Why did the Central Powers ultimately lose the war?

[Filipe Ramires]

Hmmm, I don't like this idea of the High Seas Fleet being merely a fleet-in-being. It was used that way for much of the war, but it could have been used differently - if you look at the planning behind Doggerbank you clearly see that the main idea behind bombarding coastal cities was trying to pull inferior forces out to the sea in order to ambush them with the van of the fleet. Now, this failed several times for various reasons, mainly because the HSF was not used aggressively enough. But imagine one successful engagement, resulting in most if not all of the RN battlecruiser force being wiped out, even if at the price of a number of German capital ships. The potential impact on British politics would have been enormous - in 1914/15, the pre-Kitchener years, we're still in the timeframe when there is some political dissent about the war in general.

Pretty much coastal bombardment was considered an unnecessary risk for the bigger ships. Like the submarine/torpedo boat flottillas offensive blokade policy could have faired better such means could have been used properly as well in a counter-blockade task. Small coastal submarine/TB forces were admited to be sufficient, if provided in large numbers, to fool any attempt of invasion by sea or coastal bombardment missions. Again another quote from Mr. Fisher that shows a bit of the same context (sorry but been reading a lot on him lately and on submarine doctrine in WWI ):

The attack failed, however, because by accident the British fleet changed its night position on this particular night ... (German troop transports) arrived off Barrow without being noticed, but two submarines happened to be leaving that morning for their station, having just been completed at the works. These vessels met them at the entrance to the river, and they were all torpedoed.

This brief report is from a naval exercise made during pre-war by the War College in which it was proved that the submarine could have major influence against enemy naval forces operating off the coast of Britain.
Imagine the eventual case of Aboukir, Cressy and Hogue on the other side. Half a dozen German armoured cruisers approaching the coasts of England and they are ambushed by two RN submarines. All 6 ships sunk or severly damaged.
The entire problem was that this kind of doctrine, supported by Fisher and friends, found very little support in the Admiralty and when Fisher got to be First Lord he was seriously influenced by the heavy gun school...though he instructed still to rise the production of destroyers and small coastal forces significantly. And to get matters worst there was the usual RN issue in resolving their own submarine doctrines, in other words, 3 totally different doctrines for which submarines of the time had no capability to cope with all 3 at the same time:
1 - Small submarines with shorter range but in larger numbers for coastal defence and anti-invasion tasks.
2 - Medium range submarines for "eyes of the Fleet" missions.
3 - Long range and endurance submarines for close-blockade to the enemy coasts.

Pretty much everyone was fighting to get their own doctrine on and efforts were, as expected, scattered through the 3 main doctrines leaving none strong enough to deal with its job properly.

[JWintjes]

I know the definitions of the word "virtual", and the definition of the word "history". So I ask, please define the phrase "virtual history". THank you.

In the anglophone world, it's more often known as "counterfactual history". Essentially it's the asking of "what-if" questions for a specific purpose under very stringent methodological constraints; usually in any given situation you change one variable and then consider the outcome.

"Serious" counterfactual history (and there are colleagues who deny that this actually exists...) tries not to explore any alternate universe but to understand what really happened by thinking about alternatives. Obviously, the methodological dangers are immense, as the temptation to turn into a what-if spin is great, when you start changing more than just one variable.

Neill Fergusson's book is as good an introduction as any; the literature on the subject is quite sizeable already.

Jorit

[ar]

Thank you for the explanation.
I obviously do not know who dreampt up the phrase and the meaning, but I, as a partial literate find it meaningless. I would use the term FICTION!
I blame the internet for so much of this nonsense, counterfactual history being one of them.
PS. I cannot find the word "anglophone" in my Oxford. Am I missing something?

I know the definitions of the word "virtual", and the definition of the word "history". So I ask, please define the phrase "virtual history". THank you.

In the anglophone world, it's more often known as "counterfactual history". Essentially it's the asking of "what-if" questions for a specific purpose under very stringent methodological constraints; usually in any given situation you change one variable and then consider the outcome.

"Serious" counterfactual history (and there are colleagues who deny that this actually exists...) tries not to explore any alternate universe but to understand what really happened by thinking about alternatives. Obviously, the methodological dangers are immense, as the temptation to turn into a what-if spin is great, when you start changing more than just one variable.

Neill Fergusson's book is as good an introduction as any; the literature on the subject is quite sizeable already.

Jorit

[Filipe Ramires]

I obviously do not know who dreampt up the phrase and the meaning, but I, as a partial literate find it meaningless. I would use the term FICTION!

Not to tease you at all Mr. Ar but putting 25 Type XXI submarines operational early in 1942 isn't considered fiction as well!?!??!?!

[ar]

Fiction it certainly is, and not "counterfactual history".

