Which is the best fleet aircraft carrier class of WW2?

[Timmy C]

Hi guys,

Dan:

Thanks for helping me out on those carriers' names (Wolverine or Sable).
I think they would make awesome models, especially in 1/350 scale (or as an R/C project: you wouldn't find another one on the pond. And powered sidewheel drive!)

How about one in 1/72?
http://www.modelwarships.com/reviews/sh ... p2/p2.html
Bill has finished it, although I'm not sure what happened to the finished pics =/

[Werner]

I think it is extremely fair to say that at least a very substantial percentage of kamikaze attacks that could have been launched in 1945 would have penetrated any plausible CAP available in 1945.

Actually, your statement is completely unfair. Of the thousands of Kamikaze aircraft launched, well under 10% scored, possibly much lower, including attacks against picket ships, tiny landing craft and anchored amphibious support vessels.

Except for the 5-inch gun, AAA of the era had a 10,000 foot reach. A Kamikaze had a decent chance of scoring at that range even if he was hit. That's why the 20mm started to disappear and there was a crash program to replace 40mm quads with 3-inch twins. Radar fire control and miniaturization of fire control computers meant a machine cannon with an 8 or 10 mile range could be useful in an anti-aircraft engagement of this type. Like we've been discussing elsewhere, it is the difference between "iron sights" on the target and a computer-aided guidance system.

Meanwhile, the vast majority of the intercepts were by fighters directed from control ships.

Considering fighter direction was handled by voice over a few channels, that is a real tribute.

[Lesforan]

Timmy,

Thanks. That was just awesome.

I'm thinking a powered model could be built with a continuous shaft passing through both sides of the hull to mount the wheels on. A large pulley wheel on the shaft and a small one on the motor shaft, connected with a belt drive. Could be a very quiet, smooth drivetrain. No u-joints, no gears. Maybe a pulley and belt set from a vaccuum cleaner would work.

[chuck]

I think it is extremely fair to say that at least a very substantial percentage of kamikaze attacks that could have been launched in 1945 would have penetrated any plausible CAP available in 1945.

Actually, your statement is completely unfair. Of the thousands of Kamikaze aircraft launched, well under 10% scored, possibly much lower, including attacks against picket ships, tiny landing craft and anchored amphibious support vessels.

Except for the 5-inch gun, AAA of the era had a 10,000 foot reach. A Kamikaze had a decent chance of scoring at that range even if he was hit. That's why the 20mm started to disappear and there was a crash program to replace 40mm quads with 3-inch twins. Radar fire control and miniaturization of fire control computers meant a machine cannon with an 8 or 10 mile range could be useful in an anti-aircraft engagement of this type. Like we've been discussing elsewhere, it is the difference between "iron sights" on the target and a computer-aided guidance system.

Meanwhile, the vast majority of the intercepts were by fighters directed from control ships.

Considering fighter direction was handled by voice over a few channels, that is a real tribute.

How is it unfair? you waxed lyrical without contradicting a word of what I said.

[chuck]

My sources say of the 193 Kamikaze aircraft launched during Okinawa, About 30, or 15%, penetrated the CAP to strike ships. Clearly, the bottlenecks in the Kamikaze campaign were the lethality of the kamikaze aircraft, and the technique for discerning target value. It was not the ability to penetrate the defenses.

OK, I'm thumping on you because you're making very short, very broad stateents without backing them up. "My sources" is a step in the right direction but just what are "your sources?"

After Okinawa there wasn't a credible pool of talent or aircraft necessary for large-scale attacks on US fleets. One or two aircraft might slip through from time to time if they used the right techniques in individual attacks, but if you want to break through on a massive scale you have to start with a large group and they just didn't have this after Okinawa. So I take exception to your blanket statement for all of 1945.

I agree with you on target selection, but there's another factor you missed, which is training. Most of the pilots weren't really well trained in the art of striking a target in a high speed dive. Many of them overshot because of the difficulty in keeping the nose down at high speeds.

I think, too, that the Okha hurt their kamikaze program. A raid of 4 aircraft required something like 32 fighters for escort. If they had sent those aircrarft as Kamikazes instead they might have had a better chance of hitting targets, but at the same time I'm not sure how much luck they would have had getting those pilots to all volunteer for "special attack" missions.

