Washington and WWI

[Werner]

We may never know, but to what degree did main citadel penetration contribute to the end of Fuso and Yamashiro.

Seems to me these ships suffered multiple torpedo hits. They were hardly modern by any standards.

[RNfanDan]

True, post Jutland ships definitely would enjoy considerable subtle superiority...

Aaahhh...the ol' C.S.S. factor! I agree that would tend to apply in such a disparately equal situation. It's transparently opaque, you see--one must only crudely finesse the complicated simplicity of the fixed variables, into a divisively unanimous corollary!

[Werner]

True, post Jutland ships definitely would enjoy considerable subtle superiority...

Aaahhh...the ol' C.S.S. factor! I agree that would tend to apply in such a disparately equal situation. It's transparently opaque, you see--one must only crudely finesse the complicated simplicity of the fixed variables, into a divisively unanimous corollary!

I believe this sums it nicely.

[Guest]

Did the USA & Japan start to build 18" guns ships in 1916 when Furious arrived on the scene, nope! they did only a few years later.

Furious is such an odd case - a capital ship capable of being disabled by a few 6" rounds - and her 18" guns are of a entirely substandard caliber length and totally inadequate number for salvo firing, no observer would jump to the conclusion that they are either already threatened with an effective 18" gun armed ship, or that royal navy is clearly intending to equip itself with effective 18" gunned ships. But Incomparable is a different case.

[Guest]

True, post Jutland ships definitely would enjoy considerable subtle superiority...

Aaahhh...the ol' C.S.S. factor! I agree that would tend to apply in such a disparately equal situation. It's transparently opaque, you see--one must only crudely finesse the complicated simplicity of the fixed variables, into a divisively unanimous corollary!

Hey, I thought we were all naval buffs enough so that the advantages of post Jutland revolution in capital ship design - invisible to the non-initiated - would be more than clear enough to our learned eyes.

But if you are a total naval ignoramus, I would be happy to enlighten you.

[Filipe Ramires]

Regarding Bismarck there is photo evidence of his wreck showing one of his main turrets barbettes penetrated by an heavy shell. Somehow Rodney was able to silence two of the 15'' turrets early in final battle. In terms of the shock-wave radar damage I believe that took place when Bismarck fired against the British heavy cruisers in the Denmark Strait. Finally, the torpedo hits, they only finished the job, the ship was doomed already, he was at the time, after so many hits of all kinds of calibers, a complete CTL (Constructive Total Loss). And since he was yet far away from French bases I doubt he could have made it home safely had the torpedo hits and the scuttle not take place. Even if by any "divine" act Bismarck would reach a French naval base he would be many many months being repaired...this if the Kriegsmarine though it was wort doing it.

[Laurence Batchelor]

I really wish people wouldn't base alot of of their ides about shells and penetration on the Rodney, KGV vs Bismarck episode.

The battle was not atypical, it was fought at point blank ranges in terms of how Dreadnoughts were designed and should have engaged each other.

It is much harder to penetrate with Flatter short-range trajectories. One Rodney 16" shell I believe also penetrated the armouded citadel aft of Bruno turret also wrecking internal communication.

I think a more detailed study needs to be done of the wreck of Scharnhorst to see how shells went to work at the ranges they were more designed to operate at.
It would also be interesting to see the damage the 6" shell fire had done to him.

Even if by any "divine" act Bismarck would reach a French naval base he would be many many months being repaired...this if the Kriegsmarine though it was wort doing it.

and subject to heavy RAF bombing whilst those repairs were ongoing, there a no concrete bumkers to concel something as big as Bismarck in Brest!

[Werner]

The point of the thread was, would the trend toward fewer guns of larger calibre continue. I don't think Bismarck's loss says larger shells were necessary. Instead, mechanisms which improved the percentage of hits were more important.

Probably a 12-inch to 14-inch shell is ideal if you can greatly improve the number of hits and rate of fire. Many years ago we proved that a US 8-inch "superheavy", while just too small to penetrate Yamato's deck would still have made so many hits in such a short interval as to make the Japanese ship useless.

Calibre increases beyond 15-inch were the fallacy of Jackie Fisher and his club. A real captain would not be so fussy as long as the shells hit and did critical damage.

[Laurence Batchelor]

The point of the thread was, would the trend toward fewer guns of larger calibre continue. I don't think Bismarck's loss says larger shells were necessary. Instead, mechanisms which improved the percentage of hits were more important.

Fire control and the understanding to use H.E. shells to devastating effect are more important than sheer numbers or calibres of guns.
As I've said time and again their is a finite limit and as the gun calibre goes up you effectively get deminishing returns on all that technical investment.

Probably a 12-inch to 14-inch shell is ideal if you can greatly improve the number of hits and rate of fire. Many years ago we proved that a US 8-inch "superheavy", while just too small to penetrate Yamato's deck would still have made so many hits in such a short interval as to make the Japanese ship useless.

We never proved anything, you convinced yourself!
Are we saying Agincourt is the way forward then?
Personally I think 8 shells is the ideal salvo number and anything between 14-16inches.

