What-If LCS Flight II: Littoral Combat Ship Improvement

[navydavesof]

The way I want to approach this challenge (making LCS better) is probably not the best say to approach the missions of the littorals. Instead it is my attempt to make the LCS-1/3 design a more usable ship and to make it a more capable "warship" without turning it into a DDG. The way I approach this is to elongate the ship just a little bit beyond the LCS-3 modification, and to incorporate existing weapon systems into it.

This does reach a little beyond US weapons, but not too far beyond them. This involves a Mk45 Mod4 5" gun with a 300-350 round magazine heavily loaded with the Excalibur GPS/SAL projectile. It would reach out to the Italians for their 76mm super rapid-fire guns and hopefully utilize the radar guided projectes they advertise, 32 Mk41 strike length VLS cells arranged in 2 16-cell clusters to carry TLAM and ESSM or VLASROC if necessary. Because the Millineum Gun is now owned by Lockheed, it too would be domestic. The whole structure of the ship would be gaged up, and I would use the balance of the weight to add thick and resilient Kevlar armor where it counts. The ECM suite would be as I have described earlier. I would also fit 8 thin wall Hapoons inside one of the super structure's mission module bays.

This all requires a lot of weight, but that weight can be traded for a big reduction in the propulsion plant. I would pull 1/2 of the propulsion plant shp (the ship would still be able to produce over 30 knots). That would be able to free up a LOT of weight for said structure and weapons improvements.

[Busto963]

The way I want to approach this challenge (making LCS better) is probably not the best say to approach the missions of the littorals. Instead it is my attempt to make the LCS-1/3 design a more usable ship and to make it a more capable "warship" without turning it into a DDG. The way I approach this is to elongate the ship just a little bit beyond the LCS-3 modification, and to incorporate existing weapon systems into it.

This does reach a little beyond US weapons, but not too far beyond them. This involves a Mk45 Mod4 5" gun with a 300-350 round magazine heavily loaded with the Excalibur GPS/SAL projectile. It would reach out to the Italians for their 76mm super rapid-fire guns and hopefully utilize the radar guided projectes they advertise, 32 Mk41 strike length VLS cells arranged in 2 16-cell clusters to carry TLAM and ESSM or VLASROC if necessary. Because the Millineum Gun is now owned by Lockheed, it too would be domestic. The whole structure of the ship would be gaged up, and I would use the balance of the weight to add thick and resilient Kevlar armor where it counts. The ECM suite would be as I have described earlier. I would also fit 8 thin wall Hapoons inside one of the super structure's mission module bays.

This all requires a lot of weight, but that weight can be traded for a big reduction in the propulsion plant. I would pull 1/2 of the propulsion plant shp (the ship would still be able to produce over 30 knots). That would be able to free up a LOT of weight for said structure and weapons improvements.

If you are looking to find a use for the LCS and are willing to cut the ship free from the original mission set; then adding a lot of VLS is probably the right way to go about it.

I recall some force mix proposals coming out of NPS that called for number of inexpensive surface combatants to supplement or replace the SSGN mission.

No question that the SSGN has massive capability, but the cost of that capability is also stupendous, not to mention that there are no longer SSBNs available for conversion.

Using LCS (or elderly DDGs) as a TLAM strike platform, or as an extended missile magazines (CEC) for missile shooters could make good sense.

[Busto963]

What makes sense is that we utilize the two hull types we have, and we specialize their missions them based on their size and capabilities/facilities.

- The LCS-1/3 monohull can best accommodate the ASuW mission. It can perform counter battery fire and anti-boat warfare with 76mm, 5", and a smaller caliber (25mm, 30mm, or 35mm).

Counter-battery fire is a key shortfall in current USN ability to support troops ashore, however the mission will require counter-battery radar and fire control. The requirements for this mission are demanding: a large radar with extensive electrical power requirements (current systems are phased array), a dedicated fire direction center of trained artillery men (there is no reason that sailors cannot do this job, but it will require a sizeable investment in personnel). For example, an AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder radar requires 43kw.

