Washington and WWI

[Guest]

I am referring to optical fire control, as Radar would not arrive in the 1920 time frame even with the most optimistic assumptions about progress. The practices of different navies were, of course, different. But in the USN and IJN, each main turret is equipped to assume the role of firing director for all main turrets.

[Guest]

Oh, P.S.--could someone here "enlighten me" on warships? Aren't they those big steel boats that go "boom!"?

Yes. They are what we use to pave over the ocean floor.

[Laurence Batchelor]

Despite the apparent credit that has been attributed to Jutland by historians, the most important "lesson" of that action (the disproven efficacy of the battlecruiser) appears to have been underappreciated by world naval powers, if not ignored altogether. There seems to have been no clarion moment among postwar naval designers, acknowledging this failure of the battlecruiser, even long after Jutland it retained some influence. If this statement seems absurd, just consider the significant number of battlecruisers, both building and projected, whose existences were terminated by WNC--YEARS after the war was over.

I think your seriously ignoring one of the main things to emerge from Jutland analysis, namely the fear of the torpedo!
It struck the fear of god into anyone inside a dreadnought, certainly in the Royal Navy.
In Jellicoe's Grand Fleet Orders in 1914 he even set down to his Lordships that he would turn away his entire fleet in the face of a mass torpedo attack and thus loose any chance of another crushing victory ala Trafalgar.
This is exactly what he did at Jutland, rightly in my opinion, but with the torpedo's increasing importance on the high seas, slowly an appreciation of its importance emerged.
It wasn't merely something to use anymore for the coup de grace and it was no longer subservient to the big gun.
It was proving itself a damn good offensive weapon in its own right.
The development of the submarine and destroyer in WWI to deliver and defend against just such a weapon proves my point entirely.

Because of the failure of world naval powers to recognize the "folly" of continuing to design and build such ships, the war---and Jutland, in particular---did not have the degree of impact on warship design that has been attributed to it. Based on this alone, I would tend to say ships of a non-war-affected line of development would, indeed be at least equal to those in existence by the time of WNC--just as Chuck's argument suggests.

Again sorry I have to disagree with you both.
Shortly after Jutland all British capital ships then planned or building were cancelled.
Anything designed after 1916 incorporated numerous design improvements, which were brought about by Jutland studies.
Also many of the improvements worked into the G3 & N3 designs were from extensive testing of the what parts of the High Seas Fleet the Admiralty could get its grubby hands on and dissect with a fine tooth comb.

As we all know the British through what they thought Jutland told them about their weaknesses of their Battlecruisers, had Hood completely redesigned to remedy the weaknesses.
Furthermore from 1917 onwards with some of the American Battleships operating with the Grand Fleet, that again stimulated fresh design impetus.
Your fuel economy was something admired by late war WWI British Admiral's who commented as much to their superiors.

As additional support for my opinion the events of World War Two--with its relatively huge impact on naval advancements and on sea warfare itself--stand in stark contrast to those of the Great War. However, even that conflict began with navies having only limited technological advancements over the big-gun ship designs of WW1.

I think WWI being the First true war fought by two fully mature industrial powers did have a major impact on the war at sea. Think convoys, think U-boats, think naval aviation, think the British raid on Cuxhaven in 1918.
Think everything from 1900-1914 in 1914 was untried and untested in real wartime conditions.
Importantly think by 1918 designers knew so much more about propellant, armour penetration, spotting fall of shot, fire-control, fleet coordination, zig zagging etc etc.
By 1916 Ramillies becomes the first capital ship built with torpedo bulges.
Which every navy attemtped to copy and improve upon.
All of the above would not be on or embodied into a WNC timeframe ship without WWI.
On one which had gone through WWI they would have!

I repeat I am of the belief that by WNC timeframe warships not going through WWI would reach the same gun calibres yes.
However they would be less effective warships, because they would still be very much untried and untested weapons on the seas and they would not have the above things I mention.
Thus Chuck's original question if the ships would be 'Stronger', simply NO they would very much be weaker from a technical and experience standpoint.

