The Ship Model Forum

Well coming from the submarine side of the issue, there were several problems during the 42-43 time period

1: Torpedoes, the trigger device was defective

2: Lack of quality subs. The United States was still relying on the "sugar" boats during this time, the newer ones were just coming off the docks

3: Magic intercepts were available, but they were not used effectively.

4: Sub Commanders were being replaced at an alarming rate. The peacetime Navy had not prepared many of the skippers for combat, and when it happened there was a huge burn out, shell shock rate, and just plain cowardice.

5: The sub base in Australia was not near large enough to handle more than (I believe) 4-6 subs at port at any one time. Infrastructure had to be built.

6: Americas policy at the time was Europe first, Holding action against Japan

Ric

Werner wrote:In conversation, I have got the schoolboy impression that Australia felt betrayed by the Empire. In exchange for her army in Africa, Churchill promised to defend Australia against Japanese aggression -- a promise he was patently unable to keep by 1942.

There are stories that the despirited survivors of Savo Island were given a "ticker tape" parade in Sydney, with gentlemen in suits saluting and shouting "You saved us! You saved Australia, Mate!" I don't know if it was strategy or a default stand, but Australia was a powerful place for an American to stand with his rifle.

You're not far off Werner. Australia did have some bumpy relations with Britain over the defense issue. I need to spend some time with my Volume One of the Official History of the Royal Austrailian Navy. It was mnay years since I read it, but it does go into quite a bit of detail, both military and political, about the defense relationship between Aus/NZ and the British Government. A first rate couple of books to read for anyone interested in the Australian Navy and the Royal Navy. That a two volume set " Royal Australian Navy 1939-1942 and Royal Autralian Navy 1942-1945". By G. Hermon Gill, 1985 edition Collins/Australian War Memorial.
It covers all the pre war discussions and planning as well the war period.

Bob B.

Has anybody made an effort to find any diaries/journals that King and Leahy might have kept; family papers, that sort of thing/
Attention always seems to focus on King but Leahy's contribution has remained out of sight it seems, the forgotton admiral of the war.
What about minutes of the meetings of the Chiefs? Just a thought.
Hidden history here gentlemen waiting to be found and written up, but not by me, too old.

On July 11th, 1942 the USS North Carolina sailed into Pearl harbor giving the beaten US Fleet a spark. At the time she was the Best Battleship class the US had and gave new hope to the US in the Pacific.

Her coming over from the East coast was delayed due to waiting on seeing what the Tirpitz was going to do. If the Tirpitz hit Convoys in the Atlantic, the USS NC and the USS Washington were to go out and take her on. When this did not happen, they sent the USS NC over to the Pacific.

Rick E Davis wrote:Eugene Bleil ... They wanted him to sign a form that he would NOT reveal ANYTHING that happened to him ... he told them to go to H---.

I have seen originals of these forms. They were issued to former POWs in the Pacific Theatre as well as soldiers, sailors, MPs and Corpsmen detailed to relieve POW camps. Their discharge from service and all future benefits were conditional on their promise not to reveal what they had seen or experienced -- forever. I don't know if they were legal or at what level they were authorized, but they had a chilling effect on learning the true level of horror of the war in the Pacific.

Eugene Bleil is a remarkable person. He and his brother were "hobos" that joined the US Army and he became a Mechanic and rose to Sgt rank. After nearly dying in the hands of the Japanese, he got returned to the USA after the war. Most all of the former POW's spent years in rehab ... both Physical and Mental. They wanted him to sign a form that he would NOT reveal ANYTHING that happened to him ... he told them to go to H---. He decide that he wanted to become a Doctor and had to over come the belief that he ... none of the long term ex-POW's ... could deal with this kind of stressful effort. But, he kept at it and made it. His opinion of MacArthur (the real reason he thinks they wanted him to sign that paper) in charge of Japan after the war, FDR and the high staff in Washington DC that gave up on the Philipines in late December 1941 ... can not be printed.

He is one tough cookie.

Part of that appears to be a very early response to the threat of Soviet expansion. The bad done by Japan was simply swept under the rug in a way not necessary (or possible) in Germany.

Perhaps another dose is racism. The chaos in China was not handled properly by the other allies. Neither was Indochina. France should not have been allowed to reclaim her possessions there. The events gave weight to the Communist claims that the West did not care for the rights of the Yellow man.

