What-If LCS Flight II: Littoral Combat Ship Improvement

[Busto963]

One of my pet peeves came out - I have low tolerance to the idea that a sensor solves everything. You can see it? neat - now DO something about it... MPA in the CD world could not actually effect the target of the mission, so they were not the best bargain in my opinion.

The principle problem in warfare has always been to locate the enemy first. This is paramount to carry out Admiral Scott�s maxim to hit first. The reason that carrier displaced the battleship had nothing to do with firepower, or staying power � clearly the BB is supreme in those terms. The issue is that the carrier (air wing) had superior ability to detect, and decisively hit the enemy first.

Missile combat places an even greater premium upon sensors because the results of a missile exchange are even more lopsided for the side that hits effectively first. Captain Hughes Salvo equations explain the phenomenon nicely.

Based on what analysis?

Here I was almost agreeing with you on speed and now that's wrong too...hmm.

�I'd like to point out that that analysis is no more or less stringent than any other we are using here while we talk about the theoretical.

I do not believe you are looking at the effects of speed on naval warfare in terms of historical example, or analysis of real world scenarios.

The need for 35 knot speeds for surface combatants doing ASW or MCM was simply not an issue and had no practical effect on any of the major coastal combat operations in WWII, Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf War, the tanker war, or other conflict.

I cannot think of any significant OR work out of NPS or the War College that supports this idea that 35+ knot speeds of surface combatants gains you much in tactical performance. Hughes makes reference to this in his treatise on tactics as does Dr Friedman in his reference on U.S. destroyers.

I am having a hard time understanding why you keep bringing up FAC and the LCS mission: they are separate missions.

My goal is to meet the need of the littoral - and that includes ASW and defense against small boat swarms. The FAC carries out the ASW and counter-boat mission, the MCM carries out, well, MCM. I understand you have ASW on the MCM - we are just taking differing approaches.

My opinion is that the preeminent ASW platform is a submarine: largely because of the profound sensor advantage of the submarine. If our analysis pushes us to go with different hulls for each mission, then rather than select a surface ship for coastal ASW, I would advocate for SSKs.

I am also having trouble with your insistence on concepts like transit speeds: coastal missions are about presence. While certain scenarios may not require ships to enter the coastal area (they might use drones and aircraft, or weapons to achieve their mission), once ships do enter the coastal area, they are there to stay. The tactical requirement for high speed (30 knots) is just not there.

Transit speeds ARE presence. The speed which you can move between mission boxes or within your mission box allows for more area to be covered - thus, more presence.

Okay, now I see where you are coming from � my concept of coastal operations looks a lot more like the advance force operations prior to the invasions of Normandy, or Inchon. Once the enemy defenses are broken and friendly forces move into coastal areas, the attack must be persistent, and ideally affect the entire operations area. remaining enemy forces should be presented with a smothering, molasses attack.

I think that our most serious naval challenges (PG, Korean Peninsula, Taiwan) are going to look more like the coastal operations of history than yours. I believe numbers of units are very likely to be critical.

I confess to not having a crystal ball. Perhaps I spent too much time around Captain Hughes: that man knows a few things about coastal warfare�

[SumGui]

One of my pet peeves came out - I have low tolerance to the idea that a sensor solves everything. You can see it? neat - now DO something about it... MPA in the CD world could not actually effect the target of the mission, so they were not the best bargain in my opinion.

The principle problem in warfare has always been to locate the enemy first. This is paramount to carry out Admiral Scott�s maxim to hit first. The reason that carrier displaced the battleship had nothing to do with firepower, or staying power � clearly the BB is supreme in those terms. The issue is that the carrier (air wing) had superior ability to detect, and decisively hit the enemy first.

Missile combat places an even greater premium upon sensors because the results of a missile exchange are even more lopsided for the side that hits effectively first. Captain Hughes Salvo equations explain the phenomenon nicely.

I have nothing to disagree with there, and I again admit to being oversensitive to lack of effect on target once it has been detected - that comes from my years of watching the drug runners just go by and looking at LCS designs that don't seem to be able to sufficiently effect the targets they will encounter.

In the case of the littorals, it seems that for the foreseeable future anti-swarm defense will most likely be line of sight in the initial interaction, which should cause strikes on the small boat bases and an area search to find any more potential swarm participants to mop up. Essentially, is spite of early detection, our ROE may not allow us to shoot first until the entire event has gone hot.