Unless, you are calling for basic fire support capability against shore targets, I do not see this as a viable mission for LCS.

- The LCS-2 has a HUGE helo deck and enough room to expand the hangar to accommodate MH-53 mine-hunting helicopters and the UUVs below the main deck for the MCM and ASW missions.

It's these things that should be kept in mind for future "LCS" ships before proceeding to another ship design.

The H-53 keeps popping up in the LCS discussion, largely because the H-60 is not capable of performing the MCM mission; but lets be frank, LCS is not a suitable platform for supporting H-53s for a number of reasons. This is akin to slapping a 16" gun on the smallest hull that can carry the gun and still float.

Operations and maintenance do not scale up, a two-helicopter H-60 detachment makes sense for destroyers and cruisers, but H-53s require significantly more maintenance than H-60s. It probably makes more sense to deploy them in four (4) ship-detachments, as this streamlines maintenance. The idea of supporting a single H-53 on a surface ship is ridiculous, even if the hull can physically handle the helicopter.

The Danish Absalom at 6300 tons is realistically the smallest viable platform to carry a heavy lift helicopter, and support continuous operations. I think that an LPD sized ship, fitted to carry four (4) H-53 or similar sized aircraft is actually the right solution in terms of size of force, right concentration of maintenance personnel and spare parts etc..

[Sciquest2525]

I see your point.
I advocate the USN doing 'something' with the Mk 71 and was looking for a way to increase the utility of LCS Freedom class 150 meter/6000 ton variant.
It now appears that even the 150 meter/6000 ton variant is too small for Mk 71 even with added hull depth of an additional deck level.
I know H-53 is a bit of a stretch but as in the case of the MK 71, I hoped for more utility from increased capability.
I though these changes might make the ship more salable to Congress.
With respect to mounting Mk 71 and having a useful H-53 helo capacity might have to reside in a new ship class and that in this era of defence cuts, you might not be able to afford a new ship class.
The hull though, might have a beam increase of 25% to match the length increase of 25%.
Surely, a size increase while maintaining the length to beam ratio of the current LCS Freedom might mitigate the stability margin while keeping the Freedom class power plant the same would allow extra fuel to be carried in the enlarged hull.
But I could be wrong as I lack the knowledge to make anything more than a 'layman's guess.

The pint size 90 meter variant on the Lockheed website with all diesel drive, less speed and limited endurance might make it a PC replacement, the ship being given an FFL or corvette rating for a Littoral Combat Corvette, designated LCFL-XX.
Fire power wise, the small variant offers two triple ASW torpedo tubes, two H-60 helos, two remotely controlled deck house 30 mm guns (perhaps they could be Israeli style Typhoon gun/missile mounts), eight Harpoons, 76 mm Super Rapid with Strales radar guided projectiles, eight quad paked ESSM cells, decoy launchers, ESM and presumably ECM, keel mounted sonar and towed arrays plus the proposed torpedo detection towed array.

With respect to hull strength, the Japanese are working with titanium and I saw a report somewhere in either ONR or NRL site on constructing a hull section out of that metal.
Titanium has better strength to weight ratio than steel and competes with aluminium.
I first thought of titanium to replace the aluminium deck house of Freedom and to replace the all aluminium hull and deck house of the Independence class and I then I figured that the Freedom be given an all titanium hull as well as deck house.
This would reduce weight of hull while preserving strength or enable a equivalent weight of titanium vice steel to enhance the strength of the hull without raising the weight allowance of the hull/deck house.
Big problem though, titanium is more expensive.

[SumGui]

MLP-AFSB to base the MH-53s and act as forward base for dedicated mine hunting vessels. If the buget does not allow a counter-mine MLP-AFSB, there will be LSD-41s that get cut that could be re-purposed with a smaller crew.

Takes the H-53 'need' on the LCS off the hull, and as far as I am concerned the MCM mission as well. The LCS designs as they are cannot take shock, and I find that unacceptable in an MCM vessel.

[Busto963]

MLP-AFSB to base the MH-53s and act as forward base for dedicated mine hunting vessels. If the buget does not allow a counter-mine MLP-AFSB, there will be LSD-41s that get cut that could be re-purposed with a smaller crew.