Bloody Shambles goes into some detail on the Morale problems experienced by the Colonial troops in Malaya. Much of it was the result of the best Officers having been sent to Europe (North Africa) and second rate equipment being given to the troops in the Far East. I loved these books and learned a lot. The biggest fact was just HOW IMPORTANT the logistics of war is the MOST important factor for sucess. Also, getting to hear a Bataan survivor give his story and to learn how the Military tried to silence and isolate these survivors after the war was a shock. They did not want them to tarnish the Victory.

In conversation, I have got the schoolboy impression that Australia felt betrayed by the Empire. In exchange for her army in Africa, Churchill promised to defend Australia against Japanese aggression -- a promise he was patently unable to keep by 1942.

There are stories that the despirited survivors of Savo Island were given a "ticker tape" parade in Sydney, with gentlemen in suits saluting and shouting "You saved us! You saved Australia, Mate!" I don't know if it was strategy or a default stand, but Australia was a powerful place for an American to stand with his rifle.

I do not believe that the USA ever really considered leaving the Aussies to the Mercy of the Japanese. The likely concern was, could they get help there in time? If you read the "Bloody Shambles" series of books that covers in more detail than I have seen the early war operations in the SW Pacific covered before ... you get a very good perspective of the events. There had not been many books written about the miserable performance of the allies to stop the Japanese assault. Books were written about the victories, not the failures.

Realize, that the Linchpin for the defense of the area was Singapore, fell in mid-Feb and that the Dutch East Indies were invaded in early March and fell by 8 March. There was no East Indies to "protect" by mid-March. The last forces in Phillipines gave up in April on Bataan and early May on Mindanao. The USN submarine force based in the Phillipines was moved to Australia and units coming from the West Coast based out of there as well. The remaining B-17 forces from the Phillipines moved to Australia and then up to Java in January 42. These few B-17's were joined by other B-17's and a few LB-30's that were rushed direct from the USA via a very LONG route that nearly circled the global ... to South America then to Africa then Mideast then India then Malaya then Java. About 50 bombers made this trip before it was stopped ... mostly when the route was cut. Aircraft and TROOPS that had been in the process of shipping to the Philippines before the war started, were sent to Australia instead. Many of these aircraft, P-40's and A-24's (Army SBD's), made their way to Java via air. Some were shipped to Java direct. Most of these aircraft were lost in action on/from Java. The allied "fleet" of cruisers and destroyers were not able to do much in stopping the invasion of Java as we all know. The point of this is that this WAS THE BEST MAX EFFORT that the US could muster in those months. There were commanders that were desperate to relieve the Philipines and NOTHING more could be done.

More equipment and troops did arrive in Australia in the following months and did move up to New Guinea. There never was a break in support, just a lack of the means to do it. As for why the USN didn't charge in like the Wild West and save the day? There was fragmented leadership with opinions about who was in charge and how to procede all over the board. The US turned over the leadership in the area to the British after it was obvious that the Phillipines couldn't hold out. The defense of the East Indies became priority and almost all the resources available WERE EXPENDED in the effort. It took many months for the USN to move forces from the Atlantic to the Pacific. There was a crash program to bring ships up to be fit for combat ... things that HAD been planned but not finished. AA armament was a priority ... but about the only weapons that were available in numbers to add were 50cal MG's.

The Battleships that were not damaged were returned to the West Coast .... because it was unclear what the Japanese were going to do next. Remember that prior to the war, the highly classified code breaking information was not given to all commands ... MacArthur in the Philippines had better info than they had at Pearl Harbor as well as 12 hours warning and still got surprised!!! The American public was very "excited" about a Japanese invasion in early 1942 and that was an important factor. The USN Cruiser and Destroyer forces were trying to cover two fronts, with the need for Anti-Submarine forces to defend against U-Boats was overwhelming. Only about two dozen Destroyers were added to the USN fleet in the first six months of the war. For hit and run operations in the East Indies, Cruisers and Destroyers would have been ideal. But without air cover, these forces would not last long. This left the Aircraft Carriers. I'm certain that the powers to be were NOT willing to expend them on what did not look like an operation that would accomplish anything of value. Better to use Australia as a base for bombers and submarines until the strength of the USN could be able to support offensive operations. The British fleet in the Indian Ocean was "pushed back" in April 1942 and were also stressed in being needed other places as well.

