if carriers were sunk at pearl harbour

[Werner]

I will have to reread Shattered Sword and Morrison again and ponder this.

Morrison was a first of a kind but that doesn't make him the best on the field...even more because he did his research and writing during and immediately after the war. Many elements only got "up to the surface" long after he wrote his books.

True, but don't forget he revised the series from 1955 to 1961 or so, although the revisions did not go as far as to alter any major or minor themes. He is very clever at hiding the ambiguities in his narratives with verbal sleight of hand, rather than committing himself to one version of events where they are in conflict.

[bb-56]

If Lexy and Big E where lost at pearl, Yorktown would have been in undamaged condition at Midway with Saratoga, Hornet and Wasp and still won the battle because Coral sea would have been a forfeit.

[chuck]

If Lexy and Big E where lost at pearl, Yorktown would have been in undamaged condition at Midway with Saratoga, Hornet and Wasp and still won the battle because Coral sea would have been a forfeit.

If we accept the premise of this scenario, then it is necessary to point out that forfeiting Coral Sea would likely give Nagumo at least 6 fleet carriers at Midway, making the certainty of a US win rather weak.

If we extrapolate what the immediate effects of loosing 2 carriers in Pearl really would be, then I think we can safely say the subsequent course of war would not be a replay of what actually transpired minus 2 carriers. If Lexington and Big E were lost in Pearl, then Yamamoto wouldn't have been in such a hurry to fight in Midway. If and when he does get around to it, it would probably be after he cleaned up Port Moseby and Solomons, when he couldn't possibly be under the delusion that at least 1 of the US carriers were still operating in the South Pacific, which historically had heightened his over confidence during the planning of Midway.

[MartinJQuinn]

If Lexy and Big E where lost at pearl, Yorktown would have been in undamaged condition at Midway with Saratoga, Hornet and Wasp and still won the battle because Coral sea would have been a forfeit.

If we accept the premise of this scenario, then it is necessary to point out that forfeiting Coral Sea would likely give Nagumo at least 6 fleet carriers at Midway, making the certainty of a US win rather weak.

If we extrapolate what the immediate effects of loosing 2 carriers in Pearl really would be, then I think we can safely say the subsequent course of war would not be a replay of what actually transpired minus 2 carriers. If Lexington and Big E were lost in Pearl, then Yamamoto wouldn't have been in such a hurry to fight in Midway. If and when he does get around to it, it would probably be after he cleaned up Port Moseby and Solomons, when he couldn't possibly be under the delusion that at least 1 of the US carriers were still operating in the South Pacific, which historically had heightened his over confidence during the planning of Midway.

While it pains me to say this, I have to agree with Chuck. If Lex and Enterprise were sunk at Pearl, that changes the first year of the war. There is no coral sea, no Midway, probably no invasion of Guadalcanal.

[Walt]

Destruction of the oil storage at Pearl would have been much more damaging to the war effort.

Also the dry dock facilities (Yorktown wouldn't have made Midway without them). The most glaring oversight by them, though, was the submarine facilities. The weapons that ultimately beat the Japanese, and they didn't give them a second look.

-Devin

Devin I agree.. They overlooked the SS and tenders the most effective weapon to be used against them..as well as the oil stowage and Dry docks..I think a follow up was planned if the whole fleet was caught and sunk there and the fuel and repair facilities in Pearl were invasion objectives if possible.

[56]

We forget that Yamamoto assumed Yorktown would not make Midway and hoped to fight just 2 fleet carriers there.

[rtheriaque]

Not exactly...

As planned, he'd have Midway secure in time for the American counter thrust. He wasn't expecting the fight as it came to him in reality.

Also, don't forget that American fleet carriers carried more combat aircraft than their Japanese counterparts. Two fully-laden Yorktown-class carriers would approximately equal the strike of three Japanese carriers. That, coupled with Midway's compliment, saw the Americans achieve rough parity or even superiority in terms of available aircraft in the event.