Takes the H-53 'need' on the LCS off the hull, and as far as I am concerned the MCM mission as well. The LCS designs as they are cannot take shock, and I find that unacceptable in an MCM vessel.

Excellent points.

[Busto963]

...I know H-53 is a bit of a stretch ...

More like a bridge too far...

USMC HMH squadrons have eight (8) Ch-53D/E aircraft and normally deploy them in four (4) ship detachments.

There are very good reasons why the Corps does this, even if they are not readily apparent to a layman. It is unlikely that you are going to come up with a better TOE and organizational design.

Again, I stress that the H-53 is the most maintenance intensive helicopter in the armed forces: it really is a massive waste of manpower to embark a huge logistic train, large numbers of ground crew, and tech reps to support a single H-53. Even a two ship helicopter det is pushing it in terms of using too many ground and maintenance personnel for too few aircraft. The squadrons are manned and equipped to fly four ship ship detachments: muck around with this, and you are messing with a formula that has worked for well for more than four decades.

As to ships to support H-53s, well the LPD is a proven quantity.

[SumGui]

Aviation Week LCS article:

http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.asp ... 607790.xml

[navydavesof]

I dug out my LCS-1 kit, because it's time to start making the LCS-3 mods.

First, I wanted to put one of my Mk71 8"/60 caliber mounts on Freedom. It's one huge gun! While the Hull was a lot smaller and only carried the ready service loader, the Forest Sherman-class had a far stronger hull, and its bow was properly strengthened to accept the 172,000 lb gun. There is a rumor that the gun's recoil cracked the bow of the USS Hull, but there is no evidence to that claim. The source of the claim is probably cracks between the super structure and the hull associated with mating steel and aluminum that were occurring at the time. This was common in the class. If there was any extra cracking, the extra weight on the bow may have contributed to it. However, there was no credible hull cracking.

• "The Forest Sherman class ships were some of the first to be built with all-aluminum superstructures. Beginning with the DD-937 [USS Davis], the ships were built with a higher bow to improve sea keeping in heavy weather. [USS Hull] DD-945 and subsequent ships were built with a slightly different bow design. These high bows are often referred to as �hurricane bows� and are the reason why DD-945 through DD-951 are sometimes referred to as the "Hull Class." These high bows added significant weight to the forward part of the ship and placed additional stress on the superstructure. Over time, all of these ships experienced cracks in the superstructure. These cracks were generally located around frame 50 where the expansion joint was located in the hull.
  
  When the ship modifications were being designed to permit installation of the Mark 71, special attention was given to the stresses that would result from the firing loads. Later, during the structural firing tests, the Ships Engineering Center installed several hundred strain gages in the bow of the ship. The data collected during these tests showed acceptable stress level in all locations.
  
  When the Hull returned from her first WESTPAC deployment, I talked to the engineers doing the structure inspection. They told me that the cracks they found were no different from what was found in every ship of the class. They said the only difference was that the rate of cracking was slightly increased which was probably due the increased weight added to the bow by the Mark 71 installation..."

- Leo Fischer
http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_8-55_mk71.htm

Anyway, here are the pictures of the Mk71 placed on the deck of the LCS-1 hull.

WOW!!!

More to come with modifying the model itself to meet the ASuW missions!

[navydavesof]

From the article written by Captain Robert Powers, the JMAG games that produced the "need" for the ASuW mission in an LCS produced the following desired capabilities:

- Speed was a desirable characteristic, but not at the expense of a complete warfighting suite.
- Stealth: The ship had to have a minimum radar signature to survive in littoral waters overseen by coastal and airborne radar systems.
- A Flight deck and hangar facilities were essential. Two helos per LCS would be preferable. The Helicopters and unmanned vehicles should also be capable of carrying weapons for stand-off attack.
- There was a general agreement it should have a gun in the 57 to 76mm range.
- it should have a medium-range air defense missile and medium-range anti-ship missile.
- It should have some kind of counter-battery capability to respond in real time to a shore-based missile attack.
- CIC should be incorporated for quick communication and rapid decision making
- The ship should not be built out of aluminum.
- Manning should be low, but not so low it inhibits combat capability or maintenance. Maintenance must not suffer from low manning.

