What-If modernized Spruance-class DDG

[navydavesof]

HOOYAH!

We'll show the budget dorks what they missed out on! Ha, ha, YEEEEEESSS!

Some very interesting thoughts put forward here.

I would imagine, a Mk71 modernized, had it been retained, would have a newer Low RCS layout to it. And it might have, of course, been made into a slightly more compact version.

I always thought a VLS Kidd would look neat, so I look forward to seeing the design in action, Dave. She should be quite something to see.

[SumGui]

I would have paid real money to have had been in those conversations, I'll be jealous of you until the day I die.

Many times I have considered purchasing your book, but did not due to my general frustration with the Spruance class, which I consider a great design which was under built due to politics/money. I will have to purchase it now to add to my 150+ book library, my Wife will be SO pleased to see another book come in....

You make many points which I have never seen before and are directly in conflict with other sources (the definition of a good book, by the way...).

The DDG 993 was not a DXG design, in the original sense of DX/DXG. The USN never requested proposals for the DXG design, because as Norman Friedman wrote, the contract design of the DD 963 class provided for a future conversion to a DDG, primarily by installing Tartar D and by replacing the SPS-40 air search radar with SPS-48. (Also, VAdm Weschler, the DD 963 project manager, concluded that the complexity of a new-start DXG was beyond the capabilities of the total package procurement method.) Or, an extant DD 963 could be modernized for undersea combat with towed array sonar.

"Contractors were asked to bid on runs of 30, 40, and 50 DXs, and 25 and 35 DXGs. In early 1968, it was expected that all DXs would have been delivered by 31 December 1977, all DXGs by one year later. CD contracts were awarded to Newport News, to Avondale (who had much DE 1052 experience), to Todd Shipyards, to General Dynamics (Quincy), to Litton Industries (Ingalls), and to Bath Iron Works. The competitors were narrowed to General Dynamics, Litton, and Bath for the DP stage, and Litton was awarded a contract for 30 destroyers in June 1970"
(Freidman, pg 376, col 2 paras2 and 3)

These 30 contracted to Litton are the Spruance class. Naturally, Hayler would come later as an add-on of sorts. This tells me Friedman is of the opinion that DX was Spruance, and they did request proposals for the DXG ("asked to bid"), but only awarded a contract for 30 DX. The last two lines of your above quoted passage I am in 100% agreement with.

Of course, as we know, the Kidd class commissioned with Tartar-D and SPS-48 instead of the SPS-40 given to the Spruance class, exactly as you state. They gained the SPS-49 in NTU.

There was not a design requirement for one extant DD 963 to be modernized for both warfare areas. The decision about which way to go in updating the ships was in 1975 intentionally left to the future, to depend on operational requirements. The undersea warfare upgrade was chosen in the 1980s. To call the DDG conversion design "DXG" is really not technically accurate, notwithstanding that it appears as "DXG" in US Destroyers

"The basic design provides for both modernization and an AAW conversion (i.e. DDG)."
(Freidman, pg 377, col 2, para 1)

"As for DXG, it was ordered, but not by the U.S. Navy but by Iran, which originally asked for six but then cut the order to four in view of the escalation to a unit price of $330 million. With the fall of the Shah, the new Iranian government was more than willing to part with these expensive ships, which the Imperial Navy had termed cruisers rather than destroyers. All four were bought under the FY 79 supplemental appropriation for a total of $1.35 billion, a bargain at current rates (in FY 79 six FFG & cost $1.2 billion) to become the Kidd class."
(Freidman, pg 377, col 2, para 3)

Again, Friedman's opinion is clearly that the Kidd class are DXGs. I do put weight on his choice of the word "and" in the first quote.

With a nod to the fact that the DX/DXG concept had many forms before Spruance, as does any concept through production process, I look forward to finding the difference between Spruance/Kidd and DX/DXG in your book.

The contracted DD 963 design (by Litton to a NavShips requirements specification) provided for the AAW update with the Tartar D system from an extant DD 963. The DDG 47 concept, later CG 47, came about only after the DD 963 contract was signed with Litton. The adaptation of the contracted DD 963 design (by NavOrd) for Aegis did not provide for conversion from an extant DD 963. The Aegis office (then in NavOrd) agreed to fit Aegis as a new installation within the margins for Tartar D. To keep the Aegis DDG alternative alive, the DD 963 office (then in NavShips) retained the DD 963 margins in evaluating engineering change proposals.

