What-If LCS Flight II: Littoral Combat Ship Improvement

[carr]

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[navydavesof]

My understanding of "counter battery" from a Navy perspective is that the ship tracks the projectile/missile in flight and immediately sends rounds back against the line of bearing. The USS Merrill provided SPQ-9A radar information for the USS New Jersey in 1983 for her counter battery gunfire missions. The SPQ-9A provided such good solutions that either 5 or 16" rounds were in the air within 1 minute of detection.

I understand also that in 1989 Iowa, Missouri and Wisconsin received the SPQ-9A and were slated in the WIP to receive the TPQ-36/37 as a dedicated counter battery radar.

However, since the SPQ-9B and TRS-3D rotate so fast, they are nearly as fast as a phased array.

[Busto963]

I cannot imagine a scenario where the United States commits amphibious forces, to include advance forces like MCMs without first winning air/sea/space dominance first. ...

The USA and USMC have described such a scenario, but it really smacks of budget justification and posturing, not intelligent planning.

We are at 10 carriers (9 "active" though only a few are combat ready) now with talk of going to 8-9 on a permanent basis, meaning 7-8 active since at least one is always in deep overhaul. Our air wings are steadily shrinking (half the size they were in the 1980's) and the Navy has stated that when the JSF arrives the squadrons will be further reduced by 2-4 aircraft.

The primary player in the air superiority game is the USAF. USN/USMC aircraft, are contributors, but analysis of historical record and comparison of ground and carrier based aircraft will show that land-based air wins the air superiority fight. The Navy, pretentions aside, has never fielded a significant strategic air arm, certainly not one able to fight a peer competitor toe-to-toe. Carrier air power has almost always been a tool for the operational, or most frequently, a tactical level of war.

The entire air war in Europe was carried by allied and Army Air Corps, as was the bulk of the air war with Japan. More Army (USAF) aircrew were lost in Europe than Marines in all theaters. Even at the height of her carrier strength, the primary Japanese strikes were conducted by IJA land-based aircraft. With the exception of the Doolittle Raid (conducted by army Air Corps aircraft) carrier raids against the Japanese home islands really did not occur until late-1944 onwards.

Again I am not saying the USN/USMC air is not important, but its efforts are massively overshadowed by the USAF in capability and resources. The greatest naval contribution to air superiority has been the EA-6 and the TLAM.

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Where the relevance of this touches the issue of �counter-battery fire� is this: ASCMs and the C4ISR network that supports them are strategic, possibly operational level targets. This means that they will be serviced appropriately in the air dominance phase of the campaign, and most likely by land based airpower that is directed largely at the an echelon, or two of command higher than the naval commander! The naval commander will be asking for targets to be put on the ATO. Navy and USMC air will participate, but mostly in a SEAD or other supporting role for USAF strike packages.

The Navy never will field a carrier version of a heavy bomber, tanker, AWACs, or ISR aircraft that truly matches up against competing land based aircraft. These aircraft are the back bone of offensive air operations.

This is why I am insistent that the USN needs to deploy IRBM, or a significantly more capable replacement for TLAM, on surface ships if it desires to play in a significant role in a major air campaign. I believe that the thinking behind the Mk57 VLS reflects this, I just do not think that the navy has come to full terms with the requirement.

Air dominance alone is nowhere near a guarantee of land launched ASM immunity.

I absolutely agree.

My caveat is this: the air/space campaign must have progressed to the point where strategic targets (like the ASCM C4ISR network) have been neutralized, and friendly air formations are focused on an interdiction/reduction of enemy forces throughout the operational, depth of the battlefield.

If this is done, ASCMs will not be a major threat. I respectfully acknowledge that the perspective of the guy getting shot at is understandably different.

If this is not done, ASCMs are the *least* of an attacking naval force�s problems.

I see a strong need for ASM counterbattery capability. Whether that capability is technically achievable is, apparently, in question.

I agree that the Navy needs an integrated response to shore-based ASCMs and the ability to deliver effective fires against enemy artillery. Where we disagree most fervently is that:

1) I break the two requirements apart � ASCMs are strategic targets, counter battery fire is an operational or tactical mission � the way, and time line of addressing these threats is different. This may be may not be transparent to a layman, but is a critical difference.

2) I believe that the USN needs a dedicated �land attack� ships to deliver neutralization and destruction fires in support of amphibious and coastal operations (tactical and operational targets). This will cover the counter-battery requirement, and to some extent any residual ASCM threat.

3) LCS is not the platform to address #2 above.