[Devin]

Number of aircraft is fine, but experience is what matters. The same with ships. Sure, if Enterprise and Lex are sunk, maybe they move up the deployment of Hornet and Wasp to the Pacific and safeguard the Torpedo Sponge (Saratoga) so that she doesn't sit out the first six months. It doesn't matter, though, if what ships they have they nurse and keep the carriers safeguarded in the first months. If that happens, then the strikes that Yorktown, Enterprise and Lex made (Enterprise and Lex replaced by other ships in this scenario) on the South Pacific outposts are not made, and Coral Sea probably doesn't happen (and to hell with the ships at Coral Sea, what happens if the Japanese take Port Moresby?!?!). Regardless, then the US air crews have no no experience at Midway. Midway was 4 against 2 as it was (Hornet's activities that day were a horrendous failure) and if you take Enterprise's luck and meager experience and Yorktown's contribution of getting everything right that day (well, except for the hindsight "she shouldn't have been abandoned") out of the equation, then Midway is pounded, whatever carriers are there are sunk, no Guadalcanal. No offensive until the Essex class start coming out in '43 and even THEN the new ship's crews and pilots aren't nearly as well trained because the men who did that training historically either do not get the experience or are all dead.

How's that for a cheery outlook? Man, you can really go nuts with this stuff.

-Devin

[bengtsson]

Was Midway of any real use to the Japanese Navy or just a means to get the US Fleet, as it was, out into combat? If so, then the Japanese plan of attack was the worst possible plan based on the hope that Midway would not be defended by any US Carrier Fleet to several days after the opening attacks on Midway.
If Two US Carriers are sunk in shallow water at Pearl Harbor and have only some hull damage. They'de be back of course. But 1942 would never play out as it did. The US would have not wanted to confront the Japanese except on favorable terms. They'de be looking for openings like the German High Seas Fleet in WWI. All the while waiting for mid 1943 and the new Fleet and Light Fleet Carriers.
Japan could do alot of damage in the year 1942 and with luck, the USN being down two Carriers, find and destroy what Carriers the Pacific Fleet had. Japan with 6 fleet Carriers all trained up and with first rate aircraft and the best pilots in naval aviation at the time? Big trouble for the USN in 1942. How it plays out is anyones guess. How bold do the Japanese get? How daring is the USN against a clearly superior Carrier force? We can't know can we? My best guess is the US waits and dodges the blows until they find the right situation to strike back. Their intelligence ability gives them a good chance of finding some way to ambush the Japanese, but they might find the ambush turns into a route for themsleves. My guess is, that any airstrike by a Japanese Carrier force with 6 Fleet Carriers would sink any and all USN Carriers that were found. With a 6 to 4 Japanese advantage. Maybe all four USN Carriers sunk, if they get full deck loads off, 3 Japanese Carriers sink. SO late 1942 Japan fields 3 fleet Carriers and a bunch of light Carriers. The USN is waiting to rebuild it's forces as the ship yards work overtime.
Just my guess, it ain't written in stone

Bob B.

[Werner]

The MIdway operation was designed precisely to attack and destroy a large fragment of the American mobile forces (1 or 2 carriers). I'm not sure they thought much of the atoll. They could already snoop Hawaii when they wanted, and any large force of occupation in Midway would have to be supplied by cargo ships under the edge of US long-range air and submarine forces from Pearl.

No doubt, if they had occupied Midway, it would have attracted what forces remain of the USN, but would prove a very expensive outpost to retain, moreso than Attu and Kiska.

[MartinJQuinn]

If Two US Carriers are sunk in shallow water at Pearl Harbor and have only some hull damage. They'de be back of course.

I disagree. The carriers would have been prime targets for the bombers and would have taken heavy, heavy punishment. In fact, you could make a case that if the Lex and Enterprise were in port that morning, Battleship Row might have escaped with lesser damage. Maybe we'd be going to visit the Lexington or Enterprise Memorials at Pearl Harbor, while the Arizona and Oklahoma would have served out the war in roles similar to that of Pennsy and Nevada.