Japan horded a pool of about 8000-12000 for the purpose of launching Kamikaze attacks during the anticipated invasion of the home Islands. The diminution of the scale of Kamikaze attacks in mid-1945 is due more to desired to not let this pool be drained down by what were perceived as non-critical battles. It is true that, statistically, it may take perhaps several hundred well planned Kamikaze sorties to inflict a mission kill on a capital asset, and that Japan does not possess enough Kamikaze aircraft to materially defeat the US fleet. But it remains true that adequate Kamikaze force exist to penetrate the defenses of and make mission kills out of a non-negligible fraction of the US carrier force as they were in 1945.

[Werner]

According to Morison, during the invasion of Okinawa the Japanese launched 1900 Kamikaze sorties and 5300 conventional aircraft sorties.

The score was 30 ships sunk and 368 damaged. Of the damaged ships, 67 were repaired after 15 August 1945 or scrapped after returning Stateside.

That means of the 398 victims, only 97 were "mission kills" out of 7200 sorties, a 1:74 ratio, or less then 2%

Against carriers of all types, there were 11 strikes, resulting in 5 mission kills. Two of those five carriers were available again before 1 October 1945.

given the systematic destruction of Japanese oil refining capacity by the AAF, I wonder how many suicide craft would have enough fuel to launch by October when the invasion began. Ihe import of oil essentially ended in the early months of 1945 and any gasoline in Japan was supply "in the system" since then.

[bengtsson]

It is true Japan was not really short of Aircraft at wars end. They did preserve a large number in anticipation of the coming invasion. Regular operations were cut to near zero to save fuel,aircraft and pilots for kamikaze attacks against invasion forces. That large pool of aircraft available for attacks in mid 1945 was one argument used by the US itself to justify nuclear detonations over two major cities. Of course most would have been promptly shot down, but if even 1% scored a hit, that's alot of USN casualties.
Imagine that the US shifted all it's airpower to the Pacific by invasion time and perhaps the 1% hit rate might even be a bit high. But you can't be in every inch of sky and Japan had placed planes near invasion beaches on roads and short airstrip cut out so flight times would be minutes at most. North Vietnam used this tactic to hit one of our destroyers off of the coast during the late 60's. The MIG used a conventional bomb attack, but a kamikaze using similar suicide tactics could expect some success.

Bob B.

[Werner]

It is true Japan was not really short of Aircraft at wars end. They did preserve a large number in anticipation of the coming invasion. Regular operations were cut to near zero to save fuel,aircraft and pilots for kamikaze attacks against invasion forces. That large pool of aircraft available for attacks in mid 1945 was one argument used by the US itself to justify nuclear detonations over two major cities.

How many Me-262s could not cross the Rhine because of the fuel situation. Japan would be more desperate. The first priority for gasoline would not be aircraft, but transport to move troops to the landing sites.

It would really be helpful to know what Japanese fuel reserves were at the end of the war. As I said, their tanker fleet ceased to exist in the spring of 1945 and they had no domestic reserve. Synthetic plants would be high on Curtis LeMay's target list. By August, the number of cities severely damaged by firebombing (and therefore eligible for an atomic bomb) was under 30. Three more months of bombing would have reduced this list considerably. Economists predicted the entire Japanese economy would have to be diverted to simply shelter and care for the homeless by the time of the invasion.

By the summer of 1945 aircraft engine production had already been so disrupted by bombing that the specialist Kamikaze designs had been made to fit any one of a number of obsolete motors which could be scavenged from unairworthy planes which were grounded at the various airfields or reclaimed from wrecks.

According to the US Strategic Bombing Survey, aircraft engine production declined from 46,256 in 1944 to 12,360 in 1945, half of the 1943 production.

[RNfanDan]

It is true Japan was not really short of Aircraft at wars end.

IIRC, the issue was not in the number of aircraft they possessed, but of skilled pilots to fly them and fuel enough to get them all off the ground.