As you say (I think), the Aegis deckhouses could not be installed as payloads on an extant DD 963. Instead the Aegis structures and the DD 963 strength members were merged in the DDG 47 design. Again, the design agency for DDG 47 was different than for DD 963 and DDG 993.

Just to be clear here, the only reason I brought the Ticonderoga design in was to illustrate the inherent flexibility of the basic design. I don't want to give the impression that I believe a DD-963 can be modified into a CG-47 - those changes would be far too great. The differences between DD-963 and DDG-993 are not as great.

The LAMPS mark III project was underway before the USN acquired the DDG 993 class in 1979. The test ship for LAMPS mark III was FFG 8 and was already at sea with the SH-60.

The Kidd class was ordered an built for the Shah of Iran - 'he' decided what equipment they were to have on build (And yes, I REALLY appreciated the extra air conditioning while onboard). Their LAMPS I and lack of SQR was already decided by the time the USN took over the ships. Sikorsky's S-70 was only selected to become the platform for LAMPS III in 1978 - the ships had been ordered and construction began well before that. First production SH-60B Seahawk flight was 11 Feb, 1983, and first deployment was in 1985 - both well after the Kidd class commissioning dates (1981-1982).

Again, as primarily AAW assets, the Kidd's would not have been first on the list to get refit for LAMPS III.

With ships in service, the actual situation in the 1980s was different than on paper in the mid-1970s. The actual SQQ-89 and ABL/VLS conversions of the DD 963s increased their displacements to 9,200-9,300 tons, partly for lead ballast. The DDG 993 design featured a strengthened hull that could support 10,000 tons. There was no way to increase the hull strength of an extant DD 963 to support DDG weapons on top of the SQQ-89/VLS upgrade, and there would be stability problems even had the hull strength existed.

Naturally, the refit done in the 80's may not have been a perfect match for the potential refit envisioned (AAW conversion) during the design process. I doubt much data existed on the mk 41 VLS in 1970. That the SQQ-89/LAMPS III refit may have 'eaten up' the margin, orginally designed in, to convert to DDG is quite different than the DDG conversion being impossible.

Based on the opinions of the operators of both classes of ships, what I experienced while onboard, supported by data in Friedman�s book (and other references, although they could be 'borrowing' from Friedman), I continue to stand by my opinion that there should have been no issue with refitting Spruance Class destroyers to the Kidd standard.

I look forward to finding out what those issues might be when I read your book.

I am in no way offended, in fact I find healthy debate inspiring, as it drives each party to look deeper into their beliefs and/or assumptions - and that is the best way to learn.

[navydavesof]

As a matter of fact, I asked CNO Roughead about the Mk71 and NFSF, and he acted like he had never heard of it. I can undersand, beacause he is not an expert in NSFS, and he has a lot on his plate. When I asked him, he acted like anything beyond the 5"/62cal gun and the 155mm gun was just beyond him!
But you know, if people had focused on installing the Mk 71 (since we all know it was a sucessful project) on Sprucans and Burkes, then we would have a SHOCKINGLY effective NSFS'general gunnery system on EVERY new DDG. It'd be so cool seeing a permanent UAV element to every DDG directing its gun battery
Why can't they think of this on their own? It kind of pisses me off as a sailor!

[Michael Potter]

Rockin' posts! The exchange of ideas you guys are having is very informative. So, let me ask you, I saw you said the displacement of existing DD-963 hulls could only support 9,200 to 9,300 tones but could not support 10,000 tones. With that in mind, could a DD-963 in your opinion support the addition of another 64 cell VLS pad back aft in the place of the Sea Sparrow launcher?

Thanks, and I hope I say that for other correspondents here, to whose thoughts and initiative in writing (which is time consuming, gentlemen!) I responded. I appreciate the comments from all.