4) I think that if air dominance has been won, there will be sufficient air power to interdict the ASCM threat.

5) I believe the USN needs short and intermediate range IRBMs.

[carr]

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[Busto963]

G, I'd like to pursue this further. Is this of enough general interest to continue in this thread or should we take it to PM?

I am fine either way - you have great ideas, and you ask good hard questions that challenge.

My apologies to Dave - I have "yet again" bled all over one of his threads...

[navydavesof]

G, I'd like to pursue this further. Is this of enough general interest to continue in this thread or should we take it to PM?

I am fine either way - you have great ideas, and you ask good hard questions that challenge.

My apologies to Dave - I have "yet again" bled all over one of his threads...

Keep it going, guys! I like learning from your points of view and experience! It would be great if you kept the conversation public

[carr]

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[Sciquest2525]

Would a titanium hull be stronger than an equivalent steel or aluminium hull for LCS and other small combatants?
Japanesse company used titaniumn for shipbuilding purposes and the USN ONR or was it NRL built a hull section of titaniumn
Has technology of titaniumn fabrication reached a point where the cost of of titanium hull or titanium hull and deckhouse be desirable/cost effective for future LCS variants and other small ship types where light weight and strength requirements have become competitive with aluminium?
I did some checking and the ONR website has fabricated a sample section of a titanium hull and used a new stir friction welding process to do it with.
I also came across a 32 foot motor sailor using a titanium hull.
ONR website touted the weight savings of titanium hull over steel and seems to have advantages over aluminium as well and offer increased payload weights over steel as well as other desirable features.

[Busto963]

My understanding of "counter battery" from a Navy perspective is that the ship tracks the projectile/missile in flight and immediately sends rounds back against the line of bearing. The USS Merrill provided SPQ-9A radar information for the USS New Jersey in 1983 for her counter battery gunfire missions. The SPQ-9A provided such good solutions that either 5 or 16" rounds were in the air within 1 minute of detection.

I understand also that in 1989 Iowa, Missouri and Wisconsin received the SPQ-9A and were slated in the WIP to receive the TPQ-36/37 as a dedicated counter battery radar.

However, since the SPQ-9B and TRS-3D rotate so fast, they are nearly as fast as a phased array.

I do not know enough about the technical details of the SPQ-9B or TRS-3D to pass judgement.

Modern artillery fire control have progressed a great deal since 1989. Now the expectation is that the FDC will locate an enemy artillery unit, assign battery(ies) the counter-battery fire mission, calculate a firing solution, and start putting rounds out *before* the first enemy round lands. That is serious shooting!

I note that:

• 1. Almost every counter-battery radar is now a phased array. It does not have to be, but no one is fielding anything other than phased array systems for CB fire.
  
  2. Counter-battery radars are also supposed to detect all indirect fire: mortar rounds are a pretty tiny target, and also quite lethal to friendly troops.
  
  3. If the Navy procures counter-battery systems (and it should), it makes sense that it field effective systems that protect not only the fleet, but also troops ashore until land based radars can be deployed.

The real challenge in providing counter-battery fire is not the radar, or the weapon employed, but providing a trained force of people who understand how to employ artillery (guns, rockets and missiles), understand and can develop a fire support plan to support the ground maneuver plan, understand how the enemy employs his artillery, and the best way to achieve effects on target. These are serious specialists; it seems unreasonable to expect the USN to deploy dozens of "FDC like teams" throughout the fleet, even if we expected to land a Corps level operation (~30,000 troops), which is highly unlikely as even the USMC would be tapped out to land two divisions.

[carr]

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[Busto963]

I almost get the sense that we have a partial disconnect in this discussion - that we're talking about two different problems or scenarios.

To be clear, the problem that I see is this: the Navy has stated that they will not risk ships within 25-50 miles of contested shores due to the threat of land based ASMs. Despite this statement, I still see a need to operate within that range for a variety of reasons/missions while the land is still contested and absent a completed strategic campaign. Hence, I see a need for land ASM counterbattery capability. This then, is point number one and the crux of the issue.

I see the shore based ASCM threat as separate and distinct from the counter-battery mission.

Field artillery (howitzers, MRLS systems), are not the same as short and intermediate range ballistic missiles, which in turn are not the same as an maritime strike reconnaissance network (of which ASCMs, if present, are a component).

