all-or-nothing protection. Nelson would be the first truly satisfactorily armored ship.

Queen Elizabeth and the "R"s were nice, but they had 1910 ideas of armor and in any event had been used hard in the war. They would need to be in refit for years.

Hood was a reasonable and powerful weapon. I see no reason to change her fit. The 15-inch gun was one of the best naval weapons ever built, and the 1920 tests imply strongly the 18-inch series under development would not be as good. From an economic point of view, having a separate powder and shell requirement for one ship is not too wise.

As for Hawkins, the unfortunate and unhandy 7.5-inch gun is the only thing that sets this class apart. You can tell from their immediate employment the Admiralty could not find a use for them. Why else convert one to a repair ship and another to a carrier?

In the area of the "V" and "W" destroyers, I completely agree with your assessment. I believe these are possibly as important to history as the Dreadnought herself.

Back to politics. If you agree with Churchill, all these instruments are going to be a minimum of ten years older before there is even the remotest chance for their employment in war. Meanwhile, the engineers scribble, steam turbines advance a generation or two and your fleet is a large body of second-class ships. Better to scrap most now and build for the X+10 date Churchill foresaw.

[Guest]

Regarding Churchill, he was the one who disingenuously, if not duplicitiously, formulated the theory that for the time being, in 1920, UK would best prepare to counter Japan by not preparing to fight Japan at all. That way the battle fleets would not come into conflict and this there would be nothing to prepare for.

"Fleet battles only come about if both sides wishes it". I guess if Britain does not wish a fleet battle with Japan, then it would remove the possibility of having to fight the Japanese all together.

[Werner]

In 1920 the IJN was the RN's closest ally, closer than the USN, with permanent missions attached to each other's navies. Washington drove the wedge. We are talking about the time before Washington, or if Washington had not occurred.

Incidentally, if you look at the famous oil painting of Togo at Tsushima, you will see an RN officer on the bridge, off to the left.

Churchill's "Ten Year Rule" was sound and intelligent policy by one of the brightest lights of history. In any event, it proved true. Churchill followed it himself, being consistantly against military expenditures from the end of the Great War to 1930.

[Werner]

Hawkins; Of the five, one coverted/completed as carrier during the war. An understandable decision. The othere served as cruisers, with one serving to engage in experiments for a short period only before reverting back to a cruiser. The class was judged to be the FIRST true modern cruising cruisers.
Needed muscle to work the main armament, but so---? They had NO contemporaries in other navies. World beaters at the time without a doubt until the 8" gun treaty cruisers came along ten years later.

Setting aside the battleship issue, remember the USN had a series of ten recent armored cruisers with 10-inch guns which were by international treaty to be the most powerful cruisers in the world until their retirement scheduled for 1949. The Bureau of Construction looked at refitting them with the Omaha machinery which might have brought their speed to 26 knots or so.

In any event, the USN suffered with the same problems as the RN where these big cruisers are concerned: They simply took too many resources for the cruiser mission. The crew of Hawkins or Missoula for example would serve two of the ideal cruisers (say Enterprise or Omaha).

Furthermore, these large ships threatened to generate a series of light capital ships to counter them. In fact, the feared ships appeared as the Dunkerque to counter the German Panzerschiffe.

The USN spent most of the '20s and part of the '30s with steaming restrictions as an economy. Although I do not know for sure, I imagine the RN was similarly handicapped by their civil masters in the cabinet.

[ar]

A small point, The Japanese were in AWE of the Royal Navy. The ships, the victories, and the several hundred years of history and tradition. A naval Samurai in effect.

In 1920 the IJN was the RN's closest ally, closer than the USN, with permanent missions attached to each other's navies. Washington drove the wedge. We are talking about the time before Washington, or if Washington had not occurred.

Incidentally, if you look at the famous oil painting of Togo at Tsushima, you will see an RN officer on the bridge, off to the left.

Churchill's "Ten Year Rule" was sound and intelligent policy by one of the brightest lights of history. In any event, it proved true. Churchill followed it himself, being consistantly against military expenditures from the end of the Great War to 1930.

[Werner]

A small point, The Japanese were in AWE of the Royal Navy. The ships, the victories, and the several hundred years of history and tradition. A naval Samurai in effect.

With good reason.

For hundreds of years the RN did more with less. A salutory lesson for the IJN, whose homeland lacked the capacity to match her opponents one-for-one.

[Guest]

In 1920 the IJN was the RN's closest ally, closer than the USN, with permanent missions attached to each other's navies. Washington drove the wedge. We are talking about the time before Washington, or if Washington had not occurred.

That's an entirely superficial view of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The notion of Japanese "Awe" with respect to Britain was also nothing more than a self-comforting fiction.

Indeed Britain has been of mixed mind with regard to alliance with Japan as early as 1909. The primary function of the alliance was to check Japan expansion, and partially align Japanese interests with those of Britain at a time when greater threat to more fundamental British interests exist in Europe. There was never any doubt that Japan has not consented to becoming the guarantor of gross British imperials interest in Pacific for free. The price Japan exacted was what is equivalent to a sanction from London for her to subtlety and measuredly encroach on the interests of British pacific dominions while Britain faced the high sea fleet across the North Sea. In 1906 the British had little choice. The alternative for Britain was to resist those encroachments by Japan more firmly, but expose herself to the possibility of 2 front war with Japan exploiting any European conflicts between Britain and Germany.