Putting the battlecruisers and Jutland aside, there are two minor points I'd like to make. First, someone alluded to the lack of submarine warfare that would have resulted in a weakness in warship hull design, had the Great War not intervened; I don't believe this is necessarily true because, a) the torpedo and the submarine were nothing new, even in 1914 and, b) naval designers were already familiar with the concept of subdivided, compartmentalized hulls, as well as with the consequences of not fully incorporating that concept (Titanic being the most obvious example, more than two years before the war).

The submarine & torpedo, though having been around since the early 20th Century, again were untried, seen as unreliable and of little importance.
They were still seen as something for the weaker powers to dabble in,
'"Underhand, under water and damned un-English" - Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson VC 1901.

Furthermore, no one has discussed the importance of mines (especially magnetic) in WWI which had been around for a while also and were still like the torpedo a bit of an unknown quantity.
Again their true value was only revealed in WWI.
Remember guys a big ship like Audacious was sunk by just 1 of those fellows and Hampshire was sunk by a German mine while taking Lord Kitchener to Russia to much shock value to the British public.
WWI showed torpedoes and mines were deadly against the merchant fleets of the world, Lusitania anyone?
They also showed one small insignificant submarine could sink 3 armoured cruisers before breakfast, and the ships themselves didn't stand a chance!

Yes I agree warship designers knew all about water tight compartmentalized in their hulls, but they didn't have any idea how one torpedo could sink a large warship at a stroke, and the foe remained undetected.
They didn't understand the design philosophy of trying to reduce the explosive impact radiating into the hull.
The general idea still was to line your hull in coal bunkers!

Secondly, the effect of aircraft on sea warfare was all but destined to happen, sooner or later. It doesn't bear much influence on the war/no war line of development, especially on the no-war side of the issue. The Great War did not revolutionize air/sea combat, and although it may have introduced it, the war did not effectively address the issue of big-gun obsolescence.

Even after that war, the aircraft lobby still took years to develop its strategic value, especially at sea. My point is that, despite the conflict of 1914-18, big-gunned ships remained the primary focus of most naval powers by the time of WNC. The postponement of naval conflict by removing the Great War from the developmental question, only serves to enhance the issue in favor of the no-war argument.

Yes but WWI accelerated the development of the aeroplane.
If we take the 1903 Wright brothers flight as the beginning, by 1914 in Britain hardly any development had taken place.
Yes Bleriot (sp?) had flown across the channel, but aeroplanes were just rich boys play things.
By 1914 Britain still didn't have any type of aeroplane or aero-engine industry at all. By 1918 it had an enormous one and in many ways led the world! In just 4-years that is simply astonishing!
WWI introduced the aircraft carrier, it introduced the use of airships.
Itintroduced the idea that aircraft could be used for observation and scouting.
Perhaps most importantly of all it introduced them for strategic bombing purposes, none of that capability would have come about without a wartime situation.
Without thattimulus these things would never have occurred at the phenomenal pace and in turn have the subsequent knock-on effects to the warship designers.
Warships built by 1918 had guns specially for AA purposes, the same type of warship in 1914 did not.
All of these things were ofcourse in their embryonic stages, however its very significant to develop whole new methods of attack at sea don't you think? regardless if fully perfected?

I think if WWI had lasted just a few more months then we would not have had to wait until Taranto in late 1940 for the FAA to show the world the true power of strategic air power at sea.

One final point if I may, which seems to have eluded all of us, is if we got to the WNC timeframe without WWI would our Battleships/Battlecruisers still be coal fired or oil fired! Interesting thought isn't it!

[Guest]

One final point if I may, which seems to have eluded all of us, is if we got to the WNC timeframe without WWI would our Battleships/Battlecruisers still be coal fired or oil fired! Interesting thought isn't it!

The R class showed a distinct retreat from oil firing. Britain is a country built on coal while oil is an foreign substance whose benefits are offset by its unavailability at home. So I am not convinced of any strong trend towards oil firing had been in existence that would propel the entire fleet to change over in 4-5 years.

What I am convinced of is that there was a slight, but firm trend towards the "Battlecruiserization" of battleships in the British fleet. I think the level of protection enjoyed by British battleships had not quite kept pace with the increase in gun power. What is more is I detect the same trend in the German navy with the Baden class. I think both navies were headed towards ships with much larger guns, but with protection only modestly better than the last generation of pre-WWI dreadnoughts.