For time reasons, I shall reply to the post quoted above. About the potential 2nd VLS: from my understanding, no, the DD 963s could not support a second 61-cell VLS or a 64-cell Mk 41 VLS. However, the original intent of the VLS project might have allowed for a VLS of an earlier configuration to support the DDG upgrade option.

In the original contract DD 963 design, which you see in USS Spruance and her earliest sisters as built (before USS Moosbrugger), the potential future update for air defense provided for the launcher configuration that existed on the DDG 993 and CGN 38 classes: 24-round Mk 26 Mod 0 forward, 44-round Mk 26 Mod 1 aft. The undersea warfare modernization option provided for a Mk 26 Mod 0 launcher forward.

Mk 26 launchers supported what I shall call, for the purposes of this post, "short" missiles: Standard SM-1(MR), ASRoc (the box launcher version, not vertical-launch ASRoc), and Harpoon. The original DD 963's had the capacity for 24 ASRocs: 8 in the launcher and 16 in the magazine. For handling reasons, nuclear ASRoc rounds in the magazine displaced more than their number of torpedo ASRoc rounds. Some publications hint that on Mk 26 ships, the forward Mk 26 launcher was similarly intended for 24 ASRocs (some nuclear) and the aft Mk 26 launcher was for 44 SM-1(MR)'s (none nuclear). However, all the Mk 26 launcher arms had the extensions for ASRoc. Since the DDG 993's were begun for Iran, their nuclear option was deleted, and it was not restored when the Carter Administration obtained these ships for the USN. AFAIK both Standards and ASRocs could go in either Mk 26 magazine.

The original concept for VLS was to provide a plug-in successor to the Mk 26 launchers and magazines for "short" missiles only, within the same volume and utilities. The limitation for the DD 963 class would be that the total mass of the loaded VLS could not exceed the allowable mass of the Mk 26 launcher and its loaded magazine, since the Tartar-D system would put the modernized ship at its weight limits.

If you have the weights of these various launchers and "short" missiles, which may exist in the early editions of Norman Friedman's World Naval Weapons Systems, you might be able to compute the potential number of loaded VLS "short" cells. Notice that the answer could vary depending on the mix among the different missiles. Suppose Missile X weighed 80% of Missile Y; then you could load qty 5 Missile X's in place of qty 4 Missile Y's. Since the short VLS would look the same from above as the actual Mk 41, for a model of a hypothetical DD 963 modernized for air defense you could on this basis legitimately show an aft VLS installation of the number of cells you estimate. Remember that a reload crane occupied the space of another three VLS cells per VLS, in this design.

Reagan's SecNav John Lehman put a high priority on Tomahawk, which had a nuclear version for launch in torpedo tube mode or box launcher mode. Tomahawk was a longer missile and required a deeper VLS than the VLS design for the "short" missiles. Lehman killed the VL-Harpoon to force the uniformed USN to accept his priority for the deep VLS, in order to support Tomahawk anti-ship missiles, and thus to support the naval Tomahawk program, about whose life prospects the uniformed USN was evidently dubious in the early 1980s. Three items here: 1, whether Lehman was really competing against the USSR or against the USAF, some other historian may evaluate. 2, IIRC neither a vertical-launch Tomahawk anti-ship missile nor a vertical-launch nuclear Tomahawk land-attack missile was ever developed, on Lehman's watch or ever since. 3, USN skeptics about Tomahawk could note that the USN nuclear Tomahawks were moved to storage ashore in 1989, the US Army nuclear Tomahawks or GLCMs were scrapped altogether, and the anti-ship Tomahawks were converted to conventional land attack.

The deep VLS became the Mk 41 VLS that went into USN service. Lehman did not think to tell the designers of the CG 52 series about how many Tomahawks to plan for when computing weights. The CG 52 ship designers, not operational planners, proposed 16 Tomahawks and 45 SM-2(MR)'s, which OpNav then authorized as the basis for naval architectural calculations.

The weapons community came up with an abortive antisubmarine weapon called Sea Lance, with VL-ASRoc, and with longer Standard missiles. All of these required the deeper VLS cells and increased the weight of the loaded VLS. The heavier missiles made the VLS reload crane so slow as to be useless for UnReps, since it was sized for the "short" missiles. The Standards required missile guidance systems aboard the launching ship (or aboard a ship data-linked to the launching ship, which USS Kidd and Scott actually tested in 1989, but was not implemented), which were never provided for the DD 963 class.