The US would have not wanted to confront the Japanese except on favorable terms...How daring is the USN against a clearly superior Carrier force?

If Nimitz is still put in command of the Pacific Fleet, they'd still be guided by his principle of "calculated risk". The terms weren't favorable at Coral Sea or Midway, so if PH played out differently, I think they'd have no choice but to eventually take on the Japanese Carriers.

[chuck]

Another thought. Short of the discovery of the lost memoir of Admiral Nagumo, we will never know exactly how much the threat from the missing US carriers influenced Nagumo's decision to withdraw. But it certainly seems possible that these missing carriers may have been what tipped the balance in Nagumo's mind against a third strike. If Nagumo did bag two carriers on his first strike, then that would increase the chance that he would feel secure enough to launch a third strike, which had been planned against the docks and oil farms of Pearl Harbour. This will probably effect the course of war during the first half of 1942 even more than the loss of the two carriers.

[chuck]

Another possibility is the loss of 2 carriers will not so much effect the main time line in the Pacific theater as it would influence events in the European theater. Perhaps the loss of the 2 carriers would increase the focus of American mind and resource on restoring the position in Pacific, and that would come at the expense resources devoted to propping allies in the European and African theaters. Perhaps the Atlantic fleet will be moved to the Pacific. Perhaps the main effect of loosing 2 carriers in Pearl Harbor is there would be no US landing in West Africa. Perhaps the main effect is a British setback in North Africa. Perhaps the main effect is the Germans will eek out in Stalingrad due to reduced Russian forces.

Just possibilities to get your thinking going.

[MartinJQuinn]

Another possibility is the loss of 2 carriers will not so much effect the main time line in the Pacific theater as it would influence events in the European theater. Perhaps the loss of the 2 carriers would increase the focus of American mind and resource on restoring the position in Pacific, and that would come at the expense resources devoted to propping allies in the European and African theaters. Perhaps the Atlantic fleet will be moved to the Pacific. Perhaps the main effect of loosing 2 carriers in Pearl Harbor is there would be no US landing in West Africa. Perhaps the main effect is a British setback in North Africa. Perhaps the main effect is the Germans will eek out in Stalingrad due to reduced Russian forces.

Just possibilities to get your thinking going.

It's possible, but unlikely, IMO. Germany was truly the greater threat, and Roosevelt and Churchill recognized that. Even if the carriers were on the bottom of the harbor on December 8th, I don't think it would have changed the "Germany First" strategy.

I do think you are right (ack! - there I go again, agreeing with Chuck!) about Nagumo being leery of being caught by the missing carriers that morning. For all he knew, the US carriers knew his location and a strike force was winging it's way towards him. IIRC, the Japanese tended to use their fighters for offensive purposes and might not have had a robust CAP over their fleet that morning.

[bengtsson]

I do think you are right (ack! - there I go again, agreeing with Chuck!) about Nagumo being leery of being caught by the missing carriers that morning. For all he knew, the US carriers knew his location and a strike force was winging it's way towards him. IIRC, the Japanese tended to use their fighters for offensive purposes and might not have had a robust CAP over their fleet that morning.

I think the best explaination for Nagumo being in a hurry to get the heck out of there was because of fear about the presence of US Carriers. He was engaged, jsut like Miday, it putting his main forces against a land target. He had real and justifiable , look at Midway, fears of being caught rearming or caught with over half his fighters over Pearl or down below getting armed and fueled between CAP flights. Unless he had recon flights out that showed him clear at all quareters,very hard thing to do, then he was justified in getting out when he did. It proved to be a wrong decission in the end, but there is no way he could of known that.
I am no Nagumo fan, but we should cut him a break on bailing out at Pearl Harbor. If by chance, the carriers were in port, staying put no matter how long it took to turn them to smoking hulks would have been justified.

Bob B.