The typical field artillery piece, SP gun, launcher, is going to be ~10-20 km behind the lines, while a ballistic missile or ASCM could be hundreds of km behind the lines. Even a SP artillery piece must tie into a logistics train to get ammunition and fuel. Moving and redeploying tons of ammunition is a significant and time consuming effort. ASCM and ballistic missile launchers are much more independent and can move to a firing point, or flee after firing. This makes engagement without air power problematic. Fire from ships will arrive minutes after launch and likely impact the ground after the launcher has fled. ASCMS and ballistic missile launch authority is likely to be directed from very high levels of the command (maybe national) compared to field artillery fire.

Comparing ballistic missiles to ASCMs:

• A ballistic missile is simple weapon, fired from a fixed geographic position to hit a target located at a fixed geographic position: even with PGMs, the munitions are generally area effect, potentially CBR, and in any event, can be fired without sensors, and is not terribly vulnerable to EW or soft kill systems once fired. BMs can be effective as individual or salvo launched.
  
  An ASCM is a much more sophisticated, expensive weapon, fired from a fixed location at a maneuvering enemy, and since it is generally shooting at a point target, often at very long ranges, it needs very good targeting data from sensors. The weapon may be very vulnerable to EW and other soft kill systems, but the command and control network *is* vulnerable to EW and can be �suckered� into launching an alpha strike at a non-existent target. ASCMs are certainly most effective when launched in salvos.

Major General J. B. A. Bailey notes in his definitive text �Field Artillery and Firepower�: �The �artillery duel� today and in the future may appropriately be seen as a contest between the powers of deception and concealment on the one hand and the technologies of surveillance and target acquisition on the other. The opening �duel� is more likely to be concerned with attempts to blind the enemy�s acquisition systems with lethal and nonlethal fire than with suppressing his firing platforms.�

You would think that an actual Air-Sea battle strategy might address the particulars, but in the vacuum of such a discussion�

Moving on... Can a strategic campaign as you've described actually succeed? Our only historical example, Desert Storm, would strongly suggest not.

Why are the historical lessons of WWII not relevant? Korea? Suez? Gallipoli?

The allied air campaign prior to, during, and after D-Day in Normandy are a great counterpoint. Admiral Ramsey had to deal with almost 300 German artillery batteries, in addition to mines, e-boats, submarines, the Luftwaffe� on D-day. Strategic bombing was halted to hit operational and even tactical level targets. Both the British RAF and the USAAF did this pivot.

The Scud Hunt failed in the face of overwhelming air power that had carried out almost exactly the kind of strategic campaign you describe.

Remember that the Scuds were not dependent upon a targeting network as they were being fired at fixed geographic positions, typically in Israel or Saudi Arabia, meaning they were often launched hundreds of miles from coalition lines, in the middle of nowhere and away from coalition forces.

Now, to the role of the Air Force ...

The primary player in the air superiority game is the USAF. USN/USMC aircraft, are contributors, but analysis of historical record and comparison of ground and carrier based aircraft will show that land-based air wins the air superiority fight.

On the face of it, your statement is correct and appropriate (that is, after all, the reason we have an Air Force!) though I would point out that the Navy carrier fleet in the Pacific in WWII established the air superiority that allowed the Air Force to undertake its strategic campaign.

That is a very Navy centric way of looking at things.

The USAAF was 2/3rds committed to the ETO in WWII. In the PTO, the USAAF was initially tied to defense of Australia and New Guinea, and was saddled with really difficult missions like supporting the Chinese to keep them in the war (the bulk of the IJA, and its best units were in mainland asia), which proved logistically impossible. Worse, the �Germany first� doctrine meant the PTO really did not get the equipment and manpower it needed until late in the war.

Even so, the USAAF did not depend upon naval aviation in the defense of Australia, or in supporting MacArthur�s offensives. 90% of the ordinance dropped on the Japanese islands was delivered by the USAAF planes (that is 90% of *all* allied bombs) burning every major city in Japan to the ground. USAAF B-29s destroyed a whopping 60% of Japanese shipping in the last six-months of the war using aerial mines. And USAAF aircraft accounted for slightly more air-to-air kills than naval aviation. It is clear that the USAAF more than carried its weight in the Pacific.

However, your statement is problematic with respect to future conflicts due to the continued drawdown of Air Force (and Navy!) assets and the lack of operating bases in the relevant areas. While we have bases in the Mid East (how many would we be allowed to conduct combat ops from in the event of a war with Iran?), currently, that number is more likely to decrease rather than increase. In a war with China, where will our bases be for the Air Force to operate from? Guam? CONUS? Japan's bases will be neutralized one way or the other. Naval air power may well constitute the bulk of available air power in a China war scenario and the Navy has nowhere near enough aircraft (or the right types) to conduct a strategic campaign in the manner you describe. That, again, leaves us with the choice to back away or to move in and deal with ASMs via counterbattery.