I believe that much of the ballasting of the DD 963s was to counterbalance the mass forward of the VLS if filled with Tomhawk land-attack missiles. It is for that reason that I doubt that mounting a deep Mk 41 VLS aft was a possibility for the DD 963 class; and only the deep VLS entered USN service.

[Sauragnmon]

A Tactical Mk41 aft would be a very interesting one, and a somewhat purpose-fitted unit in the aft mountings of the Spruance or Kidds - it would allow carriage of TLAM without sacrificing ASW/AAW/TBM/ETC payload in the carriage of a significant strike package.

However, I don't know how much difference is in the Ticonderoga/CG-47 VLS vs the Spruance/DD-963 designs around the aft section, but VLS-Ticons carry a Strike length VLS aft as well - I wonder if there was significant belowdeck changes in that area, but they carried Mk26 before refit, so I'm left to wonder.

[goldenpony]

The Kidd class was ordered an built for the Shah of Iran - 'he' decided what equipment they were to have on build (And yes, I REALLY appreciated the extra air conditioning while onboard). Their LAMPS I and lack of SQR was already decided by the time the USN took over the ships. Sikorsky's S-70 was only selected to become the platform for LAMPS III in 1978 - the ships had been ordered and construction began well before that. First production SH-60B Seahawk flight was 11 Feb, 1983, and first deployment was in 1985 - both well after the Kidd class commissioning dates (1981-1982).

I agree with your quote on the extra A/C. Operating in the Red Sea and even in the Med taht did come in handy. But, up in the North Atlantic it made the engine rooms really cool.

[SumGui]

If the 'full' MK 41 (Deep that is, heavy) caused the weight issue, I'd think that a program refitting up to 35 ships with two mounts each might have been enough to have development of a modified version with, say, the 16 deep +45 short mentioned by Capt. Potter. I wonder if that would save enough weight, and balance the fore/aft distribution better than what was done. The 'half' stack of MK41 (the 32 cell used forward on the Burkes) would also have been an option, as 29+29 is nothing to sneeze at either, with 32+32 w/o the crane.

I'd think either 16 deep in one VLS or 16 deep in each of a fwd and aft VLS would have been sufficient for most missions. As an operator and armchair naval architect, the SH-60B capability would be more valuable to me than VLASROC, so I'm looking at each deep cell as Tomahawk. Otherwise, 16 VLASROC forward and 16 Tomahawk aft still isn't a bad deal (or 8 and 24). Since the early 1990's the deep cells may have become more valuable, with the air threat diminishing in regards to massed Soviet air attack, but the need to tactical strike increasing. We also now have ESSM in quad packs to consider, with SM-3 probably left to the CGs with Aegis.

The removal of Sea Sparrow would also give back some weight, but the FC radars for NTU would add much more, and higher up in the ship. The first place I'd go looking for compensation is the aft MK 45, but that is so far aft I doubt it would be valuable as compensation. Harpoon is mounted high in these ships, so some 'high' weight savings could be had by moving them to the fantail like the Ticonderoga�s.

Moving into the 2000-2010 time frame, I would sacrifice half the forward VLS if it would add the MK 71 MCLWG. This would give 90 cells (with reload crane, 96 without) just as the Burke's. As I don't have weight information on the VLS and MK 71 I'm not positive how that would work out, but by time I'd think it would fit. A Early/mid 90's refit to add AAW (lets say with the fore/aft modified VLS to save weight), then a mid 2000's fit to add a modernized MK 71 based NGFS capability.