[Werner]

Except for coal and copper, almost every strategic resource had to come to Japan by sea. The anti-shipping strikes against the home islands in July and August destroyed or damaged a substantial fraction of the remaining merchant ships over 1,000 tons. Economically, Japan's industrial base was beyond the position Germany occupied in the spring of 1945.

We also have to consider the psychological and material impact of The USSR's entry into the war in August. The high command feared the USSR more than the atomic bomb.

We talk about the Kamikaze because of the unique nature of a suicide attack, and because of the fearsome injuries the fires caused on a Navy for which the casualty rate had declined dramatically since 1942. As the statistics I posted above show, the actual military value was not dramatically higher than threats faced at other times in the war, and certainly the response (the 1945 anti-Kamikaze refits) would have changed the balance somewhat. This enemy was on the ropes. I don't see how they could have executed the program Chuck outlined with the available materials and manpower, especially considering the attack from The North.

Two of the 1945 program improvements to fire control are visible in the proliferation of radar antennae on gun mounts and new light-caliber fire control directors for blind fire, which takes away most of the opportunity to saturate a ships existing central fire controls, and the other is the addition of mounts in the bows and aft of the superstructure to cover "crossing threats", a weakness in the system which did not properly carry a particular solution across from one quadrant to the next.

[bengtsson]

My only point was that Japan had aircraft in large numbers, pilots and enough gas to fly. Our own commanders expected alot of casualties from suicide air attack. If they did not believe this they should not have used it as an excuse for nuclear detonations over population centers in order to end the war. I never said Japan could wage conventional air combat on any scale by Aug 1945. The USNI Proceedings ran a long article on the state of Japan's suicide Kamikazi air assets at wars end. They were very considerable. I would have saved the article had I known there was a belief that Japan did not have thousands of aircraft ready with pilots and fuel enough to launch mass suicide attacks. We are talking suicide attacks taking place against an invasion force. If Japan didn't have these assets then the USN intelligence were ignorant or liars and some Proceedings contributers need to do better research and stop giving me false ideas.
Bob B.

[richter111]

If my memory serves correctly there were approximately 9500 aircraft available of all types for use as suicide craft in the event of the invasion.

Additionally, I also read that a total of nine (9) A bombs were to be used in the invasion, the beach areas being bombed 24 hours before the assault waves came ashore.

Ric

[Werner]

Harrison (a special consultant to Stimson) reported to Truman;

First one of tested type [i.e., Fan Man] should be ready at Pacific base about 6 August. Second one ready about 24 August. Additional ones ready at accelerating rate from possibly three in September to we hope seven or more in December. The increased rate above three per month entails changes in design which Groves believes thoroughly sound.

• August, 1945 = 2 bombs;
• September, 1945 = 2 or 3 bombs;
• October, 1945 = 3 or 4 bombs;
• November, 1945 = 5 to 7 bombs;
• December, 1945 = 7 or 8 bombs
  
  Total, 19 to 24 bombs

In the summer of 1945 the Japanese government expected the total petroleum supply to be exhausted by the end of the year.

It appears that the last employment of the surviving aircraft carriers was to bring fuel from Hong Kong in their bunkers which could be remanufactured into aviation gasoline.

Drift bottles were employed to allow the ocean's currents to move gas and alcohol from Korea to the West Coast of Japan.

[bengtsson]

Well, here are some figures I looked up, you be the judge if this force could or could not inflict harm to any degree.

US intelligence estimates of Japanese air strength were hoplessly and dangerously astray as plans for Operation Olympic went forward.

when the war ended on Aug 15 Japan had some 12,725 planes of all types. 5,651 Army, 7,074 Navy along with 100 underground plants in various stages of completion, but most machinery was not yet in production, sub-contacting was spread across the country.
July production figures were 1,131 aircraft completed
pilots were more of a problem 7,000 being available with another 1,422 in training on Kyushu itself. 800 were in hospital. All of the above were to be pressed into service for the suicide missions during the invasion.
These figures can be broken down by individual air fleets. but I will not bother with that.
Reserve stocks of fuel were set aside and buried deep to prevent their distruction by B29 raids. 30,000 tons of high grade aviation fuel were hoped to be produced each month, but that high a figure is doubtful.
20 suicide airstrips with buried fuel storage and underground hangers were in preparation in Southern Kyushu. Another 35 airfields and 9 seaplane bases were also available in Kyushu for suicide aircraft.
once the invasion was certain, 330 specially trained navy combat planes would take off to attack the USN Task Forces, a second force of 2,000 Army and Navy planes was to fight to the death in the conventional air combat over the invasion force. While these two forces engaged the Americans 825 suicide planes were to hit the Transports on the open sea. As the invasion convoy approached the anchorages, another 2,000 suicide planes were to attack in waves of 300-400 at the rate of one wave a hour.