I really don't see that there was any plan to leave Australia to fight alone.

Perhaps there might have been some British pressure on the US to help defend Australia.

I'm thinking and perhaps the British & US high commands were that if Japan got Australia the lines of communication for the British from the Indian Ocean into the Pacific would be cut.
It would be darn tricky for Britain to ever operate in the Pacific without Australia as a foot hold, remember she had lost the impregable (yeah right!) Singapore and Hong Kong.
She had nothing left to base her fleet or aircraft from in that theatre of operations (even if on the defensive at this stage of the war).

It would be hard to base her fleet at Addu Atoll, or Trincomlee or within an existing USN base (as this would put extra strain on the US's infrastructure some of which might not be compatable) and then have to operate out into the Pacific from there.
Especially so when you consider the Royal Navy's lack of a fleet train, lack of replenishment training, less endurance and higher fuel burning than the USN on the whole.
Thus Britain may have been pushing for the USA to help defend Australia for her own interests later in the war.
The only downer to this is King was not pro-British, rather the opposite on occasions.
But then again he could have been ordered to do this by his superiors or had his ear bent?

Another idea could be that the US high command felt a duty to help out as Britain was left with scant resources to help out Australia herself when she was being tied down in the Atlantic, Med and fighting a land war in North Africa. Thus if fell to the US to do her bit to help out a Commonwealth nation who contributed cruisers to American task forces later on, maybe again partly for political reasons?

Another difference is one I cannot fully answer, what in strategic value was Australia over the East Indies?
What natural resources or infrastructure are more important to defend in Australia?
Correct me if I'm wrong, as I'm sure someone on here will, but wasn't Australia used for land bombing operations later on in the war, on the Dutch Oil Refinies?
Again could this have been a political consideration back in 1941?
Or what about its use as a submarine base and also its dockyard facilities and oil storage, was it worth defending?

Of course you might just be looking for something which isn't there and over the following months when the US decided to defend Australia they realised they made mistake with the East Indies and they were not going to make the same mistakes twice?

I for one think its more a political and geographic change of policy, though I could be mistaken.

P.S. ar further to our conversation, 41 RN Destroyers involved, 23 damaged and 6 were sunk (4 air attack/2 E-boats)

ar wrote:Has there been any published material on the inside thinking on the matter of defending the East Indies by the USN?

Werner wrote:According to Shattered Sword, the Japanese high command was considering the occupation of the Northern part of Australia at exactly this moment in time. Perhaps King had intelligence assets which have not come to light?

Not that I am aware of. The relevent volume of Morison is a but crude by his later standards.

I get the impression from this source that since the original WPL42 went out the window on 7/12/41, they abdicated strategy to the Dutch and English, who, after all, had more at stake than the USA in the East Indies.

Except for the spring carrier raids in the SW Pacific (which, oddly, Morison doesn't cover to any detail), the US seems to have been "up a tree" until about May.

Has there been any published material on the inside thinking on the matter of defending the East Indies by the USN?

Werner wrote:According to Shattered Sword, the Japanese high command was considering the occupation of the Northern part of Australia at exactly this moment in time. Perhaps King had intelligence assets which have not come to light?

According to Shattered Sword, the Japanese high command was considering the occupation of the Northern part of Australia at exactly this moment in time. Perhaps King had intelligence assets which have not come to light?

To summarise the reasons why the USN did not defend the East Indies.

Batchelor;
Unable to defend in short space of time;
need more time to prepare;
still recovering from PH.

GUest;
Superiority of enemy land and sea based air power;
better lines of communication;
Japanese closer to their base of operations.

Werner;
Not enough tankers to operate west of Manila.

Dick J;
Command restructuring.
Lack of confidence.
USN had no experience in multiple carier operations.

Devin;
USN not ready to engage due to lack of experience.

Rick E Davis;
Unable to defend the Indies because of putting all eggs in one basket.
Unwilling to engage the enemy in their own backyard.
Inadequate code breaking.
Sub standard equiptment.