Adding CAPT Potters input to my own considerable ego, it seems that a 32 cell forward, 32 cell aft with SH-60B and a MK71 MCLWG might be the most logical/possible combination for a mid 1990�s refit. 64 total cells (let�s say 16 deep, 16 'short' each) would give us 32 deep cells and 32 short. In the 2000-2010 time frame, I'd also consider modifying 8 of those short cells for quad pack ESSM. So - total 2009 load out would be 32 ESSM, 24 SM-2(block II/III as appropriate for the 'short' cells) and 32 long cells for a mix of Tomahawk/SM-2 (Longer range)/VLASROC as the mission requires. If the weight existed for all 64 cells to be 'deep', great (and that would prevent the need for putting a short version in service) - but I'm concerned with the added weight of all the other systems required by NTU (computers, FC radars, SPS-48E, etc). I�m still leaning toward re-using the NTU equipment as much as possible from the decommed CGs to keep costs under control. To this I would add the Flex deck/boathouse and sacrifice mount 52 to get it, with an eye toward a 76mm or 57mm if weight allows on top of the 'boat house' in the former mount 52 position, a deck higher, which I am hoping is far enough aft not to interfere with operation of the Helos. Harpoon I'd site forward of the bridge (the fantail wouldn't work with the boathouse), as the 32 cell MK 41 should leave deck space.

I now have a guide for a modified Spruance class that I�ll probably put together first, thanks to this discussion. I imagine I'll be using the Kidd class as the starting point, in order to get the superstructure, masts, and radars as close as plausible.

I Must have 10 different mod ideas for the Spruance class floating around in my head, hopefully I'll get time to model some next summer. I expect CAPT Potter's book to make some more realistic, although when modeling, you don't HAVE to be realistic...

But whatever we build, were probably looking at a departure from service about 2010-2015 anyway, as 35 years is all that can really be expected, and my opinion on the material condition of the Kinkaid while I was onboard would not have even supported that.

[navydavesof]

These are very interesting ideas and observations. I understand that they, as they were, should have been able to survive s standard service life of 30-35 years. If they were upgraded in such a way as the CGs are being right now, a massive hull and equiment upgrade, and a project similar to SLEP, the ships should have been able to survive for 50 years. There is no excuse that our ships do not last that long anyway.
It sounds to me that an NTU upgrade with a Mk71 up forward would certainly push the limits of the Spruance-class and possibly cause stability to become twichy in heavy seas.
Now, the question is:

What is so different between the Ticonderoga aft weapons position and the Spruance aft position that the Spruances could not support the very sme VLS pad as the Ticonderogas?

Thanks guys.

[Cliffy B]

As far as the 8"/55 goes, my father (Hayler plankowner) told me that at least Hayler, if not the whole class, was built ready to accept the guns with all of the necessary structural reinforcing. Whether or not they removed some of that in overhauls to save weight I don't know. The Mk 45s were installed in the interim until the 8"/55 was ready but then it got canceled so they kept the 5"/54s

[Sauragnmon]

From what I know, ALL of the Spruances were built drag-and-drop for the Mk71 - the Ticons and the Kidds did not feature the design as by that point it had become a non-concept. Their magazine positions in 51 were designed for the 8" systems and from day one the concept was that it would carry the Mk71.

I'm not exactly sure What differs between the Spruance/Kidd and the Ticon in the aft mounting so much that the magazine can't be adapted to carry VLS aft.

In the concept, a VLS-Spruance with 8" Might be pushing the edge of weight tolerances, but I'm not entirely sure.

[Michael Potter]

I'm not exactly sure What differs between the Spruance/Kidd and the Ticon in the aft mounting so much that the magazine can't be adapted to carry VLS aft.

The DD 963's as built had volume aft for the Mk 26 mod 1 launching system. The deep Mk 41 VLS was developed after the DD 963s were built so the question really is whether the VLS was adaptable.

Taking the ships as they existed in the late 1980s with the modernized undersea warfare systems installed, you would need to figure the margins (in damaged condition, like after a torpedo hit) of stability, buoyancy, and hull strength, and whether those could support the additional weight of a loaded VLS. My estimate is no -- see my post of 21 Jul 2009 21:05 in this topic thread.

You would also need to compensate for the loss of NSSMS. And, the fleet did not necessarily need more VLS cells.

[Sauragnmon]

In the context and timeframe in which his modernization is being presented, NSSMS has been for the most part supplanted by ESSMS, which can be quad-packed fore and aft in the VLS cells presented, easily supplanting the NSSMS and Mk26 launcher aft.