In order to accomplish this, I have chosen the following weapons to accomplish these missions:

- A Flight deck and hangar facilities were essential. Two helos per LCS would be preferable. The Helicopters and unmanned vehicles should also be capable of carrying weapons for stand-off attack.

• Facilities for 2 H-60 helicopters and 3 assembled and 5 disassembled Shadow UAVs or 2 AH-1W/Z Super Cobra

- There was a general agreement it should have a gun in the 57 to 76mm range.

• For the anti-boat/swarm mission, the 76mm SR gun with radar guided munitions fits the bill

- It should have a medium-range air defense missile and medium-range anti-ship missile.

• ESSM fitted in Mk41 VLS and 21-cell RAM launcher would accomplish this.

- It should have some kind of counter-battery capability to respond in real time to a shore-based missile attack.

• Volume of fire is essential in counter battery fire per mission, but we must also plan on more than one engagement per mission. This moves us away from utilizing missiles such as TLAM or Harpoon for counter battery and moves to a gunnery capability. The best gun for this size of ship would be the Mk45 Mod4 utilizing the upcoming GPS/SAL projectile. To properly direct calculate the counter battery solution, the combination of the SPQ-9B and TRS-3D into a GFCS is necessary.

- As stated earlier, the Harpoons should be in the mission module bays in the upper super structure.
- NULKA and Chaff should be incorporated into the structure.
- SLQ-32 should ray from the super structure, perhaps in the DDG-51 style.

Any further suggestions as how to properly address these missions?

[navydavesof]

My next question is now concerning missile capabilities.

Should the ship have the capability to fire missiles we refer to as "long sticks"? The long sticks are TLAMs and VLAs. In the future, LRASMs will be long sticks also, but that will need strike-length tubes. So that leads to the question: Should the LCS have those types of missiles or should their mission sets not push into missions requiring strike length missiles?

In order to accommodate strike-length missile tubes, I think they would have to go in the bow between the main gun and the super structure. There is not a lot of room up there, but maybe 1-2 modules could be accommodated, meaning 8-16 missiles.

Should the long range strike of the TLAM, the anti-submarine of the VLA, and the future ASCM LRASM be incorporated into the LCS?

[SumGui]

I would avoid long sticks.

VLA is for outer layer ASW in blue water - not a mission this platform is supposed to be tasked with
TLAM is a loooong range strike weapon, and its range allows it to be 'thrown' from father out.

These are capabilities better left to the Burkes which will probably be in area, and 8 (or even 16) weapons for 'just in case' or occasional use probably does not make it worth the cost to the vessel to have them aboard.

I would also be concerned about weight forward - if you are already upgrading to a Mk 45 (adding weight) and adding 8-16 Mk 41 cells (adding weight) and the weapons you are going to load those with (adding weight)...you get my point.

NSM is the right size Anti Ship Missile for this vessel, Harpoon hay be a little large (and it is aging poorly at this time). I'd rather have 16 NSM than 8 Harpoon (or better, 8 NSM plus multiples of Griffin or Brimstone/Sea Spear). Harpoon and LRASM have range capabilities which may be excessive, and thus not worth the cost to place on this platform - leave them on the Burke in the area and let the LCS call 'Big Brother' for these larger weapons if the situation dictates.

To really have fun with counter battery fire - those 16 forward VLS quad packed with a Naval variant of MLRS rockets would do nicely. The M30/31 goes approx 37 miles, that is the kind of system you would want on the platform which is operating close to shore. Would this require the long cells? Don't know - hasn't been built yet. That capability might be worth the long cells, if needed.

And I'd rather go to the Otobreda 127/64 instead of the Mk45 Mod 4 for the higher rate of fire and Vulcano IF the weight of a 127mm can be handled.