There is an untold story here.
When others in the high command were willing to let Australia fend for itself, King decided the opposite. This must have been in March/April.
Why did he make this decision to defend Australia but NOT the Indies?
What was the difference.
Why did others not want to do this?
If the arguments given here by the six I have mentioned are valid, then Australia should have been let go.

I hold myself in readiness for some well crafted replies.

I suppose I should leave this go dormat, but I happened upon this and have my two cents worth.

The USN post Pearl Harbor was in NO POSTION to go out and risk the only eggs they had left to go do battle in the Japanese backyard so to speak in 1942. The US had lost their main outpost in the area, the Phillipines, and lost a whole lot of people and material in the process. FDR committed the USA to defending the Phillippines and making it a fortress only in APRIL 1941. 1,000's of troops, dozens of B-17's, over a 100 P-40's were hurriedily sent without all the necessary training. Our logistics and equipment shortages meant that in December 1941, we were FAR behind the ability to defend the Phillipines and to repel the Japanese. Green untrained Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen were left out on a limb. The Brits did much the same in Indo-China. The number of Carriers or Oilers didn't matter very much at that point. Our Intel wasn't up to telling us where the IJN would be or how best to ambush them in such confined areas with their Scout Aircraft everywhere. The Code Breakers were not reading 100% of the stuff the Japanese were sending out at that point and the Naval code was the last to be broken.

The USN (and USA and USAAF) equipment needed to be brought up to standards able to fight off this new war with an enemy with effective aircraft weapons. The Japanese aircraft were not perfect by a long shot, but ours were not better for a long time. Our soldiers, sailors, airmen needed training and better weapons that were in the pipeline to do the job they ended up doing. Good allied pilots, with P-40's or F4F's could defeat the Japanese aircraft. But, green pilots were just as likely to bail-out of their aircraft out of fear to face them.

If the USN had rushed a force to relieve the Phillipines, which was desired by the powers to be until late December 1941, and if a couple of carriers were lost or badly crippled ... what would we do then? Our ships didn't have adequate AA defenses in place ... the first 40mm guns showed up in mid-1942. They would have been "swimming" ducks.

I think the US was quite concerned about the defense of Austraila after the lost of the Dutch East Indies ... there was almost nothing left to stand in the way of the Japanese. The only thing that saved Austraila was the Japanese had achieved their objectives by and large, lost steam and didn't really push. They needed to rest, refit, and see what they had. The Oil resources in the Dutch East Indies were a shambles thanks to the Dutch and the Japanese NEVER did get them fully back on-line. I read a very interesting article awhile back (I wish I could remember where ... Warship Int'l?) that basically agrued that the Japanese werre doomed almost from the start because of oil resources. They had saved up what they thought would be enough oil before the war for a six month war. They were WAY off and used much more than they thought they would. That really slowed their operations after a point. The allies were active with our submarine forces from early on and did disrupt the Japanese supply lines as early as 1942. They never did recover to having an adequate supply of oil to fuel the war machines and domestic needs.

Oh, and we were fighting a German U-Boat menace in the Atlantic and trying to beef up the Brits.

For an appreciation of the early phases of the war in the Pacific go read the "Bloody Shambles" series of books by Shores, Cull and Izawa. Also, Wm Bartsch's books on the Phillipines ... "Doomed at the Start" and "December 8, 1941 - MacArthur's Pearl Harbor". Also, go listen to a Bataan Death March survivor like Dr Eugene Bliel who was an Aircraft Crew Chief on Lt Buzz Wagner's P-35A. Many people gave their lives to slow down the Japanese efforts and it took many more to reverse their gains.

What do you expect with the Prime Minister an Army officer?

There's a story told that Tojo was prone to inflammatory remarks where he would stand at his place at the table and rant, pound the desk and so on.

One day the Naval Minister pushed his foot under Tojo's seat and moved it back a foot or two. When Tojo went to sit down, he collapsed on the floor instead.

In many ways the logistic efforts of Japanese navy were inferior to those of the army during WWII.

It's amazing that the Japanese equivalent of the Hellcat and Corsair, the Mitsubishi A7M, started at about the same time as the F6F in 1940, and was still in prototype stage in 1945. Several other arguably superior Japanese land based fighters, Such as the Hi-84, started out in 1942 and were already in squadron service in 1944.

That Zero also showed that a diving zero got rudder lock from the distortion of the rudder ans stabilizers.