To properly calculate the weight, we would also have to look at the weight of the full Mk29/25 GMLS and equipment that was in the aft missile position that would be supplanted by the weight of the Mk41 VLS in that area - how much of an actual difference is there presented - Spruance was designed to house Mk26, housed the Mk25/29 on the aft position. Ticon housed Mk26 in the position, converted up to the Mk41. In Theory, it should be possible. In concept, the Mk41 should to a degree weigh Less as it does not have the mechanized magazine and launcher weight to handle, though it has the weight of the cell packing and the hatch mechanisms, and the crane in the case of earlier Mk41 launchers. Then we also would look at the weight of the Typical loading for a VLS of that size, or ostensibly the maximum loading of the VLS, vs the Mk26, and calculate from there.

In concept, the forward VLS might want to be smaller as well, with the larger Mk71 gun in position, it might present obstruction for forward cells at times through that bustle at the back of the turret.

Just a few thoughts.

[navydavesof]

Well, the Mk71 certainly weighs more.

Total weight 224,471 lbs

Max Mk45 weight: 54,150 lbs

I wonder if that would really cause much of a problem, because the ships were designed to take that gun in the front. Might it have actually improved stability?

[Sauragnmon]

Hmmmm, the Mk71's a heavy sucker.

Anybody have weight changes between the Spruance ASROC and Spruance VLS, Ticon Mk26 and Ticon VLS? I pulled the following from Wikipedia (so validity questionable):

Kidd - Full Displacement - 9,783 Tons
Tico - Full Displacement - 9,600 Tons
Sprucan - Full Displacement - 8,040 Tons

I don't know where in their respective service lives these are. If we can get Kidd original vs NTU, Spruance Mk16 vs VLS, and Ticon Mk26 vs VLS, we can deduce a few things, within reason:

Tico - the change would represent, to my knowledge, two Mk41 VLS mountings being fitted to the hull, so we could reason the tonnage change, divide by half to get weight of one VLS, as to my knowledge that's all that was fitted in that change, though I'm likely wrong.

Kidd - We can find the weight of the NTU suite in this one, again, not much else changed, though this would not include the SPS-48 radar, as it was already fitted.

Spruance - this is the full refitted weight with the VLS upgrade...

Now my concept might be a little screwballed here, I haven't had a whole lot of sleep, but it makes sense to me here.

We can take the Kidd Class, we're looking at essentially turning the Spruance into a Kidd, though minus a few things like the Air Conditioning. We can shave off some weight here and there, and we can take in the weight change from Mk26 to VLS on a Ticon, applying it to the mixture. We can also count in the weight alteration from the upgraded sonar suite, and then we can measure up if there's enough space in the ten thousand tons to refit the Mk71 in place on the new modified VLS-carrying monster. Though I would imagine the SPG-60 on the Spruances didn't come in until AFTER the VLS Upgrade, call it a hunch somewhere along the way. We could similarly toss the Sea Sparrow's illuminator suite, for more SPG-60/62 systems, mount a few more of them in strategic places to improve the engagement suite, yank off the older search radars for the NTU suite... ok, I'm rambling now, I'll shuddap.

[Michael Potter]

Gentlemen, please read the earlier posts in this thread, including mine. I already posted accurate data for displacement of a DD 963 with VLS or ABL: 9200-9300 tons. "Sprucan - Full Displacement - 8,040 Tons" is fiction. They were heavier than that brand new.

The limiting displacement for the DD 963 class as built was 8800 tons. The USN got above that for the VLS/ABL/SQQ-89 modernization by ballasting, and I would think by altering parts of the damage control system.

When designing the VLS installation, the USN set no requirement to maintain a margin forward for a heavier gun mount. The Mk 71 mount failed in accuracy during actual testing in the 1970s owing to muzzle wobble. Measured by deflection it literally could not shoot straight. The USN began experiments with guided projectiles. That continued until the previous administration, who gaily spent all the budget and then killed the project without delivering anything.

It is great to model alternative ship designs and to show never-were's. But unless you have a basis in facts, as a matter of honesty you owe it to viewers of the models to make clear that you based them on known fictions, instead of on researched facts and principles of naval architecture.

[Sauragnmon]

As I warned early in that post, I was not exactly well rested, and the figures I was going on were from wikipedia - I did not see the full exact numbers presented forward.

