Calling all Yamato (大和) and Musashi (武蔵) fans

[bucketfoot-al]

The "hard book" will be $29.99 when its released in October. Rest assured I will tell you as soon as Robert emails me.

The Iowa vs Yamato almost happened.

Nimitz initially just sent his 6 battleships to intercept Yamato at Okinawa, to let them shoot it out.

Rear Adm Dayo, however, in charge of the carriers, steamed North on his own initiative and when he was in range cabled Nimitz that he was ready and asking for permission to attack.

Nimitz's reply: "You go get them."

Obviously, Yamato would have been sunk anyways, but of course Nimitz made the right call - 10 pilots lost against the possibility of losing several thousand lives if Yamato managed to score a couple of lucky hits on the American battleships' magazines.

Yes, Yamato might have scored some hits before the 16" guns of the USN got it in range. At that point, however, not only given the USN's numerical superiority, but given the radar ranging capabilities of the US battleships, Yamato would have been annihilated. (Remember what happened to battleships Fuso and Yamashiro at Surigao Strait in the middle of the night in Oct 1944. The accuracy of the USN battleship fire was nothing short of incredible.)

You also have to remember that the 16" guns of the USN had a faster rate of fire that the Yamato's 18" guns which took something like (I can't remember exactly) somewhere between 1/2 minute and 1 1/2 minutes longer to load for the next salvo.

In a one-on-one between Iowa and Yamato, it would have been a much closer run thing. Yamato's greater punch and range versus Iowa's faster rate of fire and radar ranging. Yamato's optical range finders proved their worth at Samar - the indisputable film evidence of Yamato's 18" rounds bracketing - and finally impacting - White Plains at 33,000 yards is a pretty amazing testimony to the superiority of Yamato's optics over anything similar that any of the other powers had at that time. One of the Futabayasha books has a CGI recreation of what the actual optical range finding control center looked like, and it is truly amazing - something like out of one of the Star Wars films. If I have a chance I'll try to find it scan it and post it.

I'd love to have the opinions of some folks who are actually familiar with the technology involved in this type of optical targeting ....

[chuck]

One more point, and perhaps rather obvious to many, is the implication--presuming Yamato's gunnery being as accurate as it apparently was at Leyte--for the "what-if" enthusiasts of the proverbial Iowa -v- Yamato surface confrontation.

It's definitely not material I can access today (I am not a Kindle owner), but I understand the printed book will be available, later this fall. I'll be putting my wallet on a crash diet, when it does!

Thanks for the information, Al!

I always thought if Yamato's optical fire control was as good as, say Bismarck's in Denmark strait, Yamato was more than a match for Iowa in fair weather, but if Iowa was determined to finght to the finish, it would be a long drawn out, bruising battle as Iowa had a respectable immunity zone against Yamato and was faster.

But if Yamato's optical gunnery was much beyond expectation as Lundgren thinks, then she would have fair chance of scoring decisive deck penetrating hits from well outside of Iowa's immunity zone, and could potentially decide the battle in her own favor even before Iowa realized that she had a flight or fight decision to make. To any captain of Iowa accustomed to normal naval gun accuracy, it would not have seemed possible that Yamato could hit Iowa at the ranges seen in Lundgren's analysis, and probably would still be thinking about his tactical options instead of committing himself one way or another at ranges where Yamato's salvos would straddle.

[chuck]

The range of the Japanese 18.1" naval rifle was certainly sufficient, and the optics aboard that ship were considerably larger than those aboard other IJN capital ships.

Apart from perhaps Fuso and Yamashiro, each of which had considerably smaller RFs up-top, Yamato and Musashi had probably the highest main-rangefinder bases above the sea to be found in any Japanese gunship. At such heights, and with their great baseline, might it not be at least possible to obtain a "good" range figure, from the start?

Keeping in mind, of course, that instances of surface combat involving Yamato aren't exactly plentiful...

As well, Lundgren's work seems well-respected among peer and readership, alike...I wouldn't mind if this book turns out to be another Shattered Sword, considering some of the grist that has appeared before (Prange, Lord, Middlebrook, et.al.)

Food for thought?