Had there been no WWI, the fleets in the North Sea would not be headed towards floating fortresses like the N-3, but instead towards a hybridized battleship-battlecruiser.

This would also seem to be the trend followed in Japan, but it is the opposite of the trend followed by the USN up to the Colorados.

[Laurence Batchelor]

The R class showed a distinct retreat from oil firing. Britain is a country built on coal while oil is an foreign substance whose benefits are offset by its unavailability at home. So I am not convinced of any strong trend towards oil firing had been in existence that would propel the entire fleet to change over in 4-5 years.

If was Fisher again who pushed through oil powered dreadnoughts.
This meant Britain had to make a major investment in the Arabian oil fields to guarantee supply.
Fisher even wanted to incorporate the internal combustion engine into steam machinery in a Dreadnought, but then again he had many crazy fool daydreaming days!
Oh how he pestered Yarrow over that and wouldn't take "it can't be done" as an acceptable answer!

R-class were merely improved Iron Duke's, it was the QE's which were the pinnacle of WWI built RN Dreadnoughts in my eyes.

This question though I meant in the context for all Navies upto 1922.
Would the QE's have materialised with/without being oil fired without WWI and in turn make everyone copy this development path up to 1922?

[Guest]

The Japanese 8-8 ships all featured mixed oil and coal fired boilers. Clearly the benefit of oil did not convince everyone by 1920. It should also be remembered that although Nagato and Mutsu were often criticized for certain reactionary design features like torpedo net booms and hull side casemate guns that had been abandoned by others, these features were only abandoned by others as a result of WWI. Had there been no war, all of the battleships built in early 1920s would look more like Nagato than N-3.

[Werner]

On the Second Battle of Savo Island South Dakota was badly hit also by 14'' and mostly 8'' shells having her bridge badly shoted. Haven't Washington showed up and hit Kirishima seriously I am quite sure that the odds for South Dakota survivability would not have been much positive.

Look at the battle damage reports. South Dakota's damage was primarily in the upper works and among the AA gun crews. The hits were almost all 8-inch. Her actual fighting value was not much diminished (mount 16-II was in fact inoperable the day before this action from aviation action). BTW, Hiei was lost before Kirishima.

Having Yamato and Des Moines alone shooting at each other at point blank range would most likely reduce Yamato to a Hiei style or bit worst case, and Des Moines reduced to a floating hulk.

If you recall the characteristics of my posited battle, it was that Des Moines would attack at night or in poor weather and at maximum range, where her 8-inch penetration approximates Yamato's deck armor. With her radar suite only an idiot would close another capital ship. Suriago Straight proves the efficacy of US radar fire control. The Tennessee, California & West Virginia had solutions before the Japanese ships reached maximum range, and they were able to spot fall-of-shot using radar returns from splash echoes. Only one US cruiser or destroyer was ever visible to the Japanese before they were pummeled to pieces. Even in daylight, the 33-4 knot Des Moines would control an engagement with a 26-7 knot foe.

I reiterate my challenge: Demonstrate a Japanese hit of 14 inches or larger beyond 13km at any time in WW.II. With the possibility of one hit by a 14 inch shell glancing off the deck of Gambier Bay, an 18-knot non-maneuvering target, you will fail. In fact, the total number of hits by 8-inch guns over 13km in daylight can be counted on fingers.

You will also not be able to point to a single 16-inch or 18.1-inch hit, ever.

[Guest]

On the Second Battle of Savo Island South Dakota was badly hit also by 14'' and mostly 8'' shells having her bridge badly shoted. Haven't Washington showed up and hit Kirishima seriously I am quite sure that the odds for South Dakota survivability would not have been much positive.

Look at the battle damage reports. South Dakota's damage was primarily in the upper works and among the AA gun crews. Her actual fighting value was not much diminished (mount 16-2 was in fact inoperable the day before this action from aviation action).

Having Yamato and Des Moines alone shooting at each other at point blank range would most likely reduce Yamato to a Hiei style or bit worst case, and Des Moines reduced to a floating hulk.

If you recall the characteristics of my posited battle, it was that Des Moines would attack at night or in poor weather and at maximum range. With her radar suite only an idiot would close another capital ship.