[carr]

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[Busto963]

Regarding TLAM, the fleet has thousands of VLS cells. Let a Burke handle long range strike. It's not part of the LCS mission unless you see it as being used in the counterbattery role. I really like a navalized version of the M270 MLRS for counter battery work. It has a range of 26 miles (190 miles with ATACMS).

Counter-battery fire will require an appropriate counter-battery radar and fire control. The requirements for this mission are are not trivial.

An AN/TPQ-47 Firefinder radar used for counter battery work weights 2.5 tons and requires 43 kilowatts of electrical power and only covers a 90 degree sector. Ergo you will need some along the lines of four (4) of these radars 10 tons of topside weight, roughly 172 kilowatts of power, a data link into Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) and a minimum of dozen crew to man a dedicated fire direction center.

Counter battery work is not a viable mission for LCS. Certainly the ship could deliver fires against shore targets, but even with a 203mm gun, and MRLS, this is just not a viable platform.

[carr]

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[Busto963]

I readily admit that counterbattery is a topic I'm not overly familiar with. However, just to be clear, the counterbattery that Dave is referring to is land launched anti-ship missile counterbattery fire rather than artillery counterbattery. This is from the original generic littoral vessel requirements as described in the Proceedings article Dave references. Whether that still requires the effort and equipment Busto describes, I don't know.

I get it, but I think this is a problem with the author of the Proceedings article, and more generally the USN, confusing terminology, rather than a real mission of LCS. Soldiers and Marines, our NATO allies, as well as USAF TACAIR guys all understand counter battery to mean killing enemy artillery systems with artillery: (which does include rockets and missiles). This term goes back to the Napoleonic "artillery duel".

Shooting at shore based ASCM batteries *after* they have fired seems to be a waste of effort, and if you know where the ASCMs (along with the C4ISR system supporting them) are *before* they shoot, then they become prime targets for the targeting board and the strike planners.

They real issue here goes back to the lack of a clearly defined LCS mission that people in the strategy, operations, and resourcing world could all get behind. Admiral Cebrowski and Capt Hughes had one concept, Captain Powers another, the mission set articulated to Congress differed from the these. Tragically confused.

My very vague understanding is that counterbattery is more a software issue than hardware.

Modern radars used for the mission are phased array systems. There is no requirement for Aegis-like computing power.

Obtaining a firing solution is very much a mater of curve fitting parabolas: a fairly straight forward math problem provided you can track the projectiles. You do need stable radar antennas that are pointed in the general direction of the point of launch, point of impact for most of the flight.

A really good FDC with the right system pointed in the right direction can detect incoming rounds, calculate a firing solution for friendly batteries, and engage the enemy artillery before the enemy rounds land on friendly forces.

Of course with ROE concerns...

For a "what if", I would assume that a TRS-3D or some such radar with suitable software modifications would suffice. Maybe not?

I do not think TRS-3D or any rotating antenna radar is suitable for counter-battery work. As far as I know, all counter battery radars have been fixed systems: part of this is due inevitably to the geometry of most ground engagements, but the radar will not be as effective if it rotates and misses part of the flight path of a projectile.

I think the requirement calls for a very stable radar platform. I am not seeing how a sea based system fitted to an LCS is going to be sufficiently stable to do the job. I also question the idea of trying to put a FDC on an LCS.

The right solution is a larger ship 8-12,000 tons with the FDC, and counter-battery radar and all of the necessary C4ISR to sort out the ground fight; supported by smaller combatants operating as the firing batteries. 90% of the shooting would be done by the smaller combatants, who would deliver neutralizing fires in less than 15 seconds, preferably with an MLRS/POLAR type weapon, or 160mm rockets and missiles, before rapidly moving to a new firing possition.

I still see the need for 20-21 cm tube artillery, as well as, 155 mm guns, but most of the work for those weapons would be to deliver single-shot precision destruction of point targets, or to deliver volumes of smoke/illumination (including IR)/non-lethal munitions, or massed fires to destroy obstacles and minefields. These should be deployed in battery groupings of 4-6 tubes. Example, a flotilla of four destroyers with single-gun 155 mm turrets would form a single firing unit, even though physically dispersed.