Yamato had 15m range finders, most other Japanese battleships had 10m range finder. But in practice accuracy of range finders do not scale linearly with base length, and 15m range finders are not 50% more accurate than 10m range finders.

Yamato's masthead is also not really any higher than those of other Japanese battleships. You can count the deck levels between waterline and top of bridge tower of Japanese battleships to see Yamato's director and range finders were at essentially the same height above water as those on other Japanese battleships.

The significant difference is Yamato has more sophisticated fire control computers than all other Japanese battleships except the Hiei, which has the same computer as Yamato. But I believe the main difference between the computer used in Yamato and those in other Japanese battleships is in the degree of automation in data input. In older Japanese battleships the data used for fire control computers has to be manually entered into the computer by operators dedicated to the purpose. In Yamato when the range finder and director zeros in on the target, all targeting information is automatically transmitted to the computer. The actualy mechanism for computing fire control solutions is the same.

So given comparable training, I would not expect Yamato to be able to shoot substantially more accurately than other Japanese battleships, at least in the initial part of the battle. In later parts, higher automation may mean less impact from crew fatigue, and Yamato's firing accuracy might not decline with crew fatigue as might be the case on older Japanese battleships.

[bucketfoot-al]

Thanks Chuck!

Absolutely fascinating! I'm gonna find that illustration of Yamato's fire control center today and post it. Would love to hear your commentary on it!

[chuck]

Thanks Chuck!

Absolutely fascinating! I'm gonna find that illustration of Yamato's fire control center today and post it. Would love to hear your commentary on it!

Norman Friedman's Naval Firepower: Battleship Guns and Gunnery in the Dreadnaught Era is somewhat dismissive of Japanese fire control (some of his criticisms are menifestly self-contradictory) but the book does have some good illustrations of the components of Japanese battleship fire control.

But it is true the Yamato class had the first and really the only fully integrated sythetic firecontrol computer in the imperial Japanese navy. Fully integrated sythetic fire control had been a feature of Royal Navy ships since 1927. So on the surface Yamato features the first generation of a contempary fire control technology when Royal navy was already on second or third generations. So it does beg the question of did Yamato really shoot so much better than any RN ships or any ship from any other navy, for that matter?

[bucketfoot-al]

Of course, it is also possible that the Japanese got their hands on the British technology and improved upon it, no?

[chuck]

Of course, it is also possible that the Japanese got their hands on the British technology and improved upon it, no?

Well, possibly.

Japanese synthetic fire control computers were all descendants of a British 1921 commerical synthetic fire control computer designed by Dreyer, who also designed the Dreyer fire control system used in WWI era British battleships. But the commericial fire control system he designed after WWI and which the Japanese bought was fundamentally different from, and more advanced than, the analytic Dreyer fire control table he designed for the Royal Navy before WWI.

But, the British navy didn't adopt dreyer's new fire control computer because the admiralty was already working on an even more advanced synthetic fire control system called the admiralty fire control table, which first saw service on Nelson and Rodney in 1927. Admiralty fire control table was a fully integrated fire control system. It would be used as primary British surface control system for cruisers and larger until 1960.

In 1930, during negotiation about London naval treaty, the British offered to sell the new admiralty fire control table to the Japanese in return for Japanese concessions in the negotiation. The Japanese refused.

So the guts of Japanese fire control computers used in WWII continue to be based on the guts the Dreyer clock, an earlier generation of fire control technology than what was used by the British. But the Japanese probably had some ideas about just what additional capability British admiralty fire control table had over Japan's Dreyer fire control clock ( not Dreyer fire control table) based computers. One main difference is fully automatic data integration. The other is the guts of solution computation in the admiralty system was also most likely more advanced than in the Dreyer clock Japanese system was based on.

With the system the Yamato had, the Japanese added data integration to their fire control computer. But the guts of solution computation was still based on 5he Dreyer clock. Is it possible the Japanese had improved Dreyer based computation mechanism until it out performed the admiralty fire control table?

I suppose it is possible. But one has to also keep in mind Japanese precision machinery industry was not quite as well developed or as advanced as those of Britain, Germans and Americans. This was reflected in many areas of Japanese armament industry. Fire control computers were some of the most advanced and sophisticate precision machinery of WWII era.