I reiterate my challenge: Demonstrate a Japanese hit of 14 inches or larger beyond 13km at any time in WW.II. With the possibility of one hit by a 14 inch shell glancing off the deck of Gambier Bay, an 18-knot non-maneuvering target, you will fail. In fact, the total number of hits by 8-inch guns over 13km in daylight can be counted on fingers.

You will also not be able to point to a single 16-inch or 18.1-inch hit, ever.

This is a waste of time. We've already heard each other's arguments in their entireties several times before and neither of us has been moved. Reiterating the same thing again will serve no purpose.

[Werner]

It would serve slightly more purpose if you would log in, Chuck.

It's clear you and several others have very distorted ideas of what my original position was. That won't stop you from poo-poohing, however.

[Werner]

It would serve slightly more purpose if you would log in, Chuck.

It's clear you and several others have very distorted ideas of what my original position was. That won't stop you from poo-poohing, however.

Examine the Battle of Empress Augusta Bay. Here the US began to use their radar superiority to keep out of torpedo water and heavily hit the enemy.

Meanwhile, the Japanese heavy cruisers act indecisive and lost. Only one dud hits Denver late in the battle.

This is a year before Leyte and three before my putative battle between Yamato and Des Moines.

In an article in US NAVAL INSTITUTE Proceedings the "Father of Japanese Radar" said the search radar aboard Yamato could not detect a similarly-sized ship at 12Km. She had pieces of a fire control set aboard but never had a working fire control radar.

[RNfanDan]

I think your seriously ignoring one of the main things to emerge from Jutland analysis, namely the fear of the torpedo!

I will counter that by pointing out that the fear of torpedoes was already quite healthy. British men-of-war had been sporting torpedo defense booms and nets for more than a decade; Jutland didn't exactly introduce the Royal Navy to that fear.

Shortly after Jutland all British capital ships then planned or building were cancelled. Anything designed after 1916 incorporated numerous design improvements, which were brought about by Jutland studies.

The jig was up after Jutland, and the Admiralty knew it--the actions taken subsequently are proof positive. So why, even in the face of such overwhelming invalidation of their existence, did Britain stubbornly press forward with yet more battlecruiser designs, long afterward?

I think the answer is that the RN, as I stated earlier, either chose to ignore or misunderstood Jutland's "message". That it was misunderstood seems highly unlikely, given their actions in the battle's aftermath, leaving only the more unpleasant conclusion.

I think WWI being the First true war fought by two fully mature industrial powers did have a major impact on the war at sea. Think convoys, think U-boats, think naval aviation, think the British raid on Cuxhaven in 1918. Think everything from 1900-1914 in 1914 was untried and untested in real wartime conditions. Importantly think by 1918 designers knew so much more about propellant, armour penetration, spotting fall of shot, fire-control, fleet coordination, zig zagging etc etc.

I'm thinking what went into 1914 from a naval standpoint, emerged in 1918 only incrementally better. In went big-gunned ships as rulers of the seas, out came these same ships; this is not so, by any measure, with WW2.

Into that war, went big-gunned ships, many of which were the same to emerge from WW1, that ruled the seas; out of WW2 came radically new tactics, strategies that never existed in 1939, advancements in technology beyond anything the previous twenty years ever produced and, above all, a whole new ruler of the seas.

The Great War may have seen some developments and limited enhancements to pre-war technologies, but nothing to match either the magnitude or quantity of truly new and revolutionary advances that emerged from WW2.

[Werner]

The deceleration of battlecruisers between Fisher's departure and his return in 1915 demonstrates the impact of a huge will on a consensus bureaucracy.

Between Lion and Tiger the professionals knew the battlecruiser was a mistake. Fisher's return squeezed out Renown, Repulse, Hood and the three large light cruisers.

The pity is the blame for the great losses is attributable to operating personnel who bypassed safety measures for Fisher's performance metrics and controllers who were reluctant to sponsor or encourage scientific enquiry into the safety of powders until after thousands of lives were lost.

[Guest]

I think your seriously ignoring one of the main things to emerge from Jutland analysis, namely the fear of the torpedo!