Calibre increases beyond 15-inch were the fallacy of Jackie Fisher and his club. A real captain would not be so fussy as long as the shells hit and did critical damage.

Fisher was only following his reading of Tsushima, the big gun and speed being his reading of what won the battle.
However it was the Japanese to first introduce 16" calibre, shortly followed by the USA, not Fisher! He also had nothing to do with Nelson & Rodney as he had already been booted out of the Admiralty by that time and of course he had nothing to do with the Lion's.
I agree on the second point in part, any Captain just wishes he's given the best weapons for the job, which again includes F/C, shells, fuses, barrel wear, stable gun platform for a ship etc etc
He ain't going to be too fussed if he's out gunned as long as he has confidence in the tools and crew at his disposal.

[Filipe Ramires]

Many years ago we proved that a US 8-inch "superheavy", while just too small to penetrate Yamato's deck would still have made so many hits in such a short interval as to make the Japanese ship useless.

In which battle that happened????????? As far as I can tell neither Yamato or Des Moines faced each other. I find hard to believe that a single shell from Des Moines would disable Yamato but then a 18.1'' shell of Yamato, yes...go on...she was blind, even a lucky hit, would most certainly do serious damage to the cruiser.
The case of Hiei brings that theory a bit to attention. The Japanese "battlecruiser" much less protected then Yamato was taking hits from 5'' to 8'' shells at point blank range. She was in fact damaged indeed but not disabled and she kept firing back disabling or damaging any ship she could do harm. Other then the 8'' shell which penetrated the armour and wrecked the steering room and therefore reducing the speed of the ship so that next day she could have been caught by aviation, Hiei was much fighting capable yet.

[Werner]

I think the fact that Musashi's fire control was knocked out by one of the very first near aviation torpedo or bomb misses is pretty conclusive information regarding the amount of damage done by non-penetrating hits.

[Filipe Ramires]

I think the fact that Musashi's fire control was knocked out by one of the very first near aviation torpedo or bomb misses is pretty conclusive information regarding the amount of damage done by non-penetrating hits.

Point being??? Kongo's main fire control was disabled by a straffing passage of a USN plane at Samar. Fire Controls are vulnerable to many things...from bomb near misses, straffing, bomb or torpedo hits, blast from the ship own guns, etc etc. Concussion is the worst that can happen to a FC.

[Laurence Batchelor]

Fire control gear are very delicate instruments, their 'softness' doesn't equate to a general 'softness' for the entire ship!

Even a ships own blast damage can disable them!
Undoubtively if one if the sightlayers had a Ruby Murray the night before that could even disable one!

[Werner]

No, but such a ship can be counted as a "soft kill" as specified above. Look at South Dakota or San Francisco in 1942.

Having in impenetrable deck and sides do not guarantee your value as a fighting unit. That's why designing for a penetrating hit which touches off a magazine is a fool's errand. The same work can be done with less effort.

[Laurence Batchelor]

Having in impenetrable deck and sides do not guarantee your value as a fighting unit. That's why designing for a penetrating hit which touches off a magazine is a fool's errand. The same work can be done with less effort.

No but designing your offensive systems in a warship on the off chance you can knock out something delicate and valuable at range and in rough weather is a folly.

Your on safer, proved ground if you make sure you can always damage him via penetration whenever you hit (which isn't very often pre Radar).

Every hit must count, before Radar, as often your foe may withdraw.

[Filipe Ramires]

No, but such a ship can be counted as a "soft kill" as specified above. Look at South Dakota or San Francisco in 1942.

Having in impenetrable deck and sides do not guarantee your value as a fighting unit. That's why designing for a penetrating hit which touches off a magazine is a fool's errand. The same work can be done with less effort.

The Battle of Guadalcanal was a complete chaos for both sides and San Francisco had her bridge shot to pieces by 14'' shells from Hiei. She was disabled but not sunk because it was too much of a chaos in that battle. Losses were high for both sides therefore I don't consider this battle a "soft kill".
On the Second Battle of Savo Island South Dakota was badly hit also by 14'' and mostly 8'' shells having her bridge badly shoted. Haven't Washington showed up and hit Kirishima seriously I am quite sure that the odds for South Dakota survivability would not have been much positive.
Point blank range battles are hard to predict and usually come up with serious losses to both sides. Shells, like you said will hit the targets horizontally and torpedoes will have short runs given the target less time to spot and evade them.
Having Yamato and Des Moines alone shooting at each other at point blank range would most likely reduce Yamato to a Hiei style or bit worst case, and Des Moines reduced to a floating hulk.

[Guest]

Many years ago we proved that a US 8-inch "superheavy", while just too small to penetrate Yamato's deck would still have made so many hits in such a short interval as to make the Japanese ship useless.

Hardly.

[Guest]

I think the fact that Musashi's fire control was knocked out by one of the very first near aviation torpedo or bomb misses is pretty conclusive information regarding the amount of damage done by non-penetrating hits.