The whole concept of the "Super Spruance" as one might call Dave's idea, is the amalgamation of a number of demonstrated concepts based around a few core what if's in the process, such as:

What If the Spruances had not been removed from service?
What If the Spruances had been indeed fitted with Mk71, or an upgraded version to deal with fire accuracy?
What If the Spruances had been fitted with Mk26 Aft, and then upgraded, in similar fashion to the Ticonderoga, with VLS Fore and Aft, including associated fire control suites.
What If the Spruances, in this configuration, had further been upgraded with New Threat Update software to improve their multirole performance as fleet defence ships in more than simply ASW but in Anti-Air as well.

It's been stated the Spruances had accomodation for upgrade to a Mk26 suite aft, which would mean that ostensibly, it could still be fitted with a Mk41 Tactical VLS aft.

It's now been clarified that the Original VLS upgrade package on the Spruance did Not accomodate the idea of Mk71 - It is not clear whether this removed the extra bulkheads and magazine space fittings that came with the concept of a forward mounted 8" position, but is potentially safe to assume. From this, we could draw a partial compromise thought - why not decrease forward VLS cells, in light of an AAW/ASW suite being fitted in the aft block through Mk41 Tactical, to a 48 or 32 cell Mk41 Strike VLS - you're still gaining in the number of cells, and still retaining the strike package, with less forward intrusion into areas such as the planned 8" magazine. You're also decreasing the ammount of forward weight added, allowing the aft Mk41 to serve as fore/aft bias ballast for the forward systems, by and large an improvement against the Sea Sparrow's weight in the aft sections of the ship for fore/aft ballast bias. At this point ballasting could also similarly be adjusted to accomodate the new balancing of the ship.

We are not working in the context of pure fiction, as we are attempting to keep the concept grounded in the facts - well, Dave is anyways... My Spruance mods are... a little more out there, but that's just me, don't pick on him for that.

[SumGui]

I have read in recent documentation covering the options of retuning to building the Burke class in place of Zummwalt, that the AGS/155mm could be mounted on the DDG-51, but it would cost mount 51 and the forward VLS. There was no indication rather that was space or weight motivated. Keep in mind this information should be regarded are entirely anecdotal, as I was not able to relocate the article which presented this data to verify that I am remembering correctly. I believe it was Defense Industry Daily, but the expanded content on DDG-1000 is now in their subscription section, which I do not have access too.

That might provide rough guide for the modeling world to 'exchange' the refit 61 cell/Mk 45 DD-963 with an AGS system and a 32 cell VLS, were the refit to be done today. That still does not solve the ballasting issues mentioned by CAPT Potter, so the best so far it status quo. How to modify aft to get some balance back to alter that need for ballast?

As AAW might not be as important in a Spru refit today (we have a number of DDG-51s which will be far more capable than Spru refit for AAW in any case), why not belay the addition of a full AAW suite, an instead accept a robust point defense air system (ESSM, RAM, Phalanx block I) as any vessel with AGS will probably want to be close to land anyway? We would not want to waste a �gun line� asset on an AAW post, nor would we want the opposite.

So, one possibility for a 'land attack' Spruance might be the AGS forward, a 32 cell VLS fore and aft w/ESSM and Tomahawk (with an eye toward a medium range fire support missile), alteration of the hangar space to allow 1 SH-60 and 2 (or more?) UAV, a 57 or 76mm rapid fire gun in place of mount 52 to deal with the small boats that will doubtless be encountered close in, and removal of the towed array, as it would probably not be used in the littorals (and a medium freq sonar instead of the current LF in the bow). Again, the earlier boathouse/flex deck concept would be a good fit for an asset operating this close to land. Positions of RAM and Phalanx could be worked out as needed, and one can debate rather Phalanx is needed if a 57/76mm is added to deal with local surface threats.

I suppose one other option would be to remove mount 52 and Sea Sparrow to somehow get another AGS aft, but the separation between the aft location of the proposed VLS (where the Mk 29 Sea Sparrow was) and mount 52 is much greater that it is forward, so much re-arranging would have to be done for that to happen, if it could. It would also leave this theoretical �Land Attack� Spruance with only the 32 cells forward - I�d imagine with 32 ESSM in quadpack and 24 cells available for other weapons. Maybe not a bad combination, but I�d be concerned about close-in small boat protection without a small caliber mount to deal with them (remember, mount 52s space/weight is for the second AGS � not for the 57/76mm).