Of course, this brings us to items like surface gunfire and the need for a system like Hellfire/Brimstone, so we have found a loop here.

I do not believe you are looking at the effects of speed on naval warfare in terms of historical example, or analysis of real world scenarios.

The need for 35 knot speeds for surface combatants doing ASW or MCM was simply not an issue and had no practical effect on any of the major coastal combat operations in WWII, Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf War, the tanker war, or other conflict.

I cannot think of any significant OR work out of NPS or the War College that supports this idea that 35+ knot speeds of surface combatants gains you much in tactical performance. Hughes makes reference to this in his treatise on tactics as does Dr Friedman in his reference on U.S. destroyers.

Note you state 35 knot speeds for ASW and MCM platforms - I only stated 35 for the FAC (now, if the ASW role was taken by the FAC, that is 35kts by default of where the ASW equpiment is mounted). MCM is fine 20 or less.

A small ASW platform will not have VLASROC (which would probably not be effective in shallow water anyway), so in the absence of helo or MPA support, the weapons they will have (in the near term) are surface launched torpedo and ASW mortar. Employment of weapons with ranges similar to these was shown to be most effective when the prosecuting vessel had a speed advantage on the submarine contact (as some SSKs today can sprint 20-25kts, I SWAGed my ASW asset required speed at 30kts). This is one reason the increased speed of submarines post WW II was such a concern - it drove the need for ASW escort speed higher. Granted, that data is prosecuting a moving submarine contact, in the case of prosecuting a bottomed SSK speed is less relevant. My concern is that SSKs can transition between crawl, sprint, and bottoming. An ASW mortar or rocket with range to match the sensors the ASW platform would be using could obviate the speed requirement.

Dr. Friedman's reference also talks about the advantage of escort speed over a submarine contact in the post-war ASW section.

While MPA or helo support is the desired state when prosecuting an submarine contact, we cannot guarantee that there will always be an air asset available, or that it would be in the right place at the right time. I want to ensure the ASW asset can still prosecute a submarine contact in the event of no air support. (I am also overly sensitive to the "Brown shoes save the world" cult - yes, I have my issues....).

In the case of most earlier studies, they involve fleet actions in blue water with occasional forays into restricted waters. In a blue water operation, your speed is in relation to a massive ocean, and is therefore not terribly relevant tactically. Strategic speed becomes the driver (how fast can you get to the AOR?). Dr. Friedman's destroyer work has good reference on speed when it discusses the Seahawk project, but again, the lack of cost benefit there assumes blue water ASW (no terrain), and I'm not an advocate for 40+ knots, so in two cases it breaks as a comparison. It is a fantastic reference for placing undue speed requirements on a design. My opinion is that 30-35 on the ASW/FAC hull of the sizes we are discussing would be easy to achieve without undue impact on the design.

I would love to have time to do a dissertation on the tactical effect of higher speeds in relation to the terrain that the littoral environment adds to the equation. I simply don't think terrain and reaction time has been considered sufficiently yet, in surface or subsurface actions. Some of my current influences in this belief are the books "Night Work" (CLs in the Solomons), and "Inside the Danger Zone" (http://www.usni.org/store/books/history ... anger-zone). I recommend both.

Some may not believe littoral terrain will be a major influence - but I am fascinated at the complexity it adds.

I really do believe many of our movements of the surface assets will have to be reactionary, and in the reactionary case that sprint speed becomes very important.

I have not yet read Capt. Hughes' revised book, I'll have to add that to the to-do list......

My opinion is that the preeminent ASW platform is a submarine: largely because of the profound sensor advantage of the submarine. If our analysis pushes us to go with different hulls for each mission, then rather than select a surface ship for coastal ASW, I would advocate for SSKs.

Agree here - now in addition to a separate Frigate thread, we need an SSK thread (or we just buy 212s...).

I think that our most serious naval challenges (PG, Korean Peninsula, Taiwan) are going to look more like the coastal operations of history than yours. I believe numbers of units are very likely to be critical.

I confess to not having a crystal ball. Perhaps I spent too much time around Captain Hughes: that man knows a few things about coastal warfare�

If we all had a crystal ball, we would be robbed of the fun and mental stimulation of conjecture...

[Busto963]

Of course, this brings us to items like surface gunfire and the need for a system like Hellfire/Brimstone�

Strongly agree, but would add Spike and the lowly unguided 70mm rocket pod to the �fashion show.�

I do not believe you are looking at the effects of speed on naval warfare in terms of historical example, or analysis of real world scenarios.