[carr]

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[Busto963]

My understanding from various readings on the origin of the littoral missile "counterbattery" (feel free to suggest a better term!)

During the Kittyhawk deployment to the NAS to deal with the Iranian threat to close the Straights of Hormuz, killing Silkworm sites was strike warfare...

Shooting at launch sites/platforms after they shoot is no different than in true counterbattery work. The enemy still gets one free shot.

While the definitions are being blurred by technology, I do not agree with this.

An ASCM launcher is essentially a one-shot missile in a box, often mounted on a truck. The expense of ASCMs puts practical limits on the numbers of weapons deployed.

An artillery battery is not a one-shot affair. Besides the tubes/launchers, there is also the ammunition supply, transportation vehicles or aircraft to move ammunition, a communications network etc., even dispersed SP guns have to reattach themselves to this infrastructure. Destroying 2 guns out of a four-gun PzH2000 battery still leaves a very potent threat.

Bottom line, artillery batteries, particularly dispersed into single gun firing elements (still under central control) are significantly harder to destroy or neutralize completely, and have greater staying power than the fire and forget ASCM launchers.

Given what seems to be a tendency to use mobile anti-ship launch platforms, missile counterbattery would seem to be a variant of Scud hunting. The key is to get the counter shot on target before the launch platform can move which, in turn, requires a rapid response weapon with a bit of area impact, hence, my suggestion for a navalized MLRS.

MLRS and GMLRS are awesome. Ship launched VLS variant is highly desired.

Remember that Scud hunting was an effort to kill the launchers before they shot, not after, which is typical of counter-battery fire. In any event, even with JSTARS and a host of national systems looking for them, the Iraqis were still able to shoot a large number of the weapons - fortunately sans chemical warheads.

Least we dismiss the relative poor performance of U.S. intelligence in targeting scud launchers in the first Gulf War, and assume that technology advances have improved the odds in our favor; recall that during Operation Anaconda, Our conventional forces were deployed into combat with absolutely incorrect knowledge of the numbers, disposition, intent, and composition of the Taliban and AQ fighters.

It was a real nasty surprise to find the enemy deployed in force, in the mountains, with D30 howitzers that outranged and out punched the single battery of 105mm howitzers that our forces brought, and that the enemy was absolutely committed to stand and fight. Had SOCOM had not deployed significant numbers of forces into Afghanistan that reported actual enemy strength and disposition, the conventional forces may have faced a real disaster.

One difference between today and the time when the counterbattery requirement was conceived is the existence of UAVs, now. Long loiter UAVs ought to prove quite useful. Guided by the ship's counterbattery radar, a UAV could visually acquire and track the launch platform. Assuming that several littoral ships would work together, there ought to be sufficient numbers of UAVs to ensure a good chance of one being close enough to the launch platform to be able to acquire it before it can move.

This is classic aerial interdiction.

This is one mission where aircraft is infinitely better suited to kill the target over trying to call in fires from ships. Drones, A-10s, EM-314s: it does not matter, but the airframe must be armed, or at least be able to lase the target.

Straight OODA Loop stuff. see it kill it.

If a fixed radar is needed, that's fine (SPY-1F?). If there is something inherently limiting about a smaller (LCS size) ship in the counterbattery role, then I guess it can't be done. Presumably, though, the originators of the conceptual requirement believed it could be done. I wonder if the greater size of anti-ship missiles compared to artillery shells wouldn't make the backtracking easier?

Well most artillery fire follows essentially a ballistic trajectory, which again, is a very straight forward mathematical problem to solve. Even during WWI, gunners were able to effectively determine the location of firing batteries buy using sticks to measure angle of impact, flash ranging, and other really simple techniques.

ASCMs do not follow a ballistic trajectory and can maneuver to interim waypoints, and do all sorts of nasty things that can make locating the launcher impossible based upon flight path.

Aegis is overkill, and if reprogrammed for the mission, significantly degrades the capability to see ASCMs, and other flying threats. Phased array radars are perfect for the job.