The decline of USAF (and carrier aviation) strength does not does not mean that the solution is pursue flawed courses of action. This is a question of national will. You either have the tools to do the job or not. If you lack the forces, then you have to decide to build them, or to walk away from the game.

During WWII, our leaders did not try to mount carrier raids on the Japanese home islands until IJA and IJN strength was sufficiently worn down. That took until late 1944. They were brave, but not stupid.

Naval aviation also flew thousands of land-based aircraft to include B-24s, because they were the right aircraft for the mission. Likewise, the USMC as an expeditionary force, should have bought A-10s back in the day and formed them into forward deployable squadrons, rather than trying to operate F-14s.

The Navy is doing the right thing by buying BAMs based on a USAF design.

This is why I am insistent that the USN needs to deploy IRBM, or a significantly more capable replacement for TLAM, on surface ships if it desires to play in a significant role in a major air campaign.

I agree completely but I don't see that tied into the ASM counterbattery issue. Did you mean it to be?

Yes. Sea launched ballistic missiles would be the cheapest way to hit deep inland targets from long distances out at sea. Hitting these targets would contribute to air superiority by destroying radars, command centers, aircraft parked on the ground, and yes the ASCM C4ISR network.

Without a true bomber, a long range air superiority fighter, and minimal tanker assets, carrier aviation cannot effectively hit deep (200nm plus) inland targets, and will be a marginal player in the air superiority game.

My caveat is this: the air/space campaign must have progressed to the point where strategic targets (like the ASCM C4ISR network) have been neutralized, and friendly air formations are focused on an interdiction/reduction of enemy forces throughout the operational, depth of the battlefield.

If this is done, ASCMs will not be a major threat.

The most relevant example, Desert Storm and the Scud Hunt, suggests that this is not true. A thoroughly dominated enemy was able to launch Scuds with near impunity.

Scuds are not ASCMs.

That raises the next, highly relevant point. You are suggesting (I think) that the frequency of ASM launch would be suppressed to an operationally and tactically irrelevant (or acceptable) level. On paper this might be true but the impact of even occasional ASM launches (as with occasional Scud launches that had absolutely no op/tactical relevance) is all out of proportion to the actual damage that they might inflict. Scuds presented no actual combat threat but absorbed enormous resources on our part for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was political dealings with Israel.

My position is that shore based ASCMs will be fired as soon as the enemy determines an attacking fleet is within range for an effective strike. The question is: �can blue forces suppress the C4ISR network needed to feed targeting to the ASCMs?�

Tactical and IRBMs are a different matter. Potential enemies may indeed decide to withhold ballistic missiles or employ them singularly, particularly if they begin to lose the fight for air/sea control. A strike on invasion beach heads, hitting the logistic train (iron mountain) as it off-loads using chemical warheads would be devastating.

You state that you agree that the Navy needs "an integrated response to shore-based ASCMs". � Regardless of agreement, what do you envision as the elements of the integrated response? You mention a land attack vessel. What weapons? What other elements?

The need is for:

1. ISR aircraft - long legged reconnaissance airframe with a synthetic aperture radar to look deep into enemy battle space and pick out key ground targets.
2. EW aircraft � the growler is not it, primarily due to range.
3. Interdiction aircraft
4. IRBMs.
5. Tactical ballistic missiles (POLAR/GLRMS)
6. (12) dedicated CA134/ Deutschland-like ships with IRBMs, a long-range counter battery radar, a defensive system against artillery like iron dome to provide a cheap extended range C-RAM over coastal forces, VLS primarily for POLAR. This is the core of advance force ops and fire support. These ships would be held in reserve (not "reserve" ships) to deploy only to support contingencies and combat operations.
7. A 155mm gun suitable for destroyers or frigates, if possible a double gun turret. AGS is not the answer as it does not fire NATO standard projectiles.

[carr]

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[carr]

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[Busto963]

I'm looking narrowly at ASM counterbattery capability - is it needed?; can it be done?

The capability is needed, technology is available and mature, it can - and should be done.

C-RAM is also part of counter-battery fire.

Soviet thinking on counter battery fire apportioned up to 50% of artillery to the mission � that should give you an indication as to value they placed on CB. After the Red army got its house in order, it was not unusual to devote months to painstaking analysis of German artillery deployment and organization. Russian tactical employment of artillery suffered from command and control rigidity, but their CB efforts were fearsome, and that philosophy/doctrine continues to this day. The west never really caught up. This doctrine is still very much alive.