The need for 35 knot speeds for surface combatants doing ASW or MCM was simply not an issue and had no practical effect on any of the major coastal combat operations in WWII, Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf War, the tanker war, or other conflict.

I cannot think of any significant OR work out of NPS or the War College that supports this idea that 35+ knot speeds of surface combatants gains you much in tactical performance...

Note you state 35 knot speeds for ASW and MCM platforms - I only stated 35 for the FAC (now, if the ASW role was taken by the FAC, that is 35kts by default of where the ASW equpiment is mounted). MCM is fine 20 or less.

I think 30 knots is sufficient for all three coastal mission areas: ASW, MCM and ASUW.

Remember that as a general rule, you can go 80% as fast on half the power. Going from 30 to 35 knots is likely to nearly double the size of your propulsion plant: a major impact on hull design and cost.

A small ASW platform will not have VLASROC (which would probably not be effective in shallow water anyway), so in the absence of helo or MPA support, the weapons they will have (in the near term) are surface launched torpedo and ASW mortar.

I wanted to address this point: I think that it is possible to put VLS on a 600-800 ton hull. While VLA is probably not effective in shallow waters, the cost and weight of VLS is not great, and inevitably, there will be someone who dreams up something useful to shoot out of them that will be appropriate to the ship in costal opearations.

In the case of most earlier studies, they involve fleet actions in blue water with occasional forays into restricted waters. In a blue water operation, your speed is in relation to a massive ocean, and is therefore not terribly relevant tactically.

I disagree.

Operations Research began as a serious study of ASW during WWII. The mathematics of the problem are driven by hard physics of sensors and probability theory. I think you will find that signal to noise ratio (at the sonar), hydrography, and speed are always key factors in ASW.

If you want to look at the mathematics of Search and Detection look to Alan Washburn�s basic text on the subject titled �Search and Detection�. The topic is extensively modeled by stochastic and Monte Carlo simulation methods by the USN, and certainly other navies.

Some may not believe littoral terrain will be a major influence - but I am fascinated at the complexity it adds.

In ASW, hydrography always influence an engagement � you are right to address it.

[SumGui]

I think 30 knots is sufficient for all three coastal mission areas: ASW, MCM and ASUW.

Remember that as a general rule, you can go 80% as fast on half the power. Going from 30 to 35 knots is likely to nearly double the size of your propulsion plant: a major impact on hull design and cost.

Certainly true on the power - but on the size we are considering most of the existing reference platforms already have over 30 knots, in some cases well over 30. I am/was operating on the idea that the majority of what we need for LCS already exists out there. I am a big fan of using a solid reference point and making minor modifications. I think the utility of speed on a conventional hull ends at about 35 knots based on my time on two platforms of about this size - Squall and Whirlwind.

Operations Research began as a serious study of ASW during WWII. The mathematics of the problem are driven by hard physics of sensors and probability theory. I think you will find that signal to noise ratio (at the sonar), hydrography, and speed are always key factors in ASW.

If you want to look at the mathematics of Search and Detection look to Alan Washburn�s basic text on the subject titled �Search and Detection�. The topic is extensively modeled by stochastic and Monte Carlo simulation methods by the USN, and certainly other navies.

I'll clarify that I am not under the impression that hull mounted sensors will be effective at 20+ knots, I want the 30kt speed to reposition the sensor platform itself - ala sprint and drift.

In ASW, hydrography always influence an engagement � you are right to address it.

ASW Hydrography won't be the only effect - all sensors will be influenced by the terrain of the littoral - visual and radar included. There are many references covering the odd electromagnetic 'terrain' of the Arabian Gulf, and many history references to small platforms using the congested radar picture generated by small islands and large landmass backdrops to their advantage - including my time hunting drug runners. Targets who are familiar with the resident 'sensor terrain' of a given area will have an advantage.

[Busto963]

I think 30 knots is sufficient for all three coastal mission areas: ASW, MCM and ASUW.

Remember that as a general rule, you can go 80% as fast on half the power. Going from 30 to 35 knots is likely to nearly double the size of your propulsion plant: a major impact on hull design and cost.

Certainly true on the power - but on the size we are considering most of the existing reference platforms already have over 30 knots, in some cases well over 30. I am/was operating on the idea that the majority of what we need for LCS already exists out there.