I obviously do not know who dreampt up the phrase and the meaning, but I, as a partial literate find it meaningless. I would use the term FICTION!

Not to tease you at all Mr. Ar but putting 25 Type XXI submarines operational early in 1942 isn't considered fiction as well!?!??!?!

[JWintjes]

Thank you for the explanation.
I obviously do not know who dreampt up the phrase and the meaning, but I, as a partial literate find it meaningless. I would use the term FICTION!
I blame the internet for so much of this nonsense, counterfactual history being one of them.

Actually that's not the case. Counterfactual history emerged in the 1930s - there is a famous piece by Churchill on the American civil war.

In any case there is a serious distinction between fiction and counterfactual history - the historian does not want to know what might have been, instead he wants to know what the significance of any particular event has been. One method - of several - to do so is to look what might have happened without that event.

It's a tool for analyzing what has actually happened, not for dreaming about any conjectural things.

PS. I cannot find the word "anglophone" in my Oxford. Am I missing something?

Yes:

A. n. An English-speaking person. B. adj. English-speaking.

I should add that to the best of my knowledge the word has entered English language only in the 20th century.

Jorit

[JWintjes]

Filipe,

thanks for the interesting post on Fisher and RN submarine doctrine!

I would nevertheless slightly disagree on the following point:

Pretty much coastal bombardment was considered an unnecessary risk for the bigger ships.

I think the events of 1914 and 1915 actually showed that coastal bombardment was in fact feasible, even though the material damage might be negligible. It certainly created considerable public pressure and in the end provoked Doggerbank, which I suspect was one of its main tasks right from the beginning.

I would agree, though, that sustained coastal bombardment was much more risky than appearing at dawn, sending shells towards a coastal town for an hour or so and then retreating back into the mist.

Jorit

[Werner]

PS. I cannot find the word "anglophone" in my Oxford. Am I missing something?

Yes:

A. n. An English-speaking person. B. adj. English-speaking.

I should add that to the best of my knowledge the word has entered English language only in the 20th century.

Jorit

Must have never visited Quebec.

[JWintjes]

Wouldn't "anglophobe" be more fitting there?



Jorit

[chuck]

By the French Army's own reckoning, there were around 30,000 executions a year for desertion. This does not speak to a unified home front.

One could never overestimate Werner's capacity to crudely exaggerate any perceived shortcomings in those he dislikes.

[chuck]

Wouldn't "anglophobe" be more fitting there?



Jorit

It's closer to "Canadaphobe" or "Englishphobe" than the traditional meaning of "anglophobe".

[chuck]

In theory yes. However, due to the small distances involved (mind you, we're talking about a three hours' drive on the motorway, 40 minutes if Werner is behind the wheel... ), any significant lead by the Germans would probably have resulted in the fall of Calais and Dunkirk.

Jorit

Three hours' normal motorway driving is 7 days' marching. There were no PzKfW IVs or SdKfz 251s. A slow steam freight train carrying troops from Paris would embark, travel, disembark in less than a day. A defensive position can be reinforced far faster than an force attacking it can maneuvers.

[Charlestonguy]

Filipe,

thanks for the interesting post on Fisher and RN submarine doctrine!

I would nevertheless slightly disagree on the following point:

Pretty much coastal bombardment was considered an unnecessary risk for the bigger ships.

I think the events of 1914 and 1915 actually showed that coastal bombardment was in fact feasible, even though the material damage might be negligible. It certainly created considerable public pressure and in the end provoked Doggerbank, which I suspect was one of its main tasks right from the beginning.

I would agree, though, that sustained coastal bombardment was much more risky than appearing at dawn, sending shells towards a coastal town for an hour or so and then retreating back into the mist.

Jorit

Ah yes I think we are getting close to the reasons here.

�It certainly created considerable public pressure and in the end provoked Doggerbank, which I suspect was one of its main tasks right from the beginning.�

This war just like every one before and after was a process of evolution. Trench warfare developed late in the US Civil War out of necessity, the same was true in this war when mass attack under concentrated machinegun fire was pure suicide in most cases. Larger cannon, aircraft, mechanized forces and naval advancements all transformed the world from the old mass charges and Calvary to modern warfare.
Unrestrictive submarine warfare developed over time, and was not a policy from the start. The uses of submarines were still considered underhand and dastardly by most people, no chivalry involved.
Public opinion is always a driving force even for monarchs, after all the French took care of theirs when the King failed to take care of the people.
Germany blundered in so many places at the same time, fighting on more fronts than it could sustain being just one, that the end was inevitable.

[Filipe Ramires]

- the historian does not want to know what might have been, instead he wants to know what the significance of any particular event has been. One method - of several - to do so is to look what might have happened without that event.