You are also including artillery counterbattery in the discussion. I am not; not because I specifically think the Navy should not do it but because I don't know enough to have an opinion on it. My uninformed gut feeling is that the land forces should be responsible for artillery counterbattery if for no other reason than availability - naval forces tend to get diverted to other activities.

No army or marine officer around the world would exclude �artillery� from a discussion of counter battery fire.

The navy has to provide this capability for forced entry operations (this could include vertical envelopment by army troops), until the ground forces can get their guns, launchers, radars, C-RAM and C4ISR system up and running, as well as the ammunition supply to do the job. The air force and naval aviation are on the hook for interdiction to suppress enemy artillery, as well as ASCMs. This is an acknowledge challenge of forced entry operations.

Even if the ground forces were to have counter-battery fire capability immediately, the navy will still have to worry about the enemy artillery fire into coastal approaches.

The typical field artillery piece, SP gun, launcher, is going to be ~10-20 km behind the lines, while a ballistic missile or ASCM could be hundreds of km behind the lines.

Quite right but an ASCM or ballistic missile that is more than 50 miles (to pick an illustrative number) is no longer a counterbattery issue since it is beyond the instant response range of an existing or foreseeable counterbattery weapon (the launch platform will have moved before the weapon can arrive). Missiles that are launched from beyond 50 miles become a strategic issue (as you are focused on) rather than a counterbattery issue.

BM can be tactical, operational or strategic weapon, mostly dependent upon the type of warhead and range. I can easily see a scenario where the enemy holds his ballistic missile back out of easy carrier air striking range in preparation to fire on landing beaches, HLZs, FARPs and even the debarkation points for an amphibious landing. This can done because a competent enemy will pre-site suitable HLZs, landing beaches, ports, airports, etc. ahead of time for engagement with any IDF system. The ballistic missiles can be hidden, with no requirement to for additional targeting until Ali the forward observer picks up a radio and requests fire be placed on target AB051�

This is why there is an unequivocal requirement for interdiction aircraft to be operating over battlefield.

I see many instances where we won't mount a total strategic campaign just to pass near land. For example, mine clearing in the Mid East will involve operating within reach of land based ASM but will not justify a total strategic campaign.

We have a number of forces in the region to provide cover just for this scenario.

We need the "offensive" defense option of ASM counterbattery. The conceptual littoral (not LCS!) vessel was envisioned as the expendable means of applying counterbattery so as to allow high value ships to operate near land at greatly reduced risk. That premise still seems valid to me.

Much of this rest upon the opinion of author of the LCS article. There are so many iterations of LCS mission sets that my eyes glaze over. There is a kind of knee jerk reaction akin to the IED issue - years ago IEDs were simply �land mines� and booby traps. Axis and allies alike sowed tens or hundreds of millions of them.

I do note that Captain Hughes, certainly a key figure in the thought process and logic of small combatants, has advocated in many venues for ballistic and long range cruise missile type systems on small combatants, to address the same targets that were called �strike warfare� back when Iran first threatened the SoH/PG with Silkworm missiles. The tools then were the TLAM and naval aviation.

I genuinely see much of the �ASM counter-battery� terminology flap as a solvable with a well-designed, integrated ATO and artillery fires plan, along with TLAM, and SRBM or IRBM strikes. The defensive end needs to be addressed with an area type C-RAM and counter fire system to complement Aegis.

[carr]

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[navydavesof]

Considering the counter battery capability, I chose the Mk45 Mod4 because it can throw 5" rounds a little over 23 miles. With the CCF on standard 5" rounds, the gun can engage GPS targets beyond 23miles, and depending on if the Excalibur 5" GPS/SAL projectiles would have the RAP capability of most of the Excalibur rounds, it would be able to reach out well beyond 23 miles.

While ASCM ranges are far longer, I don't know if LCS would be operating further than 20 miles from the coast. I wonder how deep inland some ASCMs that would threaten an/a group of LCSs might be positioned. I bet the launchers would be within the Mk45's range of the coast.

[carr]

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[navydavesof]

What range would you anticipate the LCS operating from shore in the counterbattery role? Every mile offshore is a mile less inland range for the 5" gun.

Great, great, great question!

I am not sure!

I know you have mentioned:

Specifically for ASM counterbattery, Dave suggests the SPQ-9 series radar as appropriate and I've suggested a navalized MLRS/ATACMS as a possible weapon [5" guns just don't have the range].