[carr]

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[Busto963]

As I recall (correct me if I'm wrong), while the preferred event was to find and destroy the launcher before it launched, every effort was made to destroy the launcher even after launch so that it could not reload and relaunch. I know little about land based anti-ship launchers but, presumably, it would be the same situation - a launch platform ("truck" of some sort) with the ability to upload targeting info would be used to launch and reload/relaunch multiple missiles. Hence, destroying the "truck" even after firing would be highly desirable.

Locating individual ASCM launchers is likely to be harder than we think, but it is also clear that an enemy who holds back his ASCMs after detecting our fleet is going to face rapidly escalating odds that his missiles will be destroyed, or rendered impotent as his C4ISR network is destroyed.

The idea of holding back ASCMs to fire after the attacker commits to the attack is great theory, but ignores the fact that the attacker will either win air/space dominance prior to committing forces, or not attack. The second phase of an air campaign will be to interdict enemy movement to and on the battlefield. This will make it difficult to reload launchers.

This is why Hezbollah, Iran, North Korea, and others have gone to exceptional lengths to conceal and harden their artillery, and if applicable, ASCM sites. We will probably kill mobile launchers anyway, but trying to reload ASCMs is not particularly viable.

The real value of the shore based ASCM threat is to complicate the attacking force strike planning, to attrite the defenses (I am speaking of the attacker defensive systems as well as individual units), and to work on the morale of both sides. It makes good sense to keep aging ASCMs around as long as their warheads and propulsion systems are stable, regardless of their obsolescence. Forcing a fleet to expend munitions and assets in destroying the ASCM network, coupled with forcing it to expend expensive, and limited numbers of SAMs to destroy obsolete missiles is an excellent way to reduce its capability. If a few leakers get through, so much the better...

This is one mission where aircraft is infinitely better suited to kill the target over trying to call in fires from ships. Drones, A-10s, EM-314s: it does not matter, but the airframe must be armed, or at least be able to lase the target.

Quite right, assuming the aircraft are available. The premise of the original concept was that aircraft were unavailable in sufficient numbers for whatever reasons. That leaves the ships to perform the counterbattery on their own. Whether the Navy will have armed UAVs in the near to moderate future is somewhat doubtful.

I cannot imagine a scenario where the United States commits amphibious forces, to include advance forces like MCMs without first winning air/sea/space dominance first.

A first strike on our MCM forces in the NAS/PG, is one thing, but actually planning to conduct an operation without not only air support, but air dominance? Unthinkable.

The USA and USMC have described such a scenario, but it really smacks of budget justification and posturing, not intelligent planning.

ASCMs do not follow a ballistic trajectory and can maneuver to interim waypoints, and do all sorts of nasty things that can make locating the launcher impossible based upon flight path.

While theoretically true for some (most?) models of anti-ship missile, now, we only need the initial portion of the flight path, assuming we spot it from the start, to backtrack it to origin. Missiles are generally programmed to perform their tricks as they get closer to the target. Even waypoints won't conceal the initial path unless a waypoint is programmed into the very start of the path. That's not normally done although it probably can be. Again, this is where a UAV presence can help detect launch points (radar, optic, thermal bloom).

I think shore based ASCMs will be fired at the onset of a campaign; I doubt our ability to see the initial launch point without national intelligence assets, or substantial TACAIR; and think that the enemy will certainly use waypoints, if for no other reasons than to coordinate his ASCMS to saturate fleet defenses.

The Navy has stated that they will not approach enemy islands closer than 25-50 miles due to the threat of land launched anti-ship missiles (I think they're being far too cautious but that's another topic). Given the proven and theoretical difficulty in finding and removing ASMs pre-launch, missile counterbattery would seem to be required. The Navy/Marines are having fits trying to come up with doctrine/tactics/equipment to carry out 25-50 mile amphib invasions. The ability to deal with the anti-ship missiles would allow the invasion to occur at much closer distances and simplify the exercise.

I strongly agree � and add that not only will it be extremely difficult to launch amphibious assaults over long distances; the reality of logistics through put requires almost immediate access to the beach or a functional harbor and POL facilities.