Every design represents a trade-off; but buying a hull with an excessively large propulsion plant is unacceptable. There is no reason that the power plants for a given hull should not be sized appropriately for the mission, existing design or not. There is plenty of room for improvement here.

I'll clarify that I am not under the impression that hull mounted sensors will be effective at 20+ knots, I want the 30kt speed to reposition the sensor platform itself - ala sprint and drift.

I do not understand your reasoning both in terms of the search methodology, efficiency, and effectiveness, as well as in terms of sonar performance.

The reasons sprint and drift works for blue water ASW does not translate into coastal ASW.

"Coastal" ASW almost certainly calls for an exhaustive search of a fixed geographical area, which is not remotely related to the problem that blue water ASW presents. In blue water, repositioning the sensor along the axis of advance assists with the search methodology; in the coastal scenario it does not.

I cannot get my head around the idea of taking a search platform and dashing through an unswept area with your primary sensors either off-line (VDS, TACTASS), or severely degraded (hull); all in the off chance that the SSK is going to attempt a high speed dash. Then there is the issue of VDS deployment or recovery. It is probable that the �sprint� is in the wrong direction in relation to the target. In the event that the dash is towards the enemy, the platform is now blinded during the approach, and the noise makes it more difficult for other searching units to detect, the enemy. Mathematically, this is the same methodology as conducting a random search - the least effective method possible for searching a fixed geographical area.

[Sciquest2525]

How about the characteristics of an armed LCS? The miniBurke option?
150 meters with baseline propulsion and 6000 tons displacement?
Fast Forty Twin displace 30mm guns of ASuW weapons fit? Up to 788 rounds with deck penetration, 900 rds/min ROF, dual magazine/dual feed.
Fast Forty Single weights less with no deck penetration, how about it? 144 rds ammo/450 rds/min/dual feed/dual magazine?

[Busto963]

How about the characteristics of an armed LCS? The miniBurke option?
150 meters with baseline propulsion and 6000 tons displacement?
Fast Forty Twin displace 30mm guns of ASuW weapons fit? Up to 788 rounds with deck penetration, 900 rds/min ROF, dual magazine/dual feed.
Fast Forty Single weights less with no deck penetration, how about it? 144 rds ammo/450 rds/min/dual feed/dual magazine?

FFG-7s were on the order of 136 meters and displaced roughly 4300 tons (depending on flight): at 150 meters and 6000 tons you are proposing a large frigate or destroyer.

If you are advocating a ship along the lines of the Absalom class, then that is fine, but I am not following the weapons loadout for a 6000 ton warship.

Keep in mind, that the CRS defined missions "The LCS�s originally stated primary missions are antisubmarine warfare (ASW), mine countermeasures (MCM), and surface warfare (SUW) against small boats (including so-called �swarm boats�), particularly in littoral (i.e., near-shore) waters."

A 6000 ton ship should provide a robust MCM helicopter capability, but then it probably is not going to be cheap enough to field in great numbers.

[SumGui]

Fun videos for potential LCS weapons:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jo86Sy7_kuw

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HC9p7_JAXMA

Nice to see the bridge of a Cyclone class PC bridge in that second video...spent many an hour there....

[navydavesof]

While this is several steps down the road, I am going to apply a camoflague to the LCS-3 Flight II design. I have been seeing on the CASF LCS-1 thread people are suggesting one camo over another. For instance:

Wish they'd honor tradition by re-using some of the neat WWII Destroyer schemes! Love to see a MS-12(mod) or a true splinter scheme like MS-3X/6D:

Surely they could make minor tweaks to a "legacy" design to accomplish the stated objectives ("Fort Worth was painted with a pattern intended to meet two principal objectives: to conceal hull exhaust ports, to reduce detection and exterior maintenance of the ship when compared to a uniform haze gray paint job.").

Perhaps something like the following two for Gearing DDs:

http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/imag ... 177463.jpg
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/imag ... 104908.jpg

Keeping in mind that this ship will be operating within eye shot of the coast conducting ASuW operations, and its exhaust port will need to be masked ( ) what kind of camo would you consider?