The main difference between the Okinawa campaign and the battle over the Olympic invasion forces would be the short flight times for Japanese aircraft. At Okinawa the Japanese flew 425 miles from southern Kyushu to the invasion force. That gave plenty of air time to cut the attacker to pieces in the air. That luxury would not exist in operation Olympic. With plane's flight times measured in only a few minutes the advantage would shift from the American fighters to the Japanese suicide planes. The Japanese had use of 58 other air fields within easy flight range to the invasion force all of these were to be used for the launch of suicide planes.

Now these are just figures, alot could be expected to go wrong with Japanese plans, but this force was in place or would be by Sept.
The war was all but over for Japan's naval and airforces and Japan could not fight conventional air warfare. But the above force with the advantage of short flight times is not to be considered a minor threat, in the SUICIDE ROLE.

Bob B.

[Vlad]

i think i have to vote Illustrious on this one. Unlike most other carriers, they had an armoured deck and an armoured hangar. they brushed off Kamiakzes from their steel deck much more easily than the US wood-deck carriers and were back in action quicker. their survivability is also clearly show by the battering some of them took in the mediterranean.

A carrier must not only carry planes, but also still be there when they come back to land!!!

but, i hear you say, she only carries 36 planes! well, thats debatable. the early members of the class carried 36 in the hangar. once they lengthened the flight deck on the later ships and started following the USN park-on-deck practice they as good as doubled their aircraft capacity. overall winners I say.

[MartinJQuinn]

Illustrious class
Length 744
Beam 96 (wl)
Draft 28
Displacement 23,207/28618 full
Crew 2000 (including air group)
SHP 110,000
Speed 30.5
Range 11,000 @14 knots
Aircraft Carried 36
Armament 16 4.5" guns

Essex class
Length 872 (short hull)
Beam 93 (wl)
Draft 23 (28 full load)
Displacement 27,100/36,380 full
Crew 2600-3300 (including air group)
SHP 150,000
Speed 32.5
Range 15,000 @15 knots
Aircraft Carried 90-100
Armament 12 5" guns

It's very speculative to judge these two classes against each other. IMO, it's like comparing apples to oranges. They were designed for very different purposes. The Essex class was bigger, faster, carried more planes and had better range. The Illustrious was better protected, but had a smaller strike capacity. Both showed they could take a tremendous amount of punishment and still survive.

Even factoring the better protection the Illustrious class carried, I believe the Essex was the better all around carrier, based on the edge she had in speed, range and aircraft capacity.

[C T]

Just as a thought does anyone know what the flight deck loads for the USN carriers were to be for Olympic? I seem to remember reading something along the lines of 75 to 80 fighters per carrier and only 20 strike aircraft.
C T

[Werner]

Remember, the current generation of fighters (F6F, F4U) performed ably as strike aircraft. The 30 dedicated bombers were not alone.

[Tracy White]

In fact, the Navy started sending carriers out without Hellcats because the Corsair was a better strike fighter. Hellcats, if any, were relegated to the night fighter mission. If you look at Air Group 5 on CV-13 in March of 1945, she had 6 hellcats (four night fighters and two photographic), 36 corsairs, 15 avengers, and 15 helldivers. The Tiny Tims that cooked off in the hangar bay were on F4Us.

[M.I.Nutzerwutt]

USN:

4. The Independance class CVL was a conversion acceptable but not awesome.

Those acceptable ships did pretty good maybe better than you give them credit. There were 9 of them by the end of 1943 and they out numbered the Essex ships almost the whole year. They kicked butt at a time they were needed badly and were right there with the big carriers even after they finally got caught up. Dont sell them short the Japanese didnt.