For the Japanese to perfect and earlier generation of precision machinery until it outperformed a later generation is certainly possible, but it would be quite a coup for its somewhat deficient precision machinery industry.

[Senkan]

Saw this on Youtube and thought I would share.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rJNPka4Th2I

[Senkan]

The Iowa vs Yamato almost happened.

I don't think Iowa was in the Deyo task force. That force consisted of old WW1 era BB's. I don't think all these ships had radar fire control and had Yamato encountered this force during day light hours it would have been interesting.

From what I've read regarding Samar, the most impressive thing I thought was that Yamato hit a destroyer with it's 18.1" guns at a range of over 20,000 yards. Hitting a small CVE going 15 knots at 30,000 yards doesn't seem as impressive. Like Iowa sinking the Katori.

[bucketfoot-al]

"Spruance ordered Admiral Deyo to assemble a force of six battleships (USS Massachusetts, Indiana, New Jersey, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and Missouri), together with seven cruisers (including the battlecruisers USS Alaska and Guam) and 21 destroyers, and to prepare for a surface engagement with Yamato should the airstrikes prove unsuccessful."

If this quote I just found is accurate, 1 Iowa class battleship (New Jersey) was on her way as part of TF 54 ...

[bucketfoot-al]

From what I've read regarding Samar, the most impressive thing I thought was that Yamato hit a destroyer with it's 18.1" guns at a range of over 20,000 yards. Hitting a small CVE going 15 knots at 30,000 yards doesn't seem as impressive. Like Iowa sinking the Katori.

I think she hit Johnston at 14,000 yards, but the amazing thing is that she hit Johnston with her very first (and only) main battery salvo fired at Johnston. (Her secondaries had been firing at Johnston prior to the main batteries, so she had already targeted her, however). 3 18" and 3 6" shells hit Johnston almost simultaneously, causing Kurita to cable Tokyo "I have just sunk a cruiser!"

[Senkan]

Here is a list of Battleships under Deyo's command in April '45.

TG 54.1 - Gunfire Support Group
CTG RAdm Morton L. Deyo

FSU 1 - SouthernEast Shore
CTU RAdm P.K. Fishler
BB Texas, Maryland (till 45/04/07)

FSU 2 - Naha City
CTU RAdm C. Turner Joy
BB Arkansas, Colorado

FSU 3 - Hagushi Beaches
CTU RAdm Bertram J. Rodgers
BB Tennessee/FF, Nevada

FSU 4 - Hagushi Beaches
CTU RAdm Lynde D. McCormick
BB Idaho, West Virginia

FSU 5 - Hagushi Beaches
CTU RAdm Allen E. Smith (ComCruDiv5)
BB New Mexico, New York

Not sure why Spruance would allocate ships to Deyo that weren't under his control when he already had battleships. Why not give command to the Admirals already overseeing these ships of (I'm guessing) TF 58?

[bucketfoot-al]

What I believe is the definitive version of the Center Force vs. Taffy 3 engagement off Samar Island on 10/25/2014, by Robert Lundgren, is now out in HARDCOVER (link below).

HARDCOVER BOOK AVAILABLE AT : http://www.amazon.com/gp/offer-listing/ ... 1401990301

[Fliger747]

Nostalgia be dammed as it were, sending in the planes was probably the smart thing to do. However the old bombardment ships had already had a night shootout that was quite successful at Surigao Straight. Perhaps Yamato could have gotten some good licks in, but enough large caliber rifles to land a shell nearby every second are going to tell quickly. As with Bismark, or even the shootouts in the slot, the softer upperworks and fire control are susceptible to early and easy disablement. The radar of the age was not terrifically accurate in bearing but quite good in range and impervious to smoke screens etc. Even shell splashes could be ranged for correction of fall. This could be impacted a bit with several ships firing but time of flight could be carefully noted. Numbers tell, Graf Spee theoretically should have done better against two cruisers.

Of course lucky beats good any day. Nimitz was a smart guy and good leader, his motto was in essence rock'em and sock'em but don't loose your shirt. The official term was the principal of calculated risk.... Iowa would never have been sent alone against Yamato because they didn't have to. A far cry from the desperate days when Willis Lee sailed down the slot at night in Washington with Sodak along.