[Sciquest2525]

A senior USN officer, commander of surface forces, I believe, is calling for scrapping Arleigh Burke Flt III and LCS. He wants a clean sheet of paper design for air/missile defense and an LCS replacement. The AviationWeek.com article mentioned that the 'armed' export LCS might be adequate.
I was in haste yesterday, and did not have time to mention above article.
We have been given the Multi Mission Combat Ship or MCS from Lockheed offering, first, a short hull Freedom Class with 90 meter length/12 meter beam/1650 tons with four desiel drive/waterjets/3500 nmi range @ 15 knots. Ship features hull mounted/towed array/VDS sonars, two triple 12.75 inch ASW torpedo tubes,76 mm gun, two 30 mm guns for small craft defense, Harpoon SSM/other SSM RAM 21 cell launcher, two helos, decoy launchers, reduced space for mission modules, 3D and fire control radars, ect and maximum speed unspecified for export. By contrast, the current Freedom class is nearly naked in terms of armament.
The website claims that the hull form is proven for lengths of 67-150 meters and 1000-6000 tons displacement.
I had thought of having two 76 mm gun CIWS, RAM 21 cell launcher and replacing the 30 mm guns replaced by Fast Forty 40 Single or Twin guns with choice of ammo

[Busto963]

... the Multi Mission Combat Ship or MCS from Lockheed offering, first, a short hull Freedom Class with 90 meter length/12 meter beam/1650 tons with four desiel drive/waterjets/3500 nmi range @ 15 knots. Ship features hull mounted/towed array/VDS sonars, two triple 12.75 inch ASW torpedo tubes,76 mm gun, two 30 mm guns for small craft defense, Harpoon SSM/other SSM RAM 21 cell launcher, two helos, decoy launchers, reduced space for mission modules, 3D and fire control radars, ect and maximum speed unspecified for export. ...

I had thought of having two 76 mm gun CIWS, RAM 21 cell launcher and replacing the 30 mm guns replaced by Fast Forty 40 Single or Twin guns with choice of ammo

Well the MCS looks to be a proper corvette - she also has a small 8-cell VLS!

Sticking with diesels seems to be a wise choice. How this affects the sonar is another question.

I do not think you are going to get another 76mm gun on that hull without giving up something in exchange. I think SumGui has the right idea for anti-swarm boats: Helllfire/Brimstone, maybe with similar launcher for Griffin.

I would like to see how the redesign affects:

• 1) Sea keeping (90 meter planning hull).
  2) The mission deck and boat/ROV handling.
  3) how is the MCS able to accomplish the MCM mission? Maybe the fleet would buy a specialized hull for MCM?

[Sciquest2525]

At least Lockheed's entry is cheap looking.
Forgot to mention the eight cell VLS at either the self defense or tactical lengths. You might have four cells with quad paked ESSM (16 missiles) and four cells for VL-ASROC.
The 150 meter is my favourite for a low/high mix of two LCS types. With a 6000 ton displacement, new systems might be possible.
The inability of the MH-60S to safely tow the mine detection sonar and minesweeping sled is a problem that might be resolved by operating the EH101 Merlin or V-22 Osprey in the minehunting/mineclearing role but the hanger would have to have an additional deck level because of height of both these a/c.
Structural strengthen might be needed to accomodate the higher weights of these a/c.
Seahawk will need replacement in the 2020s and Merlin weighs more at 14 tones vs. the 11 ton SH-60 for roomier cabin and greater payload capacity while the tilt rotor Osprey offers more speed and payload. The ideal solution though would be a MCM version of the upcoming MH-53K which three deck levels high and lengthened to accomodate the MH-53K and the necessary structural strengthen to handle about 95,000 lbs gross weight of the 'K' model.
It should be noted that the earlier MH-53Es were used in minesweeper role.
You could only afford a small number of 'super LCSs' to accomodate one stowed MH-53Ks but they have greater weight availible for minesweeping gear.
Osprey might replace the Seahawk but current USN destroyers/cruisers/LCSs lack the hanger length, height and weight
limits to operate the Osprey so it would be operated on them (if ever) permanently parked, one per ship, on the flight deck.
Replace aluminium deckhouse with either steel or composite deckhouse.
Redesign deckhouse to add the additional deckhouse height to accomodate Osprey tiltrotors, EH101 Merlins and MH53K large helicopters.
Naturally, the aviation support facilities would have to be swapped out for each of these a/c for maintaince/repair support depending on the mission.
EH-101 and/or an Osprey variant for ASW with the heavy weight for MCM.
Naturally, a properly trained a/c crew for each type would also be needed.
Big LCS problem is that Independence class has an internal mission bay elevator which the Freedom class lacks and Independence flight deck able to handle H-53 helos though, it cannot accomodate it in the hangar.
Folded, the Osprey is 63' long/18.5' high/18.5 wide.
Folded H-53 helos is 99' feet long, around 16 feet wide and around 20 feet high and requires a big hangar.
Hopefully, we might have the 90 meter MSC as the coastal low end and the 150 meter variant as the high end.