I will counter that by pointing out that the fear of torpedoes was already quite healthy. British men-of-war had been sporting torpedo defense booms and nets for more than a decade; Jutland didn't exactly introduce the Royal Navy to that fear.

The fear of torpedoes were strong, but it only became strong enough to accept major increases in size and displacement purely on behalf of improving torpedo defense towards the second half of the first world war with adaptation of blisters. Prior to that it had been the case that if a torpedo were to hit, then let's hope for the best. Certainly really proactive steps to improve a ship's torpedo resistance had to wait for another age.

[Guest]

Between Lion and Tiger the professionals knew the battlecruiser was a mistake. Fisher's return squeezed out Renown, Repulse, Hood and the three large light cruisers.

Hood was not Fisher's work. Rather she was the British reaction to the German reaction to the Renown and Repulse. The Germans had been working on a follow on battle cruiser class of 6 ships with 13.5 inch guns. When news of 15" gun Renowns leaked out, the German upped the caliber of the last 3 ships to 15" also. Hood was intended to be an exact match for the German 15" battlecruiser.

[Filipe Ramires]

Look at the battle damage reports. South Dakota's damage was primarily in the upper works and among the AA gun crews. The hits were almost all 8-inch. Her actual fighting value was not much diminished (mount 16-II was in fact inoperable the day before this action from aviation action). BTW, Hiei was lost before Kirishima.

I've read the damage reports on most of the ships that were present in the battles of the 12-13th November 1942 (Battle of Guadalcanal...the one where Hiei was lost) and on the 14-15th November 1942 (Second Battle of Savo Island...Kirishima lost). The Japanese battleship only got a single 14'' hit on SD and the heavy cruisers did the rest...for some reason SD had a power failure which in a middle of a naval battle is something hazardous to say the least. Without having many more destroyers left to protect her and having not Washington been there and went unnoticed to strike Kirishima SD would most likely have been lost. She was simply outnumbered. I don't see her able to defeat 1 BB, 2 CA's, 2 CL's plus a dozen destroyers or so by herself.

If you recall the characteristics of my posited battle, it was that Des Moines would attack at night or in poor weather and at maximum range, where her 8-inch penetration approximates Yamato's deck armor. With her radar suite only an idiot would close another capital ship.

We have been through this for many times and everytime we reach no conclusion like Chuck said. Present me a battle where Yamato faces Des Moines and I will take my conclusions. Until then it's mere theory and paperwork. There are many more factors in a battle then mere technological superiority.

Suriago Straight proves the efficacy of US radar fire control. The Tennessee, California & West Virginia had solutions before the Japanese ships reached maximum range, and they were able to spot fall-of-shot using radar returns from splash echoes. Only one US cruiser or destroyer was ever visible to the Japanese before they were pummeled to pieces.

Again technological superiority means very little in this particular case. The Japanese were heavily outnumbered in Surigao Strait; they had their "T" crossed from the very beginning; in fact this was not a "T" type action but rather an "U" type ambush, the only way they had left rather then charging the USN battleline was denying the Americans the engagement and withdraw. Since that IJN force was mere bait practically they simply went on to meet their final doom. Radar or not the battle would have been won by the USN anyway.

[Laurence Batchelor]

Despite some on here diverting this tread away for their own private discussions, we're all happy then that the answer to....

"Would Anglo/German have produced stronger ships than G-3/N-3, 8-8 and Lexington/South Dakot by 1920 had there been no WWI?"

...is NO?

The Gun calibre might be as large but the rest of the ships systems and design charateristics would be weaker! and not stronger!

or are we still in disagreement on this?

[Guest]

Yes. Anglo-German race would have anticipated Yamato by 20 years in gun caliber, ship speed, and maximum thickness of armor.

[Guest]

Of course the Anglo-German race would have done all of that in a much smaller hull, which would almost certainly not have Yamato's 9.5 inch deck nor her 56,000 ton reserve buoyancy. I believe the 1920 German or British super battleship's armored deck, while still probably turtle backed, has a good chance of having already having its center portion elevated one deck level to cover more internal space. Hood had such a high arched armor deck without any direct input from WWI experience. The mere knowledge that hits can be scored at >15,000 yards was sufficient to lead to re-examination of the optimal height of armored deck. American ships would have already have the newer flat armor deck that rested on top of the belts. Americans having pioneered this type of armored deck even before WWI. In all cases the deck would probably be less than 6" thick.