Cheers: T

[Ian Roberts]

Very interesting comments about the quality of the optical rangefinders aboard the Yamato and Musashi - I had never heard this before. The assumption across most of the internet is that the Japanese "super battleships" would not have been able to stand against the radar-directed gunfire from the American battleships. I still think this is the case, but it's now sounding like it would be a much more close run thing than I had previously thought. Of course, it's fortunate that battle never occurred... enough Japanese sailors were killed during Ten-Go and we should all be thankful more Americans weren't thrown into it as well...

[Fliger747]

Japanese optics have always been very good. Their training was always first rate as well. Perhaps the optics had advantages early in the war as radar was often not fully utilized due to technical immaturity and lack of understanding of it's capabilities and limitations by commanders and lack of a coherent doctrine. However intelligent use of smokescreens and tactical maneuvering advantage could easily negate the best optical systems. Later in the war Aircraft spotting could not be counted on by the Japanese due to a general lack of control of the air, even locally.

In many of these discussions luck is an imponderable and with highly variable. Though an individual one on one battle between these ships was unlikely, they could have met off Samar but perhaps for Bull's Run. Who knows, Radar was somewhat vulnerable as any softer parts of the ships. Bismarck's main fire control was probably put out of action early on by an 8" shell from Dorsetshire. It is interesting to note that USN was unaware of the caliber and even the tonnage of these ships till after the war. Japanese security was quite effective during the construction of these behemoths. USN did have an excellent 18" naval rifle available, who knows the Iowa's might have been up gunned as were the North Carolina's somewhat late in the design process. Six 18" instead of 9 16"? As it was, the 16" 50 cal installed was probably the better weapon.

Really quite fascinating ships!

Cheers: T

[Oterlia]

Yamato and Musashi's half sister Shinano. 1/200 Shinano, with a Tamiya 1/700 Shinano in front.

[Oterlia]

When is the Tamiya 1/350 Musashi new tool coming ?

[Timmy C]

Not been announced.

[Chuck not signed in]

Japanese optics have always been very good. Their training was always first rate as well. Perhaps the optics had advantages early in the war as radar was often not fully utilized due to technical immaturity and lack of understanding of it's capabilities and limitations by commanders and lack of a coherent doctrine. However intelligent use of smokescreens and tactical maneuvering advantage could easily negate the best optical systems. Later in the war Aircraft spotting could not be counted on by the Japanese due to a general lack of control of the air, even locally.

In many of these discussions luck is an imponderable and with highly variable. Though an individual one on one battle between these ships was unlikely, they could have met off Samar but perhaps for Bull's Run. Who knows, Radar was somewhat vulnerable as any softer parts of the ships. Bismarck's main fire control was probably put out of action early on by an 8" shell from Dorsetshire. It is interesting to note that USN was unaware of the caliber and even the tonnage of these ships till after the war. Japanese security was quite effective during the construction of these behemoths. USN did have an excellent 18" naval rifle available, who knows the Iowa's might have been up gunned as were the North Carolina's somewhat late in the design process. Six 18" instead of 9 16"? As it was, the 16" 50 cal installed was probably the better weapon.

Really quite fascinating ships!

Cheers: T

There is much more to optical fire control than the quality of optics themselves. The Japanese were generally technically deficient in many other ways compared to systems used in US, UK and Germany.

For one thing, while Japanese range finding optics were good, they were not of the type shown to be most effective by experience in WWI, at least not in the beginning of a battle. Prior to WWI, the Royal Navy favored coincidence type range finders. The Germans favored stereoscopic type. Experience of WWI showed stereoscopic range finders were more accurate, achieved their correct readings faster, and were more difficult to fool with optical camouflage. Stereoscopic range finders have a considerable advantage in getting the range quickly and achieving hits first. After WWI RN abandoned coincidence range finders and opted for stereoscopic finders. But the Japanese never abandoned coincidence range finders, and the main range finders on the Yamato were coincidence type, with only a stereoscopic set for back up. So Yamato achieving a first salvo hit at long ranges with rangefinders that are known to be not particularly good at getting an accurate reading fast would be somewhat surprising.