[Busto963]

The 150 meter is my favourite for a low/high mix of two LCS types.

I am not sure that the �high mix MCS is really worth the effort. At 6000 tons it should be a true destroyer or large frigate with the sea-keeping , sensors and weapons to match. The planning hull draws much concern here.

The inability of the MH-60S to safely tow the mine detection sonar and minesweeping sled is a problem that might be resolved by operating the EH101 Merlin or V-22 Osprey in the minehunting/mineclearing role but the hanger would have to have an additional deck level because of height of both these a/c.
Structural strengthen might be needed to accomodate the higher weights of these a/c.

I love the MCH101, but I just cannot see operating it off of a 90 meter ship as it is on the same weight class as a H-47, or H-53, and given the concern about the hull strength, I cannot see the deck girders being able to take the weight either. Remember you have a large open mission deck underneath. The V-22 brings weight and exhaust heat concerns.

The H-53/MCH101/H-47/V-22 are very large, very specialized aircraft that cannot be added to a design without a lot of thought from the outset (read major redesign).

The ideal solution though would be a MCM version of the upcoming MH-53K which three deck levels high and lengthened to accomodate the MH-53K and the necessary structural strengthen to handle about 95,000 lbs gross weight of the 'K' model...

The H-53 has nearly twice the Class �A� mishap rate of any other helicopter in the U.S. military (the V-22, although not a helicopter is worse). The H-53 is also the most maintenance intensive helicopter in the U.S. military.

The H-47 has nearly the same capacities as an H-53, is flown in allied naval service, is in current production, cost a lot less than a H-53 to buy and operate, and it floats!

�Osprey might replace the Seahawk but current USN destroyers/cruisers/LCSs lack the hanger length, height and weight
limits to operate the Osprey so it would be operated on them (if ever) permanently parked, one per ship, on the flight deck.

Osprey is not likely suited to towing MCM sleds; the requirement is to tow at <20 knots which is the transition zone between hover and fixed wing flight. The V-22 is at its least stable part of the flight envelope, and this is where most of the crashes (the V-22 has the worst mishap rate of *all* U.S. aircraft).

[carr]

..

[Sciquest2525]

Is the semiplanning hull has some stability issue in blue waters?
The SV-22 would have to met a sustained hover requirement for operating a dipping sonar but as pointed out but I don't know if the hovering issues you pointed out could have been solved. SV-22 would have had the complete S-3B avionics plus the dipping sonar, 60 sonobuoys,MAD, high resolution nose radar, MAD, four internally stowed ASW torpedos, fueslalage side Sidewinders and an auxillary wings with four hardpoints for fuel tanks, IR suppressor for the engines. Although the hover requirements might not be met, it could might still operate, sans dipping sonar from CVNs/destroyers/frigates as an SA-3B replacement if the issues you pointed out could be met.

[Busto963]

Is the semiplanning hull has some stability issue in blue waters?

Yes!

The SV-22 would have to met a sustained hover requirement for operating a dipping sonar but as pointed out but I don't know if the hovering issues you pointed out could have been solved.

No. Carr did a great job of explaining why, but the V-22 was not designed to fly like a helicopter - it is a plane that is designed to fly like a fixed wing plane and spend a very limited part of it's flight profile in hover. It does not hover nearly as well as a helicopter.

SV-22 would have had the complete S-3B avionics plus the dipping sonar, 60 sonobuoys,MAD, high resolution nose radar, MAD, four internally stowed ASW torpedos, fueslalage side Sidewinders and an auxillary wings with four hardpoints for fuel tanks, IR suppressor for the engines. Although the hover requirements might not be met, it could might still operate, sans dipping sonar from CVNs/destroyers/frigates as an SA-3B replacement if the issues you pointed out could be met.

What you are describing is nothing like any V-22 variant that has been funded. This may have made it to the artists concepts, but it did not get any serious consideration by the engineering team.