That would make the refit Spruance class a good fire support ship, instead of a second class (to the Burke/Tico) AAW ship.
They'd still have the big radar cross section they've always had, though, which would be a liability tactically and asset politically while close in shore.

[Sauragnmon]

You're cutting the capabilities short of using this concept fully:

Yes, AAW capacity would be second beside Burke/Tico - but they're off with the CV's, how many are with the gun line?

Why are we stopping short at 32 aft? Go for a full 61/crane or 64 aft, Tactical Mk41 supporting the Short missiles but not TLAM. This extra VLS would be more weight bias aft. Extra director positions mounted aft, similar to a Tico's aft director grouping, would increase threat engagement capacity as well.

Mount 51 could be retained in concept, or upgraded to the 5/62.

Additional Land Attack in the Short VLS could be through a revived VLS version of the LASM as well. NTU Suite can support defensive fire just as well at range, and still cover up close just the same. I'm not saying a full AAW suite, but a handful of SM-2ER Block IV wouldn't be remiss for the defensive suite, plus ESSM Quadpacks. RAM could be fitted on the fantail. The NTU Suite's Radar can still support ESSM and RAM, they use it on the CVNs these days, just not the full NTU Suite.

Of course, using the 155mm AGS would also give the support capacity for the Exalibur Guided Munitions package, granted the naval deploy round would reach much further in concept.

[navydavesof]

Hmmm, well very interesting guys. Thank you very much for the credit of the concept, comprehending, and keeping in perspective the actual concept. I appreciate you pointing that out.
The whole point I am trying to accomplish with these upgrades to the Spruance-class is to fill the NSFS VOID as quickly and effectively as possible. In order to make them effective NSFS ships, the Mk71 is the gun necessary, and in order to make them multi-mission enough to be accepted into the fleet, an AAW capability needs to be put on the ship. Well, NTU was about the most effective off-the-shelf system the Navy ever came up with, and it happened to be one of the two best AAW systems in the world.
I have heard over and over that NTU was in many ways superior to Aegis and did not cost nearly as much. So far, the only advantages I have heard Aegis has over NTU were that Aegis always had constant 360 degree covereage because of her fixed SPY arrays, and she had a better time kieeping track of swarm missile attacks.
NTU is a cheap way of bringing the land attack/ASW ships of the Spruance-class up to AAW standards needed to make them very competant escort ships. One must remember, too, that the NTU was specifically geared toward bringing the rest of the fleet up to the level of Aegis. In comparison to Aegis of 1990 being $500million, the NTU was only $52million. What a deal!
So, Captain Potter, it sounds like you're saying the potential issues with fitting a 64cell pad aft is not feasible because the area fitted for the Mk26 is not deep enough. In that case, why was the Mk26 area up front deep enough? If the two magazine areas (forward and aft) were meant for the same weapon system, then any mods made for one would likely be good for the other.
I understand that the Kidds were fitted with a 24 cell Mk26 forward specifically in the case that the Mk71 was ordered for the front mount. As a result, it soundsl ike the forward VLS pad might actually have to be reduced to a 32 cell pad, which sucks.
We all understand from other gunnery progects that barrel whip is a very fixable issue. The errors in the Mk71 were not corrected, and the project was dropped, because we cannot have gunnery getting in the way of aircraft; thus is why the battleships are not around anymore.
All of that aside, it certainly sounds like if these modifications were equipped on the Sprances-class DD(G)s, the ships would be pressed to their limits.

[navydavesof]

My vision for a DDG-963 is that it is fitted with a very effective AAW package, the only effective NSFS capability in the fleet, RAM lauchers can be put up on top of the AC units, and a perminant RPV unit would be attached. A permenant UAV det would be stationed aboard the ship. The intel gathered by ScanEagle last year when it was deployed aboard a DDG in my AOR was incredible. Such a UAV det would be aboard for both intel gathering, gunfire spotting, and laser deignation.