The ATACMS seems to be a pretty long range (300 km!) and delivers a pretty heavy warhead (500lbs!). I have not been able to find much on diameter and adaptability with the Mk41. What versions would you refer to for Mk41 use?

It seems like there are only two elements to consider in range: 1) How far the LCS operates from the coast and 2) How far the forces (ASCMs/field artillery) are from the coast. Then, there is a question of number of shots available. The ATCAMs/MLRS, unless they have been made much smaller, won't fit in the Mk41 VLS very well, and even if they do will comprise, 10 or 20 rounds?

The variants of 5" ammunition provide the Navy with a number of options. After war had broken out, or if someone with sense in their heads had gotten in charge, they would take the 5"/54 caliber RAP rounds and put CCF on them providing a 30+nm range 5" GPS capability to the 5" gun. Or they could put the CCF on 5"/38 caliber rounds and throw them even further. However, those are not the same as landing 500lb bombs from ATCAMs, but it does provide a repeatability and volume of fire.

If the Excalibur 5" GPS/SAL is produced, then we would probably be looking at 5" precision guided RAP rounds reaching out to (I would hypothesize) 40 or more miles. If the LCS are operating anywhere within 30 miles of the coast, they could address those targets with laser guided munitions, guided (hopefully) by Pioneer/Shadow UAVs.

[Busto963]

Gentlemen,

Weapons range for counter-battery fire is only one consideration, assuming that reconnaissance, interdiction, and CB radar are in place, serious attention must be directed to speed of response, munitions, maximize number of rounds impacting on target in a short period, and organization.

Just as field artillery has come to rely upon phased array radars for counter-battery, the rocket has become the weapon of choice for dealing with enemy howitzers and rockets. Rockets have are supremely effective per-round carriers of submunitions preferred for CB, each launcher can salvo its weapons almost instantaneously, and rockets have the range/speed of flight characteristics desired for the mission.

Gun-howitzers will do the job if in, and are more economical for mortars and small rockets, but the 155mm weapon is probably the minimum caliber that should be considered.

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Where does this leave us?

Reality is that there are no MRLS weapons, no 155mm+ gun-howitzers, no counter-battery systems, no Fire Direction Centers, no C-RAM systems for area coverage), and most importantly, no JSTARS like system in the fleet.

Leaving aside the last issue, a minimal CB capacity could be built up in stages.

Step one is to start thinking in terms of organization: field artillery is organized along the lines of firing batteries, typically 4-6 howitzers or launchers - the navy needs to build around this idea rather than re-invent the wheel, I would suggest that a single turret be considered a battery; four ships with a single turret guns would operate as a single firing battery: they could be distributed geographically, but would fire as one unit.

Two: fire control, the USMC could provide this expertise, but forget trying to put them on every ship as that is wasteful. At best you will get one per battery. Where to put them? Since the FDC does not need to be with the battery, put them on a larger ship. One option would be to put them on an frigate or destroyer ( provided you could spare at least helicopter hanger for them. Communications and of course CB radar feeds and terminals would be another issue. With a DDG, you could keep the DDG farther to sea and still provide anti-air protection for "the gun line". More realistically, put the FDC on an LPD.

Three: guns. As Dave has noted in the past, you fight with what you have. Absent a 155mm or 8" weapon, 5 inch guns are what we have. My suggestion would be to install the 5" gun, but build the installation with the capability to support a 155mm or larger weapon.

Four: Rocket systems. A MLRS/GMLRS capability is desired, but not immediately available. The solution, install a readily available navalized 160mm system bought from the Israelis, as well as VLS. A vertically launched weapon with the capacity to carry a DPICM submunition load equal to the 203mm MLRS is hugely desired.

Five: C-RAM/ CIWS and RAM/SeaRam are point defense systems, and we need to cover areas. The Israeli "Iron Dome" seems to work, covers a large area, and the launchers are containers and sealed - might work.

Six: CB radar. Mount an AN/PQS 47 on the flight deck of whatever platform you locate the USMC FDC as an interim solution. Obviously undesireable, but it could fill the gap.

The "right solution" is to build a dedicated platform for fire support, with the C4, and CB radar, and C-RAM to do the job. Smaller naval combatants could be attached as task organized firing elements.

[navydavesof]

Excellent post! It certainly leads to a good equipment set for a small to medium sized NSFS platform.

I cannot find anything on the AN/PQS 47. Is that the right designation?