The USMC had trouble putting any external armament on their V-22s, AFSOC systems (the turret) comes a great expense. I shudder to think what it would cost to ad a bomb bay to the V-22, let alone how you would access it to arm the aircraft. I suppose you could drop torpedoes the way the C-130 drops daisy cutters (pushing them off the ramp), but the modifications you are talking about would require a major structural modification of the aircraft, and major $$$. Just adding drop tanks would radically affect manning, training, logistics, and depot level maintenance.

It would be nice if the Navy could build a VSTOL aircraft with similar capabilities as the S-3, but it is safe to say that the V-22 will never be that aircraft.

[Sciquest2525]

Maybeye a clean sheet of paper tiltrotor could be designed for USN that would meet the requirements of sustained and safe hover. The advantages of a tiltrotor and not the Osprey for ASW/ASUW would be greater payload, greater speed and more and better sensors for both ASW/ASUW missions. These features could be part of the design process from day one which would include more stable/prolonged/safer hover/helo mode performance.
Or have the EH101 Merlin licensed produced here with future ships helo hangars enlarged to accomodate the Merlin with folded dimensions of 52 feet long, by 15 feet wide (sans any weapon pylons) and 17 feet high. Greater payload and endurance also.

[carr]

..

[Busto963]

The advantages of a tiltrotor ... for ASW/ASUW would be greater payload, greater speed and more and better sensors for both ASW/ASUW missions.

I'm not really seeing the advantages. ASW is a slow process over relatively small surface areas. Speed is not a particular advantage (travel to and from the operating area, maybe?). What better ASW sensors would a tiltrotor have that a standard Seahawk helo wouldn't? As far as payload, the S-3 Viking carried two torps, if I recall. A Seahawk can carry two torps. Would a tiltrotor be able to carry more? Seems unlikely if a Viking couldn't.

I think the V-22 is a poster child for bad weapon systems, but a tilt-rotor MPA would, in-theory offer significantly greater search range and search rate. It would be a much more responsive platform for SuCAP; being able to respond to threats over a wider area.

I do not see a problem with payload for tilt-rotors, the thrust to weight is enormous: you almost cannot overload a V-22 as there is not enough cargo volume for what she can lift.

The ability to actually put usable weapons bays and hard points on the airframe is another issue.

Given the inherently more difficult maintenance issues (the MV-22 has a 53% availability rate) for a tiltrotor, I'd rather have two Sea Cobras than one tiltrotor for ASuW work. �
The most useful role for a tiltrotor seems to be just what it's being used for today - a high speed troop transport that can land troops in a combat zone. Even there, it's not as efficient as helos for the actual landing because the turbulence effects prevent formation (closely spaced) landings. Landings have to be very spread out or performed one at a time - dangerous and inefficient at getting troops on the ground quickly!

This is the problem with the V-22, it has an advantage over existing airframes under a very narrow set of conditions, mostly in the initial deployment of troops at long range, but once the battalion or regiment is deployed, the V-22 is vastly inferior to helicopters in tactical utility/performance, maintenance demanded, and cost of operations. For example, many combat loads (e.g. a 155mm M777 howitzer) cannot be carried internally, which requires the V-22 to sling load cargo, which kills range, speed, and again, the V-22 does not hover as well as a helicopter. In short, the helicopter does a better job for most tasks.

The U.S. Army did a much better job structuring its rotary wing force than the USMC. In fact, Secretary McNamara should have stuck to his guns and forced the USMC buy the CH-47 with the Army, instead of the H-53, for service commonality.

Waiting for the V-22 to replace the H-46 cost the USMC dearly: they could have bought variants of both H-60s and H-47s at low cost and been done with it. Now the Corps lacks a good medium lift helicopter (the H-60); the V-22 does not really replace the H-46 in the role, and because of cost it will never be fielded in large numbers; and the aging H-53 fleet is praying that the next generation H-53K (a completely new aircraft) will not only perform as expected, but be cheap enough to buy in quantity. Neither the V-22, nor the H-53 can carry a tactical vehicle internally (e.g. a HMMWV) � instead they must sling loading them as cargo and that kills performance. Between the H-47, the H-53, and the V-22: the H-47 is the only heavy lift aircraft that is really suited for an air assault. The V-22 is just awkward during insertion (and lacks weapons), while the H-53 is not particularly agile, the tail rotor has a nasty habit of killing troops as they exit/enter the bird, and limits troop deployment during the most critical portion of a vertical envelopment: insertion.

[carr]

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