There is a strong chance that the ~18" guns would be disposed in twin turrets, making for fairly long ships. There would be pressure to reduce hull length by making superstructure shorter, just as there were with the Yamato. So there is good chance that their secondary armaments would still be in hull side casemates. Only the rigorous war experience convinced everyone of the weakness of hull side case mates. It is possible the British would adopt the unsuitable 4" triple secondary turrets.

Without having experienced gas warfare, the 1920 super battleship probably would not have the enclosed tower bridge so characteristic of battleships from Nelson onwards. A primary, although often unstated, reason for the enclosed tower bridge of WWII era battleships was gas protection. Instead these ships would probably still have open tripod masts to support their fire director positions.

There is a good chance that these ships would still have torpedo net booms. Torpedo nets were only removed when experience of WWI showed that they constitute a serious menace to the propeller when they are shot loose from their storage in battle.

The 1920 super battleships would also have much weaker and more sloppily specified torpedo defenses than any WWII battleship, and also probably more sloppy than what is in the G-3 or N-3 ships. Nothing is as effective as wartime experience in focusing rationality and thoroughness on a warship design problem.

They would, of course, still have numerous small boilers rather than a few big boilers of WWII ships. So in all likelihood their machinery space would occupy quite a bit of the ship's length if they were to achieve 27 knots. The distribution of the numerous boilers suggests they would be multi-stacked. But this is not certain.

[Laurence Batchelor]

Did G3/N3, Lex & 8-8 have their main belts angled from the vertical like Nelson & Rodney?
If not that is another feature they would be lacking.

Agree on the continued use of casmated secondaries.
I also agree on the continued use of torpedo tubes in battleships if no WWI.

But sorry I still can't see you having as well armoured ship of 32knts as G3 emerging without the lessons of WWI.

I can only see the gun calibre reaching the same limits.

I also think that without WWI displacement would still be around 1920-1922 the 40-50,000tons and not as much as 56,000.
Look at the progression of the increasing of tonnage from 1905-1914 what are we talking 23,000ton Dreadnought to a 35,000 QE???
Thus I can see the progression 1914-1922, without war as being 35,000 to 45,000, 50,000 tops, it just makes more sense.
The only thing which might make tonnage increase at a faster rate is suddenly the IJN and USN start making much bigger ships inturn making the RN and Germany to think bigger than they were each time they brought out a new class of dreadnought in the actual 1905-1915 naval arms race.

[Guest]

Did G3/N3, Lex & 8-8 have their main belts angled from the vertical like Nelson & Rodney?
If not that is another feature they would be lacking.

Agree on the continued use of casmated secondaries.
I also agree on the continued use of torpedo tubes in battleships if no WWI.

But sorry I still can't see you having as well armoured ship of 32knts as G3 emerging without the lessons of WWI.

I can only see the gun calibre reaching the same limits.

I also think that without WWI displacement would still be around 1920-1922 the 40-50,000tons and not as much as 56,000.
Look at the progression of the increasing of tonnage from 1905-1914 what are we talking 23,000ton Dreadnought to a 35,000 QE???
Thus I can see the progression 1914-1922, without war as being 35,000 to 45,000, 50,000 tops, it just makes more sense.
The only thing which might make tonnage increase at a faster rate is suddenly the IJN and USN start making much bigger ships inturn making the RN and Germany to think bigger than they were each time they brought out a new class of dreadnought in the actual 1905-1915 naval arms race.

The Hood had angled belt, so the technology was understood by 1920. I don't know if N-3/G-3 had inclined armor. If N-3/G-3 have vertical belts, it would be for a conscious reason as would be the case later with KGV, not for the lack of understanding of inclined belt's benefit.

The first pair of 8-8 ships, Mutsu and Nagato, did not have inclined belts. But the next group, Amagi and Tosa, did.

I don't think a well armored 32 knot ship would emerge. But a moderately well armored super Queen Elizabeth with 27 knot speed and 18 inch guns probably would emerge. It would merely be a logical evolutionary process with adaptation for the need for 18" guns.