[Werner]

There's another point: fuel management. Remember, he had a rendezvous with tankers to make, or his task force would have to paddle back to Japan. They were flat out of fuel a couple days later and only one division (Soryu & Hiryu) could drop out to help after the failed first assault on Wake Island.

The strategic plan for the Striking Force made for a tight schedule. Their "dance card" was filled out for months. Nagumo's first job was to protect the carriers and air groups, or the strength of their thrusts would be blunted when they got to Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean.

It's quite possible that when Nagumo learned the USN carriers were not in the harbor, he dismissed this effort as secondary to the tasks to come in Java and Borneo, and dismissed further attacks as not worth the risk to his aviators and ships.

[chuck]

There's another point: fuel management. Remember, he had a rendezvous with tankers to make, or his task force would have to paddle back to Japan. They were flat out of fuel a couple days later and only one division (Soryu & Hiryu) could drop out to help after the failed first assault on Wake Island.

The strategic plan for the Striking Force made for a tight schedule. Their "dance card" was filled out for months. Nagumo's first job was to protect the carriers and air groups, or the strength of their thrusts would be blunted when they got to Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean.

It's quite possible that when Nagumo learned the USN carriers were not in the harbor, he dismissed this effort as secondary to the tasks to come in Java and Borneo, and dismissed further attacks as not worth the risk to his aviators and ships.

Not to put too fine of a point on it, but the contribution of the mobile fleet to the Southern thrust seems more symbolic than material, and the face time that Nagumo's force was scheduled to put in in South East Asia and Indian ocean could hardly justify compromising the real attack against pearl harbor.

[Werner]

Not to put too fine of a point on it, but the contribution of the mobile fleet to the Southern thrust seems more symbolic than material, and the face time that Nagumo's force was scheduled to put in in South East Asia and Indian ocean could hardly justify compromising the real attack against pearl harbor.

That's true in hindsight, but the strategic goals of the opening phase of the war would require a strong presence in the South while the Army consolidates it's gains. I'm sure the Japanese plan allowed for the possibility of the US, UK and Dutch massing their forces for a major strike into the East Indies or the Philippines.

[Yamato1701]

...The end result is that Enterprise is sunk on December 8th (in the real world, she was nearly back to port), and islands are firmly under Japanese control till 1943....

This is actually impossible. From an occupation standpoint this would tie down several divisions, and nearly all food, fuel and provisions would have to come across the Pacific from Japan on ships that would also have had to carry sufficient fuel outbound for the return voyage. Nearly every merchant hull was tied up in the first quarter of 1942 with the much more important occupation of South East Asia and the Philippines.

It would have been more difficult to take and hold Hawaii than it was the Philippines, because of the larger presence of US civilians and troops there, and the possibility of an immediate counterstrike from the US homeland.

From a strategic standpoint, Hawaii is the most important US base in the Pacific Area. For the Japanese it would confer no strategic advantage except to deny it to the US Navy. It's too far from the US mainland to serve as a base for long range bombing, and the large population guarantees prying eyes would be reporting all ship and troop movements back to the US Military.

turtledove covers this point. The story uses several japanese Divisions to take Oahu and a division each for the neighbor islands. As for food, well it didn't go well for Japanese troops and even worse for US civilians and far far worse for US POW's. All land used for Pineapple was converted for growing rice, which would take awhile. In the book, the Japanese troops eventually allow civilians (Mainlander and Hawaiian) to fish the surrounding waters. Eventually the US sends Subs to perform recon, and one of the main characters in the book has a semi-routine meet with a sub to pass on inteligence. There was an immediate re-invasion planned, but it was turned back with the loss of 3 more carriers, and it was another year till the various pressures of the war on japan sap the defensive strength from the islands and the US is able to retake the islands, and restore food delivery. Turtledove is an interesting read. I highly recommend his other series'. One which presupposes the South won the Civil War and the affects on the North America continent through WW2. Another series has Aliens invade during WW2 and the history of a alien/human occupied world through 2070's.