Let me ask you again, do you prefer that your hits penetrate, or will you settle for your hits merely ringing resoundingly against the outside of the armor, and trust the outcome on the chance that some soft but vital component can be damage sufficiently as to prevent your opponent's guns from landing penetrating hits into your citadel.

Since in most modern battleships the entire fire control direction can be assumed by any one of the major turrets, I suspect that the only way for non-penetrating hits to disable a well armored battleship's ability to hit back would be to hit close enough to each of range finder ports on each of the main turrets to shake loose the optics.

[RNfanDan]

Let's ignore for the moment the fact that Washington ships enjoyed the benefit of the lessons of WWI, while the hypothetical no-war scenario ships we are talking about would of course be denied this benefit. Let's instead concentrate on whether the magnitude of the ships, their size, speed, thickness of armor and main gun caliber, would have matched or surpassed the ships of Washington.

I would estimate the correct answer to the poll question as being "yes"
(the fact that I actually voted "no" was the result of misinterpreting the question). .

Considering that these two world powers had already accepted the fact that they would be "natural" enemies in any future conflict, there was bound to be strong incentive for just the kind of warship development Chuck has postulated. In my opinion, the most important of the Anglo-German conflict's "lessons of war", and that of Jutland in particular, seems to have been grossly underappreciated (if not altogether ignored) by the time of the WNC.

Despite the apparent credit that has been attributed to Jutland by historians, the most important "lesson" of that action (the disproven efficacy of the battlecruiser) appears to have been underappreciated by world naval powers, if not ignored altogether. There seems to have been no clarion moment among postwar naval designers, acknowledging this failure of the battlecruiser, even long after Jutland it retained some influence. If this statement seems absurd, just consider the significant number of battlecruisers, both building and projected, whose existences were terminated by WNC--YEARS after the war was over.

Because of the failure of world naval powers to recognize the "folly" of continuing to design and build such ships, the war---and Jutland, in particular---did not have the degree of impact on warship design that has been attributed to it. Based on this alone, I would tend to say ships of a non-war-affected line of development would, indeed be at least equal to those in existence by the time of WNC--just as Chuck's argument suggests.

As additional support for my opinion the events of World War Two--with its relatively huge impact on naval advancements and on sea warfare itself--stand in stark contrast to those of the Great War. However, even that conflict began with navies having only limited technological advancements over the big-gun ship designs of WW1.

Putting the battlecruisers and Jutland aside, there are two minor points I'd like to make. First, someone alluded to the lack of submarine warfare that would have resulted in a weakness in warship hull design, had the Great War not intervened; I don't believe this is necessarily true because, a) the torpedo and the submarine were nothing new, even in 1914 and, b) naval designers were already familiar with the concept of subdivided, compartmentalized hulls, as well as with the consequences of not fully incorporating that concept (Titanic being the most obvious example, more than two years before the war).

Secondly, the effect of aircraft on sea warfare was all but destined to happen, sooner or later. It doesn't bear much influence on the war/no war line of development, especially on the no-war side of the issue. The Great War did not revolutionize air/sea combat, and although it may have introduced it, the war did not effectively address the issue of big-gun obsolescence.

Even after that war, the aircraft lobby still took years to develop its strategic value, especially at sea. My point is that, despite the conflict of 1914-18, big-gunned ships remained the primary focus of most naval powers by the time of WNC. The postponement of naval conflict by removing the Great War from the developmental question, only serves to enhance the issue in favor of the no-war argument.

(Sorry for the long posting)

Oh, P.S.--could someone here "enlighten me" on warships? Aren't they those big steel boats that go "boom!"?

[RNfanDan]

Since in most modern battleships the entire fire control direction can be assumed by any one of the major turrets, I suspect that the only way for non-penetrating hits to disable a well armored battleship's ability to hit back would be to hit close enough to each of range finder ports on each of the main turrets to shake loose the optics.

Not necessarily true--in fact, that argument really doesn't carry much weight. Even in the most modern of duelling-battleships warfare, they did not house their radar and fire control systems within the main turrets. Each turret can certainly fire under "local control", but once the central fire control apparatus loses its sensors--even if the CIC (or its equivalent) is protected by main armor belt and deck--it becomes exponentially more difficult to fire with effect. The key is centralization. Lose those eyes and ears, and the guns lose most of their capabilities.

Even if the ability to direct all main-armament turrets was possible from any single one, they weren't individually radar-equipped, and their optical rangefinders were quite a bit lower than those typically mounted in the superstructure--meaning they were blind at extreme ranges. With guns capable of delivering ordnance well-beyond the visible horizon, they couldn't be effective until they were detrimentally within range of the guns of their similarly-armed opponent. Disabling each turret's aiming and ranging apparatus one-by-one is not a tactic likely to be encountered.

A good example of the ineffectiveness of "local control" is that of Bismarck, whose highly-qualified gunnery officer, M�llenheim-Rechburg, was forced to assign such duty after his controls were knocked out by a British shell. Once this occurred, accuracy fell-off sharply from the ship's aft main armament.

Penetrating hits are not a requisite for winning a gunnery duel at sea.