I agree with this as well but I also have to say that it is "dangerous ground" to take that way. Basically you either get success and your theory is appreciated or you get seriously burned...sometimes burned because some academics can be VERY hard narrow minded. I've been through that specially when defending my Master thesis when I was explaining the IJN submarine doctrine in WWII and the guy that was arguing my thesis had the solid idea that the Japanese had the same doctrine of the German Uboats. I was unable to convince him that both doctrines were different. Sadly, admitting mistakes or the lack of knowledge makes some higher degree people think they have reason. Whatever... the sad thing is that I admired the guy until then because he is one of the finest Portuguese historians for Military History of the 20th Century.

I think the events of 1914 and 1915 actually showed that coastal bombardment was in fact feasible, even though the material damage might be negligible. It certainly created considerable public pressure and in the end provoked Doggerbank, which I suspect was one of its main tasks right from the beginning.

I agree with you on this as well. Coastal bombardment, with surprise and little or no opposition implemented by the adversary, is surely an operation with BIG impact...specially if you are shelling a coastal city. Public opinion from that city will certainly have a different point of view regarding leaving the coasts unprotected. My point was that it was, at a given point, a calculated risk to proceed with coastal bombardments. For instance, Fisher was far from being eager to send capital ships to bombard the harbour cities of Germany, Netherlands or even France, knowing in advance that such countries could mobilise submarines and TB's to protect those cities and to try to inflict as much damage as possible to the incoming capital ships. It is always a calculating risk any shore bombardment.

Unrestrictive submarine warfare developed over time, and was not a policy from the start. The uses of submarines were still considered underhand and dastardly by most people, no chivalry involved.

Well, like I said it was a matter of doctrine basically. Fisher was most keen for unrestricted submarine warfare as well. He actually despised any kind of Law of the Sea that could go against British principles. Before the war he had many supporters regarding that and they were pretty much well aware of the capabilities of the submarine. Apparently, and I could go on with more diplomatic details on this for ages, their doctrine didn't prevail. Yet, other countries thought different or were meant to think different in WWI. Politics here had a very negative influence and what they thought it was the best thing for them turned exactly the contrary to them.

[Werner]

By the French Army's own reckoning, there were around 30,000 executions a year for desertion. This does not speak to a unified home front.

One could never overestimate Werner's capacity to crudely exaggerate any perceived shortcomings in those he dislikes.

One can never underestimate Chuck's capacity to become fractious. The number is from the August publication "Wikipedia".

[Werner]

The Scarborough raid and the Zeppelin strike both dramatically affected domestic morale, according to Massie. The Zeppelin raids had an "Orwellian", end of the world feel, though, as if the German Air Service were suddenly elevated to indestructable aliens bent on outright destruction of humanity.

[chuck]

One can never underestimate Chuck's capacity to become fractious. The number is from the August publication "Wikipedia".

Since Werner is unlikely to have a high opinion of my peaceable nature, I think Werner must be slightly confused about the rhetorical meaning of "can never underestimate"

[chuck]

The Scarborough raid and the Zeppelin strike both dramatically affected domestic morale, according to Massie. The Zeppelin raids had an "Orwellian", end of the world feel, though, as if the German Air Service were suddenly elevated to indestructable aliens bent on outright destruction of humanity.

But it had no practical effect to speak of. I wonder if the officialdom actually condoned or promoted the panic so as to better vilify the Germans.

[Werner]

The Scarborough raid and the Zeppelin strike both dramatically affected domestic morale, according to Massie. The Zeppelin raids had an "Orwellian", end of the world feel, though, as if the German Air Service were suddenly elevated to indestructable aliens bent on outright destruction of humanity.

But it had no practical effect to speak of. I wonder if the officialdom actually promoted the panic so as to better vilify the Germans.

It had no practical tactical effect. It caused a great rumble through the British government and people, who were wondering if their complacency over the last 75 years had put them at a fatal disadvantage. Many newspapers called for negotiations to an immediate cease fire.

[chuck]

But it had no practical effect to speak of. I wonder if the officialdom actually promoted the panic so as to better vilify the Germans.

It had no practical tactical effect. It caused a great rumble through the British government and people, who were wondering if their complacency over the last 75 years had put them at a fatal disadvantage. Many newspapers called for negotiations to an immediate cease fire.

What fatal disadvantage? Would the Germans be better prepared if British dirigibles were to drop bombs on Germany? It's only the shallowness of Baltic and narrowness of Denmark strait that kept the British from bombarding German coastal towns.

BTW, the Germans had approximately 40 Uboat of various degrees of inadequacy in August 1914. The British sank 21 of them in the first 12 month of the war according to Conway. So while the British had no good way of combating an adaquate Uboat during this period, with the help of the inexperience of German crew and inadaqucy of German boats they seem to have done respectably well.