All thoughout WWI, Japan had lived up to her obligation under the Anglo-Japanese alliance, but has also ruthlessly exploited her sanction to roll back the interests of British dominions in the pacific. The anglo-Japanese alliance has been a cause ot complete dismay in British Dominions from 1914-1918. By the end of WWI there was no longer any question that continued Anglo-Japanese alliance could only be bought at the cost of a rupture with British Dominion. By the end of WWI it was clear that in fact Japan was now indeed the only possible opponent for the RN. By the end of WWI there was also no longer any doubt that the interests of British dominions, and therefore by extension the interests of Great Britain, coincided much more closely with those if USA than those of Japan. The British may have refrained from prematurely announcing her intentions, but there was no possibility that Anglo-Japanese alliance would be renewed in 1922, Washington or no Washington. Quite simply, to renew Anglo-Japanese alliance was to cause Australia and New-Zealand to desert British imperial orbit and move into American orbit. It was in effect to renounce the entire British pacific empire.

From the Japanese perspective, there was little fear and no awe. There were sober assessments of the relative strength, of course. There were also clear understanding that so long as UK and US does not act in concert, then war with US was more likely than war with UK, and therefore it behooves one to make friends with the one who is less likely to be your enemy.

So the notion that Washington treaty broke an otherwise snug and cozy relationship between a majestic teacher and overawed pupil was a sugar coated fiction.

[Werner]

Which "encroachments" on British Pacific prerogatives do you speak? They didn't "unfortify" Singapore or Hong Kong. What parts of the British Pacific did Japan encroach? The Gilberts? The Ellice Islands?

[Guest]

Which "encroachments" on British Pacific prerogatives do you speak? They didn't "unfortify" Singapore or Hong Kong. What parts of the British Pacific did Japan encroach? The Gilberts? The Ellice Islands?

1. In 1918, neither Singapore nor Hong Kong were fortified, and neither were able to support a fleet capable of taking on IJN. Britain effectively had no major fleet base in the pacific and had to rely upon a combination of anchorage stretching from Trincomalee to Sidney.

2. The encroachment was economic. By allying herself with Japan, Britain has effectively bar herself from too actively promoting the commercial interests of her dominions at the expense of those of Japan. Japan had ruthlessly rolled back the commercial interests of Australia, New Zealand, and Britain herself in 1914-1918. Weather it was right or justifiable for Australia and New Zealand to have these interests in the first place is not relevant. With extension of Japanese sphere of influence into former German possessions in the South Pacific, Australia and New Zealand were both compelled to make non-subtle threats of offering to host American fleet in their own ports in defiance of British wishes should Anglo-Japanese alliance continue.

[Werner]

I think Mr. Raffles would have something to say about your low opinion of his works....

Hong Kong has a museum which boasts "600 years of coast defense".

[Guest]

When Churchill was formulating his non-confrontation theory with respect to Japan, Japan was RN's only possible opponent. His theory boil down to "If there is no RN force in the pacific, then war with Japan is not possible".

[Werner]

Apart from British, Dutch and American colonial interests in The Pacific, what "economic interests" existed which weren't already in the hands of Japan?

I don't see a "Yokohama YKK" pier in any of the 1937-41 photos of the Japanese occupation of southeast China. There are "U.S. Royal Rubber" and "Shell Oil" signs about, though.

[Guest]

I think Mr. Raffles would have something to say about your low opinion of his works....

Hong Kong has a museum which boasts "600 years of coast defense".

Hong Kong has only been in British possession for 50 or so years in 1918. By fortified I mean able to support fleet operation for substantial period of time. Not there are no landward or coastal fortifications of any kind. At best Hong Kong can may be adequate to act as some sort of forward staging point for the RN. But the distance between HongKong and a real fleet base means even that is questionable and not for the large scale.

It was pointed out in 1918 that in a major confrontation with Japan, major repair to British warships is not possible unless the ship sails all the way back to Malta.

[Guest]

Apart from British, Dutch and American colonial interests in The Pacific, what "economic interests" existed which weren't already in the hands of Japan?

I don't see a "Yokohama YKK" pier in any of the 1937-41 photos of the Japanese occupation of southeast China. There are "U.S. Royal Rubber" and "Shell Oil" signs about, though.

Actually, quite a bit at the beginning of WWI. Japanese interests outside of colonies in Korea and Taiwan and direct trade with the US and Britain, was negligible in 1914. By 1918, even before receiving German Asian and Pacific possessions, Japan already dominated northern and eastern China and the carrying trade throughout the west pacific south to the shores of Australia.

[Werner]

The German Pacific? Half of New Guinea, most of the Solomons and Samoa? I bet the 1920 GNP of the German Pacific was under $100,000US.

[Guest]

The German Pacific? Half of New Guinea, most of the Solomons and Samoa? I bet the 1920 GNP of the German Pacific was under $100,000US.

Yes, but it sits much closer to Australia, gives Japan plenty of coaling stations to further extend her carrying trade to the west and south, and makes it all the more plausible for Japan to dominate Australian security and transportation. In one generation Australia went from being a imperials outpost without much to worry about other than how to fit well into British imperial interests in Asia and making some off on the side, to staring a far stronger foreign power in the eye who has eliminated much Australia's chances for making anything on the side. How does it make you feel if at the same time you must smile and be polite to that foreign power because he is good friends with your own Imperial suzerain?

[Guest]

Oh, The German possession in China was by no means negligible in its own economic worth, not to mention giving Japan access to resource rich Northern China.